


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THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Edited by Paul Nesbitt-Larking,
Catarina Kinnvall & Tereza Capelos
with Henk Dekker



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Summary: "This ground-breaking collection recalibrates the study of political psychology by providing a detailed and much needed analysis of the discipline's most important and hotly contested issues. Advancing our understanding of the psychological mechanisms that drive political phenomena, this study showcases a range of approaches in the study of these phenomena in Europe and the world and underscores the valuable contribution political psychology has made in generating answers to timely research questions. Individual chapters from the world's top experts in the field explores the ways in which political psychology impacts on issues as diverse as migration, conflict and violence as well as electoral politics while also situating the discipline within the realm of political decision-making and policy on important debates relating to foreign policy and relations, political participation and terrorism amongst a variety of other issues. Furthermore, the collection offers analytical illustrations of Social Identity Theory, psychoanalytic approaches, Dialogical Self Theory, Social Representations Theory and Self-Categorisation Theory, allowing for an in-depth engagement across theoretical contributions to the field. Using theoretical and methodological approaches in conjunction with empirical evidence, this Handbook maps the diverse field of political psychology in its entirety and explores its future direction. The resulting volume is a KEY addition to the libraries of all those who study or harbour an interest in political psychology." — Provided by publisher.

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Part I

Introduction

1

Introduction: Origins, Developments and Current Trends

Paul Nesbitt-Larking, Catarina Kinnvall, Tereza Capelos and Henk Dekker

The aim of our *Handbook* is to discuss theoretically, methodologically and empirically what political psychology has become in a European and global context, how it investigates its core subject matter and what some of the main findings have been. Theoretically, the *Handbook* seeks to pluralise political psychology as a field by discussing how historical and contemporary approaches and ways of defining political psychology have depended on context and discipline. In particular, the book shows how moving beyond the state of the discipline as traditionally defined opens up novel theoretical discussions as well as alternative methodological approaches and empirical focuses. The content of the book further illustrates how political psychology needs to expand in terms of theoretical depth, methodological diversity and European-specific examples and approaches to account for a broad variety of work that is currently being undertaken across universities in Europe and elsewhere. The *Handbook* takes an interdisciplinary approach and aims at understanding how political, economic and social forces interact with psychological dynamics and how these are mutually researched and reinforced across a number of relevant empirical cases.

Theoretically, our *Handbook* provides a broad outline of the history of the field in order to give a comprehensive background to its origins and development. In doing this, it specifies the particular sub-fields that have emerged in European-based political psychology, such as psychoanalytic approaches, critical social psychology, social identity theory, self-categorisation theory, rhetorical analysis, narrative and discourse analyses, social representation theory, dialogical self theory and a range of qualitative and quantitative methodologies that link theoretical perspectives to the practical issues of enquiry. Empirically, the book covers a broad range of issues and focuses that are of particular relevance not only in Europe but also in other contexts. Themes of postcolonial analysis, related to patterns of immigration, citizenship regimes and the challenges of ethno-cultural integration are found throughout many of the chapters. Race and ethnic relations, the politics of religion in the public

sphere and European approaches to multiculturalism and community relations are also investigated. In the broad context of a century of tyranny, civil strife and war among nations, the issues of European unity and integration, regional and local nationalisms, neo-nationalist movements and the politics of human rights occupy a range of perspectives developed in the chapters. Of critical importance to many of the authors in the volume are matters of personal and social identity and the constructions of self and other. While race, ethnic and regional perspectives are important, the authors also explore differences of gender, social class and age.

The origins of political psychological study: A rich field of research

The systematic study of political psychology has been developing for almost 50 years, and it is now a well-established sub-field of enquiry in the North American academy and an increasingly recognised field of research in Europe and in the rest of the world. The intellectual roots of political psychology are both ancient and European, and the core theories, methods and studies in political psychology that have informed the development of the sub-field in North America have their origins in centuries of European scholarship. Many of the questions occupying political psychologists today thus originate in political philosophy and its commitment to theorise, critique and diagnose the norms and practices of political action across time and space. In this respect, political psychology, like political philosophy, has to do with the various symbols and categories that we use to organise our lives and through which we tend to make sense of the world. Similar to political psychology, political philosophy has always been concerned to address social problems and puzzles that have emerged throughout history and in specific contexts. It lies at the humanities end of political science, and is concerned with human behaviour in and across various political and cultural contexts. Hence, both political philosophy and political psychology share an interest in the humanistic study of politics. Most political philosophy also has an irreducibly normative component, whether expressed in a systematic or diagnostic fashion; through a textual or cultural approach; through an analytical, critical, genealogical or deconstructive methodology; or through a particular ideological lens. This has meant that political philosophy, like political psychology, has emerged as an 'unapologetically mongrel sub-discipline with no dominant methodology or approach' (Dryzek et al., 2006: 5). In terms of their relationship with political science, both sub-fields have also had to confront and deal with the presumption that human beings are 'rational' decision-makers concerned with maximising their expected utilities. This belief, as most political psychologists have noted, is basically pure fiction when applied to human behaviour and action and has been reworked in most accounts of the field.

Political psychology has always been a problem-centred field. Van Ginneken says that political psychology is about the need to control, to regulate and to understand (1988: 6), and throughout history there have been compelling historical events that have conditioned entire research agenda. In Wagner's words:

A comparative analysis of social science developments can demonstrate that the cognitive orientations of social science discourses are shaped in complex interplays of intellectual traditions, on the one side, and the impact of political structures, on the other, meeting and being mediated in scientific institutions as the societal locus of legitimate discourse.

(1989: 105)

As for the historical origins of the field, most observers would originate political psychology – at least in its more modern version – to the interwar years when it emerged as a response to the increased political tension and destruction of the First World War and as a reaction against modern totalitarian states. Of major significance was mass media's role in shaping people's perceptions and the systematic use of modern propaganda during this time. Such political developments resulted in a search for more systematic knowledge to understand the connection between political and psychological processes. This became even more pronounced after the onset and outcome of the Second World War, making political psychology particularly relevant as it sought to understand and explain how the horrific actions and deeds that constituted the Holocaust could have happened (Deutsch and Kinnvall, 2002). Speaking from a personal point of view, for George Marcus, as for many other political psychologists, this has meant a continuous probing of questions of tolerance. 'How does a nation secure tolerance for all diverse individuals? Are there conditions in which democracy can be a just society?' (Marcus, 2002: 96–97).

As a field of research, political psychology first emerged in the United States at the University of Chicago under the encouragement of the political scientist Charles Merriam. Merriam (1925, 1934) explicitly called for a scientific political science that would draw on psychology. However, it was Harold Lasswell (a student of Merriam) who became one of its main figures, and his early books from the 1930s and 1940s (1930; 1935; 1936; 1948) developed a rather distinctive psychological perspective in order to understand political behaviour, politics and politicians. In his work, Lasswell predominantly focused on individual and social psychological processes, such as motivation, conflict, perception, cognition and the formation of attitudes and group dynamics as well as on personality and psychopathology, as causal factors affecting political behaviour. Lasswell was, as were many of his time, inspired by Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysis as well as by how the unconscious motivates political

activities; his work inspired a focus on psychobiographies of famous leaders. This inclination to emphasise psychological processes as determining political processes has tended to dominate much American political psychology and has resulted in less interest in how political processes affect psychological ones. European political psychology, in comparison – even if it has been influenced by American definitions – has been more interested in exploring this connection. To a large extent, this has to do with the influence of more Marxist perspectives in Europe which focused on how political processes affect psychological ones as well as on how they affect personality. Thus we have seen in European political psychology a stronger connection between political sociology and psychology, for instance, in studies of political culture, political socialisation and political learning which have all increased our understanding of how cultures and structures affect individual practice and behaviour.

In this regard, European political psychology, and political science more generally, has always had a different set of progenitors than American political science. Social and political thoughts from Marx to Weber and Durkheim had been concentrated on either structure or norms as something supra-individual for explaining the complexity and contingency of behaviour. This, Blyth and Varghese (1999) argue, has resulted in a focus on ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ missing in the American tradition. The lesser emphasis on ‘grand’ theory and on formal reasoning and quantitative methodology in favour of more pluralistic approaches that tend to privilege social theory and philosophy have implied the existence of different research agenda in Europe as compared to the United States.

As Deutsch and Kinnvall (2002) argued more than ten years ago, to the extent that the social sciences, including political psychology, have uncritically imitated the methodologies appropriate to a technical cognitive interest, they have tended to neglect the fact that human action has to be understood with reference to the meanings that the action has for the actors and for its audience. All human action is rooted in intersubjective contexts of communication, in intersubjective practices and forms of life which have specific historical origins (Bernstein, 1976; Giddens, 1984, 1991). The uncritical imitation of the technical orientation of the natural sciences has also led many social scientists to ignore how their theoretical and empirical work – that is, their scientific activities – are influenced by the implicit assumptions, the value positions, ideological orientations and political-economic viewpoints in the communities in which they participate (Deutsch and Kinnvall, 2002). In an article from the early 1990s, David McKay (1991) notes some stark contextual differences between the European and American contexts in terms of political focus which, he argues, have affected differences in research agenda:

[i]n no European country is the business of politics infused with the liberal individualism so intimately associated with the USA. Instead, European

democracies are a complex melange of liberalism, corporatism, consociationalism, elitism, populism, statism and socialism. European political science reflects this in just the same way as American political science – which is primarily concerned with the study of the USA – reflects the individualism of American politics.

(McKay quoted in Kinnvall, 2005: 33)

The preponderance for more positivist work within American political science, with an emphasis on objectivist epistemology and quantitative methodology, cannot be ignored. However, in contrast to political scientists, most political psychologists on both sides of the Atlantic are in favour of plural approaches. In both settings, we have seen studies of the individual as a political actor, concerned with political decision-making, the development of the individual, political personality, political behaviour and politics and emotions. Here, the steep increase in studies of emotions and affective reasoning should be mentioned, not least as this is related to neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. Hence a number of studies, especially in the United States, have focused on cognitive and affective information processes and action, sometimes connected to public opinion and the effects of ideology, values and emotions. Surveys, experiments, focus groups and inter-group studies are common methodological approaches. However, there is also much work in political psychology that remains critical to this 'scientific emotional turn' and instead is focused on more discursive political psychology related not only to communication studies, political rhetoric and the media but also to social psychology and inter-group relations more generally. Social movement research, group identity and categorisation, prejudices, xenophobia and inter-group conflict, racism and gender discrimination constitute together with collective political action a specific focus.

A field that received a lot of attention in political psychology during the Cold War and which is now reasserting itself in response to recent events is International Relations. Focus on foreign policy analysis, crisis management, perceptions and misperceptions, political leaders, conflict analysis and conflict resolution, trauma, genocide, terrorism and mass murder are all examples of a more global political psychology. Proceeding from an awareness of political events as transnational and global, much of this research transcends national borders and boundaries and builds not only upon a number of different and sometimes contradictory psychological theories such as development psychology, social psychology and psychoanalytical research traditions but also upon more micro sociological theories, as well as social constructivist, postcolonial and discursive theories.

In more general terms, there are of course a number of empirical concerns that remain specific to the European context, just as there are issues that are mostly limited to North America. Questions of race, ethnicity and racism have

arisen in the context of distinctive histories and structures and have given rise to different sets of issues. Despite differences, it is important to note how both American and European political psychologies have always been close to their socio-historical environments. From the perspective of his intellectual formation in the United States of the 1960s and 1970s, David Sears (1993) rightly states that

political psychology has been very much stimulated by urgent political problems of the day, especially those with actually or potentially devastating human consequences, whether maniacs in high office, the rise of totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, the radical right, the Cold War, Arab-Israeli Conflict, the specter of nuclear war, or the transitional problems in postcolonial nations.

(quoted in Nesbitt-Larking and Kinnvall, 2012)

Hence, we should be careful not to essentialise those differences that may exist, but to recognise them as being related to different political contexts and concerns and as arising in different geographical spaces. However, it is equally important to identify similarities and to go beyond political limitations in order to address and construct a more global political psychology. This book, which is predominantly focused on alternative methodologies, themes and topics if measured against a more mainstream conception of the field, is an attempt to move towards such a global realm.

Organisation of the *Handbook*

The *Handbook* is divided into five parts and focuses on theories and methodologies, central themes and 'hot issues' (i.e. current topics) in parts II, III and IV, respectively. In comparison to most other volumes in the field, we are concerned to show a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches existing in political psychology. Much research in departments of psychology and political science in Europe and in other parts of the world deal with different political psychology research questions than those typical for the United States, and there is a need to provide students with the theoretical and methodological tools to study these questions. Hence Part II, which focuses on theoretical and methodological developments, starts with a broad variety of approaches to respond to political psychological puzzles.

In Chapter 2, 'Social Representations and the Politics of Participation', Caroline Howarth, Eleni Andreouli and Shose Kessi examine the role that social representations theory can play in understanding political participation and social change. The chapter examines the role of recognition in shaping the participation of different social groups and the possibilities for agency and

resistance in contexts of contested participation. Focusing on social representations allows a combined exploration of how dominant and hegemonic relations are both maintained and disrupted through localised and everyday practices of political participation and thus provides a way forward for investigating the possibilities for social change.

In Chapter 3, 'Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorisation Theory', Denis Sindic and Susan Condor examine the key theoretical assumptions of these theories. They argue that since the social status dynamics described by Social Identity Theory and the associated identity management strategies have political consequences, the theory can contribute to the understanding of power dynamics. However, the theory remains unclear as to whether these political consequences are underpinned by conscious intents from social actors. Self-categorisation, in comparison, can enlighten several specific features of politicised identities (such as their reliance on the existence of a superordinate category) but is less suited to tackle other features (such as their essential contestedness).

In Chapter 4, 'Psychoanalysis as Political Psychology', Stephen Frosh is concerned with how psychoanalysis is drawn on in political theory as a resource for radical critique. Proceeding from classical 'Freudo-Marxist' theory to contemporary relational theory to the powerful application of Lacanian ideas in the political sphere, Frosh argues that the latter offers a rallying point for those who regard radical politics as requiring suspicion of all fixed positions, including those advocated by radicals themselves. As such, it is probably true to some basic Freudian premises, for instance, that everything can and should be analysed, and that utopias are always imaginary consolations.

In Chapter 5, 'Methodological Approaches in Political Psychology: Discourse and Narrative', Phillip L. Hammack and Andrew Pilecki review methodological approaches that emphasise how texts and stories work in political psychology. They discuss the linguistic mediation thesis that underlies these approaches and then review three related methodological traditions: (1) rhetorical and discursive psychology; (2) critical discourse analysis; and (3) narrative analysis. They review the theoretical premises and methodological practices of each approach, as well as representative empirical work relevant to political psychology.

In Chapter 6, 'Dialogical Approaches to Psychology and Ethics', Sarah Scuzzarello provides a historical background to Dialogical Self Theory and presents a critical overview of the ways it has progressed within and outside psychology. One of the main tenets of the theory is the assumption that a dialogue between self and other and within the self is not merely cognitively and emotionally important, it is also essentially ethical. The ethical implications of a dialogical approach are examined, and particular consideration is given

to how dialogical ethics may contribute to develop responsive answers to the cultural and moral diversity that characterises today's globalised world.

In Chapter 7, 'Experiments: Insights and Power in the Study of Causality', Tereza Capelos focuses on key principles and applications of experimental research design that have transformed how we think about political psychology. Experimental studies are unique in their ability to allow for testing cause-and-effect relationships and can enrich the methodological diversity of research agendas currently relying on observational methods at the individual and institutional level. Experiments are essential methodological tools that should be part of our everyday empirical practice. This chapter aims to provoke the appetite of political psychologists for more, better and broader collaborative experimentation applications in the field.

These theoretical and methodological chapters all provide evidence of rich and multidisciplinary approaches to political psychology and highlight that there is no one way of thinking about or doing research in this field but many. Depending on choice in theoretical and methodological approach, different aspects are being highlighted and studied. Part III of the *Handbook* focuses on some of the many themes that characterise political psychology. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but should predominantly be viewed as complimentary to more traditional approaches, thus covering everything from postcolonial analysis to conflict, terrorism, gender, race, ethnicity and voting behaviour.

In Chapter 8, 'Lessons from the Postcolony: Frantz Fanon, Psychoanalysis and a Psychology of Political Critique', Ross Truscott and Derek Hook elaborate a political psychology that draws inspiration from Frantz Fanon's strategic and critical deployment of psychoanalytic theory. Attending to an instance of the tenacity of race thinking in post-apartheid South Africa, the chapter plots a trajectory between a Freudian diagnostics of individual neurosis and a Fanonian sociodiagnostics. The objective of such a political psychology is not only to mark the symptomatic persistence of the past in the objects of analysis, but also to show a way to work through the relationship between psychoanalysis and its colonial conditions of possibility.

In Chapter 9, 'Conflict Analysis and International Relations', Karin Aggestam provides an overview of research in this field. The chapter probes the extent to which theories and methodological approaches enhance knowledge about contemporary conflict dynamics, discussing how the field of conflict resolution, with its stated ambition to bridge the theory–practice divides, has expanded by drawing upon social psychology and cognition theory. Aggestam is primarily concerned with the intractable nature of identity-based conflicts and elaborates on how barriers to conflict resolution may be overcome. The chapter concludes by highlighting some new interesting avenues in the field of conflict analysis, including identity politics, historical grievances and reconciliation.

In Chapter 10, 'Do Terrorists Have Goatee Beards?: Contemporary Understandings of Terrorism and the Terrorist', James McAuley offers a comparative analysis of cultural and political interpretations of organised non-state violence. McAuley questions whether any definition so wide as to encompass US-based 'street gangs' and paramilitary groupings in Northern Ireland can be meaningful or, indeed, useful to social science. Rather, he argues that the organisation and actions of street gangs and paramilitary organisations can both be considered as politically motivated; as cultural performance; and as acts of ideology and symbolism, moving us towards a fuller understanding of what others simply classify as 'terrorism'.

In Chapter 11, 'Gender, Race and Ethnic Relations', Sebastian E. Bartoş and Peter Hegarty examine the contribution made by psychological research on prejudice to the understanding of gender, race and ethnic relations. Three lines of research are addressed. First, genocide, workplace discrimination and legal reform are examined on a social-political level. Second, measuring and reducing prejudice are considered on a psychological level. Third, queer theory and discourse analysis are discussed on a cultural level. The authors argue for the possibility of integrating them strategically to enhance our understanding of gender, race and ethnic relations. To illustrate this, a case study is presented on sexual and ethnic prejudice in Romania.

In Chapter 12, 'Voting and Not Voting: The Principal Explanations', Henk Dekker discusses how voting theories indicate that there is a multi-step funnel of causality in which systemic/institutional, demographic, socio-economic, personality and socialisation variables influence political cognitions and affections, which in turn are the most proximate causes that affect voting/non-voting or the intention to do either. Parents, schools, mass media, civic groups, parties and governments seeking effective strategies to promote voting in general, and voting by young citizens in particular, can all benefit from the list of variables that positively relate to voting.

These contemporary themes all have one thing in common; they display a concern with political socialisation and context, emphasising historical legacies and trajectories for a fuller understanding of how political psychology works in practice. Part IV of the *Handbook* explores this in further detail as it addresses a number of current topics and events in today's national, transnational and global world, proceeding from emotions to migration to political mobilisation and conflict in various forms.

In Chapter 13, 'Political Emotions', Nicolas Demertzis argues that little effort has been made regarding definitional clarity of the term 'political emotion'. Defining them as lasting affective predispositions that play a key role in the constitution of political culture and the authoritative allocation of resources, this chapter differentiates political emotions proper (or sentiments) from 'politically relevant emotions'. The relational, social and programmatic nature of

political emotions is exemplified via the analysis of political cynicism, on the one hand, and *ressentiment* as opposed to resentment, on the other. Both emotions are complex and crucial for contemporary electoral politics and political identities.

In Chapter 14, 'Group-focused Enmity: Prevalence, Correlations and Causes of Prejudices in Europe', Beate Küpper and Andreas Zick present a new conceptualisation of collective prejudices towards groups as elements of a syndrome of group-focused enmity. The chapter gives an overview of empirical findings from a representative cross-cultural survey of eight European countries (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Poland and Hungary). While the overall level of prejudice varies remarkably across Europe, different types of prejudice are interrelated and associated with perceived intergroup threat, authoritarianism and rejection of diversity in every country; social dominance orientation and religiousness are also important predictors.

In Chapter 15, 'Political Psychology of European Integration', Ian Manners explores what political psychology and European integration have to say to each other in the understanding of the European Union (EU). The chapter draws on five strands of political psychology as part of this engagement – conventional psychology, social psychology, social construction, psychoanalysis and critical political psychology. It argues that the study of the EU has much to benefit from political psychology in terms of theories and methods of European identity and integration, but it also maintains that political psychology can benefit from the insights of European integration by rethinking the processes that drive the marking of inside and outside, interior and exterior, belonging and otherness.

In Chapter 16, 'Migration and Multiculturalism', Paul Nesbitt-Larking explores the political psychology of migration and multiculturalism and studies how both majority and minority communities in immigrant-receiving countries have been shaped by patterns of immigration and regimes of citizenship. He further explores how the political agency of those citizens and denizens has contributed to the development of narratives, discourses and identities of belonging and exclusion as well as community relations. Within the context of these typical identity strategies, the chapter profiles a range of studies in political psychology including an analysis of the identity strategies among Muslim minorities in Europe.

In Chapter 17, 'Political and Civic Participation among Ethnic Majority and Minority Youth', Dimitra Pachi, Theopisti Chrysanthaki and Martyn Barrett discuss factors related to majority and minority youths' political and civic participation, using theoretical and empirical evidence primarily from Europe. These factors range from the macro political and societal characteristics, through demographic and proximal social factors, to endogenous psychological factors. The chapter argues for a complex multilevel approach to the study of youth

participation, which incorporates culture and makes use of clear typologies of explanatory factors of youth participation and specific forms of political and civic participation.

In Chapter 18, 'Fear, Insecurity and the (Re)Emergence of the Far Right in Europe', Catarina Kinnvall analyses how far right movements have emerged as social-psychological responses to a politics of fear, insecurity and vulnerability and the reasons behind their affective (as well as electoral) success in Europe. The chapter examines what such a politics of fear looks like, stressing the idea of 'subjective deprivation' in relation to the search for one stable identity, highlighting the role of 'emotional governance' and 'nativism' as crucial for understanding the appeal of these movements. Finally, the chapter discusses how these psychological constructs are related to gendered notions of masculinity and to the individual search for ontological security.

In Chapter 19, 'A Political Psychology of Conflict: The Case of Northern Ireland', Neil Ferguson, Orla Muldoon and Shelley McKeown analyse the psychology of political violence and conflict through a case study of Northern Ireland. They explore how group identity combines with other intrapersonal and social factors to push people towards employing violence and engaging in peace-building. They also examine the importance of inter-group contact in building a shared future for Northern Ireland's divided communities and assess the emergence of a potentially unifying Northern Irish identity and what this means for community relations and the peace process.

In Chapter 20, 'Narrating Moments of Political Change', Molly Andrews argues that stories – both personal and communal – are pivotal to the way in which politics operates, both in people's minds (i.e., how they understand politics, and their place within and outside of the formal political sphere) as well as to how politics is practised. This chapter explores the relationship between micro and macro political narratives to investigate the dynamic interplay between the stories of individuals (both told and untold) and the contested stories of the communities in which they live. It is framed around a case study of one East German dissident's challenge to emotionally negotiate the opening of the Berlin Wall as well as examples of narratives in times of change from the United Kingdom and the United States.

In Chapter 21, 'The Culture of Conflict and Its Routinisation', Daniel Bar-Tal, Guy Abutbul-Selinger and Amiram Raviv elaborate on one of the mechanisms of culture of conflict that routinises the intractable conflict as part of everyday experiences. There are at least four ways in which conflicts are routinised into everyday lives: through information, images and symbols, everyday practices and conflict language in everyday talk. Routinisation is very functional. It normalises the unusual life under intractable conflicts; it prepares society members to cope with life characterised by threat and dangers; it reinforces solidarity, cohesiveness and fate interdependence, and thus shapes collective identity.

In Chapter 22, 'Narrative Constructions of Conflict and Coexistence: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina', Johanna Mannergren Selimovic investigates narrative strategies for constructing everyday peace in a contentious and polarised political setting. Through a close reading of postwar micropolitics in the Bosnian town of Foča, the chapter traces meaning-making narratives around the war. It shows how collective, ethnonationalist stories are challenged and negotiated in narrative encounters that construct new meanings and practices. The author demonstrates how a narrative analysis may deepen understandings of the multifaceted processes towards peaceful coexistence in deeply divided post-conflict contexts. Ultimately, the chapter engages with the issue of how societies can recover from mass atrocities and build sustainable peace.

In Chapter 23, 'Political Socialisation and Social Movements: Escaping the Political Past?', Igor Petrović, Jacquelin van Stekelenburg and Bert Klandermans link the field of political socialisation research to the social movement literature. Political socialisation scholars have mainly focused on participation in party politics, thereby largely ignoring political socialisation into movement politics. Subsequently, a more extensive role for political socialisation in the study of social movements is proposed and two themes are introduced where such intersection could work. The first concerns the relationship between party and movement politics and how citizens choose between and combine these two paths to political influence. The second concerns political socialisation in times of democratic transition.

We designed this *Handbook* not only to reflect significant theoretical considerations, timely topics and discussions in political psychology, but also to highlight the variety of methodological applications employed in the investigation of political-psychological phenomena. We believe that there is a need for political psychology handbooks and textbooks to be more methodologically diverse than is currently the case. A review of methodological approaches that rests only on quantitative, survey-based and experimental political psychology is a partial representation of the richness of methodologies that our field affords us. Our *Handbook* aims to highlight the variety of methodological applications, qualitative and quantitative, noting the significant contribution of discursive, social psychological, psychoanalytical and narrative approaches to political psychology.

We believe that the chapters selected for this volume offer a diverse methodological toolkit to our readers. Here are some examples of what is featured in the pages of our *Handbook*: A variety of survey applications, from panel data, to multilevel studies to cross-cultural surveys, appear in the chapters by Dekker; Pachi, Chrysanthaki and Barrett; Kupper and Zick; Bartos and Hegarty; Petrović, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans; and also Manners. The principles of experimental analysis are reviewed in the chapter by Capelos, and experimental applications are also featured in the chapters by Dekker, and Bartos and Hegarty.

Interview findings are presented in the chapter by Bartos and Hegarty as well as by Petrović, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans. Psychoanalytic approaches are discussed extensively in the chapters by Frosh; Kinnvall; Manners; and Truscott and Hook. Discourse analysis receives an extensive discussion in the chapter by Hammack and Pilecki, while its applications are also reviewed in the one by Bartos and Hegarty. Micro and macro narrative analyses are discussed in the chapters by Andrews; Hammack and Pilecki; Kinnvall; Mannergren Selimovic; and Nesbitt-Larking.

This list is not exhaustive, nor does it showcase all the methodologies that make up our field. It offers, however, a good indication of the variety of approaches, their strengths, weaknesses and, more importantly, their complementary value to create psychological explanations for the complex political phenomena that we seek to investigate and understand.

There is an ongoing debate in political psychology as to what constitutes psychological and non-psychological factors. As evident through this quick glimpse of these very multifaceted chapters, it is clear that what counts for psychological dynamics is by no means easy to define. Rather, these chapters all expand established accounts of what political psychology can and should focus on by enlarging the field as well as the focus of research. In the concluding chapter in Part V, 'Ideology, Society and the State: Global Political Psychology in Retrospect' (Chapter 24), Paul Nesbitt-Larking ties together the volume and shows how the chapters, gathered throughout the *Handbook*, both reflect and extend the largely American research traditions into Europe and beyond. The chapters, he says, speak to a political psychology in which history and social structure, the state, ideologies and hegemonies are fundamental to our understanding of the political mind – how we cannot even begin to investigate the relationship between politics and psychology without recognising how the already social character of the individual is constituted by and through power relations. The chapters in our *Handbook* represent different epistemological claims and ontological points of departures, but they share a political understanding of the need to approach the discipline of political psychology in non-disciplinary ways and with non-disciplinary means – thus opening up the field of research to a broader audience beyond Europe and the West. In Chapter 25, we offer a brief Afterword in which we describes the principal academic and intellectual organisational tools which are currently available for the development and furtherance of research into political psychology.

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Part II

Methodological Approaches

2

Social Representations and the Politics of Participation

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Recent work has called for the integration of different perspectives into the field of political psychology (Haste, 2012). This chapter suggests that one possible direction that such efforts can take is studying the role that social representations theory (SRT) can play in understanding political participation and social change. Social representations are systems of common-sense knowledge and social practice; they provide the lens through which to view and create social and political realities, mediate people's relations with these sociopolitical worlds and defend cultural and political identities. Social representations are therefore key for conceptualising participation as the activity that locates individuals and social groups in their sociopolitical world. Political participation is generally seen as conditional to membership of sociopolitical groups and therefore is often linked to citizenship. To be a citizen of a society or a member of any social group one has to participate as such. Often political participation is defined as the ability to communicate one's views to the political elite or to the political establishment (Uhlener, 2001), or simply explicit involvement in politics and electoral processes (Milbrath, 1965). However, following scholars on ideology (Eagleton, 1991; Thompson, 1990) and social knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 2007), we extend our understanding of political participation to all social relations and also develop a more agentic model where individuals and groups construct, develop and resist their own views, ideas and beliefs. We thus adopt a broader approach to participation in comparison to other political-psychological approaches, such as personality approaches (e.g. Mondak and Halperin, 2008) and cognitive approaches or, more recently, neuropsychological approaches (Hatemi and McDermott, 2012). We move away from a focus on the individual's political behaviour and its antecedents and outline an approach that focuses on the interaction between psychological and political phenomena (Deutsch and Kinnvall, 2002) through examining the politics of social knowledge.

Participation, therefore, is more than the communication of views, through for example voting or other explicitly ‘political’ behaviour such as working on political campaigns; participation can be conceptualised as *the power to construct and convey particular representations over others*. In other words, it refers to the symbolic power to construct legitimate social knowledge, norms and identities, as well as to disregard, marginalise or silence alternative ways of knowing and being. This type of power is typically afforded to groups of higher sociopolitical status who have the power to construct what is ‘real’ or ‘true’. However, in contrast to Durkheim’s ‘collective representations’, social representations are dynamic systems of knowledge and, as such, are always potentially open to challenge and negotiation. Social representations are never completely fixed, even though they can be hegemonic and so support systems of ideology; they nonetheless allow for resistance and agency through the active re-appropriation of existing knowledge and identity positions. Therefore, SRT, particularly in the critical approach developed here (CSRT), is able to explain both established patterns of social and political relations and the possibility for shifting unequal patterns of participation, challenging the politics of identity and achieving social change.

This chapter is divided into four parts: the first lays out SRT; the second highlights the ways in which SRT offers a contextualised and dynamic approach to the politics of participation; the third part examines the role of recognition in shaping the participation of different social groups; and the final part explores the possibilities for agency and resistance in contexts of contested participation. We conclude with a discussion of the benefits of incorporating SRT into political psychology.

What are social representations?

Social representations are ‘ways of world making’ (Moscovici, 1988). They are localised systems of meaning (Jovchelovitch, 2007) that are constructed through communicative practices within and across social groups and enable the communities that produce them to make sense of their social world and position themselves within this world. Social representations are evident in all forms of social and political interactions – from everyday debates in local cafes and pubs (Moscovici, 1976), to television programmes and media debates (Rose, 1996), scientific discourses (O’Connor et al., 2012) and laws and policies (Andreouli and Howarth, 2012; Castro, 2012). Serge Moscovici, who first developed this concept in 1961, characterised social representations in this way:

Social representations... concern the contents of everyday thinking and the stock of ideas that gives coherence to our religious beliefs, political ideas and the connections we create as spontaneously as we breathe. They make

possible for us to classify persons and objects, to compare and explain behaviours and to objectify them as parts of our social setting.

(Moscovici, 1988: 214)

Social representations are simultaneously social and individual. On the one hand, they are constructed in social interaction and can be embedded in rather stable social structures, but, on the other hand, they are individual because they shape individual cognition and thinking. As Farr notes, social representations are ‘“in the world” as well as being in the “head”’ (1987: 359). What differentiates social representations from individualising theories of cognition is the emphasis on communication in cognitive development or, more generally, the construction of knowledge (Howarth, 2011; Psaltis and Duveen, 2006, 2007). Knowledge is not seen as the outcome of simple information processing but as the outcome of self–other interaction that, in turn, is shaped by existing social relations (e.g. asymmetric or equal). We see here that, in line with cultural psychological perspectives (Vygotsky, 1978), individual cognition is bound with societal circumstances.

From its very beginning, SRT was a theory about the politics of knowledge, social relations and social change. Social representations enable dialogue and argumentation; they support community identities and fuel intergroup conflicts; and they inform the politics of the everyday and the normative politics of legal, institutional and policy debates. Moscovici (1998) once described social representations as ‘the battle of ideas’, demonstrating that ideas and knowledge practices are always located in a particular social perspective, and so develop and defend particular social identities and positions in intergroup relations (Staerklé et al., 2011). This becomes particularly evident in super-diverse societies (Vertovec, 2007) where different social, cultural, religious or other groups advance different, sometimes conflicting, versions of social reality. The construction of social representations, therefore, is never disinterested. It is a political project (Howarth, 2006), guided by the interests, goals and activities of the groups that produce them within a given intergroup context (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999, 2008). Furthermore, as ideas translate into social practices, they not only help us understand social and material realities, but also construct these realities – in ways that support or contest social relations and therefore systems of inclusion, exclusion and power (Howarth, 2004; O’Sullivan-Lago, 2011). While SRT clearly sits within the original vision of social constructionism (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), in its critical version (CSRT), we characterise this theory as being more about the *political* construction of realities and social relations (Elcheroth et al., 2011).

While Durkheim (1898) saw representations as collective, coercive and even ‘total’, operating as social facts, Moscovici’s proposal allows for movement, complexity and resistance in a more dynamic version of social representations.

In this vein, social representations can never be seen as ‘neutral’ or ‘static’ (Marková, 2008: 466), and this means that SRT is equipped to deal with the heterogeneity (Gergen, 1991), intersectionality (Brah and Phoenix, 2004) and polyphasia of contemporary knowledge systems, intercultural relations and social identities (Howarth et al., 2013). Not only are representations located within particular histories and contexts, they also form the normative expectations of particular communities, broader social groups and nations, and evolve in a constant process of social re-presentation.¹ As we are continually reconstructing the past in terms of the present (Mead, 1934), weaving contemporary concerns into our social histories, this process of re-presentation is to be expected.

Thus, in the process of shaping the context and events within which they emerge, representations transform. It is not that each representation changes entirely in every social interaction. As Duveen and Lloyd insist, social representations have a ‘relative resistance to individual modification’ (1986: 221). There are representations that appear to have substantial durability and are resistant to competing forms: these are collective or ‘hegemonic’ representations (Moscovici, 1998), such as individualism (Farr, 1991) and race (Howarth, 2009). Hegemonic representations, similar to ideologies, are comparatively unchanging over time and so are almost completely dominated by a central nucleus of ideas (Abric, 1993). Other representations, particularly those that oppose the dominant order, are more contested and so more reactive to peripheral elements (Abric, 1993). However, even hegemonic representations should not be seen as simply uniform systems of belief or ideology, as Staerklé et al. (2011) point out:

Such shared and common points of reference are necessary for meaningful communication. However this does not mean that all group members would share the same knowledge. . . . Because social representations are elaborated through discussion and debate, individuals *anchor* such common reference points in the normative perspectives of their own groups.

(Staerklé et al., 2011: 761)

The *reactive* and *transformative* nature of social representations is not something to be problematised (Jahoda, 1988) or minimised (Potter and Litton, 1985); this must be worked with, not against, as such reactivity and transformative potential are the essence of the worlds we live in and the politics of the projects we construct (Foster, 2011).

Indeed, some representations are particularly dynamic and reactive to social and political contexts. These include what Moscovici defines as emancipated and polemical representations (Duveen, 2008; Moscovici, 1988). The former are ‘the outgrowth of the circulation of knowledge and ideas belonging to

subgroups' (Moscovici, 2000a: 28). The latter are 'generated in the course of social conflict, social controversy and society as a whole does not share them' (Moscovici, 2000a: 28). These different types of social representations embody and define the experience of reality, determining its boundaries, its significance and its relationships (Purkhardt, 1993). Social representations therefore both extend and limit possibilities. They naturalise and legitimise relations of domination *and* challenge the status quo and stimulate innovation (Castro, 2012; Castro and Batel, 2008). It is this dynamic relationship between stability and change that makes SRT particularly appropriate for the study of social change and participation.

Social representations as political participation

The ways that people participate in social and political life can take many different forms, as different contexts are characterised by different 'cultures of participation' (Haste, 2004). For example, in the United Kingdom, concern over young people's political 'apathy' led to the establishment of citizenship education in all schools as a mandatory subject of the national curriculum (Advisory Group on Citizenship, 1998). In Senegal, Tunisia, Mozambique and South Africa, young people have become actively engaged in civic activism through popular culture in response to their disenchantment and/or exclusion from government and party politics (Honwana, 2012). Hence, it seems that while young people are disillusioned with mainstream forms of participation, they are instead more engaged with 'glocal' politics (O'Toole and Gale, 2010). They can be engaged in the politics of identity and actively involved in developing alternate representations of community and nationality in local community projects (Howarth et al., 2013).

Different contexts can open up or close down possibilities for participation. For example, migrants' legitimacy to participate in the construction of knowledge about Britishness depends on the particular political context in terms of both formal immigration laws and policies and lay representations of immigration. It has been shown, for example, that 'elite' Western migrants are more readily recognised as similar and equal and have thus more entitlement to become part of the nation compared to 'non-elite', non-Western migrants (Andreouli, 2013; Andreouli and Howarth, 2012). By being recognised in their social context (by dominant others and powerful institutions), they are able to participate in processes of 'imagining' the national community (Anderson, 1991). Similar results have been found in other contexts. Ali and Sonn (2010) discuss how, in Australia, dominant social representations of the 'authentic' white Australian limit the ability of ethnic minorities to take part in the construction of the nation and perpetuate the status quo of white privilege. Equally, in the Greek context, it has been shown that ethnic representations of national

identity exclude ethnic minorities from the national 'we' (Chrysochoou, 2009; Kadianaki, 2010). Through constructing different ethnic identities as incompatible, such ethnic representations of nations create a dichotomy between cohesion and multiculturalism (Chrysochoou and Lyons, 2011). However, equal participation of ethnic minorities in the social and political life of a country depends on the adoption of multicultural policies (Kymlicka, 2010) as well as the development of more inclusive representations of 'us' involving groups previously seen as different, as O'Sullivan-Lago's (2011) research in Ireland shows. More generally, it can be argued that negative representations of intergroup difference legitimise a social order that privileges the majority (Staerklé, 2009) and thus reduce the participation of minorities.

We see similar processes in other settings. In the current global order, people's ability to participate in social and political life is often determined by North-South development relations and discourses (Campbell and Cornish, 2010). The dominant or powerful institutions and practices of development tend to represent marginalised communities as recipients of development interventions rather than people with agency and the ability to participate in (and create) social change. As development interventions promote access to resources in marginalised communities, these also construct knowledge about the people who inhabit these spaces. Through stigmatising representations of global poverty (Dogra, 2012), recognition and expertise are most often attributed to Western economic and cultural practices (Jovchelovitch, 2007; Kothari, 2006). More recent strategies in development do recognise these critiques and focus on empowerment, community mobilisation and participation. However, the more ambivalent and contradictory representations of development continue to be mediated by racialised and gendered discourses (Kessi, 2011), mirroring the ongoing cultural effects of colonial history (Dogra, 2012).

Recent political unrest in Senegal and Tunisia has brought forth alternative forms of participation. Through the Hip Hop movement and social media, young people have gained legitimacy through slogans that touch directly upon their sense of belonging in the national culture: 'I don't feel Senegalese anymore' (Honwana, 2012: 119) and 'Tunisia Our Country' (Honwana, 2012: 123) are the lyrics of popular rap artists condemning the authoritarianism and corruption of political regimes and indicate the central preoccupation that representations of *belonging to the nation* take in quite different forms of participation.

Hence, political psychology should take social context and culture seriously in its understanding of participation (Haste, 2012). Following this line of reasoning and similar recent work in the field (e.g. Elcheroth et al., 2011), we propose a conceptualisation of political participation which is sensitive to the contexts, dynamics and specifics of intergroup relations as these are reflected in

processes of re-presentation. We suggest that SRT offers both a contextualised and a dynamic approach to the politics of participation.

Political participation is often linked to membership of a polity as citizenship is seen to provide the conditions for having and exercising political rights. According to Marshall's (1964) model of citizenship, participation refers to the *political* rights of citizenship, complemented by *social* rights such as welfare, and *civil* rights such as liberty and freedom of speech. However, depicting participation as an extension of one's formal citizenship status limits our understanding of processes of inclusion and exclusion to issues of formal membership, such as ethnic and civic participation (Kohn, 1944). As Andreouli and Howarth (2012) have shown, recognition is not only a matter of state institutions but also a matter of lay social relationships and interactions (Honneth, 1995). Naturalised citizens, for example, can be formally included in the polity and be entitled to full membership rights, but their position within the social representations of the nation may remain precarious (Andreouli and Howarth, 2012). The same seems to be true for minoritised groups such as African Americans (Philogène, 2007), German Muslims (Holtz et al., 2013), gay Muslims in the United Kingdom (Jaspal, 2012) and black lesbians in South Africa (Mkhize et al., 2010). In global politics, despite the existence of legitimate transnational institutions defending the rights of marginalised groups, sex worker groups (Blankenship et al., 2010) and people affected by HIV/AIDS (Campbell et al., 2012), among others, nevertheless struggle to exercise control in representational and decision-making practices.

Indeed, this state-centric model of political participation has been criticised for being too narrowly focused on mainstream forms of participation, such as voting and standing for office, ignoring other informal arenas where politics is enacted, especially by young people (O'Toole et al., 2003), women (Fraser, 1989) and marginalised communities (Mirza and Reay, 2000). Contemporary multicultural and transnational societies have become sites of multiple types of participation, not all of them linked to official parliamentary politics (Soysal, 1994). New social movements (Wieviorka, 2005) have led to new forms of political participation and mobilisation (Stott and Reicher, 2012), focusing, for example, on the domain of culture (Nash, 2001), religion (Modood, 2010) or gender (Phillips, 2009). This identity politics calls for a new understanding of participation, one that is not limited to the official political sphere. In fact, as Nash argues, we should not just study the relations between state and society, but all social life must be seen as potentially political (Nash, 2001: 77). This parallels the approach to SRT outlined here that focuses on the *political* construction of lay social knowledge systems and social relations.

We define participation as *the power to construct and convey particular representations over others*. It is essentially about having the power to construct social representations that, as Moscovici has argued, are 'ways of world making' (1988:

231). Powerful groups have the ability to define social reality by participating more fully in the construction of social representations. In societies where asymmetric power relations are uncontested or even legitimate (Tajfel, 1981), hegemonic representations become normative and permeate habitual ways of thinking and engaging with others. It has been shown, for example, that minority groups may hold attitudes that justify the status quo and are thus contrary to their group interests (Jost, 2011; Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004). Being unable to participate equates to lacking the agency to construct social reality in one's own terms, in ways that promote the interests and projects of one's various social groups. Minoritised groups often lack the symbolic power to institute their version of the world over others; as a result, they are 'forced' to accept or live by representations constructed by others. Social representations have therefore consequences beyond the immediate context of their production. For example, dominant essentialising representations of Britishness do not only function to create the national group as 'insiders', they also function to exclude others such as migrants and particularly racialised migrants who thereby cannot easily participate in the definition of the nation. As Haste has argued, to 'become involved requires that one has a sense of ownership of the issue, that one defines oneself as a member of a group or as a holder of particular beliefs' (Haste, 2004: 433).

However, dominant representations can potentially be resisted by active minorities who offer an alternative perspective that they strive to legitimise through strategies of social influence (Moscovici, 1985; Sammut and Bauer, 2011). These representations can be described as polemical (Moscovici, 1988) as they are in conflict with dominant representations and portray an alternative version of the world. Overall, we can see that participation is essentially about power and agency. It is an inherently political process as it is framed by power and structural relations and has to do with the possibilities to maintain or challenge these relations, that is, possibilities for agency and resistance in the ongoing processes of participation.

In connecting social representations and participation, two key issues are particularly important:

1. the role of (mis)recognition in shaping the dynamics of social relations and constraining or advancing the participation of different social groups;
2. the possibilities for agency and resistance which enable disadvantaged groups to participate.

The role of (mis)recognition in participation

Political participation is not just a citizen's membership status but the ability to act as a citizen, to participate in the social life of a community. We can

thus conceptualise participation and citizenship as practice (Barnes et al., 2004; Isin and Wood, 1999) that embeds us within certain intergroup relations and identity politics. Practice refers to performing ‘acts of citizenship’: ‘those deeds by which actors constitute themselves (and others) as subjects of rights’ (Isin, 2009: 371). In this sense, political participation is not restricted to those who hold the status of citizenship, but to everyone who can make political claims in the public sphere (Isin, 2009). Therefore, when considering the meaning of participation, the question is not ‘who is a citizen’ but ‘who is an actor’, or, rather, ‘who is *recognised* as a legitimate political actor’. The next logical question to follow being what or who determines who is a competent political actor?

Being an actor is not a matter of individual traits but a matter of social recognition. On the one hand, this is defined by existing norms and institutions, such as the state itself. For example, in Western democracies young people under the age of 18 are not allowed to vote, indicating that they are not seen to be as politically competent. On the other hand, who is considered competent enough to have a valid political voice is subject to public debate (Gibson and Hamilton, 2011). Such processes of social recognition, both at the level of the state and also in public debate, are shaped by the social representations that mediate patterns of communication established between different social actors (Andreouli and Howarth, 2012; Psaltis, 2005). This is evident in stigmatising representations of ‘others’ that limit their ability to institute their version of the world. Gender asymmetries and lack of recognition of women’s ‘epistemic authority’, for example, limit their participation in the knowledge construction process (Psaltis and Duveen, 2006). The symbolic exclusion of ‘cultural others’ in institutionalised discourses within school curricula can similarly lead to disengaged identities and barriers in communication and participation at school (Howarth, 2004). Thus, social representations that misrecognise minoritised groups have a negative impact on their ability to participate in the public sphere (Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011). Social representations can therefore be equally constraining as tangible exclusionary mechanisms.

However, while social representations can work in ways that close down the possibilities of participation, we can also see social representations as an instrument of participation:

It is the process of participation that forms the on-going arena that allows social representations to be expressed, reaffirmed, and if necessary, renegotiated. Participation involves the processes of negotiation of worldviews and projects. It provides a forum for the establishment of dialogues between different representations...and for the clashes between competing representations and projects...It is here that we need to consider the power

differential between communities since not all projects and representations are equally recognised in the public arena.

(Campbell and Jovchelovitch, 2000: 266)

Who can participate in the knowledge construction process depends on intergroup dynamics. For example, polemical and emancipated representations reflect more heterogeneous social systems whereby different communities participate in the construction of different versions of their social worlds. It all depends on the level and quality of dialogue that is developed among groups. While dialogical encounters allow for the construction of hybrid and pluralistic representations, non-dialogical relations construct a hierarchy of knowledge, such that the knowledge produced by more powerful groups acquires more validity than the knowledge constructed by dominated groups (Jovchelovitch, 2007). This is most evident in hegemonic representations which reflect social relations that are characterised by high asymmetry. These types of social representations are rarely challenged; they resemble Durkheim's collective representations in that they are based on the power of belief, not on argument or knowledge (Duveen, 2002; Marková, 2003). Hegemonic representations or normative systems do not simply operate within the reified sphere of the law and policy (Batel and Castro, 2009), but the 'normative system moves from the macro to the micro level and becomes effective in personal relationships' (Moghaddam, 2008: 894). Such representations are often taken for granted, unreflectively reproduced in everyday routines and habits and often reified and institutionalised through objectification (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Billig (1995) argues that nationhood is one such representation. Indeed, the idea that nations are imagined, constructed artefacts (Anderson, 1991) is rarely acknowledged or reflected upon. Even in conditions of super-diversity (Vertovec, 2007) where the multiplicity and fluidity of national categories are apparent, people often represent nationals and non-nationals as 'naturally' different groups of people. This social representation is also institutionalised through state policies, and objectified in very tangible national borders that create a physical distinction between 'us' and 'them', enforcing essentialising representations of nationhood. Social representations can therefore potentially become powerful norms (Castro, 2012), acquiring a truth status, and therefore blocking negotiation and dialogue. As Moscovici (1976: 69) has argued:

The activities of society as a whole, or of a group, always result in the establishment of a norm and the consolidation of a majority response. Once such a norm and response have been elaborated, behaviours, opinions, the means of satisfying needs, and in fact all possible social acts are divided into four categories: what is permitted, and what is forbidden; what is included and what is excluded.

Therefore, inasmuch as social representations allow for contestation, it is important also to acknowledge the mechanisms by which this contestation is blocked. Stigma that misrecognises the perspective of the other is one such mechanism (Gillespie, 2008). This is evident within the micro-discursive contexts of interpersonal interactions (Psaltis and Duveen, 2006), the broadly institutionalised contexts of schools (Howarth, 2004), as well as across more global and hegemonic systems of representations of global development. Such misrecognition of the perspective of the other can even be instrumental for minimising the impact of laws which are explicitly devised for stimulating participation (Castro and Batel, 2008). For instance, Kessi (2011) demonstrates how, in a participatory youth development project, the popular and stigmatising representations of communities as lazy, ignorant and irresponsible were both resisted and reproduced by young people whose agency was undermined in the face of these widespread and imposing images of poverty and underdevelopment. Hence, participation in certain contexts can reproduce unequal relations when groups are unable to exercise their agency and be fully recognised in their social and political environments. Equally, and particularly relevant for political psychology, empirical research such as Kessi's (2011) shows that resistance is an importance aspect of participation.

Possibilities for agency and resistance in participation

All representations contain the possibilities for alternative ways of thinking and knowing (Marková, 2008) as thinking is only possible through tensions and contradictions (Billig, 1987; Moloney et al., 2005). Rose et al. (1995) place oppositional themes at the heart of SRT and argue that without this focus on oppositions social psychology could not account for the 'diversity, tension and even conflict in modern life' (Rose et al., 1995: 4). They point out that such contradictions are a common feature of common knowledge: 'one only has to think about Hitler's Germany where Jews were accused at once of being fierce capitalists and uncompromising communists, hugely successful and totally degenerate' (Rose et al., 1995: 4). The contradictions inherent in social representations relate to Moscovici's original concept of cognitive polyphasia that 'highlights the idea that people draw on different types of knowledge to make sense of the world around them' (Provencher, 2011: 377). Jovchelovitch explains with reference to Moscovici's seminal study on forms of common knowledge about psychoanalysis (Moscovici, 1976): 'contrary to well-established interpretations of cognitive phenomena, the different forms did not appear in different groups, or different contexts; on the contrary, they were capable of coexisting side by side in the same context, social group or individual' (Jovchelovitch, 2007: 69). Marková (2003) demonstrates the importance of oppositional themes or *themata* for participation, social recognition, dialogue

and thinking in general, such as we/them, freedom/oppression, fear/hope and social recognition/denial of recognition (see also Moloney et al., 2012; Moscovici and Vignaux, 1994).

It is precisely this focus on the oppositions or dialectics of everyday life that makes SRT a particularly useful approach for a political psychology of participation, citizenship and social change (Elcheroth et al., 2011). SRT highlights the potentially transformative, ongoing, unsettled or incomplete nature of social relations; it depicts a social world that is always a social and political construction. Central to SRT is the ability of social actors to debate their ideas. Marková has argued that ‘through “representing” humans search for meanings and through “representing” they construct, maintain and transform their reality’ (Marková, 2008: 473). Although asymmetries in dialogue and recognition help to maintain dominant representations, they are also the starting point for negotiations because they create debate and contestation; it is ‘the impossibility of consensus that is the basis of all dialogue’ (Marková, 2000: 424). The continuous struggle for recognition is at the core of all social relations. It has been argued, for example, that prejudice reduction – that is, greater social recognition – may have adverse effects, reducing resistance to the status quo and discouraging minorities from mobilising towards greater social transformation (Dixon et al., 2012). Thus, asymmetries in dialogue silence different perspectives and maintain the status quo, but misrecognition may also provoke social change because it functions as a motivation towards greater participation and agency (Howarth et al., 2012).

From a critical social representations perspective (CSRT), agency refers to having the power to construct and institute meanings, to claim authority over normative expectations, ideological positions or ‘the truth’. Resistance involves the possibilities to challenge such normative expectations, propose alternative representations (Gillespie, 2008) and provoke transgressive forms of social relations (Howarth, 2010). For example, research in Norway shows how immigrant youth ‘reproduce or resist social representations which frame ideological boundaries of ethnic groups when negotiating identities’ (Phelps and Nadim, 2010: 6). Hence people do not simply ‘adjust’ to the sociopolitical order, they also resist (Castro, 2012: 2) and so produce alternative positions (Staerklé et al., 2011), emancipated or polemical representations. However, possibilities for agency and resistance are opened up and closed down in different contexts and are related to the limits of dialogue in different social relationships and encounters (Jovchelovitch, 2007). One cannot simply think oneself over barriers to participation as ‘participation in conditions where material and symbolic obstacles prevent the possibility of real social change can be a hollow exercise’ (Campbell and Jovchelovitch, 2000: 266). Indeed, this ‘legitimises the status quo’ (Campbell and Jovchelovitch, 2000: 266). Hence we need to examine what aspects of the social context or social relationship are likely to

support or undermine participation (Campbell and Cornish, 2010). What are the characteristics of safe social spaces where people can engage in dialogue, debate dominant representations and overcome barriers to participation?

It has been found that positive levels of social capital are key in providing the appropriate conditions for resistance in youth development projects (Kessi, 2011). These include relationships of trust and reciprocity (Caughy et al., 2003), common rules, norms and sanctions (Chambers, 2004) among community members and alliances with significant individuals or institutions (Campbell, 2003). These conditions take into account the intersecting elements needed for dialogical encounters. They strengthen not only the symbolic positioning of groups but also access to the material and structural resources necessary for participation. This gives an example of how

[w]hat we do is evidently shaped by social norms, by institutional possibilities and institutional constraints. But equally, we can act – act *together* that is – to alter norms, institutions, and even whole social systems. . . . acting together as group members empowers us to impose our perspectives even against the resistance of others.

(Subašić et al., 2012: 6–7)

Participation is bound up with the social psychological possibilities of agency and resistance, which rest on our social identities, our position in relations of power and inequality and sense of what is achievable and attainable (Subašić et al., 2012: 6–7). This involves the re-appropriation of social representations, collective conscientisation (Freire, 1970) and ‘a sense of one’s agency and efficacy – that action is possible and potentially effective and that the individual can personally take such action, alone or with others’ (Haste, 2004: 430).

Hence, participation is equivalent to having a legitimate voice in the construction of social representations, which depends on patterns of social recognition. As ‘ways of world making’, social representations have *consequences that may extend beyond the context of their production* to a broader collective. As Elcheroth et al. point out: ‘What counts is *the power to shape mutual expectations within in a collective* in such a manner as to enable or impede coordinated actions directed toward a given purpose’ (2011: 745, emphasis in the original). This depends on the dynamics of intergroup relations, the patterns of (mis)recognition and the possibilities for agency and resistance that are established between groups of different power status.

Conclusion: What does SRT bring to political psychology?

What SRT brings to political psychology is a much-needed ‘less top-down view’ of the political nature of social relations and social interactions (Haste, 2004,

2012), and this expands our understanding of political participation as far more than the communication of views to political elites (Uhlener, 2001) through voting behaviours, for example (Milbrath, 1965). What SRT brings is a sharper focus on everyday culture, local contexts, the dynamic nature of knowledge processes and the ongoing politics of social participation. This promotes an analysis of participation as *the power to construct and convey particular representations over others* and so highlights both the political constraints on participation and the ways in which such constraints are challenged and overcome. This extends our understanding of what constitutes 'the political' and incorporates the politics of everyday interactions and the symbolic power to develop social meanings that have consequence beyond one's immediate context.

In turn, bringing political psychology to SRT – and so developing CSRT as a more critical approach – forces the political construction of knowledge and social relations to come to the fore and demands a sharper analysis of the role of political institutions and discourses on social psychological processes. As 'institutional practices and discourses have an impact on the collective and individual identity formation and negotiations' (Scuzzarello, 2012: 4), there is a need to develop more detailed analyses of the very political nature of the production, dissemination, negotiation and contestation of social representations, that is to connect the political psychology of state institutions *and* social norms (Andreouli and Howarth, 2012).

A political psychology of participation embedded within the frame of SRT allows a combined focus on the ways in which both dominant and hegemonic relations are maintained through the ideologies of the past and particular vested interests and, at the same time, allow a focus on the ways such discourses and social relations are disrupted, unsettled and sometimes transformed. Hence, this perspective invites an understanding not only into the ways through which we understand our social worlds but also in terms of the process how 'people make their futures' (Subašić et al., 2012: 12), as Campbell and Jovchelovitch have also argued:

Whenever a community participates and develops a way of knowing about itself and others, it is, by the same token, instituting itself as such, inviting a future for what it does and indeed, actualising the power it holds to participate in shaping a way of life.

(Campbell and Jovchelovitch, 2000: 267)

As social and political psychologists, it is imperative that we examine not only the social construction of knowledge but also its political construction and contestation, and what possibilities there are to reconstruct versions of social relations and so invite different futures and different ways of life.

Note

1. We use a hyphen when discussing the practice of social re-presentation to highlight the fact that representations are constantly reinterpreted, re-thought, re-presented.

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3

Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorisation Theory

Denis Sindic and Susan Condor

Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorisation Theory

Political behaviour always involves social groups, whether these take the form of concrete networks and gatherings of individuals such as pressure groups, demonstrations, governments, cadres or committees, or whether they are constituted as large-scale institutions or imagined communities (Anderson, 1991) such as polities, states, political parties, interest groups, publics, constituencies or electorates. In so far as social groups are central to politics, it follows that the psychology of groups should be relevant to our understanding of political psychology. Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT) represent major theoretical attempts to clarify the social-psychological processes associated with group membership and action and should, therefore, be in a good position to provide a significant contribution to that understanding.

SIT developed from Tajfel's work on intergroup processes which focused on the genesis of conflict between social groups, as well as the factors which influence support for, or attempts to change, established social hierarchies (see, e.g., Tajfel, 1974, 1978a, 1978b; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Turner (1982; Turner et al., 1987) later adopted some aspects of this approach as the basis for his SCT of group behaviour in general. Because the two theories share many key assumptions, they are often discussed under the general label of 'the Social Identity approach' or 'the Social Identity tradition'.

Early research adopting the Social Identity approach to intergroup relations often investigated real-world political behaviour, including political party affiliation (Kelly, 1988), trades union participation (Kelly and Kelly, 1994), the Northern Ireland conflict (Cairns and Mercer, 1984), Hindu–Muslim relations in India (Ghosh and Kumar, 1991) and responses to the Sino-British accord in Hong Kong (Bond and Hewstone, 1988). Tajfel's model, which emphasised how intergroup conflict could be rooted in concerns over collective identity as well as competition over material resources, was especially relevant to

the New Social Movements that arose during the 1960s and 1970s (Reicher et al., 2010; Tajfel, 1978b), and social psychologists subsequently applied SIT to the women's movement (Williams and Giles, 1978) as well as ethnolinguistic minority group movements (Giles, 1977). Later, as SIT came to be increasingly adopted as a general metatheoretical perspective by social psychologists (Abrams and Hogg, 2004), fewer researchers focused on its particular relevance to political attitudes and action (see also Brewer, 2001; Huddy, 2001; Oakes, 2002; Reicher, 2004). However, the past decade has witnessed a renaissance of interest in the ways in which SIT and SCT might enhance social-psychological understanding of a range of formal and informal political behaviour, including party identification (Greene, 2004), political solidarity and affiliation (Subašić et al., 2008), leadership (Haslam et al., 2010; Hogg, 2001), political rhetoric (Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004; Reicher and Hopkins, 1996a, 1996b, 2001), political participation and activism (Drury, 2012; Muldoon and Lowe, 2012; Thomas et al., 2009), schism (Sani and Pugliese, 2008), national separatism (Sindic and Reicher, 2009), conspiracy theorising (Sapountzis and Condor, 2013) and extremism (Baray et al., 2009; Hogg, 2012; Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2009).

It is now beyond the scope of a single chapter to provide a comprehensive overview of the ways in which the Social Identity approach might contribute to political psychology (see Ispas, 2013). Consequently, for the purposes of this chapter we will focus on two general issues. First, we will clarify, and where necessary distinguish, the key theoretical assumptions of SIT and SCT as they relate to political cognition and action. Second, because politics involves both groups and power, we will focus on some of the issues where the dynamics of identity and power intersect. This will include a consideration of the political consequences of identity management strategies, as well as a discussion of the particular case of politicised identities.

Social Identity Theory: Identity strategies and the dynamics of intergroup relations

Tajfel originally defined social identity as 'that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (Tajfel, 1978a: 63). According to this perspective, group membership provides people with a sense of their distinct place in the social world (where they stand in relations to others) and acts as a practical guide to action by imparting the norms concerning the typical, appropriate or desirable forms of behaviour associated with a particular group membership. More specifically, Tajfel claimed that the processes associated with social (as opposed to personal) identity underpin intergroup (as opposed to

interpersonal) behaviour. That is, to the extent that people see themselves and others in terms of group membership, and to the extent that they personally identify with the social group to which they belong, they will tend to act towards others as group members rather than as unique individuals. In emphasising the distinctive character of collective behaviour, Tajfel's approach differed from existing social-psychological perspectives that often sought to explain intergroup behaviour with reference to the personality traits of particular individuals (see, e.g., Adorno et al., 1950). Indeed, one fundamental assumption that underpins SIT is that groups and not individuals are the main engines of both social conflict and social change (Reicher et al., 2012).

SIT proposes a motivational element to intergroup behaviour (see, e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1979) by suggesting that people are generally concerned to maintain, or to achieve, a positive sense of self, and that when they identify with social groups, this manifests itself in a need to perceive the groups to which they belong positively (for a review, see, e.g., Rubin and Hewstone, 1998). Moreover, SIT also proposes that social categories are necessarily defined and evaluated comparatively. Consequently, in order to achieve a positive evaluation of their group, group members will be motivated to establish, and to maintain, a positive differentiation (i.e. positive distinctiveness) between in-group and relevant out-groups on valued dimensions of comparison (Tajfel, 1978a). Membership of groups consensually regarded as superior will confer a *positive* social identity, and conversely, membership of groups consensually regarded as inferior will confer a *negative* or *unsatisfactory* social identity, which may, under certain conditions, motivate the members of those groups to take collective action towards challenging the existing social hierarchy and the inferior status conferred to their group.

Of particular relevance to political psychology is the fact that SIT provides a model of the ideological context in which the identity management strategies that people adopt to deal with an unsatisfactory social identity may be expected to lead to collective action (for more extended overview of identity management strategies, see, e.g., Blanz et al., 1998; Brown, 2000; Ellemers, 1993; Haslam, 2001). The most important of these conditions is arguably the perceived *permeability* of group boundaries, that is, the extent to which people believe that it is possible for individuals to move between social groups. In so far as members of socially devalued groups perceive *individual mobility* to be possible, they may respond to their inferior status by attempting to 'move up' the social hierarchy and by psychologically dis-identifying with the group to which they currently belong. However, when such mobility is perceived to be impossible or undesirable, people may engage in various forms of collective activity aimed at changing the comparative value associated with their group as a whole.

Tajfel described the latter situation as involving an ideology of *social change*. The term 'social change', however, is potentially misleading, since under these ideological conditions members of devalued groups will not necessarily attempt to challenge the existing intergroup hierarchy directly. According to SIT, the kind of collective activity that members of devalued social groups engage in will depend upon the perceived *security* of intergroup comparisons (Tajfel, 1978a; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Perceived security can be subdivided into two aspects. The first concerns the perceived *legitimacy* of the status quo – for example, whether people assume that their inferior status has been justly ordained or deserved. The second concerns the availability of *cognitive alternatives*: the possibility of imagining changes to the existing intergroup status quo. Where existing intergroup hierarchies are perceived as legitimate, and/or where cognitive alternatives are not available, low status group members are unlikely to challenge the out-group directly. Instead, they may attempt to attain a positive social identity by strategically comparing their group with another of lower status; re-evaluating the labels and symbols conventionally associated with their group; or adopting strategies of *social creativity* to forge a favourable identity for their in-group on new dimensions of comparison. It is only when unfavourable intergroup comparisons are perceived as illegitimate and where cognitive alternatives are present that members of devalued social groups will engage in *social competition* and attempt to directly contest their inferior status.

Members of high status groups also have at their disposal a variety of strategies that mirror those of the low status groups, which may be used in an effort to maintain their position in the intergroup hierarchy. For example, they may attempt to make intergroup boundaries appear permeable by allowing a few out-group members to pass, but in proportion that remain largely symbolic (*tokenism*; see Wright and Taylor, 1998). Similarly, in an attempt to maintain existing social hierarchies, members of dominant social groups may seek to legitimate the status quo, for example, through reference to innate differences between human gender, nations or races.

Social Identity Theory and the psychology of politics

How can the model of social identity strategies proposed by SIT contribute to our understanding of political psychology? In general terms, the need and ability of humans to actively distinguish themselves from each other, which lies at the core of the theory, can be seen as both the condition of possibility and the very *raison d'être* of politics, if we define politics as that paradoxical human activity that both promotes differentiation between human beings and aims to deal with its problematic consequences (see, e.g., Arendt, 1958). However, a more restricted definition of politics is that it concerns the dynamics of power, and more specifically the processes of obtaining and using that power

in public life. From that point of view, SIT's focus on the social-psychological evaluation of identities may appear to downplay the political aspects of intergroup relations, since the ultimate goal of identity management strategies has conventionally been understood as being about status rather than power. In so far as they have addressed issues of power, Social Identity theorists have tended to focus on the ways in which power may impact upon the quest for positive social identity, rather than focusing upon political power as a key problem in its own right (see, e.g., Sachdev and Bourhis, 1991). Moreover, there is a large proportion of SIT research that tends to treat power and status as synonymous, using terms like 'dominant/subordinate groups', 'high/low status groups' or 'majority/minority' interchangeably (for classic discussions of the distinction between the constructs of status and power, see Goldhamer and Shils, 1939; Weber, 1946).

Nevertheless, the potential relevance of SIT to political psychology becomes apparent once we appreciate how status and power are often related in practice. Changes in group status can act as catalyst for, or constitute an outcome of, political change, and conversely status inertia often go hand in hand with maintaining the political status quo. In practice, the success of the various identity management strategies adopted by members of low status groups is likely to depend on the groups' access to power. Similarly, the extent to which a high status group may be able to (for example) convince others of their innate superiority is likely to depend on their effective control of media of education and communication as well as their privileged status per se. Conversely, the identity management strategies adopted by members of low status groups may not simply enhance the subjective value of their identity, but may also affect power relationships. In fact, there are always political consequences associated with the different strategies for achieving a satisfactory social identity, whether or not these are imagined or intended by the social actors concerned. For example, when individuals pursue a strategy of individual mobility, their choice makes it harder for other members of their group to organise any form of political or social resistance. In contrast, strategies of symbolic social competition (e.g. challenging existing group stereotypes) may help to mobilise group members to political action (Reicher et al., 1997). Overall, the identity dynamics described by SIT can therefore be said to be political in the sense that they both shape and are shaped by power dynamics.

However, there are also limits to the contribution of the theory to our understanding of political dynamics. First, as Rubin and Hewstone note (2004), although SIT does not preclude considerations of power and, indeed, invites a more detailed analysis of power dynamics and their interaction with identity processes, such analysis generally remains to be developed (but for recent developments in that direction, see Haslam et al., 2010; Simon and Oakes, 2006; Sindic et al., in press; Turner, 2005).

Second, although most work adopting SIT has focused on struggles over status rather than conflicts over political power, there have been (as we noted earlier) notable exceptions as well as a recent revival of interest in applying SIT to political behaviour. However, any thoroughgoing attempt to apply SIT in this area requires a consideration of group behaviour which is directed at political goals in their own right. For that reason, it challenges what has for some become a key assumption of the theory, namely that all group action can necessarily and ultimately be understood as a quest for status. In that respect, it should be noted that the message in Tajfel's original writing was not that intergroup conflict could be reduced to social competition over status, but rather that this struggle should be understood as an intervening mechanism in conflicts over other type of goods (e.g. those who accept their negative identity are unlikely to challenge their political disadvantage since they see such inequalities as legitimate on the basis of their lower status). That is, Tajfel's primary concern was for the ways in which group identification provides the psychological basis for collective social action designed to challenge concrete economic and political as well as social inequalities. In that context, the struggle over status can represent but the means towards other ends, including political ones. This political preoccupation of Tajfel is apparent if we consider, for instance, his views that stereotypes 'cannot be understood without a consideration of the functions they serve in the competitive and power relationships between the groups concerned' (Tajfel and Forgas, 1982: 133). It is true that the function of *social differentiation* (the role of stereotypes 'in helping to preserve or create positively valued differentiations between one's own and other social groups') centres on questions of group status. However, the functions of *social explanation* and *social justification* (the role of stereotypes 'in contributing to the creation and maintenance of group "ideologies" explaining or justifying a variety of social actions') are clearly oriented towards political goals (p. 134).

Finally, one can question the extent to which SIT is able to deal with the specific phenomena of *politicised* identities, that is with collective identities that are normatively defined in terms of an explicit political commitment and where group members are consciously aware of being part of a power struggle (Simon and Klandermans, 2001). At present, SIT remains somewhat unclear on the extent to which the eventual political consequences of identity management strategies can be traced back to the deliberate intent of the social actors concerned. For example, a white comedian making a joke about black people may very well contribute to perpetuate negative stereotypes about black people and thereby help to maintain their lower status and subordinate position in society. However, the immediate goal of the comedian might really be only to make other people laugh (Condor, 1990). That is, there may not be any explicit political intent behind the joke, nor any awareness by the comedian of 'white people' as a politicised identity, involved in a power struggle with

'black people' – contrary to, say, the case of a white supremacist making the exact same joke (Billig, 2005). At present, SIT does not really allow us to differentiate clearly between those two cases, despite the fact that they do differ in important respects.

Thus, despite their pervasive political consequences, it is not clear whether the social identity dynamics described by SIT can be called political in the full sense of the term. This, of course, does not mean that such identity processes are irrelevant to our understanding of politicised identities, but rather that the generic focus of the theory may need to be complemented by other approaches tailored to tackle this more specific issue. There are, in fact, other specific characteristics of politicised identities that the theory has difficulties with, which will be addressed after we review SCT.

Self-Categorisation Theory

As noted above, SIT proposes that people act in terms of their social identity whenever they see themselves and others in terms of group membership rather than as particular individuals. Another way to put this is that social identity processes come into play when people categorise themselves (and others) as group members. SCT focuses on the nature, antecedents and consequences of this psychological process of self-categorisation.

In terms of the nature of the process, SCT postulates that when we self-categorise as group members we come to see ourselves as similar to (and interchangeable with) other in-group members on the key stereotypical aspects that define the group, a process termed *depersonalisation*. This does not involve a loss of selfhood (as is the case in *deindividuation*, see Reicher et al., 1995), but involves the experience of the self as defined by group membership rather than by unique individual characteristics. This is very close to SIT's notion of social identification, but one key difference is that in SCT social categories are always part of a hierarchical structure as a function of their level of inclusiveness. For example, Simon may see himself as a unique individual when among friends, as a political psychologist when comparing himself to cognitive psychologists, as a social scientist when comparing himself to natural scientists and all the way up to defining himself as a human in comparison to other species. Thus, the choice is not between different unrelated identities but between different identities nested into each other.

One implication of this hierarchical structure is that a particular category or identity is not solely defined by its comparison with another group situated on the same level of categorisation. Its definition also depends upon its relation with the level of categorisation immediately above it. In particular, the superordinate category that encompasses both in-group and out-group(s) provides the specific dimensions of comparisons along which the groups are

contrasted. This is because the superordinate category defines the prototype of what the groups should be like. For example, members of national groups will not compare themselves along any random dimension, but along the prototypical characteristics of a great or a good nation. This factor may help to explain why groups often choose to compete on the same dimension of comparison. It also alerts us to the ways in which political arguments often relate not only to the outcome of intergroup comparisons (e.g. whether 'our' political party is better or worse than another), but to the prototype of the superordinate category (what political parties, in general, should be like). Consequently, group members may be inclined to define superordinate categories in such a way as to favour their own group over relevant out-groups in the ensuing intergroup comparisons (Mummendey and Wenzel, 1999).

In terms of the antecedents of the self-categorisation process, the main question addressed by SCT relates to the question of why any particular categorisation should be psychologically salient in a particular context. Following ideas first outlined by Bruner (1957), SCT proposes that the psychological salience of a particular level of self-categorisation is determined through an interaction of *accessibility* and *fit* (Oakes, 1987; Turner et al., 1994). *Accessibility*, or *perceiver readiness*, refers to an individual's readiness to use a given set of categories as a function of past experience, present expectations, motives, values, goals and needs (which includes all the factors contributing to long-term social identification). The concept of *fit* concerns the relationship between the nature of categories and external reality and can be divided into two aspects. *Comparative fit* refers to the relationship between categories and the distribution of intragroup versus intergroup differences: the set of categories that maximise the ratio of intergroup differences compared to intragroup differences will be most salient. *Normative fit* refers to the fact that the specific content of these differences should match the stereotypical expectations associated with these categories. For instance, if a group discussion is split on a question of welfare spending, with some people arguing for more support for unemployed people and others for less, political orientation is likely to become salient, and participants are likely to categorise themselves as liberals versus conservatives, because the categories account for the differences in orientation adopted by individuals and also because such differences are in line with existing stereotypes concerning political ideology.

In terms of the consequences of self-categorisation processes, the principles outlined by SCT have been applied to many different areas (see, e.g., Haslam, 2001; Turner et al., 1987), but there is one area in particular that has perhaps received the most attention and that is also directly relevant to our understanding of politics, namely the processes of social influence (Turner, 1991). Social influence is key to many political processes, including the spread of political ideas, elections and voting, political mobilisation and the very nature of

political power (Lukes, 2005). For SCT, social influence does not depend solely on the characteristics of the message, the messenger and/or the audience (see Hovland et al., 1953). It also depends on the relationship between messenger and audience that is established by the self-categories employed in a particular social context.

Specifically, the consequences of the process of self-categorisation on influence are threefold. First, the nature of the salient self-categories will determine who we can influence and who we should be influenced by. That is, the process of self-categorisation creates the expectation that we will agree with other in-group members and disagree with out-group members (Abrams et al., 1990), so that social influence should only take place in the former case since only people sharing a common group membership will try and reach a consensus. Second, the specific content (i.e. stereotypes, norms and values) associated with the salient self-category will determine who, among in-group members, will be seen as prototypical (i.e. embodying the groups' spirit and values) and is therefore more likely to be influential. Finally, the specific content of in-group identity also sets limits on the nature of the messages that can be influential: influence will be limited to messages which are seen to be consistent with the group stereotypes, values and norms.

These processes are also important for the related phenomenon of leadership. SCT focuses not merely on the personal qualities that make a good leader, but also on the relationships between leaders and followers (see, e.g., Haslam et al., 2010). According to SCT, effective leaders need to present themselves as embodying the group's identity and will, but followers are not passive in that process since they help define the dimensions along which the prototypicality of a potential leader will be assessed. Thus followers 'make' the leader as much as the leader 'attracts' followers.

The Social Identity tradition and the psychology of politics revisited

By way of conclusion, we return to the issue of how the Social Identity approach (this time with the inclusion of SCT) might help our understanding of politicised identities. We have already suggested that politicised identities possess specific features that make them more than just one type of identity among many. One important factor is that the power dynamics in which politicised identities are involved can only make sense in the context of a common superordinate group. A political protest for equal rights between blacks and whites, for instance, can only make sense if we invoke a superior category that provides the framework within which judgements about the existing (in)equalities between groups and their legitimacy are made (e.g. black people deserve the same rights as white people because they are all human beings). SIT's focus

on the nuclear situation of two groups in a dyadic relationship, apparently isolated from their relationships to other groups and the rest of society, might lead to disregard this aspect. However, SCT's tenet that the relationships between groups is always mediated by their common membership into a shared superordinate category (which provides the dimensions of intergroup comparisons) highlights this important aspect of political cognition and rhetoric.

The relationship of groups to a superordinate category can also help to account for two supplementary and related facts about political behaviour. First, a great deal of political action is not (or not only) simply directed at the out-group per se but at a more general audience (Simon and Klandermans, 2001). Those who argue for the extension of rights for ethnic minority groups, for instance, have probably little hope to be heard by those against whom they protest. Rather, their call for justice may be directed not only towards fellow in-group members (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001) but also towards the larger public who may possibly be won to their cause (Condor et al., 2013). This is illustrated by protesters all over the globe using protest signs written in English, even when the protest is taking place in a non-English-speaking country. The attempt to mobilise a 'universal audience' (see Condor et al., 2013) only makes sense if protesters assume that, because of their common superordinate membership, people from other groups may share the same dimensions of judgement and thus should be able to assess the legitimacy of their claim.

Second, political groups do not always act in terms of the interest of their own group defined in narrow terms. Political parties, for instance, do not claim to act solely for the benefit of their own party, but for the benefit of the country as a whole. Conflict between parties, then, is shaped not only by the relation of one group to another but by their common relationship to a superordinate category. The latter not only defines the 'rules of engagement', but the possibility to steer its direction and fulfil its interests may be what is ultimately at stake. This is why claims about the prototypicality of the in-group in relation to the superordinate category (e.g. that 'we' better represent what our compatriots are like and what they want) can be made for political reasons (Sindic and Reicher, 2008).

Nevertheless, there are at least two other issues related to politicised identities with which the Social Identity tradition currently struggles. First, although both SIT and SCT assume that the ideological/political/cultural context and the specific contents of identities play a key role in determining the outcomes of psychological processes, the psychological processes themselves are assumed to remain invariate. Certainly, there may be common psychological processes that characterise all types of social identities, but there may also be specific processes associated with different types of identities and their specific contents and ideological frameworks. For instance, the adoption of particular ideological frames of reference (e.g. communitarian vs. liberal; see Condor and Abell, 2006) about national identities may lead people to embrace different reflexive stances

towards their own identity, and thereby to develop complex relationships with that identity that go beyond the simple identification/dis-identification dichotomy.

The particular content and ideological context of politicised identity may well vary, but must necessarily be related to principles of a political nature, such as legitimacy, justice, fairness and the right to self-determination. To express this argument in the terminology of SCT, the dimensions of intergroup comparison provided by the superordinate category must be relevant to the political claims – in the same way that, for instance, moral categories must be based on dimensions that can inform moral claims. The fact that the SI approach has tended to assume that identical processes underlie all forms of social identity means that it cannot enlighten us about the differences between (to pursue the example) political and moral identities.

Second, and finally, another key characteristic of politicised identities lies in their ‘essential contestedness’ (Gallie, 1956; Swanton, 1985), that is, the fact that they are not only open to contestation, but that they will inevitably be contested since that contestation is a natural correlate of the political dynamics in which they are involved. Any definition of European identity, for instance, is bound to have implications for the (il)legitimacy of political integration at the European level (Duchesne, 2008; Sindic, 2010), and it is precisely because of those political implications that it is actively and consciously contested.

This essential contestedness can be seen as a logical consequence of the processes described by both SIT and SCT. At the same time, however, it is also a factor that they are somewhat ill-equipped to handle. Thus on the one hand, since both theories emphasise how identities have key consequences for social influence and political mobilisation, it is only logical to infer that those who wish to shape the political opinions and actions of others will attempt to formulate and disseminate particular definitions that suit their specific political purposes. Put differently, it is the various attempts to create political consensus that gives rise to political contestation over the meaning of politicised identities (Haslam et al., 1998; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Empirically, studies show that those who attempt to mobilise support for a political project use argumentative principles that are remarkably in line with SCT’s principles, such as maximising the scope of the in-group, minimising the scope of the out-group and defining the content of in-group identity in order to make it normatively consonant with their message (Reicher and Hopkins, 1996a, 1996b).

On the other hand, the way in which both SIT and SCT describe the contextual antecedents of identity contents leaves little theoretical room for such purposeful contestation. In SIT, perceptions of permeability, legitimacy and stability are typically taken for granted as a point of departure from which questions as to their consequences are being addressed (Reicher, 1996), and the question of what, in turn, shape those perceptions is often deferred to other

disciplines such as sociology or social history (Tajfel, 1979). This suggests a view where the contents of social identities are the results of sociological and historical forces beyond purposeful human agency. In SCT, this is even more apparent since the perceived content of categories is almost entirely and mechanically determined by the immediate comparative and normative social context. Yet, it is a key part of the political process itself – perhaps even one of its most essential characteristics and purposes – to contribute to the elaboration of the meaning of social and political realities, such as who we should compare ourselves with and on what dimensions; what is and what is not legitimate; and what can or cannot be changed.

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4

Psychoanalysis as Political Psychology

Stephen Frosh

Introduction

Psychoanalysis has a mixed reputation as a source of political understanding. On the one hand, it is an individualistic discipline that focuses on privatised psychotherapeutic work. In this clinical context, which is its major one and in which most of the creativity and development of psychoanalysis has been located, the tradition is to bracket off the social and political and focus instead either on the purely 'internal' – the impulses, wishes or desires of the 'analysand' – or on the relational, constituted by the 'use' made by the analysand of the analyst under the guise of the transference. Despite various interventions that draw attention to the way the individual in such an encounter is already unavoidably constituted, in part or whole, by the sociopolitical context (e.g. Layton et al., 2006), and despite the commitment of many psychoanalysts to progressive social causes, analytic practice tends to stay firmly within these psychological boundaries. In some respects, one might argue that this is appropriate: after all, the trade of psychoanalysts is in the speech of their patients, with the affects to which it gives rise and the unconscious ideas it is assumed to reveal, and that is all they know and all they can deal with. If, that is, psychoanalysis is a practice of speech, as Lacanian psychoanalysts in particular are wont to assert (Parker, 2010), then perhaps it is only right that analysts maintain a studied agnosticism towards the political situation. They have no more access to it, or understanding of it, than anyone else; their area of expertise, such as it is, lies in interpreting speech and exploring the unconscious manoeuvres that surround it; their task is to listen,

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think and interpret in terms of these unconscious dynamics, not in terms of political formations.

So far so good; we go to a doctor to get her or his advice on how to manage our ailments, and when doctors use their medical expertise to pronounce on society, we are suitably wary. They might know what affects the health of their patients (impoverished services, high levels of unemployment, poor public health) and have views on what a just society might be, and these might be informed by their professional experience, but this does not in itself make them political theorists. Why, then, might we expect more from a psychoanalyst?

In fact, the links between psychoanalysis and politics are deep-rooted and provocative. There is a rather rich seam of work on the politics of psychoanalysis, which includes infighting between its various schools as well as investigations of the sometimes dark history of psychoanalysis' collusion with oppressive regimes (Frosh, 1999, 2005). There are also many examples of ways in which psychoanalysis has been used as an instrument to advance progressive politics by supplying a theory of the social subject that is compatible with radical critique. This theory has various attributes, depending on how it is drawn upon. Some writers have been interested in what psychoanalysis has to say about 'mass psychology', understood as a form of social psychology that reveals patterns of irrationality and desire that fuel many societal occurrences. Others have focused on the apparent mismatch between 'objective' social conditions and the feelings and beliefs of subjects, which is really to say that psychoanalysis is being looked to in order to flesh out a theory of ideology. Still others have drawn on psychoanalysis as a contributor to a grand theory of the social and political sphere, seeing in some of its ideas (e.g. envy, phantasy, narcissism) concepts that offer leverage for accounts of contemporary society. In each case, psychoanalysis' understanding of subjectivity, fuelled by its clinical work, is being extended to provide material for broad political analysis. In each case again, this extension sometimes seems legitimate and sometimes seems to push logic almost to a breaking point.

Psychic colonialism and political parallels

Psychoanalysis has been engaged with what might be broadly thought of as 'the political' from early on in its formation as a discipline. Freud's (1908) paper, "'Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness', with its argument that neurosis is in large part caused by the hypocritical relations governing sexuality in the Europe of the early twentieth century, can be understood as an intervention in the social and political mores of his time. His own political position was at best liberal (he was suspicious of socialism, despite having sympathy for the argument that economic and political equality should be sought) and in many ways conservative, with a liking for order. In line with many other

social thinkers, he assumed that the drives and desires of the individual need constraining by society. The aim of psychoanalysis as a therapy would always be to channel what is formless and dangerous into social usefulness, converting 'id' into 'ego' in the famous words of his *New Introductory Lectures*, as 'a work of culture – not unlike the draining of the Zuider Zee' (Freud, 1933: 79). Culture consists in making the unconscious passions of the individual into works of social value, and this involves 'draining' them, channelling them into good use. In this way, *sublimation*, which is often understood as a defensive manoeuvre in which troubling unconscious impulses are allowed expression by being disguised in socially acceptable ways, is made into the organising principle of sociality. This is a conservative view because it assumes that social organisation is not only essential but also inherently restrictive: human society cannot survive if the terrors of unconscious life were let loose and unregulated, and there is consequently no hope for a perfectly utopian future world in which everyone will be libidinally satisfied. Politically revolutionary ideas, for Freud, were 'consolations' (Freud, 1930: 145), similar in function to the illusions and wish-fulfilments that underlie religion.

However, as with much else in Freudian thought, the social theory explicitly promulgated by Freud in works such as *Totem and Taboo* (1913) and *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930) may be less productive and interesting than his apparently more technical, 'psychological' model of the mind. This is not to overlook the fecundity of the social texts: in each case, Freud's grand and provocative 'sociological' readings have given rise to an extensive literature; much of it is critical but also deeply engaged with the question of the relationship between individual desire and human possibility. Yet, the most compelling of these engagements are those which address Freud's conceptualisations not so much on the level of his discussions of how society works but rather through the lens of his theory of mental structures and mechanisms and the way they construct subjecthood in the warp and weft of drives and relationality. To give just one example, Jacqueline Rose's (2007) introduction to Freud's writing on the 'mass' is a meditation on what can be learnt from 'social' texts such as *Moses and Monotheism* (1939) and *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), and it involves a subtle illumination of how 'mass formations' operate in relation to its subjects. Rose deploys Freud's understanding of society as a kind of necessary evil, marking out the function of mass formation as 'one of the most effective systems a culture creates to keep its subjects sane' and arguing that, particularly in the case of religion, this is done by 'deluding them with the false consolations of belief' (2007: 69). She suggests, again with Freud, that the psychology of the mass reveals what humans might be like in the absence of social constraint. This both underlines the need for the protection that society offers and shows up the crudeness with which it fulfils its task, producing unnecessary suffering along the way.

This is, exactly, the Freudian mode of social analysis; yet what has to be observed here is that apart from explaining that society or 'culture' is repressive, little is said about the structure of society itself. That is, as a 'psychosocial' approach, Freudian theory remains very much on the 'psycho' rather than the 'social' level. There is nothing, for example, stated directly about class, race or gender, to use (in some ways anachronistically) some of the major axes around which sociological and political analysis is constructed. Nor is there anything about 'interests' in the way familiar from much political theory. However, what we do get is a means of understanding the *irrationality* of the social in a form that owes a great deal to the general psychoanalytic understanding of unconscious irrationality, and which is novel in relation to most political approaches. At the heart of this is Freud's insistence on *conflict*: not just the evident one between the individual and society, but the internal conflict that becomes the driver of irrationality in the public sphere. 'Ambivalence' is one way of conceptualising this, 'the cruel ambivalence lurking within our most cherished forms of allegiance' (Rose, 2007: 68), but there are other ways too, including those that focus more on 'lack' than on conflict and those that use psychoanalytic formulations to elaborate a vision of social life in which modes of excess and 'enjoyment' are of central significance. Both these sets of ideas will be returned to in the section 'Lack and enjoyment in political thought'.

Rose uses this understanding of the politics implicit in the psyche as a way into discussing significant issues surrounding oppression and ideology, most notably through explorations of South African literature and examination of what might be termed 'counter-currents' within Zionism. In the latter case in particular, she is interested in ways in which Zionism acts as a fragile container for social identities, and how as an 'excessive' set of beliefs and practices – originally seen as a form of insanity by many of its Jewish critics – it both mobilises aspirations and enthusiasms and creates pressures that have potentially damaging consequences. Zionism, she suggests, is a political force built out of dreams, and hence out of the elements of the unconscious that have evaded censorship but that reflect conflictual, disturbing and dangerous wishes. The idea that Zionism as a political force is expressive of, and inhabited by, unconscious desires that are parallel to, or *the same as*, those to be found in the psyche of the individual subject allows Rose to explore different resonances of Zionism for some of its opposed progenitors, from those adopting a narrow nationalism concerned mainly with control and security, to those more open to the presence and needs of others. What is rehearsed here is an opposition between different forms of psychoanalysis. The nationalist mainstream is paralleled to ego psychology – that classical approach which dominated particularly in America from the 1950s onwards and is centred on promoting conscious control over unconscious urges and adaptation of the subject to the demands of the social world. Politics, read through this lens, is a process of management whereby

what is slippery, subversive and counter-intuitive is converted into something solid, orderly and normative. Priority is given to the security and sovereignty of the nation-state as a homogenous element that stands firm against the internal and external forces threatening to fragment it. As a model of psychic life, this kind of psychoanalysis has a strong affiliation to an image of mental health as rationality, in which managing the unconscious – turning it into ego in the most concrete reading of that formula – is the primary aim. As politics, this is an account of identity as forged through the repudiation of doubts and visions, through the loss of dreams and, most importantly, through the sloughing off of alternatives.

The opposed strand to ego psychology within psychoanalysis has taken a number of forms, including most voraciously Lacanianism with its antagonism towards the idea of the ‘norm’ and of the integrated ego as the measure of mental health. The end point of Lacanian analysis is, among other things, a moment of stepping aside from the place of knowledge, in which fantasies of perfect integrity and wholeness give way to an awareness and enjoyment of the fissures of non-knowledge, of ‘lack’ – a point which will be discussed in more detail later. But it is not only Lacanianism that promotes this kind of ‘openness’ against the ‘closures’ of the hermetic system of ego dominance. Relational psychoanalysis, with its interest in how the ‘Other’ is embedded in the ‘self’, also challenges the idea that any subject can be truly ‘individual’. The proposal here is that the presence of otherness within the subject creates an experience of contingency, uncertainty and untranslatability that contradicts claims for homogeneity and rational self-government. In this vein (and in line with a perspective shared, e.g., by Butler, 2012), Rose (2007) emphasises the relationality inherent in Freud’s work, stressing how certain readings of Freud produce a model that makes others central to what is experienced as the ‘self’, ‘ego’ or ‘identity’. This means that the personae of each subject’s social world are always ‘in here’ as much as they are ‘out there’. Society itself is therefore foundational for what is taken to be individual, removing any meaningful distinction between these two classically opposed categories:

We only exist through the others who make up the storehouse of the mind: models in our first tentative steps towards identity, objects of our desires, helpers and foes. The mind is a palimpsest in which the traces of these figures will jostle and rearrange themselves for evermore. From the earliest moment of our lives – since without the rudiments of contact, the infant will not survive – we are ‘peopled’ by others. Our ‘psyche’ is a social space.

(Rose, 2007: 62)

Identification is a key mechanism here – at its most active, a process of ‘devouring’ the Other in order to become them, to appropriate them for use by the

self. The subject is thus built up as a kind of colonial project, taking in the others upon which its identity and personal economy are to be based and then denying or repressing the original source of these riches. This denial is always of necessity specious, because it hides the interdependency upon which all psychic life, not just its overtly social formation, is based. Interestingly, this colonial model can also be read the other way around: not so much the subject as coloniser, but as *colonised*, as the unknowing, subjugated recipient of the intrusions or 'messages' (Laplanche, 1999) of the Other. By a further turn of the screw, the subject believes itself to be an active conqueror of the domain of otherness, consuming its gifts in order to strengthen itself; but it is also at the mercy of the Other, dependent on it, unconsciously infiltrated and knocked off course by it, tied to it by processes of desire and need, yet always fighting against this awareness.

Subjective politics and social repression

From the emergence of political psychoanalysis after the First World War, when the conditions for revolution in Europe were apparently ripe and when steps were taken towards this – in Germany, most of all – yet when reaction set in quickly and fascism rather than revolutionary socialism emerged, the question of why people are 'chained to their chains' has been thought of as a potentially psychopolitical question. Simply, it seems that people somehow embrace conditions under which they are oppressed, or at least fail to take up opportunities to resist them, and this inertia has always puzzled revolutionaries. This need not mean reducing it to a purely psychological phenomenon, a kind of neurotic fear of change to be addressed through psychiatric treatment, though there are elements of that view to be found in some writers. Rather, the question is how and why the repressive features of the existing society come to be 'internalised' to such an extent that the subject believes in them, is emotionally invested in them, is unconsciously committed to them and, hence, is self-sabotaging when it comes to the opportunity for release. This question forces an engagement with the political concept of ideology as something more than a superstructural consequence of economic processes.

There was a small pantheon of early Freudo-Marxists who took this question on, for example, the members of the 'Children's Seminar' run in the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute by Otto Fenichel for the purpose of studying relations between psychoanalysis and politics (Jacoby, 1983). Among these, the excessive figure of Wilhelm Reich has come down to later generations as the embodiment of a politically daring thinker, part revolutionary icon, part tragic figure of persecution, part madman. As has been rehearsed in many places, Reich's (1946) account of psychopolitics holds tremendous attractions as an early riposte to linear reductionist thinking in which all psychic trials

are understood as the straightforward, unmediated consequence of economic woes, to wither away once the economic structure of society is set aright. For Reich, there is an important intervening process in which the 'character' of the subject is installed as 'armour' through patterns of authoritarianism, operating particularly through the family, and this character holds in check and distorts the natural sexual ebullience of the free subject. *Sexual* revolution is as necessary as political revolution if anything is to significantly change. In this way, Reich articulates the modern notion that political structures deeply affect subjecthood, constructing each person's consciousness and creating personality around ideological axes. In so doing, he delineates a broad concept of ideology as something that determines not just a person's perceptions but her or his character. Thus, he moves rather close to the contemporary notion of ideology as a force that positions or 'hails' (Althusser, 1971) subjects so that they experience themselves in the world in certain ways that are given by society but upon which they also have some capacity to act. Even though Reich still treats ideology as an error or distortion of reality, denying people the freedom to express their basic and 'natural' desires, the manner in which he describes the insertion of ideology into this natural core is both subtle and helpful, particularly his account of the tendencies central to the patriarchal-authoritarian family.

Reich's provocative yet problematic theory has acted as a partial springboard for many discussions of psychoanalytic politics. These tend to go on to debate the contribution of Marcuse (1955) and the Frankfurt School in elaborating a more sophisticated model that develops further the idea that society enters the psyche as sedimented orthodoxy, as a mode of 'second nature' that represents itself as truth in order to manage or repress the actual desires of the subject. A particularly important element in Marcuse's thinking is the idea that in late modernity the potential for libidinal release given by technological advances is counteracted by the creation of an 'administered society' in which repression is sustained through the management of pleasure itself. That is, the administered society *manages* pleasure rather than simply places restrictions upon it – it creates certain ways of enjoying, leading its subjects to believe that their needs are being met. This notion that society is in some way administered to *provide* enjoyment as a way to contain it is important for some contemporary thinking on how pleasure and lack go together, and on what this has to do with political processes. For both Reich and Marcuse, there is an image of a kind of fullness or 'too-muchness' of the drives that have to be managed in order for society to maintain itself. In the case of Marcuse (as in Freud), there is a level at which this is necessary for society to survive, whereas with Reich the issue is one of revolutionary transformation – a society purely of the drives is envisionable as the outcome of genuine sexual revolution.

Commenting on Theodor Adorno's (1967) version of this, which also employs the idea of 'naturalised' drives to which the subject becomes submitted, Žižek (1994) identifies the paradox that arises. In this, repression is made both essential and oppressive, feeding into a kind of paralysis of psychoanalysis when faced with the question of political liberation:

There is thus a radical and constitutive *indecision* which pertains to the fundamental intention of psychoanalytic theory and practice: it is split between the 'liberating' gesture of setting free repressed libidinal potential and the 'resigned conservatism' of accepting repression as the necessary price for the progress of civilization.

(Žižek, 1994: 12)

The 'indecision' to which Žižek refers has indeed characterised the history of psychoanalysis' involvement with radical politics, revolving around the question of whether there is an ineradicable core of antisocial impulse within the individual which has to be managed for society to survive. The distinction between repression and sublimation, which Žižek describes as being obscured in much theory, including that of the Frankfurt School, becomes important in making it possible to theorise a difference between a society that works solely to keep its subjects' urges in check by instituting an internal, repressive process and one which allows expression of these urges in socially recognisable ways. The latter is more aligned with social reformist situations and does two related but politically distinct things. On the one hand, if there is a legitimate distinction between repression as a process that drives wishes 'underground' and a life-enhancing way of expressing these wishes, there is a way of conceptualising political resistance as something more than another form of neurotic defence, and also a way of thinking about the prospects for change that does not have to adopt the attitude of 'resigned conservatism' described by Žižek above. On the other hand, resistance turned into sublimation is also a good description of much that occurs in the administered society. As this society becomes more complex, so it allows expressions of dissent which then get picked up and used in the service of the social order itself, thus averting radical change. The remarkable ability of late capitalism to deal with its critics by co-opting them is an excellent example of the workings of this kind of sublimation.

Relationality and social conflict

Since the Second World War, the concerns of psychoanalysis have in many places been diverted from the problems of managing inner drives and impulses to questions of human relatedness – of isolation and intimacy, of the interpersonal conditions that give rise to stable selves and of the fragilities of

dependency, destructiveness, love and loss. This 'relational turn' in psychoanalysis is reflected in the wide influence of 'British School' object relations and Kleinian psychoanalysis; in American self-psychology; and in contemporary intersubjectivist theory (see Aron and Mitchell, 1999; Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). The relational turn has also seeded some other useful developments in psychopolitical theorising. The core idea worked on in rather different ways in these approaches is that psychological and political well-being both depend on relational conditions that promote rather than stunt growth. These conditions are seen as entwined with processes of recognition and affirmation that are crucial for the developing human subject but that are systematically stymied by social inequalities and oppression. Layton (2008), for example, writing about the 'subject versus object' division argues for the importance of being recognised as a subject rather than treated 'like an object'. The latter, she claims, is a description of what it is like to be embedded in social processes of exclusion and derogation. For Layton, relationality is forged in a psychic space divided between tendencies to maintain the splits induced by cultural hierarchies, and hence shaped by 'relational trauma' that 'divide the subject against itself', and 'those parts of self that have known and are able to seek out relationships based in mutual recognition of self and other as separate but interdependent subjects' (Layton, 2008: 67). This kind of theorising, as Rustin (1995) has persuasively argued, is based on a 'positive' view of psychoanalysis in which the emphasis is on finding alternatives to, or ways out from, the constraints on human capacities wrought by oppressive social processes alongside psychic impulses that are themselves destructive in form. Conflict and destructiveness are recognised as real and are not whisked away, but the psychological and political momentum is towards identifying means to overcome them and to produce a more settled society, characterised by more fulfilling ('based in mutual recognition') relationships. Along the way, this involves identification of requirements for healthy psychic development and the kinds of social arrangements that might promote this. So, for example, Winnicott's (1960) ideas on how 'false', conformist selves arise have been influential among relational psychoanalysts in adumbrating the conditions of early parenting that result in secure subjects attuned to the possibility of trust and relational interdependence.

Many of these ideas have been taken up credibly in social theory, for instance in the work of Axel Honneth, to produce a reformist account of social change. Honneth (in Fraser and Honneth, 2003) examines social and political conflict as derived from a 'fundamental struggle for recognition that itself is the key to understanding the long-term development of social interaction in capitalist societies' (McNay, 2008: 271). Drawing directly on object relational and intersubjectivist psychoanalysis, Honneth suggests that healthy development is dependent on an accurate and sustaining experience of recognition from the parent, and that this developmental necessity can be writ large as a simple fact

of human experience. The argument here is that 'the desire for recognition is so fundamental to individual self-realization that it is the motivating force behind social development' (McNay, 2008: 273). 'Affective recognition', grounded in childhood experiences in the family, is thus the source for the kind of emotional stability and security of selfhood that is necessary for sustaining social life. It gives rise to 'legal' and 'status' recognition in a triad that as it develops produces new forms of human opportunity, but if blocked evidences distortions and constraints on freedom. In particular, claims for legal and status recognition can become the fuel for social struggle and collective resistance; that is, an essentially affective condition (the demand for recognition rather than, e.g., for resources) leads to political activity.

Honneth's model of social conflict has stirred up a great deal of interest and debate, with the positioning of affect at the heart of sociality being one of its attractive elements (because it counters the hyper-rationalism of much social theory), as well as a source of contention. What is of interest here is the use it makes of psychoanalytic theory as an account of recognition which is then extended into a description of the foundations of the human subject and thence as a prescription for social progress. This has a lot of face-value plausibility, and in particular it evidences the possibility of linking the intimacies of the supposedly personal sphere (the parent-child encounter, for instance) with the rationalities and irrationalities of social action. This link might explain the passion with which people struggle for fairness and equality, for recognition of themselves and for all the other elements that go into 'identity politics'. However, there is also a considerable amount of criticism of Honneth's reliance on this psychoanalytic model, which says something about the problems of importing psychoanalytic developmental thinking into political and sociological theory. Some of this relates to the familiar danger of reducing the political to the psychological. For instance, in her critique of Honneth's model of recognition, Fraser (in Fraser and Honneth, 2003) argues that its psychological focus displaces and reifies economic and social concerns to make all politics a matter of identity struggle. Not only is this unhelpfully reductionist in neglecting the specificity of the political domain, but it also tends towards conservatism (despite Honneth's attention to a wide range of modes of resistance) because of the adaptational tinge to it in which survival and acknowledgement in a particular social environment become central to healthy citizenship. McNay (2008: 218) particularly problematises the differentiation implicit in Honneth's writing between a realm of politics and a 'prepolitical' realm of feelings, which in essence involves relational immediacy and a mode of genuineness that lays down markers for later authenticity. The power of this account is that it facilitates a focus on emotion in social life and so allows one to gain theoretical leverage on the intensity of people's investments in politics. The problem, as McNay points out, is that it makes the political and social sphere subsidiary

to the psychological. Put more broadly, the relational model of psychoanalysis deployed in this way becomes one in which the subject loses its sociality through being postulated as an entity that is self-constituted prior to the operations of social forces. Relationality may be originary, but it tends to be reduced to promoting or thwarting the growth of the subject rather than *structuring* the subject from the start.

Lack and enjoyment in political thought

This brings us back to the perspective offered by Lacanian psychoanalysis, the exponents of which have framed the issues somewhat differently. There are a variety of ways into this, some of which are excessively abstract for this discussion. However, most Lacanian political theorists draw heavily on the classic Lacanian distinction between the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real as different 'registers' of experience relating in differing ways to sociopolitical phenomena and to the prospects for radical change. These registers have developmental origins (the Imaginary being loosely aligned with the narcissistic pre-Oedipal stages of development; the Symbolic with the Oedipal; and the Real with what precedes symbolisation), but more importantly they refer to differing ways in which the subject is positioned in relation to modes of knowledge and being. In Lacanian theory, the division between Imaginary, Symbolic and Real classifies a discrepancy between what is *imagined* to be true (the Imaginary fantasy of an ego that can function autonomously and with integrity, of a subject that can fully know the truth); what can be *symbolised* and consequently manipulated, investigated and analysed (so psychoanalysis itself operates in the domain of the Symbolic); and what can never be known, or can be known only at the edges or by its sudden appearance in moments of breakthrough (the Real). These elements of the Lacanian scheme frame a set of 'lacks' contributing in different ways to the subject as a social and political entity. One sense of 'lack' here is in reference to the subject as riven with splits; a second portrays the subject as intrinsically lacking in the sense of being cut off from the source of power, which always lies outside it as an Other that gives form and force to the subject's being. Both these types of lack are central to the Lacanian account of how the human subject is constituted. Indeed, the second type, which is essentially a description of how the Symbolic works, is vital to Lacanian ideas on sexual difference and on the construction of the subject in language. It stresses that the subject is not *a centre to itself*, but rather it is displaced and inhabited by something outside it. The subject is always constructed according to the desire of the Other, always answerable to a 'big Other' that is over and beyond itself and can perhaps be thought of as 'society' (among other things).

What is of political importance here in distinguishing the Symbolic from the Imaginary relationship to the Other is the postulation of the Other itself as

lacking, not as a fully formed answer to the subject's desire. That is, the subject is lacking because it is placed in a web of symbolic positioning which cuts it off from the source of its desire; but the Other is also lacking, because it makes demands on the subject, facing the subject with the question, 'What does the Other want?' The interesting point here is that the Other is conceptualised not as a solid structure of power that acts over and against the subject but as having a gap within itself that produces a desire of its own, which the subject is also immersed in. If the Other is lacking (if 'it needs me'), then the subject is faced with the question of what it is in the subject that is desired, and hence of what kind of lack in the Other can be filled by the (also lacking) subject. In this complex array of interlinked abstractions surrounding lack, one can just about glimpse a political theory, one which has been taken up by an array of commentators (e.g. Bosteels, 2006): the mutual construction of lacking subjectivities produces a play of investments that circulate between subject and Other and operate in the social field. For example, Hook (2008) shows persuasively how the perpetuation of apartheid depended both on a set of fantasy investments by its proponents, fuelled by envious longings and anxieties as well as greed, *and* on the existence of a social order that produced absence and exclusion as a means of sustaining itself, and hence inevitably generated a field of desire. This is because any process of boundary-making and exclusion creates the possibility and invitation to transgression (psychoanalysts above all know this, but so do lawyers), thus fuelling anxiety and more rigid defensiveness. Hook (2008: 287) comments, 'this state of affairs, the fact of such oscillations of agency, the "taking of turns" between the subject and the Other, indicates the need to consider the role of the unconscious, the unconscious understood in the Lacanian sense of the subjective locus of the Other'.

There is a third type of lack here, however, produced by the impossibility of symbolisation of the Real. The Real is constitutively unsymbolisable and as such always features as a lack at the centre of the human subject, and this has effects in generating a gap into which subjecthood must fall. Out of this come some possible political readings linked to the Lacanian endeavour. One is to conceptualise lack not only as promoting human creativity but also as always setting limits to it: there is never any closure in the political field, because there is always something left out. While this is anti-utopian in its implications, it also creates a constant pressure for newness, for seeking something else. This has some implications resonant of Cornelius Castoriadis' (1995) divergence from Lacanian orthodoxy, in which he focuses on the constant creativity of the human subject *in the imaginary* as a kind of generator of a stream of signifiers that gets broken into and constrained by the institutions of society, but which nevertheless is the source for radical imagination. However, this approach suffers from dividing the originary, essential psychic 'monad' off from the social, returning them to an oppositional relationship. In contrast, the 'orthodox'

Lacanian position maintains a stance that the Other (and hence the institutions of society) and the subject are never separable, that desire and creativity are produced by the Real. That is, meaning is not something pulsing away that is shaped or distorted by social pressures; there is no pure, transparent communication between subjects, for example. Instead, the openness of the Lacanian field is given by the fact that there are always gaps in the functioning of the Symbolic. It can never quite hold together because of the presence of something unsymbolisable at its core – which does not mean that the effort is never to be made to symbolise it, but rather that it can never be mastered. The ‘political’ here is the response to the constitutive lack within the subject and the Other. It

refers to the moment of failure of a given identity or social construction; a failure which not only dislocates the identity in question but also creates a lack, stimulating the desire for a rearticulation of the dislocated structure, stimulating, in other words, human creativity, becoming the condition of possibility for human freedom.

(Stavrakakis, 2007: 54)

That is, the fact of lack creates the desire for change – an idea that drives Stavrakakis’ belief in and commitment to radical democracy.

Reflexivity and revolution

The emphasis on lack in Lacanian political thought has been much criticised for its tendency to posit irrevocable exclusions to the social order and also for its abstractness, which to some has meant that it is more an account of ontology than of politics. It is also attacked for its negativism, even nihilism, which ironically can result in a conformism that reduces the prospects for change to that of coming to accept its impossibility (e.g. Robinson, 2004). While this is probably an extreme formulation, there is a genuine critical point to do with a question over the extent to which social change can occur if one assumes that lack is constitutive and unavoidable. As is suggested by the query posed by Žižek to Adorno’s work, quoted earlier, there is a difficulty about whether psychoanalysis is ever to be in a position to advocate change or whether it will always retain a ‘diagnostic’ edge, which means it can never commit to anything. This can lead to frustration with the Symbolic, in which it is possible to observe a wish to break through what seem to be interminable negotiations over meaning and attempts to advance understanding through reflection and careful thought, and instead to substitute a kind of nihilistic violence that shatters the existing order on the grounds that this might be the only way to escape its constraining power. In some of Žižek’s writing, for example, one can find a foregrounding

of 'terror' and also a writing style that is often apparently wilfully contrary, working through a systematic process of unsettling expectations by reversals and provocations. 'Today's "mad dance"', he writes, '... awaits its resolution in a new form of Terror' (Butler et al., 2000: 326); elsewhere he emphasises the difference between a false resistance and a radical act that basically smashes apart the symbolic order through the insurgence of the Real.

Stavrakakis (2007) argues that this advocacy of the break radically revises and is incompatible with the Lacanian emphasis on lack. It is a kind of impatience with it, which also relies on a belief in a 'divine miracle' that will dispense with negativity and create a new order. Even Žižek's use of the Lacanian trope of *jouissance* buys into this, despite its efficacy in instigating a penetrating analysis of apparently 'irrational' investments in political turmoil. At its broadest, *jouissance* references the 'enjoyment' that comes with immersion in the Real, with 'enjoyment' signifying how the subject gets taken up in unsymbolisable, irrational activity that makes it feel alive, yet which is also bizarre, overstated, excessive to the apparently realistic demands of the situation. In psychoanalytic treatment, the subject does this in relation to the symptom, which can be a nodal point holding the psyche together. Enjoyment also operates at the core of the political, as excessive phenomena (war, terror, nationalism) overwhelm the social order and subjects find themselves caught up in them. This is, as noted, an important idea that gives leverage on the extensive questions brought up by apparently irrational political and social acts – internecine conflicts, self-destructive political claims, obvious 'cost-benefit losers' that are clung onto until the bitter end. The idea that subjects might find these enlivening precisely because they allow expression to the unsymbolisable, excluded core of subjecthood is one that Lacanian theorists, and Žižek in particular, have contributed to political thought. It also, however, raises questions over whether this use of the concept of enjoyment is really 'Lacanian' and is not rather an appeal to a kind of vitalist life energy. That is, if *jouissance* is the answer, then perhaps the Lacanian/Freudian emphasis on avoiding pretence that there is a cure – that the analyst actually knows the truth of the subject – has been forgotten.

That said, Žižek often shows an exemplary allegiance to the Lacanian lesson that psychoanalysis is not a programme or policy for action but rather a critical discourse that is committed to returning subjects to what they can and cannot know. Where, for example, many contemporary social theorists see the reflexivity of contemporary society as a move towards emancipation, Žižek (2006) argues that it is now precisely this reflexivity that operates to preserve things as they are, for example by making the interpretations that could be offered by a psychoanalyst into something already known to the subject, who thinks about herself or himself in this way in the first place. Žižek's argument here is subtle and is pursued into a consideration of superego

violence, but for current purposes it is interesting mostly for its understanding of the efficacy of psychoanalysis as a model for activity in the political culture. 'Reflexive modernity' of the kind that would be promoted, for example, by Giddens (1991) is seen by Žižek as an instance of the absorption of analytic discourse into the administered society. Rather than giving leverage for revolutionary activity, this tendency removes the sting from psychoanalysis; that is, it becomes another instance in a long history of the blunting of the subversive edge of psychoanalysis, so that it becomes an agent, rather than a critic, of the status quo. If everyone is adept at using psychoanalytic ideas reflexively – if everyone already knows what their dreams mean in Freudian language – then psychoanalysis cannot surprise anyone, and it cannot speak any more from the margins in a way that will produce a radical shock. In Žižek's account, psychoanalysis always has to stay one step ahead, doing the unexpected – just as he does, perhaps playing the fool:

Traditionally, psychoanalysis was expected to allow the patient to overcome the obstacles which denied him or her access to 'normal' sexual enjoyment; today, however, when we are bombarded from all sides by different versions of the superego injunction 'Enjoy!', from direct enjoyment of sexual performance to enjoyment of professional achievement or spiritual awakening, we should move to a more radical level: today, psychoanalysis is the only discourse in which you are allowed *not* to enjoy (as opposed to 'not allowed to enjoy')... The desire that no longer needs to be sustained by the superego injunction is what Lacan calls the 'desire of the analyst'.

(Žižek, 2006: 304)

Much feeds into this idea of the desire of the analyst, but at the end of it there is an important question about the outcome of psychoanalytic politics. Drawing on the Lacanian idea of there being different 'discourses' that structure reality, Žižek writes:

Lacan's claim [is] that the discourse of the Analyst prepares the way for a new Master... The question, however, remains: how, *structurally*, does this new Master differ from the previous, overthrown one...? If there is no structural difference, then we are back with the resigned conservative wisdom about (a political) revolution as a revolution in the astronomic sense of the circular movement which brings us back to the starting point.

(Žižek, 2006: 307)

Žižek's own aspiration seems to be to construct new 'Master-signifiers' based on the disappearance of the Freudian unconscious (collapsing under the weight of self-reflexivity) and its replacement with a revolutionary break. He

acknowledges, however, that what this means is there could be a very narrow dividing line between the analyst and the totalitarian leader: 'the difference between them is the difference between the perverse social link (in which the pervert *knows* what the other really wants) and the discourse of the analyst who, while occupying the place of supposed knowledge, keeps it *empty*' (Žižek, 2006: 380). Can one trust the analyst to do this? Can one trust any revolutionary leader to provoke a break without reverting to the authoritarian mastery that she or he supposedly seeks to replace? The Lacanian answer to this would seem to be that it is unlikely that one can.

Perhaps once again we are back to the ambivalence found in the psychoanalytic concept of resistance: everything we intensely oppose, we also desire; every position we seek to overcome, we also wish to occupy. The predictability and eventual mundanity of these recurring events possibly contributes to the appeal of the call to 'revolutionary terror' as a way of breaking through repetitions by sweeping them all away, until, that is, one thinks of the consequences. Psychoanalysis offers a great deal of leverage here, in outlining the patterns of desire in which subjects become stuck. But there is still little evidence that psychoanalysis can point a way through it to something 'more real than the Real' which will put a stop to the cycles of power that continually impose themselves and create subject positions of predictable kinds, whichever individuals end up occupying them.

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5

Methodological Approaches in Political Psychology: Discourse and Narrative

Phillip L. Hammack and Andrew Pilecki

My fellow Americans, all of us in this grand hall and everybody watching at home, when we vote in this election, we'll be deciding what kind of country we want to live in. If you want a winner-take-all, you're-on-your-own society, you should support the Republican ticket. But if you want a country of shared opportunities and shared responsibility, a we're-all-in-this-together society, you should vote for Barack Obama and Joe Biden.

(Bill Clinton, 5 September 2012)

In his speech formally nominating US president Barack Obama for re-election at the 2012 Democratic National Convention, former President Bill Clinton used the power of language to forge a link between Obama and the would-be voter. He crafted contrasting societal narratives of 'you're-on-your-own' versus 'we're-all-in-this-together', evoking contrasting imagery of isolation versus community in the midst of hardship and linking these narratives to two distinct party ideologies. The speech was rhetorically constructed to motivate and inspire an electorate that had become increasingly complacent amidst continued economic decline and the bitterness of an ugly campaign. Clinton delivered a series of rational arguments about why re-electing Obama would be vital – arguments rooted at least in part, as he put it, in 'arithmetic'. Employing a rhetoric not just of reason but also of emotion ('And if you will renew the president's contract, you will feel it. You will feel it.'), he argued that Obama represented not just the sound, logical choice but the only hope for a politics of 'cooperation' rather than 'constant conflict'.

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Clinton's speech illustrates the way in which language is mobilised to influence a populace to engage in a particular act of political behaviour (in this case, casting a ballot for Obama–Biden). It illustrates the way in which politicians use rhetoric to persuade, to evoke, to engage an audience in an identification process by which his or her language becomes *my* language (Hammack, 2014). In other words, politics is, in large part, a language game in which authorities capitalise on fundamental psychological processes to motivate behaviour.

In this chapter, we position the use of narrative and discursive methods in political psychology in relation to the *linguistic mediation thesis* which links cognition, emotion and action to political settings and processes. Our aim is to connect these methods to a shared intellectual project within the interdisciplinary endeavour of political psychology – the project of linking politics and mind through language (Hammack and Pilecki, 2012). We argue that the study of language in relation to power, accessible through narrative and discursive methods, stands to elevate political psychology's contribution by integrating levels of analysis (person and setting) and explicitly seeking to explain human action.

We begin by describing the thesis of linguistic mediation that unites narrative and discursive methods in political psychology (Hammack and Pilecki, 2012). We ground this thesis in the history of interdisciplinary social science inquiry on language, context and mind. We then outline three specific methodological traditions: rhetorical and discursive psychology (RDP), critical discourse analysis (CDA) and narrative. For each approach, we present theoretical assumptions and practical guidelines, along with empirical examples related to political psychology.

Political psychology and the linguistic mediation thesis

The increasing interest in narrative and discursive methods in political psychology speaks to a more explicit embrace of the idea of linguistic mediation in the link among politics, mind and behaviour. The central tenet of linguistic mediation is that our encounter with the material aspects of the world is rendered sensible through language – systems of signification that, though arbitrary (de Saussure, 1916/1972), imbue meaning and guide action. In other words, human action commands a world of meaning anchored in language – a world in which we engage with words arranged in such a way as to evoke a cognitive, affective or behavioural response (Bruner, 1990). Common to both discourse and narrative is the idea that words cluster in such a way as to provide sensibility and coherence to more complex concepts or events. A key empirical question for political psychology is then how individuals appropriate or repudiate narratives and discourses as they engage with the material world.

An emphasis on language, thought and social context as co-constitutive is not new. Early theorists in the social sciences such as Sapir and Whorf saw thought itself as determined by the words and grammars available in a particular cultural context (e.g. Sapir, 1921, 1949; Whorf, 1956). For example, Whorf (1956) illustrated how the grammatical structure of the Hopi Indian language invokes a reality in terms of 'events', while most European languages are grammatically structured to convey a reality rooted in 'things'. Concepts like time, space and matter are not universally conveyed in the same way across language communities. Rather, the structure of languages often reveals a distinct cultural frame for collective sense-making of the material world (Whorf, 1956). Language thus both conveys and constructs a cultural reality as inhabitants learn it.

Early scholars of symbolic interactionism such as George Herbert Mead (1934) saw language as a particular form of communication, or 'gesture', which was negotiated in the social act. Symbolic interactionists view all social interaction – including all forms of communication – as sites of mediation and reconstruction of social and political realities. In other words, mind and self emerge in what Mead (1934) called the 'conversation of gestures' that characterises all social interaction – that interaction always oriented towards some 'generalised other' in reference to which we see ourselves as an object. Social interaction as well as its linguistic content is thus always constructed with reference to a community of shared understanding and shared symbolic forms. This perspective on language and social interaction would continue throughout the twentieth century (e.g. Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1967, 1981).

Ideas about social mediation in symbolic interactionism have considerable overlap with the cultural psychological approach to language and social practice. Vygotsky (1978) has been the most often called upon of these theorists within psychology, positing the concepts of 'inner speech' and 'social speech' and their convergence in practical activity. But the most explicit of these theorists with regard to language was Volosinov (1929/1973), who linked the use of signs to political projects associated with particular ideologies. Bakhtin (1981, 1984) argued that discourses contain 'voices' and that our engagement with language in discursive forms such as the novel is always dialogic. According to Bakhtin, language is comprised of 'living utterances' (1981: 276), always situated in a particular historical and political context. Through processes of internalisation and appropriation, individual psychology is shaped to serve ideological interests that maintain or challenge a given sociopolitical context (Bakhtin, 1981; Volosinov, 1929/1973).

These theoretical perspectives on language, thought and sociopolitical context emphasise the way in which words and their organisation shape individual consciousness in such a way as to serve some end related to social organisation. The theses of linguistic relativity (e.g. Sapir, 1921) and symbolic

interactionism (e.g. Mead, 1934), in which individuals would seem to possess significant agency in everyday language practice in social interaction, are more 'neutral' vis-à-vis political projects and the 'ideological state apparatus' (Althusser, 1971). The rise in popularity of a Marxist perspective on language in the 1970s, coinciding with the (re)discovery of the works of Volosinov, Bakhtin and Vygotsky, signalled a new politicisation of the concept of discourse.

The post-structural movement in social theory aimed to counter a neutral linguistic relativity, seeking to supplant this perspective with a view of language as intrinsically political and hegemonic (e.g. Butler, 1993; Foucault, 1972). Foucault hence illustrates how discourses about sex, sanity and punishment mandate particular forms of subjectivity – as in 'the homosexual' (Foucault, 1978) or 'the prisoner' (Foucault, 1977). Subjectivity here is understood not just in terms of a sense of 'self-consciousness' but also in terms of subjection to another by means of control or dominance (Foucault, 1982). Hence, post-structural theorists such as Foucault view language as inevitably hegemonic and serving the interests of a particular power configuration.

The general thesis of linguistic mediation in political psychology thus views language as co-constitutive of politics and thought within these general traditions of social theory and linguistic philosophy. Methods that emphasise discourse and narrative either explicitly or implicitly adopt this perspective on language, politics, mind and behaviour. In the remainder of this chapter, we outline three specific methodological traditions relevant to political psychology. These traditions should not be interpreted as isolated intellectual projects. Rather, they have mutually informed one another and show a degree of integration with regard to the interdisciplinary endeavour of political psychology (Hammack and Pilecki, 2012).

Rhetorical and discursive psychology

Theoretical assumptions

Rhetorical and discursive psychology (RDP) views language as a form of social action or practice developed in close engagement with opposing ideas about concepts presented in social texts (Billig, 1996; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Potter et al., 1993). Language does not reflect social reality; it actively constructs reality (Potter, 1996). The study of discourse is the study of texts, either realised in products like everyday conversations, interviews, media accounts or political speeches (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Discourse serves a social function by constructing versions of reality, as demonstrated by language variation, which individuals may come to internalise and reproduce through their own discursive practices (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Potter et al., 1990). Talk then serves the function of creating social categories and, in this

way, represents a vital form of social action for study (Edwards, 1991; Edwards and Potter, 1992).

A key theoretical contribution in RDP is the concept of *interpretative repertoire*. Potter and Wetherell define interpretative repertoires as 'recurrently used systems of terms used for characterising and evaluating actions, events, or other phenomena' (1987: 149). They are 'clusters of terms... and figures of speech often clustered around metaphor or vivid images and often using distinct grammatical constructions and styles' (Potter et al., 1990: 212). Interpretative repertoires, in effect, represent the background knowledge from which versions of actions, self and social structures are manufactured through talk (Potter and Wetherell, 1995a).

The epistemological implications of these theoretical assumptions are significant. Chiefly, a concern with language use in everyday, naturalistic settings challenges the hypothetico-deductive approach at the core of mainstream psychology (Potter and Wetherell, 1995b). Rather, the RDP approach is rooted in an interpretive, inductive epistemology concerned with language as a form of social action. The aim is to discover and analyse the way in which texts illustrate variations that reveal the function of language for social relations and individual understanding. The focus is on interrogating practices through the lens of language and social interaction (Potter, 1998). Discursive psychology is thus anchored in a constructionist perspective and a relativist, rather than a realist, metatheory common in traditional experimental psychology (Potter, 1996, 1998).

Practical guidelines

Rather than as either specific paradigm or method, RDP is better viewed as an approach characterised by particular theoretical and metatheoretical assumptions (Potter, 2003). RDP is theoretically rich and anchored in constructionist claims about the relationship between thought and action via language. Theoretical rigor does not, however, reduce the emphasis on empiricism in this approach. Rather than the standard collection of self-report data or observational data that characterises traditional psychology, RDP focuses on the analysis of texts, hence representing a form of qualitative methodology.

The analytic emphasis in RDP is on how language is used within texts to fulfil particular social actions, such as justifying, explaining, blaming and the like. Speech is viewed as inherently rhetorical, concerned with the art of persuasion (Billig, 1996). A considerable amount of research has focused on the social category constructions put forward within political rhetoric, specifically the means by which social categories are used to legitimise collective action (e.g. Reicher and Hopkins, 1996; Reicher et al., 2006). Illustrating the ways in which social categorisation constitutes a form of *social action*, Reicher and Hopkins (1996) noted the rhetorical construction of common in-group categories within

anti-abortion speeches directed to members of the medical community. The formation of a common in-group was predicated on claims emphasising the similarities between the two communities (e.g. both are principled and caring). Such a rhetorical strategy, Reicher and Hopkins (1996) argue, aimed to persuade members of the medical community to support anti-abortion positions as well as marginalise the pro-choice community.

RDP studies draw upon textual data, including interviews, conversational data, media reports, political speeches or any other textual source. Interview data is treated as a socially constructed interaction between researcher and interviewee, which leads to an analysis of interview data as interaction rather than simply responses of interviewees (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Because many advocates of RDP were influenced by the methodology of conversation analysis (CA; Sacks, 1992), transcription of textual data often proceeds carefully so as to capture the nuances of the interaction (e.g. length of pauses, intonation, etc.). However, unlike CA, discourse analysis in RDP is more interested in the content and function of utterances in a larger sequence, which leads to less of an emphasis on microlinguistic features of the data compared with sociolinguists or some who use CA (see Wooffitt, 2005).

Because of its inductive nature, RDP does not rely upon hypotheses. Potter (1998) compares discursive psychology with ethology and astronomy, sciences that rely upon observational data rather than experimentation. Discursive psychologists often code data, but this coding proceeds more along the lines of a grounded theory, line-by-line approach (Charmaz, 2006) than coming to a corpus of data with a priori categories or quantifying coded data, as is more common in traditional content analysis. Discursive psychologists approach their data with theoretical guidance about a phenomenon (e.g. Wetherell and Potter's (1992) analysis of racist discourse in New Zealand), but the inductive, interpretive approach allows for discovery of potentially unexpected findings and anomalies. For example, Pilecki and Hammack (2013) analysed conversations about history between Israeli and Palestinian youth participating in intergroup contact. They discovered a 'victim versus righteous victim' interpretative repertoire of history whereby Palestinian utterances reflecting victimisation were countered by Israeli utterances reflecting justification. They argued that this repertoire served as the basis for social category construction and competition for moral status in conversations.

Data analysis in RDP is interpretive, in the sense that the analyst brings his or her particular lens to the data in such a way as to identify themes, patterns and functions. As in ethnographic and other qualitative approaches, reflexivity of position is key, as the analyst must always consider the way in which his or her interpretations are influenced by his or her status vis-à-vis the population or phenomenon of study. For example, Wetherell and Potter (1992) acknowledge

their own particular statuses in relation to the context of British colonialism and racism in New Zealand as they analyse their interview data.

Proponents of RDP, though recognising the interpretive nature of data analysis, often argue for the utility of validation procedures, thus seeking to enhance the credibility of analysis (e.g. Potter, 1998). The presentation of raw data in its intact form is key to the credibility of discourse analysis in RDP, as reader evaluations form an important part of the validation process (Potter, 1998). This approach to the reporting of findings is distinct from traditional quantitative approaches that report aggregate statistics and inferential analyses, rather than raw data.

Some discursive analysts propose an approach that goes beyond text and talk, viewing discourse as an embodied practice tied to identity and place. This approach emphasises the 'lived reality' of discursive practices and how they ultimately reinforce the relations among groups (see Durrheim, 2012; Durrheim and Dixon, 2005). Describing how the lived reality of racial segregation remains in post-Apartheid South Africa, Durrheim and Dixon (2005) note how the infrequency with which Blacks and Whites share the physical space of a recently desegregated beach, coupled with the mutually antagonistic attitudes they express, reflects both the 'lived reality' of racial separation as well as the mutually constitutive relationship between language and spatio-temporal reality (see also Durrheim, 2012).

Lastly, RDP research does lend itself to experimental inquiry despite the epistemological discrepancies that exist between the two approaches (see Potter, 2003). In cases such as these, the effect of particular category constructions (e.g. Herrera and Reicher, 1998) or discursive accounts of events (e.g. Verkuyten, 2005) is examined experimentally. Exemplifying the latter, Verkuyten (2005) found that exposure to immigration rhetoric featuring a 'lack of choice' repertoire (i.e. immigrants are forced to come to the Netherlands) significantly increased support for multiculturalism in comparison to the 'personal choice' repertoire (i.e. immigrants choose to live in the Netherlands). The use of a particular repertoire over the other was thus associated with attitudes regarding the proper place of immigrants within Dutch society.

In sum, the practice of most RDP research emphasises the analysis of texts using an inductive, interpretive approach that can integrate design principles common in mainstream psychology (e.g. experimentation), but more commonly involves methodological practices common to other social science disciplines such as sociology, linguistics and anthropology. Careful attention in analysis is given to the *functional* nature of language with regard to social categories and intergroup relations, thereby directly interrogating political contexts and configurations through analysis of linguistic practices. There is no single blueprint for how to conduct research in RDP, but numerous examples suggest

a flexible set of procedures that adhere to fundamental assumptions and call upon key theoretical ideas.

Critical Discourse Analysis

Theoretical assumptions

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) shares RDP's concern with naturally occurring language and an analytic concern with larger units of utterances than is common in sociolinguistic research (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). But CDA diverges from RDP in its more explicit concern with the way in which language is used to represent ideologies and maintain hegemony. Thus, language as used in interaction is assumed to perform social actions that fulfil ideological functions with regard to an existing set of power relations. Discourse is not considered neutral vis-à-vis systems of domination, especially the state and its apparatus (Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 1993).

CDA is founded on the key theoretical assumption that inequalities are reproduced in discourse, understood broadly as a linguistic form of social practice that seeks to reinforce dominant ideologies and the social structures they promote (Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 1993). Central concepts in CDA research are *power*, *ideology* and *hegemony*. CDA scholars are concerned with mapping the way in which language is a tool to maintain dominance. The focus on discourse allows for elaboration of how ideologies are embodied in the material reality of language in everyday social practices. Influenced by Marx and Althusser, CDA scholars view ideologies as 'significations/constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social identities), which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive practices, and which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination' (Fairclough, 1992: 87). Discourse thus empirically reveals the process of domination through ideology and affords a window into the attempt of dominant groups to maintain or secure their hegemony.

Central to the theoretical foundation of CDA is the notion that discourse and social structure are inherently *dialectic*, which provides an entrée into the study of social change (Fairclough, 1992, 2010). Just as discourse is the means by which dominant groups secure hegemony, so too can subordinate groups use discourse to resist and potentially reconfigure social structure. Some CDA researchers argue that the primary aim of CDA is to take a more 'top-down' approach emphasising dominance over resistance (e.g. van Dijk, 1993). Regardless of emphasis, though, the dialectical theoretical stance of CDA allows for a multidimensional analysis that speaks broadly to intergroup relations and power.

Key to the dialectic frame of CDA is the notion of *intertextuality* – the idea that texts contain pieces of other texts, that they are sites of reference for one

another and may 'assimilate' or 'contradict' one another (Fairclough, 1992). The idea of intertextuality can be linked to Bakhtin's (1984) notions of multivocality or polyphony in discourses. In CDA, attention to intertextuality mandates an appreciation for the history of language and discursive practice, such that the analyst is able to fully consider the relationship among texts (Fairclough, 1992, 2003).

CDA views ideologies as embodied in discursive practices, but these practices are reliant on cognitive models and social representations (van Dijk, 1993). That is, CDA views knowledge, attitudes and beliefs as structural inequities internalised and then deployed in discursive practice. Thus, CDA is concerned with *social cognition*; understood as socially distributed ideas, beliefs and attitudes; and is intrinsically multilevel in its conceptual foundation and analysis (van Dijk, 1993, 2008). Dominance is reproduced as individuals internalise and appropriate discursive practices that maintain the hegemony of some groups over others. The analysis of attempts to control and manipulate by using discourse to determine social cognition is at the heart of some forms of CDA (e.g. van Dijk, 1993, 2008).

An explicitly Foucauldian approach to CDA emphasises the sociopolitical context of knowledge, its sources of authority, its constitutive role with regard to subjectivity and the consequences of this configuration for society (Jäger and Maier, 2009). The focus of Foucauldian CDA is thus more narrowly on the knowledge–power–subjectivity link, and discourse – how phenomena are 'spoken about' (Foucault, 1982) – serves to regulate and reproduce forms of domination. Foucauldian approaches are typically concerned with the way in which phenomena are represented in a 'discourse plane' (e.g. the media; Jäger and Maier, 2009), and empirical analysis considers discourse strands and fragments guided by a concern with knowledge and power (Jäger and Maier, 2009). Central to a Foucauldian approach is consideration not just of discourse in its linguistic or textual form but also in its 'materiality' – the way in which it is embodied in the material world (Hook, 2001). Thus, the Foucauldian approach must go 'in and out of' texts in its analysis, more so than other forms of discourse analysis (Hook, 2001; see also Hook, 2005).

Practical guidelines

CDA does not constitute a clearly defined methodology but rather an approach to the study of language and power anchored in critical principles (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). Like RDP, its general methodological approach is more closely aligned with interpretive and hermeneutic approaches than deductive methods (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). Hence the analyst uses his or her own lens to make meaning of textual or other forms of discursive data, always reflexive of his or her position.

CDA researchers call for a multidimensional, multilevel approach to analysis. Fairclough's (1992) three-dimensional model views analysis of texts, discursive practices and social practices as interlinked. Text analysis includes vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, text structure and the 'force' of utterances (Fairclough, 1992, 2003). But the overall effort is interpretive and concerned with linking language to social life. Fairclough (2003) notes that this approach to language analysis stands in contrast to Chomsky's (1957) concern with language as reflective of 'syntactic structures' or underlying grammars.

In CDA, the analyst is charged with documenting how language is deployed to maintain dominance or an existing social context of structural asymmetry. For example, Tileaga (2007) has argued that people employ discourses rooted in ideologies of moral exclusion in order to justify prejudice and discrimination. Within this framework, specific groups are viewed as transgressive of normative and place-appropriate conduct. In a series of interview studies, Tileaga (2005, 2006, 2007) found that middle-class Romanian professionals employed this discursive strategy to justify discrimination against Romanies. Depicted as 'living in dirt', Romanies become objects of repulsion against the standards of 'civilised' society. As such, prejudice and discrimination against Romanies becomes normative (Tileaga, 2007).

The precise nature of how one goes about organising analysis in CDA is intentionally left unstandardised, though Fairclough (1992, 2003, 2010) offers some measures of guidance. A project relying upon CDA begins by identifying a focus of inquiry related to some social inequality. The analyst then accumulates a corpus of data that will shed light upon this problem. The corpus may consist of written or spoken text, transcribed according to the needs for analysis. Analysis then proceeds from initial description of the use of language to interpretation (Fairclough, 2001) – from the 'what' to the 'how' with regard to the maintenance of hegemony.

An explicit Foucauldian approach to CDA emphasises the micropolitical components of power and domination, specifically how they are enacted within daily practices and social relations and the ways in which discourse informs subjectivity (Jäger and Maier, 2009; see Yates and Hiles, 2010). For example, Hyde (2000) examined popular media in New Zealand between 1930 and 1950 and found that women's bodies were constructed as sites of surveillance and discipline. Discourses regarding beauty, sexuality and the role of women were thus the means through which the female body was managed and female subjectivity was constructed to suit the needs of society before, during and after the Second World War. Illustrating the use of a Foucauldian approach with interview data, Gavey (1989) analysed women's accounts of sexual encounters and noted how discourses of sexual liberation and male 'needs' placed them within subject positions in which non-consent was inconceivable. Reflecting CDA's emphasis on social dominance, Gavey (1989) concluded that

discourses of female sexuality place women in subject positions that ultimately reproduce a form of heterosexual gender relations in which women lack power.

Narrative

Theoretical assumptions

Narrative is conceived as a conceptual link between politics and mind by viewing the individual's engagement with the world of politics as fundamentally storied (Hammack, 2014). Narrative seeks to link mind and politics through language, both in the form of the *personal narrative* and the *master narrative*. While the personal narrative represents an individual's generated account of life events and the meaning of social and political categories, the master narrative represents a cultural script about the meaning of social categories that exists in cultural artefacts and mass texts such as media representations (Hammack, 2011b). Individuals engage with master narratives in the course of their development and construct personal narratives that either reproduce or repudiate key elements – a psychological process with important implications for social stasis and change (Hammack, 2011a, 2011b). The key distinction between discourse and narrative approaches is that narrativists are more concerned with the way in which coherent storylines – featuring plots, characters, themes and forms – are appropriated. Narrativists assume that stories are central elements of human cognition which significantly impact social and political behaviour, including the way in which individuals make meaning of political conflict or social transformation (e.g. Andrews, 2007; Barber, 2009; Hammack, 2011a).

Narrative approaches in political psychology are anchored in four principles (see Hammack and Pilecki, 2012). First, politics and thought are mutually constituted through linguistic practices of narration. The structural configuration of power and interest in a society presents itself to subjects as a storyline about groups and intergroup relations, but this storyline is a site of dynamic co-construction between master and personal narratives (the idea of *narrative engagement*; Hammack, 2011b). Second, the formation of personal narratives represents a universal psychological process by which individuals achieve coherence (e.g. Cohler, 1982). A key aspect of personal narrative development is decision-making (conscious or unconscious) about the content of master narratives, such as whether one appropriates the rhetoric of racism or ethnocentrism in the context of multiculturalism or intergroup conflict. Third, narrative is key to the formation and maintenance of collective solidarity in thought, word and action, as nation-states and cultural groups seek to instil a sense of common consciousness (e.g. Hammack, 2008). Here concepts of collective memory and the Durkheimian emphasis on collectives are central to the work of political psychologists who call upon narrative (e.g. Bar-Tal, 2007). Finally, narratives are conceived not as static texts but as constructed through

social practice – through acting upon the material world, often motivated by emotion and embodied in social movements (e.g. Andrews, 2007).

Practical guidelines

Like RDP and CDA, narrative represents more a conceptual and epistemological approach to political psychology than a specific set of precise methodological procedures. Narrativists begin with the assumption that *organised language* in story form represents a key site of inquiry. Data collection and analysis proceed with more attention to the holistic features of text segments than to the more minute features of language that sometimes even discursive psychologists emphasise. Transcription proceeds with less attention to the microlinguistic features of conversation than that the clear meaning of the text segment is conveyed.

Because political psychologists are concerned with multiple levels of analysis (e.g. person, context), narrativists within the discipline are interested in both personal and collective (master) narratives. Personal narrative data are typically collected via interview methods, such as a life-story interview (e.g. Hammack, 2011a). Personal narrative data may also include memoirs and other autobiographical records or other forms of personal documents (see Plummer, 2001).

To analyse master narratives, historical documents (e.g. party platform documents), political speeches and/or media accounts are typically assembled in an initial corpus of data. The goal here is to identify the way in which politics and social categories are constructed in more official accounts. For example, Buckley-Zistel (2009) examined the historical narrative disseminated by the Rwandan government and noted its emphasis on the ethnic unity that existed before the colonial era. Construing the ethnic division between Hutus and Tutsis that culminated in the 1994 genocide as a product of colonialism, this view of history reinforces efforts to instil ethnic unity by effectively erasing ethnic labels from public discourse and stifling the spread of alternative historical narratives.

Narrative analysis may proceed along either an inductive approach in which story elements emerge from the data, more consistent with grounded theory (e.g. Charmaz, 2006), or a deductive approach in which the presence of particular story forms or themes may be anticipated based upon theory. Narrative data are often analysed according to *form* and *thematic content*. Formal analysis is concerned with the overall pattern of stories that emerges in the data. For example, stories in which central characters undergo formidable challenges but end in a positive place are considered *redemptive* or *descent-and-gain* narratives in form (Lieblich et al., 1998; McAdams and Bowman, 2001). Stories in which central characters undergo challenges but end in a negative place are considered *contaminated* or *tragic* narratives in form (Gergen and Gergen, 1983;

McAdams and Bowman, 2001). Analysis of form may proceed according to coding of sequences (e.g. McAdams et al., 2001) or by graphic analysis of overall story form as obtained through a 'life-line' drawing or life satisfaction chart (e.g. Hammack, 2006).

Thematic content analysis of narrative data is interpretive and may occur either through an inductive, open-coding approach in which themes emerge from the data or a deductive, theory-derived coding approach. Given their inherent interest in language and processes of meaning-making, though, narrative researchers often employ an 'adductive' approach that combine both inductive and deductive methods. For example, Fattah and Fierke (2009) examined Islamist narratives for thematic content related to humiliation and betrayal. They then employed an interpretive analytical framework to uncover how the themes of humiliation and betrayal were used to frame relations between the Islamic and non-Islamic world. Using this analytical framework Fattah and Fierke (2009) found that relations with the United States are framed as the latest incarnation of the subordination that Muslims have experienced historically. Within this interpretive framework, moreover, the Islamist political project of re-establishing a transnational Muslim collective (*Ummah*) is legitimised as a means of restoring dignity.

Because political psychologists study contexts that range from active sites of war and conflict to stable liberal democracies, the themes that emerge in narrative analysis are likely to be context-specific. However, some theories in political psychology specify themes expected to occur in particular narrative contexts. For example, Bar-Tal's (2007) theory of the 'sociopsychological infrastructure' of intractable conflict posits particular psychological processes presumed to operate in conflict settings, such as victimisation and positive differentiation. In some cases, narrative investigators may wish to code and analyse narrative data according to these types of a priori thematic categories.

Narrative research does not preclude the integration of experimental (e.g. Pilecki and Hammack, 2013) and quasi-experimental (e.g. Charlick-Paley and Sylvan, 2000) designs. Such studies have the ability to show how context affects the form and content of narratives. For example, Charlick-Paley and Sylvan (2000) compared French and Soviet military officer accounts made before and after each country lost their respective empires. Charlick-Paley and Sylvan (2000) found partial support for their hypothesis that officer narratives would change to justify the loss of empire. While some provided a narrative that justified the loss of empire and framed it as desired and positive outcome, a portion of officers retained elements of the prior narrative and described the loss of empire in terms of abandonment and marginalisation of the military. In employing a quasi-experimental design, Charlick-Paley and Sylvan (2000) illustrate the mutability of narratives within the context of drastic sociopolitical change.

In sum, narrative approaches in political psychology are fundamentally concerned with meaning-making through stories. There is an emphasis on how language coheres to form a story that appeals to the narrative mode of thought (Bruner, 1986), thereby motivating individuals to act in ways that support or challenge a given political context. Like RDP and CDA, narrative analysis is intentionally unstandardised but follows a set of theoretical assumptions and an interpretive, hermeneutic approach to language and its deployment.

Conclusion

From the rhetoric of politicians to media representations of political conflict and social movements, words are vehicles for the control and regulation of thought, feeling and behaviour. The way in which language is used to describe and construct sensibility of the world and its distribution of power is the subject of inquiry for political psychologists who use narrative and discourse. This concern with language can be linked both to classic social science perspectives that recognise the power of words to mediate our engagement with the material world (e.g. Mead, 1934), as well as more critical perspectives that emphasise the relationship between language and power (e.g. Foucault, 1972).

Since its emergence as an interdisciplinary project uniting politics and mind, political psychology has tended to employ methodological approaches consistent with the mainstream traditions of psychology and political science. The increasing rate at which political psychologists are calling upon narrative and discursive methods reveals a shift towards more critical epistemological perspectives, as well as towards a more critical interrogation of social and political categories constructed in and through language (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). The purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of three specific traditions political psychologists have called upon when they invoke discourse or narrative. Our goal was to reveal the common intellectual origin of these perspectives in a thesis of linguistic mediation whereby persons and political contexts are mutually constituted.

Common to narrative and discourse approaches is a constructionist view of the world in which social and political categories are not considered natural human kinds but rather as themselves discourses about power and social hierarchy (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Regardless of whether one's analysis occurs within the framework of RDP, CDA or narrative, the empirical project of this strand of political psychology is to use methods that reveal language as a tool to perform action on the world (in RDP), maintain or advance hegemony (in CDA) and provide individuals with a sense of coherence as they take actions consistent with a particular storyline about the political world (in narrative). Hence narrative and discourse approaches have the potential to illuminate processes

of social stasis and change as they unfold in linguistic practices, including conversations and personal accounts, as well as attempts at political mobilisation (e.g. speeches).

In the twenty-first century, political psychology stands to serve a vital public interest by providing the kind of interdisciplinary analysis that fuses levels and perspectives to interrogate politics in motion. In the context of an increasingly connected and globalised political world, methods that are able to reveal the way in which language is deployed to challenge or maintain inequalities and conflicts are vital (Nesbitt-Larking and Kinnvall, 2012). Narrative and discourse provide both conceptual frameworks and practical prescriptions for the interrogation of language, power and social relations that stands to elevate the contributions of political psychology.

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6

Dialogical Approaches to Psychology and Ethics

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A dialogical conceptualisation of the self was originally developed in psychology by Hermans and colleagues (1992; Hermans, 2001) to provide an understanding of the self as multi-vocal and created in dialogue within the self and between the self and the other. Today, research in disciplines other than psychology has increasingly been influenced by this body of work. In particular, a strand of research analysing the dynamics of contemporary multicultural societies from a dialogical perspective is emerging (e.g. Bhatia and Ram, 2001; Harré and Moghaddam, 2003; Kinnvall and Lindén, 2010). Related to this work, a number of scholars are developing an approach to ethics where difference is seen as neither threatening nor abnormal but rather as a normal condition of being (e.g. Arnett, 2001; Nesbitt-Larking, 2009; Scuzzarello, 2009, 2010). Taken together, these studies point at possible linkages between psychology and politics, and they are good examples of what can be achieved within the framework of political psychology.

This chapter begins with a critical overview of how dialogical self theory has progressed in recent research within psychology. Particular attention is given to how different scholars have theorised the relation between self and other in a dialogical self. One of the main tenets of this theoretical framework is the assumption that dialogue between self and other and within the self is not only important for the development of a sense of identity. Dialogue is also essentially ethical. In the third section of the chapter, I focus on how researchers have developed an ethic that takes into account the fundamentally dialogical nature of psychology and social relations. Particular consideration is given to how dialogical ethics may contribute to develop responsive answers to the cultural and moral diversity that characterises today's globalised world.

The modern and the dialogical self

Until recently, a cardinal assumption of mainstream social sciences has been that the individual possesses a core self, which is independent from the surrounding social relations. Individuals were seen as having a core self,

bounded and autonomous. This understanding has been elaborated by philosophers such as Descartes and Hobbes during the Enlightenment, and it sees individuals as 'self-contained' (Sampson, 1988), independent and defined predominantly in terms of abstract, internal attributes like attitudes and abilities which are largely unaffected by the social context. Charles Taylor writes that in this perspective, the self is 'ideally disengaged, that is free and rational to the extent he has fully distinguished himself from the natural and social worlds' and that the self is 'ideally ready as free and rational to treat these worlds [...] instrumentally' (Taylor, 1995: 5). The self is an autonomous entity with clear boundaries between self and others (Richardson et al., 1998).

Scholars working in several post-positivist traditions argue that this notion of the disengaged, individualistic self is implausible. They instead understand the self as historically particular, fully embedded in social relations and created in a dialectic relationship between the person and the society surrounding her. Authors such as Gergen (1999), advocate the adoption of a situated linguistic and narrative construction of identity. According to this perspective, a person's understanding of self-identity is constructed through a process of acceptance, reformulation and adaptation of other people's stories about her and her positions in society (McAdams, 1985).

The idea of the dialogical self is part of these post-positivist debates. It draws on Mikhail Bakhtin's work on 'polyphony' in the novels of Dostoevsky and his understanding of human relations. Bakhtin, a Russian philosopher and literary critic working in Soviet Russia during the 1920s, argues that Dostoevsky managed to break with a monologic novelistic genre where the author monopolises meaning. As an alternative, Dostoevsky created what Bakhtin calls 'the polyphonic novel' (1994: 89–96) whereby the story is made up by a multiplicity, a polyphony, of voices of which the writer's is only one among many. The characters in Dostoevsky's novels are always forced in a dialogue with each other so that each character can begin a process of introspection and self-consciousness. To Bakhtin, the dialogical relationships among the voices of the characters and that of the author reflect 'the dialogic nature of human life and human thought itself' (1994: 96). This means that the notion of dialogue does not only refer to the characteristics of the polyphonic novel but is rather a characterisation of the essential nature of human personality. Every individual constructs his or her social world dialogically in terms of others. This perspective has informed specific psychological insights which conceptualise the *I* as being constituted through his or her relationship with the other.

Dialogical self theory

In developing a theory of the self as dialogical, Hubert Hermans (2001; Hermans et al., 1992) applies Bakhtin's work on the polyphonic novel to psychology. Following from this, Hermans et al. conceptualise the self as 'a dynamic

multiplicity of relatively autonomous *I* positions in an imaginal landscape' (1992: 28). 'Position' here refers to an account that is given about a person's place in the order of things and that impinges on the possibility of interpersonal, intergroup and even intrapersonal action (Harré and van Langenhove, 1999).¹ As in a novel by Dostoyevsky, where several characters coexist, each having his or her own voice and telling a story, the self is characterised by several positions. The *I* can endow each position with a voice, thus enabling the establishment of dialogical relationships between positions. Each voice has a story to tell about its experiences, resulting in a complex, narratively structured self (Hermans, 1996).

The limits of the self are not within the *I*. Rather, the self is constituted through interdependent relationships with the other, be it another individual, group, culture, institution and so on (Marková, 2003a). For instance, when an immigrant from Somalia arrives to the United Kingdom, she or he is introduced to perceptions and stories about Somalis as well as to the immigration heritage of Somalis already living in the territory. It is therefore likely that a Somali immigrant's sense of self, or *I*, will be engaging in dialogue with positions already existing in her or his 'imaginal landscape', narratives about tradition, home and loyalty to their national or religious community. This person will also construct her world in dialogue with the social world to which she migrates and the positions about being Somali created by others which see, for example, British Somalis as criminals, 'welfare frauds', Muslim extremists or as subservient Muslim women (Sporton et al., 2006). Being part of a migrant group involves therefore complex negotiations with the immigration history of the receiving country, its policies and stereotypical assumptions about a group, as well as a sense of 'home' and belonging that is imported from the homeland (Bhatia and Ram, 2001; Kinnvall, 2004).

The voices expressed by the different *I*-positions can be in contrast with each other and their internal interchange is characterised by negotiation, power, conflict and domination. In fact, the voices of some positions are more predominant and have on some occasions more opportunities for expression than others (Hermans, 2002). These voices are authoritative, demanding our unconditional allegiance and therefore not in dialogue with other voices or positions (Bakhtin, 1994: 78). Returning to our example of Somali immigrants to the United Kingdom, they will have to negotiate between different voices about, for example, the United Kingdom and their homeland (even if they have never been there), about proper and inappropriate behaviour and about being a British Somali and being a Somali from other European countries (Scuzzarello, forthcoming). Dialogical negotiations will take place between opposite *I*-positions. These negotiations will be multi-layered and complex as the voices of family, friends, homeland and British society are all represented in the dialogical self (Bhatia and Ram, 2001).

The voices expressed by the *I*-positions have evaluative and normative dimensions. People will try to adopt good stories that position them positively in the context in which they operate, and they will attempt to avoid or contain bad ones (Taylor, 1989). Peter Raggatt emphasises this moral aspect in his work on the dialogical self. He argues:

The narrating self involves taking moral positions, exploring conflicting ideas about what constitutes 'the good', through dialogue between voices occupying very different subject positions. From this, it can be argued that identity is constituted by good and bad stories in dialogical relationship.

(Raggatt, 2000: 69)

In this view, the array of possible selves, of who we would like to become and who we are afraid of becoming, is shaped by the social order in which they are created and developed. The *I*-positions in the landscape of mind are contingent upon the range of societal norms which define good and bad, honourable and dishonourable and belonging and non-belonging in a specific context. Positions are thus associated with particular rights, duties and obligations. Conceived in such a way, positions set the moral boundaries for social action. Indeed,

[A] position implicitly limits how much of what is logically possible for a given person to say and do and is properly a part of that person's repertoire of actions at a certain moment in a certain context.

(Harré and Moghaddam, 2003: 5)

This entails that the self can be theorised not only in strictly psychological terms but also in moral and political terms. The individual is not deprived of agency, however. The ways one positions oneself in relation to dominant social narratives varies from person to person, her life experience and personality. In this sense positioning requires agency (Adams and Markus, 2001). The positions provided by the socio-cultural context in which one operates can be challenged through the creation of counter-narratives creating new positions. In this way we can explain for instance the emergence of the gay movement as presenting a counter-narrative to the hegemonic heterosexual narrations of family life.

A number of authors have tried to conduct empirical work from a dialogical perspective. While there is no methodology that is *a priori* dialogical, a variety of methodologies can be used dialogically given that the analyst's epistemological and theoretical assumptions are dialogical (Sullivan, 2011). For instance, Ivana Marková et al. (2007) discuss at length the focus-group method. They elaborate on how the data deriving from focus groups can be analysed to maintain

the dialogical complexity of the discussions between participants and not to reduce it to a list of quotes illustrating the discussions. Marková et al. draw upon several analytical assumptions. First, the importance of understanding how the participants' social roles (their gender, age, profession) influence the way in which they will take on certain positions within the group. Second, the significance of accounting for the participant's heterogeneity – that is, the various voices used in the construction of her argumentation (when is the participant talking from her *I*-position as a mother? When is she talking from the *I*-position of being a lawyer? In what ways is the discussion in the focus group affected by these voices?). The third important aspect of dialogical analysis of focus group data is the understanding of each contribution in the discussion as the result of collective and dynamically created constructions that create the context for the next contribution. This is called 'internal framing' (Marková et al., 2007: 64) and brings the researcher's attention to the actual staging of the focus group and to the different topics, arguments and counter-arguments which are taken up in the discussion. The analyst should also consider the importance of the 'external framing' of the focus group, for instance the instructions given to the participants to understand how apprehensions have been formed beforehand. Finally, a dialogical analysis of focus-group material requires the understanding of the implicit and explicit assumptions about values or social rules that form the taken-for-granted background to communication.

One of the merits of Hermans' theory of the dialogical self is that it has contributed to a move away from an idea of a core self by introducing a conceptualisation of the self as multi-voiced and decentralised. This does not mean that the self is fragmented. While the self is constituted by a multiplicity of oft-conflicting *I*-positions, each voice has continuity in time in the form of 'a story to tell about his or her own experiences from his or her own stance' (Hermans, 2002: 148). Despite a polyphony of voices, an individual creates self-narratives which appear as coherent. In this respect, this approach departs from the work of McAdams (1985) that emphasises the unifying function of stories for identity as if there were one single story to tell for each person. Naturally, by adulthood several narratives about the self have become dominant, but they still have no unifying character. One's embeddedness in a social context may change over time as well as one's way of appropriating meaning from that particular context.

A second contribution of Hermans and colleagues' conceptualisation of the dialogical self to current psychological research is its dynamic conception of the self. The *I* can move from one position to another according to changes in situation and time (Hermans et al., 1992). Marková and colleagues (2007) have described this as 'the subject's heterogeneity'. A speaker is likely to build on different voices formulated by her *I*-positions in the construction of her argument. In other words, when one speaks, one does not do so from a single perspective. Rather, a person engaged in a dialogue speaks from different *I*-positions that

refer to other situations which may have taken place previously or may only be imagined. For instance, in a dialogue between a female doctor, mother of two and a male nurse, the interlocutors can shift from uttering the voice of their *I* referring to their professions in the health sector to their *I* representing their respective gender or family situations. These identification moves depend on the topics discussed, on the internal and external framing of the dialogue and on the personal and social normative assumptions endorsed by the speakers.

Self and other in a dialogical self

Bakhtin argues that in the structure of the actual world, self and other are distinguishable but still deeply interrelated entities (1993: 54). The presence of the other is fundamental to the development of a person's sense of self. Similarly, in *Sources of the self*, Charles Taylor argues:

I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors: in one way in relation to those conversation partners who were essential to my achieving self-definition; in another in relation to those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp of languages of self-understanding – and, of course, these classes may overlap. A self exists only within what I call ‘web of interlocution’.

(1989: 36)

The self does not take the position of the other nor does it fuse with the other. It exists in a ‘web of interlocutions’ with the other and the social world surrounding them. As theorised by Ivana Marková (2003a), the *ego* (the self) lives through an active understanding of and struggle with the *alter* (the other). It is important to observe that self-other relations do not necessarily refer to the relations between two individuals or groups. The relevant dyad could involve an institution, for example the government of my country (Marková et al., 2007: 10). Through what Marková (2003a, 2003b) calls ‘dialogicality’, or the capacity of the human mind to conceive, create and communicate about social realities, the self tries to overpower the strangeness of the other and to assimilate it. Contrarily to the common assumption within mainstream psychology that individuals exist prior to interaction with other individuals, dialogical researchers assume that individuals become what they are in and through interaction (Linell, 2010).

From a dialogical perspective, the self does not take the role of the other and its actual perspective, as advocated by George Herbert Mead (1934/1967). Rather, the self interprets another being as an *I*-position that the *I* can occupy and a position that creates a new perspective on the world and myself (Hermans et al., 1992). It points to two important insights in dialogical research. First,

there is an ontological interdependence between the self and the other, since the other is a constitutive part of the self and where the boundaries between the two are not as clear as intended in Western rationalistic thinking about the self (Kinnvall and Lindén, 2010).

Second, the self holds the potential for innovation through the other (Linell and Marková, 1993; Richardson et al., 1998). Through its interactions with others, the self is often engaged in acts of positioning and repositioning. The original *I*-position of the self is reformulated through dialogue with the other. This can lead to self-innovation. Thus, when two people with different positions (*I* as Swede and *I* as Iraqi) come into contact, their ways of positioning themselves in broader narratives about Swedishness or Iraqness may change. New positions can develop out of narratives which for instance emphasise a hyphenated Swedish-Iraqi identity or which redefine what it means to be Swedish. The full empirical validity of such claims has to be confirmed, however (Hermans, 1999). The theoretical underpinnings on which they build resemble those of social psychological research on prejudice as formulated by the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954). However, recent developments in this field have demonstrated that the degree to which prejudiced attitudes towards the other can diminish following contact cannot be limited to psychological changes prompted by the assimilation of the other's position but have to take into consideration structural changes in the socio-political order that account for asymmetries of power between the self and the other, institutional constraints and the historical context in which the relation between self and other has developed (Hammack, 2011; Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2006). If structural conditions and power asymmetries are not taken into consideration, researchers will not be able to fully appreciate why certain dialogical discrepancies and misunderstandings exist and, consequentially, why self-innovation through dialogue can sometimes be unsuccessful. The narratives uttered by the *I*-positions of the self and of the other can present exclusive truth claims, what Bakhtin calls 'monological' (1981), which pose a serious challenge to dialogue and self-innovation. This is particularly true in the contemporary world, where increased globalisation has subjected the self to a much larger number of encounters with the other. For example, Kinnvall and Lindén (2010) show how majority and minority communities, in an attempt to securitise their sense of self, endorse monological narratives that lock them into opposing *I*-positions, thus curtailing the opportunity of dialogue and change.

Not only the real other plays an important role in questioning, challenging and changing one's positions. The imagined other, the never-met counterpart which is used as a point of comparison to define our self and social identity, also plays an important role in creating and challenging the self's *I*-positions. Catarina Kinnvall (2004), drawing upon Kristeva (1982), argues that the other is a part of ourselves even when he or she is not physically present, because

the other exists in our minds through imagination. People develop narratives and symbols which are used to project an imagined other as different from the self and even as its enemy. These narratives and symbols provide the basis for the development of *I*-positions, whereby the self defines itself in relation to the other.

The important role of the imagined other can be illustrated with reference to Edward Said's (1978/2003) work on the representations of Muslims and Islam by the West. His argument is that Western scholars have created a system of knowledge about the Orient, called 'orientalism', which positions Muslims and Islam as a negative other to the West, as static and somehow dangerous. Said stresses that the discursive construction of the Oriental, created and maintained without actual contact necessarily having been made between Western scholars and Muslims, serves a vital purpose: it legitimises the 'idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures' (1978/2003: 133). The result is an idea of European people juxtaposed to non-European people. Important for the argument of this chapter, the development of an imagined other (that is, Muslims and Islam) as a stranger and an enemy to Europe, becomes an important component of the self-construction of a European identity which is built on the contrasting distinction between 'superior' and 'inferior'. The development of such defensive *I*-positions is tied to the socio-political order in which they operate. The monologic discourses about the 'Oriental world' work towards verbal and ideological unification and centralisation and are developed 'according to a detailed logic governed not simply by empirical reality but by a battery of desires, repressions, investments and projections' (Said, 1978: 134). The monologic truth imposed by orientalism prevents the development of dialogic contacts between self and other which, as we have seen previously, can lead to self-innovation (Hermans, 2001) and to consciousness awakening to independent ideological life (Bakhtin, 1981).

Dialogical theory and ethics

Ivana Marková (2011) criticises much work drawing upon dialogical science for disregarding its ethical implications. In the previous sections, I have highlighted how dialogue between self and other is pivotal for the development of a sense of self. Reducing dialogical theory to self–other interactions would be reductive, however. For Bakhtin and those who followed his work (e.g. Ellis and Stam, 2010; Marková, 2003a; Taylor, 1989, 1995), dialogism refers to the interrelatedness of self and other in language as well as in being:

I am conscious of myself and become myself only while revealing myself for another, through another, and with help of another. The most important

acts constituting self-consciousness are determined by a relationship toward another consciousness [...] To be means to communicate.

(Bakhtin, 1984: 287)

Existence and human agency are dialogical and social phenomena. This position is very different from the notion of independent, individual agency that has informed liberal political theory. According to this perspective, principles of justice are arrived at from a position of impartiality and autonomy. Those who are to establish the principles of what is just should be detached from the socio-political and moral context in which they live (Rawls, 1971). This abstract, universalistic and individualistic account has consequences for how we understand morality and commitment to others. Julie A. White argues that this understanding of justice and morality 'makes it possible to argue that our particular attachments to others are contingent relationships with the self rather than constitutive of the self' (2000: 50). It does not provide any reasons for why one should pay heed to others' interpretations of what is good and right and can too easily slip into egoism.

Contrarily, the point of departure of a dialogical approach is the ontological interdependence built on dialogue between self, others and the socio-political and cultural environments in which they exist. Richardson and colleagues explain this clearly:

Human understanding and existence are seen as having a fundamentally dialogical character. The shape of our practices and quality of our experiences results from the interplay and mutual influence between present and past, interpreters and events, readers and texts, one person and another, and [...] an ongoing inner dialogue among points of view. This process can be distorted by dishonesty, defensiveness, or force. But done poorly or well, it remains basic in an ontological sense.

(1998: 507)

When carried through, dialogue requires personal responsibility and commitment. In this sense, a dialogical approach, drawing upon a conception of the self as polyphonic and capable of experiencing the other within the self, can inform a particular understanding of ethics linked to Levinas' and Bakhtin's conceptions of morality. For Emmanuel Levinas (1999), ethics underlies responsibility towards the other whose needs and requirements should be listened to and fulfilled by the self. The moral subject should be capable of being *for* the other and take unconditional responsibility for her, and not only of being *with* the other, that is being physically close but ontologically separated from her. In addition, dialogical encounters entail responsibility for one's own actions. This is what Bakhtin (1993) calls 'answerability'. To be answerable is to act in

such a way as to stand behind and be committed to one's acts, a verification of one's existence.

Both Levinas and Bakhtin provide important insights into the ethical dimensions of dialogue. However, they both tend to overemphasise one side of the self–other relation at the expense of the other. In the ethics of Levinas, the other is guiding the self's actions. Instead, Bakhtin's answerability does not fully account for the role of the other within the dialogical relationship. A possibly more fruitful understanding of dialogical ethics would advocate a synthesis between the two approaches. The agency of the self should be conceptualised as existing in relation to its responsibility to the other's need. As Murray explains:

We are always already answerable in our world and in our actions as a result of our ontological nature, but we are always already called to responsibility by the Other as a result of the Other's metaphysical nature.

(2009: 148)

The main tenets of dialogical ethics are then the moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of others for whom we take responsibility. This has consequences for how we understand relations with those who we identify as others, be they migrants, strangers, or even enemies. Specifically, dialogical ethics is a responsive answer to the heterogeneous ethical backgrounds that the self may encounter in today's world characterised by globalisation, uncertainty and diversity. To be committed to one's action and to be responsive to the other's needs and requests means to be open for learning through dialogue.

A parallel can be drawn to research on deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy generally refers to a kind of political reasoning and dialogue that is mutually justifiable. According to Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996), democratic deliberation must take place in a spirit of mutual respect and equality and according to a reasoned argument that would bring citizens beyond their self-interests. In this sense, the principles underpinning deliberation are similar to those of dialogical ethics. Deliberative democratic theory, especially in the tradition established by Gutmann and colleagues, seeks to establish practices based on dialogue whereby citizens can learn about each other's viewpoints. Janusz Reykowski (2006) has empirically assessed if deliberative democracy is psychologically feasible, given that many attempts at deliberation often go nowhere. He concludes that, under the conditions that foster mutual respect and emphasise the socially important cooperative goal of a debate, deliberation can take place and lead to a (temporary) change in certain beliefs and attitudes of the participants. There is therefore some empirical evidence showing that an ethics that builds on dialogical communication is feasible in real life. However, such evidence stems from research conducted

in a controlled, semi-experimental environment, a limitation acknowledged by Reykowski (2006). Further research is needed to assess the potential of deliberation in real-life scenarios.

In multicultural societies, several attempts have been made to create institutional frameworks that would allow the majority society and minority groups to learn about each other through dialogue. Local and national consultative bodies representing migrants and minorities in governmental institutions are examples of such frameworks that may create favourable settings for deliberation on issues such as community cohesion. However, these bodies have been criticised for not ensuring equal participation, not having real power to influence policy-making and for not being representative of for instance women and young people (Phillips, 2007; Scuzzarello, 2010). Despite good intentions, bodies aimed at favouring deliberation and dialogue between minorities and governments often fail to meet the basic requirements of the deliberative approach and of dialogical ethics. In particular, they seldom managed to establish dialogue based on equal participation. Governmental institutions will always have more power to influence decision- and policy-making than bodies representing minorities and these bodies cannot ensure that all those affected can have a voice in the deliberations. Dialogical ethics is well aware of the asymmetries of power between the parts engaged in a dialogue. Indeed, Hermans and Dimaggio (2007: 38) argue that dominance is 'not extrinsic but rather intrinsic to the dialogical processes'. Hermans (2001) illustrates the presence of power relations with reference to the relationship between a young person and her parents or teachers. While the child's self is not fully determined by others (i.e. parent's or teacher's), it certainly constructs self-narratives that reflect the approving or disapproving ways in which she is addressed by more powerful people. Similarly, Linell (in Hermans, 2001) demonstrates that the relation between self and other is not entirely constructed afresh in interaction. Rather, it reflects the cultural capital of the actors involved in the communicative activities.

Deliberative democracy and dialogical ethics differ on at least two major points. First, while deliberative theory sees the self as an ultimately rational and autonomous actor, dialogical ethics sees the individual as created in a dialectic between self, other(s) and the social environment. The second difference concerns the ultimate goal of deliberation and of dialogical ethics. Through debates and deliberation, participants should find a 'mutually acceptable position' (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 9), a moral accommodation that, however, does not require the sacrifice of integrity. Dialogical ethics, instead, does not advocate the imposition of dialogue to achieve a common sense of good. To impose dialogue, even if well intended, would be nothing else but the imposition of a monologic discourse. As Arnett and colleagues advocate, dialogical ethics

[A]ssumes the importance of the meeting of communicative ground that gives rise to a particular sense of good and is simultaneously open to learning [...]. Dialogic ethics begins with meeting what is before us – the good, the bad, and the ugly. Such an ethic rejects demand and the occasionally heard comment, ‘We need more dialogue’. This statement only ensures the impossibility of dialogic ethics, which hides from the ongoing demand made by oneself or another.

(2008: 80–81)

Dialogue is therefore a respectful and attentive meeting of differences and does not necessarily aim to find a mutually acceptable position. Dialogical ethics is about listening to the perspective and needs of the other, even if presented in a monological fashion. This may lead to an exchange of information, or ‘technical dialogue’ as Martin Buber (1937/2010) called it. Openness to learn from monologue and technical dialogue may eventually lead to genuine dialogue, where new insights emerge between the self and the other.

Respect and taking the other’s viewpoints are the foundations of dialogical ethics. This is of crucial importance if we are to overcome tensions created and fuelled by contemporary diversity. Ayelet Shachar (2001), although not explicitly following a dialogical approach to ethics, suggests that ‘transformative accommodation’ could address divisions and competitions for loyalty that often arise in diverse societies.² This solution can exemplify how dialogical ethics can inform practical and political solutions to diversity. Transformative accommodation is a form of non-exclusive joint-governance between the state and the group in question, where the two parts have to compete for the loyalty of those people who overlap both jurisdictions. In order to maintain ties with a community, the leaders of the state and of the group have to provide people with choices that can appeal to them. For instance, when a practice is considered discriminatory by some members of a minority group, the leaders of that group will have to change those practices if they want to maintain the loyalty of these members. This shifts the balance of power between leaders and individual members so that ‘a dynamic new space for meaningful participatory group membership is created’ (2001: 123). Transformative accommodation has a dialogical potential because it requires dialogue between the state and the community leaders and between leaders and the community itself. It does not necessarily seek consensus. Rather, it provides opportunities for the state and leaders to learn about different moral options and it allows people to move between different *I*-positions that relate to their loyalty to either the state or the group in certain contested social arenas that affect them. For instance, if a woman who positions herself as Catholic finds the way the Catholic Church decides over divorce discriminatory or unfair, she can turn to the state while still retaining other aspects of her religion. She will not leave her *I*-position as

Catholic but rather transform it and, by turning to the state, she may develop another *I*-position that relate to her status as citizen.

One of the key principles of dialogical ethics is the willingness to learn from the other. The conscious or unconscious refusal to do so may trigger the development of what Jovchelovitch (2008) calls 'non-dialogical encounters', characterised by the lack of mutual recognition and by the attempt to impose one system of meaning and knowledge to the least powerful group. One example of this is the ban by the French government of full-covering headscarves worn by Muslim women in public places. The rationale for justifying the ban was expressed by former President Sarkozy who claimed that the full-covering headscarf is a sign of 'subservience' and would 'not be welcome on the territory of the French republic' (BBC, 22 June 2009). The assumption that Muslim women wearing a full-covering garment are submissive was made not as a result of dialogue with the parties involved. It was the result of the French government refusing to listen to and learn from the other's position and values, however monological they might have appeared.

A question that everyone exploring the possibility of dialogue in multicultural societies has to struggle with is the unwillingness of certain individuals to engage in a democratic dialogue and coexistence. Paul Nesbitt-Larking raises an important question in this context: 'what does one do with those fundamentalists who refuse to engage in democracy themselves?' (2008: 19). We cannot assume that everyone wants to engage in a dialogue. There is however a difference, as Nesbitt-Larking (2008) points out, between those who have not been enabled to participate in a democratic dialogue and those who have excluded themselves. Their decision to reject any engagement with the political community and, in extreme cases, to destroy it is an expression of agency that cannot be ignored or excused. The discussion about the refusal to engage in a dialogue does not concern only fundamentalists, however. When studying participation in a multicultural society, we should also include those migrants who do not wish to participate because they have no intention to stay and because they may be more interested in maintaining strong ties with their country of origin. This applies for instance to some recent Eastern European migrants in Britain (Scuzzarello, forthcoming) but also to Turks in Germany in the early days of the guest workers' programmes. The question of how to deal with a benevolent lack of participation should be the subject of further inquiry.

Conclusions

This chapter has reviewed parts of the existing literature that draws upon a dialogical approach. It aimed to demonstrate that this perspective has a wider field of application than psychology. In this sense, the chapter has acknowledged the significant contributions in psychology of dialogical self theory, and

it has showed the implications of a dialogical approach in politically relevant fields such as ethics and multiculturalism.

Dialogical research in psychology is important to understand the self as constructed in dialogue with the other and the surrounding social world. The insight that self and other are ontologically related to one another has profound ethical implications, something I have discussed in the second half of this chapter. A dialogical view of human beings understands ethics as arising out of communicative interactions. Dialogue, guided by responsibility for the other, answerability for one's actions as well as the desire to learn about the perspective and needs of the other, is therefore a fundamental base on which to build our responses to differing and at times contrasting understandings of the 'good'. Naturally, in order to have a chance to influence the social world, dialogue needs to address the societal narratives that shape the individual and collective relations between self and other. It also needs to address structural change so that asymmetries of power between groups in a society are improved. Thus structured, dialogue may prove a viable tool to alleviate the negative images of the other as it favours change in the moral order in which these images are created (see also Kinnvall et al., 2009).

Undoubtedly, dialogical ethics poses significant practical challenges when one attempts implement its principles. Some of those difficulties have been dealt with in the chapter. Others need addressing, however. Are there instances, for example, when monologue, rather than dialogues, is a better strategy to achieve coexistence between groups? There are certainly times when groups or individuals are not ready to engage in dialogue, as they may need to heal or develop a somehow coherent understanding of the 'good'. When is it then the right time to introduce dialogue so that we do not risk forcing it, turning it into a monologic imposition? Answers to these and similar questions will contribute to the development of a dialogical ethics and help move away from the temptation of considering this approach as concerned above all with the dialogical self, that is with cognition and affection. This would overshadow the possibilities of seeing dialogicality's ontological and ethical implications and reduce the opportunities to understand how diversity and difference can be dealt with at a time when the forces of globalisation are placing us in increasingly heterogeneous realities.

Notes

1. The concept of 'position' was conceived as a more dynamic alternative to the concept of 'role'. The move from the metaphor of 'role' to the one of 'position' entails a shift from ritualised and formalised understandings of the dynamics of interpersonal relations to more dynamic and negotiable ones (Davies and Harré, 1999).
2. Shachtar's theory presents serious issues that will not be addressed in this chapter; however, see Phillips (2007) and Scuzzarello (2010).

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7

Experiments: Insights and Power in the Study of Causality

Tereza Capelos

Unlocking the doors of the political world

As political psychologists, we face many challenges: our research involves a rapidly changing political environment; our dependent variables are subject to continuous change by multiple causes; and our measurement is subject to errors. So we seek to engage with methods of empirical enquiry that give us some level of control as we attempt to unlock the doors of the political world. Laboratory, survey and field experiments allow for testing cause-and-effect relationships and have transformed how we think about research in political psychology (Druckman et al., 2011).

In popular usage, the term 'experiment' often refers to an introduction of a new practice, for example a government 'experiment' rolling out an institutional innovation. In the scientific world, 'experiment' refers to scientific methodologies that involve deliberate and controlled manipulations to test causal propositions. Following the behavioural revolution in the 1950s and 1960s, and the increase in laboratory experiments in the 1970s, experimentation has a long history and continuously receives high prominence in political psychology among scholars in the United States (Druckman et al., 2006). There are of course limitations to experimental research, but creative experiments push theoretical, empirical and policy debate boundaries and shape the way we think about political phenomena. It is important to note the substantive contribution of prominent experiments investigating the effects of television news (Iyengar et al., 1982), opinion formation (Ansolabehere et al., 1994; Lau and Redlawsk, 1997), voting (Lodge et al., 1989), values (Clarke et al., 1999), decision-making (Quattrone and Tversky, 1988), and electoral systems (Morton and Williams, 2010), to name a few.

The enduring impact of these experiments goes beyond their specific findings. They have led to an increased appreciation of experiments, demonstrated

by the attention scholars pay to experimental studies. A quantitative analysis of the impact of experimental journal articles by Druckman et al. (2006) showed that articles including experimental research are 47 per cent more likely to be cited than their non-experimental counterparts. The interest and use of experimental research led the American Political Science Association to devote a section on experimental methods and publish the *Journal for Experimental Political Science* for readers familiar with experimental methods.¹ Offering formal training to the new generations of scholars, about 30 per cent of graduate political science departments in the United States teach experimental methodology, either as an individual course or embedded in research methods courses (Myers, 2012). In addition, some excellent resources and textbooks are available for learning more about experimental applications of research in political science (Druckman et al., 2011; Gerber and Green, 2012; Kinder and Palfrey, 1993; Morton and Williams, 2008, 2010).

Despite what looks like the explosion of experimentation in the US social sciences (Kam et al., 2007), the empirical repertoire of European political psychology does not often involve experimental design. Experiments are seen as 'exotic' or 'occasional' and remain in the periphery, while other methods dominate the field. One argument is that the hypotheses investigated by political psychologists in Europe are inappropriate for experimentation. In fact, political scientific enquiry has traditionally been seen as an 'observational science' (Lowell, 1910) and observational methodologies like survey, archival and narrative analysis research dominate the methodological world. A second argument has been that because of practical or ethical constraints experimentation is not feasible (Lijphart, 1971). However, scholars have implemented experiments in a variety of contexts extending their application beyond electoral and public opinion studies, like international negotiations (Druckman, 1994), foreign policy (Geva and Mintz, 1997), democratisation (Wantchekon, 2003), identity (Sniderman et al., 2004), corruption (Ferraz and Finan, 2008) and culture (Henrich et al., 2004).

This chapter calls for greater methodological diversity in the study of political psychology in Europe and the world. Observational data cannot fully test causal claims and hypotheses (Gerber and Green, 2000; Sniderman, 2011). Research questions investigating causality are particularly suitable for experimental methodology. Focusing at the individual level, we gain insight into the underpinnings of observed political decision-making and information processing. At the institutional level, we can access the effect of institutional environments on behaviour. Applied in the design of qualitative case studies, using the principles of experimental reasoning can allow for a deeper understanding of observed processes (Gerring and McDermott, 2007). The study of politics has been enriched and enlivened by experimental studies (Kinder and Palfrey, 1993). The pages that follow extend an invitation

to political psychologists to expand the methodological foundation of their research by adopting experimentation. Casting a look over the research questions currently investigated by other human subjects methodologies, such as qualitative interviews, or quantitative surveys, from the perspective of experimentation, brings new opportunities for discovery and allows us to challenge methodology-constrained assumptions and results.

This chapter has seven sections. First, I provide an introduction to the key elements and principles of experimentation, highlighting not only the opportunities it offers but also its shortcomings. In the second section, I review a few key experimental studies that have played a significant role in the evolution of the field. In the third section, I discuss the characteristics of laboratory and field experiments. The fourth section addresses the shortcomings of experimentation and highlights things we should be mindful about. Next, I focus on the intersection of experimental and survey design with a discussion of survey experiments. The sixth section reviews principal ethical considerations and notes our responsibilities when designing and conducting experiments. The last section highlights challenges and new developments looking ahead to further experimentation in political psychology in Europe and the world.

Experiments: Definition and key elements

Experiments are methodological tools that allow us to systematically ‘intervene’ our study participants and test causal relationships between factors that we consider relevant, holding extraneous factors constant. The control that an experimenter has by design over the experimental setting, process and materials minimises threats to valid inference that other methodologies struggle with. The main aim of experiments is to isolate the causal factor of interest from nuisance or correlated factors that might interfere with the causal mechanism under study (McGraw and Hoekstra, 1994).

Most experiments follow a standard process: Participants are either paid a small fee or, in the case of student participants, receive course credit for their participation. The experiments are conducted in the laboratory, in the field or embedded in surveys, and researchers generate vignettes that describe fictional situations which are presented in a realistic fashion, leading participants to think they are real. For example, in an experimental study aimed to investigate the effects of anger and fear on political tolerance, we presented participants with stimulus materials that were identified as, and looked like, actual news stories about a fictional Islamic youth organisation (Capelos and van Troost, 2012). We used a fictional group name because we wanted to ensure that the experimental material was not contaminated by participants’ attitudes towards an actual group. The vignettes, which appeared to be cut-offs of newspaper articles, included the anger and fear manipulations by describing

bystanders' appraisals of the fictional target group violating standards of good behaviour. The mock newspaper article described a demonstration organised by the fictional group. The banners held by the youth group members were described as 'disturbing' and using inflammatory language; participants were randomly assigned to two conditions: half read that bystanders felt angry, and the other half read that the bystanders felt afraid. We did not specify the words appearing on the banners in order to avoid contamination due to cognitive evaluations of the content. Similar non-evasive manipulations have also been used successfully in other studies. In an experiment on political tolerance by Kuklinski, Riggie, Ottati, Schwartz and Wyer (1991), respondents were primed via a small text to consider the consequences of their feelings. Li and Brewer (2004) inserted a brief description about the meaning of American identity as part of general instructions in a survey questionnaire, in order to make their respondents think about a certain type of national unity.

A key element of experimental design is random assignment of participants to treatments and control groups as they arrive at the experiment location. This means that all individuals have equal probability of being selected for one of the treatments. This allows the elimination of pre-existing inequalities or differences between control and treatment groups. By assigning participants to control and treatment conditions on a random basis, the experimenter can expect that observed differences between different conditions are caused by the treatments themselves and not external factors. This gives the experimental method a strong advantage in testing cause-and-effect relationships between factors (Margetts and Stoker, 2010; Morton and Williams, 2008).

Some research designs adopt an alternative to random assignment: within-subject comparisons between the baseline and treatment groups, where all participants are exposed to every treatment. An advantage of 'within-subjects' designs is that they do not require a large number of participants and eliminate errors originating in individual differences that sometimes are not removed by random assignment. An example of within-subjects design is the experiment conducted by Fazio et al. (1986) on sequential priming. The experiment was designed to measure the degree of association between a prime (e.g. rainbow) and a target (e.g. Obama) in long-term memory. Participants were presented with a prime followed by a target word and asked to identify if the target is a member of one of the two categories. The prime/target manipulation was varied and repeated several times. The experiment measured the latency between the appearance of the target and the response and found that a target can be identified as positive or negative faster when it is preceded by a prime of matching valence (positive prime/positive target, or negative prime/negative target), compared to being preceded by a prime with a non-matching valence.

Within-subjects comparisons were also used in sequential experiments like the ones conducted by Iyengar and Kinder (1987) on the agenda setting powers

of the media. Participants viewed 30-minute news broadcasts every day for a week. The experiment manipulated the amount and nature of coverage for particular issues (e.g. defence, pollution, economic problems) and measured the level of significance participants attributed to the specific problem. Iyengar and Kinder found that the agenda setting manipulation was successful and participants were more likely to consider important the issues that received high coverage in the news broadcasts. Here randomly assigned treatments were not possible since actions of the participants were conditional on the first stage of the experiment.

The analysis of experimental data involves difference in means comparisons between control and treatment groups to estimate the size of the treatment effect. The effects of mediating variables, when not addressed by design, can be assessed by covariates in multivariate regressions (Gerber and Green, 2012). For example, in an experiment that examined how general feelings about political actors shape the way citizens process information about policy issues, I tested for the impact of dispositional differences among participants (their levels of political knowledge and trust in the political system) as mediators of political attitudes (Capelos, 2010). The experiment varied the name of the politician supporting an actual policy proposal (G. W. Bush or N. Mandela) creating conditions of negative and positive affect, respectively, and the analysis demonstrated that participants' levels of knowledge and trust and their interactions had a significant effect on the evaluation of the issue, beyond the experimental manipulation effect. Cynic experts provided the lowest policy ratings, trusting experts were somewhat less negative, followed by cynic novices, while trusting novices provided the most optimistic policy evaluations, even in the negative affect experimental condition.

Experimental tests exist in all levels of aggregation. They involve responses from individuals, small or large groups, institutions, or cities and even countries. One of the most famous experiments is Milgram's (1974) study on obedience to authority. The study began in July 1961, and 40 male participants aged between 20 and 50 were recruited through a newspaper ad to participate in a study thought to be measuring the effects of teachers' punishment on students' learning at Yale University. Participants were unaware that after a fixed draw, they were given the teacher role, while the student was actually an employed actor. The 'teacher' participants were asked to deliver increasingly higher voltage electric shocks ranging from 15 to 450 volts to the 'student' for every wrong answer to the questions asked. The actor-student had electrodes attached to his arms, gave mainly wrong answers, and would complain, plead, scream and even yell that he experienced heart pain as the voltage levels incrementally increased during the experiment. Participants in the teacher role believed they were administering shocks, but no shocks were actually delivered to the actor-students. Although the last two identifications of shock levels

were labelled 'danger: severe shock' and past that an ominous 'XXX' in red, about 65 per cent of 'teachers' progressed to the maximum level, many after being coerced by a supervisor experimenter to continue, and all progressed to at least 300 volts. Many of the 'teacher' participants went on with the experiment, even as they were experiencing tension including trembling, sweating and other high stress signs. Milgram carried out 18 variations of the study. After debriefing participants about the true nature of the experiment, Milgram was interested in the explanations 'teacher' participants provided to justify obeying orders to inflict pain on another person and developed what is known as Agency Theory.

A well-known study that involved two cities, the Bronx (NY) and Palo Alto (CA), was conducted in 1969, at Stanford University in the United States, by Philip Zimbardo. Two identical cars were left in the street, and while the car in the Bronx was vandalised and scraped in just 48 hours after 23 destructive acts, the car in Palo Alto remained in perfect condition for a week. The characteristics of the two neighbourhoods (the Bronx being poor and Palo Alto affluent) pointed to social-economic determinants to explain the residents' behaviour. However, when one of the experimenters broke a window of the Palo Alto car, stealing and vandalism commenced soon after. This psychological phenomenon of 'turning evil' in the context of particular situational and systemic factors was labelled 'the Lucifer effect' and demonstrated the ecological differences between cities characterised by a sense of community and reciprocity versus anonymity and passive acceptance (Zimbardo, 2007). This later generated the controversial 'broken windows theory' (Wilson and Kelling, 1982), that crime and other illegal behaviours that 'break the rules' are often stimulated by perceptions of negligence and deterioration and cannot solely be explained on the basis of poverty or city demographics.

To lab or not to lab

Experiments can be conducted in the laboratory or in the field, with each choice carrying theoretical and practical implications. Holding an experiment in a lab allows for complex designs and high levels of experimental control. In an experimental study focusing on the impact of candidate reputational components of competence and integrity, gender, as well as scandal severity on electability and blame attributions, I first asked participants to complete a brief questionnaire on their political beliefs and basic demographic information and then provided the manipulation information in two stages (Huddy and Capelos, 2002). Participants read four short newspaper-style articles about a fictitious candidate in which gender, competence and integrity were varied, establishing the candidate's reputation. Participants then provided evaluations of the candidate, completed a number of memory and recall tests as a

distraction and were then asked to read an additional newspaper story containing the scandal manipulation. In the end, participants again provided their overall evaluations of the candidate along with blame assessments and responsibility attribution measures. This two-stage manipulation design allows the experimenter to collect high volumes of information regarding participants, mapping closely how they form and update impressions. Admittedly, it is more complex and time-consuming than the usually applied single-stage designs that provide participants with the candidate and scandal information in one stage (see, e.g., Funk, 1996), but it allows for greater control of generating a first impression of the candidate, avoiding the contamination of the initial trait perceptions by the scandal information. In addition, it mimics more closely the process by which citizens form and update impressions of political actors, in stages, as they receive new information from the political environment.

There are generally three key concerns raised about lab experiments. On the one hand, laboratory facilities are not available for all experimentalists. In addition, there is scepticism whether real-world lessons and valid results can be extracted from artificial environments like the ones created in labs. Finally, reliance on student participant pools is often seen as unrepresentative of the general population. These criticisms have been extensively addressed by many scholars (for a review see Kinder, 2011), but it is important to note there are also good reasons to leave the lab and conduct experiments in non-lab settings. An important benefit is that conducting experiments in real-world contexts allows for theory building in the environment where political behaviours are actually shaped and demonstrated. Some of the limitations of lab experiments are also overcome by conducting studies outside the laboratory. Field experiments boost external validity and usually use non-student heterogeneous populations as participants. In a classic field experiment, Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008) measured the impact of social pressure as an inducement to political participation. This large-scale study, conducted in Michigan, the United States, prior to the August 2006 primaries, involved a sample of 180,000 households and several hundred thousand registered voters. Randomised assignment delivered to treatment groups one of four mailings, which urged voters to vote, but also manipulated types of social pressure: for example, participants were told their behaviour would be examined by means of public records that tracked their voting, their household voting and the voting of their neighbours living nearby. The results showed that voting turnout was affected significantly by the social pressure manipulations, which served as powerful interventions. The authors concluded that their mailings were cost-effective and performed better than door to door canvassing in stimulating voting, and this has significant implications for campaign politics.

There are a number of practical constraints that limit the application of non-lab experimental studies. They have higher costs, provide the experimenter

with less control and are more time-consuming to administer in comparison to lab-experiments. In addition, they are mostly appropriate for simple studies because subjects outside the lab might get confused with complicated designs, like the two-stage personality and scandal experiment I described above. An important question to ask is how simple is too simple, and the answer depends on the complexity of the hypotheses under investigation. If a particular study aims to test complex hypotheses and causal relationships that look like real-world behaviour, a non-lab experiment with a simple design might, in the end, be too simple to be deemed appropriate. A good suggestion for experimentalists is to follow a middle-ground approach: start projects with a lab experiment to test a theory, and then when resources and time allow, aim to conduct an experiment outside the lab.

Acts of nature often intervene and change political realities, and this offers great opportunities for natural experiments. While lab and field experiments test causal claims in controlled contexts designed by the experimenter to measure change, naturally occurring ‘manipulations’, although not designed by researchers, are interventionist in nature, and they are ‘as-if’ they occurred in a constructed experiment. Experimentalists can take advantage of such naturally occurring phenomena to study cause-effect relationships avoiding two-way causation concerns, when observational studies can only point to associations (correlations) between the variables of interest. The strength of natural experiments is their realistic nature, combined with the ability to make causal inferences. Interesting examples of such experiments are found in the context of a government or policy intervention, or even a natural disasters or terrorism attacks.

Variety of applications and diversity of research questions

Applications of experimental research can be found in a wide range of subfields and can nicely complement other rigorous methods. Experiments also help us address the credibility problem from which our quantitative and qualitative studies suffer, namely the replication of our empirical claims. One political psychology area that is receiving increasing attention is research on emotions and their impact on political behaviour, which in the past was examined with ‘rational’ and ‘emotion-proof’ lenses (see Chapter 13 by Nicolas Demertzis). Affective and cognitive considerations determine political decision-making, and while affect often precedes cognition, at other times it is a product of cognitive appraisal. Experimentation is a very appropriate method to approach the two-way relationship between feeling and thinking as it can separate the two by design. In an experimental study that manipulated trait and party identification information of a fictional political leader in a campaign race, I collected measures of the participants’ discrete emotions towards the political actor.

My intention was to isolate the causes of emotionality and examine whether uneasiness and aversion towards the candidate was the product of suboptimal evaluations of the candidate's personality perceptions, and whether emotions were moderated by party identification bonds (Capelos, 2013). I found that participants expressed aversion on the basis of fluctuations of integrity, while uneasiness increased when competence and integrity ratings moved from high to average levels. In addition, motivational biases generated by party identification moderated negative emotionality, providing a safety net for the candidate.

This experiment also offered a great opportunity to replicate the empirical findings of observational studies that examine the impact of affectivity on evaluations of political candidates and vote, which rely on American National Election Study (ANES) survey data (Marcus, 2002; Marcus et al., 2000). Marcus and his colleagues show that voters experiencing anxiety towards their own party leader rely more on policy issues and less on partisanship when making voting decisions, in comparison to voters who feel complacent. When I analysed the decision-making patterns among the most uneasy and angry respondents in my experiment, I found evidence that corroborates their findings. The vote intentions of those feeling uneasy were determined by a broad array of considerations including personality evaluations and party bonds. For those feeling aversion, vote choice was based on limited information, primarily evaluations of integrity (Capelos, 2013).

Other research areas where experimental applications have a long tradition, and also complement quantitative and qualitative studies, are comparative politics and international relations. Experiments have also been growing in prominence in political theory and democratisation research (Druckman, 1994). A classic experimental study in foreign policy and international relations is the one by Hermann et al. (1997). They examined the impact of stereotypes like 'enemy' and 'ally' on whether citizens organise information about political actors into coherent pictures in their heads. In their experiment, participants filled in stereotype-consistent information when asked to identify other features of countries that were not provided in the descriptions.

Game-theoretic behavioural experiments are also widely used. These experiments are developed to empirically measure behaviour and political choices predicted in game theoretic models, in the form of dictator games, pool resource games or public good games (Aldrich and Lupia, 2011; Henrich et al., 2004). Benefits of game theory experiments include theory building and formulating the basic premises about interpersonal interactions, focusing on characteristics of the actors and the context. Game theory experiments focus on cooperation, coalition formation and non-cooperative behaviours. One of the challenges of game-theoretical studies is that to be able to make a convincing case about generalisability of principles of human behaviour one should

offer evidence from multiple environments, so these games require multiple replications across contexts.

Shortcomings of experimentation: Things to be mindful about

Experimental studies have many virtues but, like any type of empirical investigation, have shortcomings and limitations that scholars need to consider and, when possible, ameliorate. One potential problem of experimentation can arise from the interpretation of experimental manipulations, in other words how the conceptual variables that populate the theoretical debate that the study engages with relate to their experimental realisation through the particular treatment (Carlsmith et al., 1976). The aim is to make the experimental manipulations resemble as closely as possible the concepts discussed in the theory. The validity of employed measures – how to appropriately measure complex theoretical concepts – is a concern that applies not just to experiments. It is necessary to have strong links between the concepts and the experimental manipulations, and experimentalist should think carefully about how their conceptual variables are empirically realised. This is not a simple task. Naturally, political concepts are often ambiguous and experimental treatments in single studies might not capture their full meaning. One way to address this shortcoming is systematic replication across studies (Kinder and Palfrey, 1993).

A second limitation of experiments relates to criticisms of external validity – the generalisability of experimental results. The control of the information that participants receive through the experimental manipulations can allow for strong internal validity. However, experimental findings are acquired in the context of often artificial experimental settings and with samples of convenience, for example university students. Although the potential problems associated with student samples can be addressed successfully, for example with the use of moderators in data analysis (Druckman and Kam, 2011), questions about how far findings can travel beyond laboratory settings, populations and treatments are not unjustified when one considers the artificiality of experiments compared with the complexities of the real world. Artificiality is not impossible to overcome if one invests attention to the stimuli, procedures and environment of experiments. The media effects studies by Iyengar and Kinder (1987) discussed earlier provide a great example of experiments that managed to mimic closely the way citizens consume news in the real world. Kinder and Palfrey (1993) also suggest selected replications across more samples to address external validity concerns and reduce issues of generalisability.

A third limitation has to do with the reach of this method for the investigation of particular research questions. While observational methodologies are appropriate for descriptive research questions, experiments are designed to address causal questions. Such is the limitation of all methods – they simply

cannot address all problems in the field. One has to choose carefully on the basis of the research question, but also not to restrict investigation of research questions that can be tackled with only one specific methodology.

Survey experiments: The bridge between observation and causation

In surveys, the aim of the researcher is to measure opinions of participants taking a snapshot of their attitudes and preferences in a particular point in time. In other words, surveys are observational studies. In the 1990s, Sniderman et al. (1991) introduced the multi-investigator experimental surveys combining the high external validity of surveys with the high internal validity of experiments. Survey experiments involve the random assignment of participants to different stimuli embedded in a survey.

A good example is the Clarke et al. (1999) series of experiments in Canada and Germany, which tested the validity of the Euro-barometer surveys in measuring materialist and post-materialist values. Before their study, this debate was conducted with aggregate time-series data. Their survey experiment allowed them to investigate and identify measurement artefacts related to the Euro-barometer values battery on materialism and post-materialism, when they substituted unemployment with inflation items. Their study has significant implications for the understanding of political beliefs as they raised questions about Inglehart's (1990) battery of items used traditionally in the Euro-barometer to measure post-materialism. It also constitutes an excellent example of how survey experiments can be a useful tool providing replication opportunities for existing observational and experimental studies.

Incorporating experimental designs in surveys has been a valuable methodological development, which was boosted further with technical advancements, and particularly the availability of computer-assisted telephone interviewing systems (CATI) and Web-based questionnaires distributed via Knowledge Networks and Harris Interactive (Sniderman and Grob, 1996). Survey experiments became more widely known and appreciated research tools when the National Science Foundation sponsored the TESS computerised survey experiments programme (Time Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences) designed by Mutz and Lupia. TESS allows researchers to conduct experiments on nationally representative, probability-based Internet samples at no cost for successfully rated proposals.² The use of survey experiments has expanded beyond public opinion and electoral behaviour research and generated new ways to measure political preferences and attitudes (Mutz, 2011).

The addition of survey components in experimental studies is also possible. Post-treatment surveys and tasks can be embedded creatively in experimental studies in order to estimate the effects of the experimental manipulations

on behaviours. For example, we can ask participants to self-identify how they would respond in a hypothetical situation. Or, to approximate more closely making a real choice, and avoid over-reporting and social desirability effects, some scholars embed responses with excuses and ask participants to rate how acceptable they are (Duff et al., 2007), or ask participants to identify the choice that 'most people' would make (Norwood and Lusk, 2011). Other studies estimate participants' preference for a particular advocacy by inviting them to provide monetary support for a particular policy or organisation, using the experimenter's money, or introduce direct monetary costs for the subject from their compensation for participating in the study.

Ethical issues: Doing things right

A key principle for any research is that it is conducted in a responsible manner and that benefits of gained knowledge outweigh the costs to those participating (Morton and Williams, 2010: 455). In political psychology experimental studies, the probability of physical harm is most of the time zero, but researchers should also consider the potential for social, psychological and economic harm to those involved. A generally applied rule of thumb is that if the risk of harm is about the same as in daily life, then risk is considered minimal (Druckman et al., 2006). We should however keep in mind our responsibilities to participants and to fellow researchers (Roth, 2001). It is important to have consistent standards, use ethical conduct as a solid reference point and find ways to minimise negative externalities, as and when they appear.

Towards participants, we should consider issues like informed consent, deception and debriefing, violation of confidentiality or invasion of privacy that are outlined in Institutional Review Board (IRB) Guidelines and procedures. The IRB Guidebook offers a useful resource and identifies the main guidelines used to review proposed studies on risk-benefit analysis of experimental protocols.³

Informed consent is one of our responsibilities, and most studies ask for participants' permission to participate in the study prior to the start of the experiment. Informed consent forms are typically written in simple language and include an explanation of the purposes and the duration of the study; a description of the involved procedures; a description of any risks, discomfort or benefits expected from the research, issues of confidentiality of records, contact information for further study details; a statement that participation is voluntary and can be terminated at any point during the study; and when the study involves more than minimal risk, details about compensation if injury occurs.

One concern involves how 'informed' the consent actually is, and what this involves poses a dilemma for researchers: Do participants have a clear appreciation of the facts if they do not have a full understanding of what the study is about? And when consent alerts participants to the details of deception of the

experiment, doesn't this compromise the realism of the study and its findings? The amount of detail of the study intentions and the time allowed for participants to fully understand this information is something that can be debated, but the general consensus is that consent is better than no consent; the alternative of having uninformed or unwilling subjects participate in an experiment is more harmful.

A key ethics consideration is deception, and interestingly it is guided by different norms across the disciplines of political science, psychology and economics. Political science and psychology view deception as a useful, if not, necessary tool, and in these disciplines, experiments often include some form of harmless deception, to conceal the true purpose of studies. The justification for deception is the fear that participants guessing the true purpose of a study will try to provide answers that satisfy the experimenter rather than respond genuinely, known as 'Hawthorne effect'. For economics studies, deception is not customary and subjects are provided with information about the study that might make it possible for some to guess the hypothesis of the experiment. This can be a problem if participants try to manipulate the results by providing particular responses. Randomisation across conditions should eliminate systematic effects of such behaviour if it applies only to a few individuals. Where there is concern, experimentalists can also include follow-up questions to the experiment and probe whether participants guessed its true purpose (Dickson, 2011).

In the Capelos and van Troost experiment on political tolerance discussed earlier, we asked participants to take part in two ostensibly unrelated studies (Capelos and van Troost, 2012). The first was presented as a survey on political leaders and debates in the news and contained measures of civil liberties and tolerance towards groups in society, along with 'filler questions' on current political issues, evaluations of political candidates and a word recognition puzzle, aimed to mask the focus on the battery of tolerance items. The second study was described as a memory/recall test of information citizens receive in the news. Participants were asked to read two stories describing the activities of a fictional Islamic youth group. The stories were modelled after actual newspaper articles and were presented as genuine. These vignettes contained the reassuring and threatening description of a fictional group that generated fear or anger. After reading the stories, participants answered several recall questions along with evaluations of the target group. By presenting the manipulation material as genuine newspaper articles and concealing the true focus of the study, we aimed to strengthen the inferences of the experiment.

Deception of participants during an experiment necessitates full debriefing at the completion of the study. Experimenters provide a detailed account of the study and offer the opportunity to participants to receive additional information about the findings. Debriefing is a standard procedure for laboratory or

classroom environments at the end of the data collection, where it is also used as an educational tool. Some scholars alert, however, that debriefing should be provided after considering the participants' welfare; that is because debriefing can be a more complex and sensitive issue in the case of field experiments, particularly those involving public officials and elites (Christensen, 1988).

Ethical questions are often raised for using certain groups as participants. Particular care is required when conducting experiments with under-aged subjects (parental consent is essential), or elites and public officials, like members of parliament, legislators, elected representatives, judges, ministers and MPs in parliament, where the behaviour measured is part of their public duties and the resources used do not involve their personal time, but public or employer's resources and space. Research involving the above types of participants has great social benefits, but should be conducted by taking our ethical responsibilities seriously. It is important to be sensitive, and engage in appropriate consent, debriefing and compensation, taking precautions to cause as little inconvenience as possible and recognising how our decisions affect the quality of our research (Finney, 1987). Useful advice is that our studies should be conducted in a fair and transparent way, in terms of who receives the benefits and who absorbs the costs (Morton and Williams, 2010; Orr, 1999).

Our ethical obligations extend to our colleagues, and we should take precautions to not jeopardise future studies for other researchers. Participants who follow debriefing find that they have been unfairly deceived or mistreated, often experience negative emotions, which can negatively affect their willingness to participate in future research. With this in mind, we should develop experiments and conduct our research in such way with participants as if we would be studying them again, and not as 'one-shot projects', stressing along the way the social value of participating in the research (Ortmann and Hertwig, 2002).

Looking to the future: New developments and opportunities

As desirable as it is to supplement our empirical methodology diet with experiments, experiments can be costly and recruiting participants is not readily and equally available to all researchers. A new development puts experimentation within closer reach: Amazon.com offers a powerful Internet service called MTurk (Mechanical Turk) where researchers can recruit experimental subjects to perform Human Intelligence Tasks at a low cost (about 0.10 and 0.75 per participant).⁴ Amazon reports a pool of 500,000 'workers' in 190 countries (Varia, 2011). The service is already used by political scientists, psychologists and economists in the United States. Several quality control studies report that the MTurk sample is more representative than college student samples, and similar demographically to the unweighted samples obtained by high-quality

random digit-dial methods (Berinsky et al., 2012). Although the MTurk is very attractive for Internet-based survey experiments, it is not well suited for experiments that require tight laboratory controls or interactions. So far, MTurk has not been used much outside the US context, but as its strengths and limitations are assessed by more studies, it shows good potential to become a useful tool for researchers around the world.

Concluding this chapter, I echo the words of Kinder and Palfrey that 'experimentation should be part of our everyday empirical repertoire' (1993: 1). Experimentation is a methodology that complements other quantitative and qualitative approaches; it empowers us to test cause and effect relationships, it adds variety to our individual methodological portfolios, validity to our findings, and allows the investigation of our research questions with new instruments. As Kaplan noted, 'give a small boy a hammer and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding' (1964: 28). Engaging with experimentation invites us to put down our hammers, and approach our observational research designs from a different perspective. We can then put to test what we think we know and take on new questions. Experimentation also enhances exchanges across political science, psychology, economics and sociology boundaries and expands our knowledge foundations. This is particularly important for political psychologists as our field lies at the intersection of these disciplines. Campbell (1969) put forward the argument that experiments should be seen as essential for policy and social innovation as they can offer insights about the consequences of political and social change. The challenge is how to engage more scholars, conduct more and better studies, and stimulate our minds to engage experimentally with what Lippmann (1922) called 'the world outside, and the pictures in our heads'.

Notes

1. For more information on JEPS, visit: <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=XPS>.
2. For more information on the TESS experiments visit <http://www.tessexperiments.org>.
3. For more information see http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_guidebook.htm.
4. More information about the MTURK service is available online at www.mturk.com.

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Part III

Themes

8

Lessons from the Postcolony: Frantz Fanon, Psychoanalysis and a Psychology of Political Critique

Ross Truscott and Derek Hook

Introduction

In this chapter, we explore some of the possibilities and dilemmas in forging a psychology of the postcolonial, placing psychoanalysis – specifically Frantz Fanon's (1952) *Black Skin, White Masks*, the most explicit psychoanalytical of his works – at the centre of such a prospective form of political psychology. Fanon's work can be taken as a founding event for a postcolonial psychology, both a point of origin and a definition of what such a field of critical praxis might entail. To be specific, it is his ambivalent relation to psychoanalysis, his repetition of its concepts – aware always of their potential to transmit, re-inscribe and reify certain ideologically loaded Eurocentric ideas – against their origins, as it were, that we want to emphasise here.¹

As we are proposing a psychology of the postcolonial drawing on psychoanalytic ideas, it is worth noting at the outset the discordant relationship between psychology and psychoanalysis. Although associated in the popular imagination, psychoanalysis emerged not in the discipline of psychology but within and against nineteenth-century psychiatry – and Fanon himself was a psychiatrist. Freud did, of course, refer to psychoanalysis as a branch of psychology (e.g. Freud, 1895, 1933), and, significantly, his writings were published in English, edited and translated by James Strachey, as the *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. What should not be overlooked, though, is that it was only later, following the much resisted 'question of lay analysis' (see Freud, 1926a), the question of whether non-medically trained

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professionals should be permitted to practice psychoanalysis, that it fell into, and then later out of, the discipline of psychology.

While psychoanalysis is still sometimes taught in clinical psychology programmes, it is usually turned into a form of psychology or it is relegated to the fringes and the distant 'unscientific' past of the discipline (see Burman, 2008; Frosh, 1999; Parker, 2011, 2008, 2004). And this is true of various categories of psychology; indeed, to speak of psychoanalytic social psychology today is almost necessarily to speak historically, and there is little that one might refer to as a contemporary tradition of psychoanalytic social psychology, even less so one willing to keep up to speed with more recent innovations in psychoanalytic theory (although, admittedly, the contributions of Frosh, 2002, and Parker, 2011, 2003, 2001 make for something of an exception). If psychoanalysis has found a home within the discipline of psychology, it is in critical psychology, a field usually defined in two ways: as the internal critique of the discipline of psychology, or as the various kinds of analytical work done by politically committed psychologists. Thus, psychoanalysis is either deployed to draw attention to the unconscious, libidinal dimensions of psychological work or in taking up politically charged issues outside the clinical setting, often aligned to a feminist, anti-racist or Marxist agenda. But while Fanon has been a central figure for a range of academic disciplines, it is quite astounding how little impact his writings, and the work of anti-colonial and postcolonial scholars more generally, have had on psychology, including critical psychology (although see Bulhan, 1985; Hook, 2004a, 2004b, 2012; cf. Painter et al., 2006: 221).² This chapter, then, addresses a gap in the literature, not simply the old antagonism between psychology and psychoanalysis, but that of Fanon's critical appropriation of psychoanalysis.

This is not to suggest that the relationship between psychoanalysis and critical psychology is not without its tensions. Within critical psychology there has also taken place, under the influence of the work of French philosopher-historian, Michel Foucault, among other poststructuralist thinkers, a shift towards a focus on discursive constitution of the subject (e.g. Edwards and Potter, 1992; Fairclough, 1992; Hook, 2001, 2007; Jorgenson and Phillips, 2002; Parker, 1992), casting serious doubt over notions of psychical structures and operations, including those of psychoanalytic theory.³ This depsychologisation of critical psychology was no doubt necessary as a corrective to the universalising tendencies of mainstream psychology. However, warnings against the perils of psychological reductionism can frequently occlude from serious consideration the psychical dimensions of power (Hook, 2007, 2012).⁴ If subjectivities are not only the effect of colonial and neocolonial distributions of power but also their conduits and their channels of transmission, then a key question of this chapter revolves around how one might critically draw on psychoanalytic concepts as a means of thinking about a psychic dimension to the persistence of colonialism.

In forging a psychology of the postcolonial, a Foucauldian analytics and Fanonian psychoanalysis are not entirely incompatible. Early on in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) Fanon makes two assertions. First, he establishes the pathological nature of the colonial situation that stems from and is articulated in two distinct but intertwined desires: 'The black man wants to be white. The white man is desperately trying to achieve the rank of man' (1952: xiii). Second, Fanon asserts the centrality of psychoanalysis for a critique of colonialism; indeed, for Fanon, 'only a psychoanalytic interpretation of the black problem can reveal the affective disorders responsible for this network of complexes' (1952: xiv). The desire to be white is what Fanon would go on to diagnose as a kind of neurosis. Likewise, psychoanalysis was crucial in Fanon's characterisation of the position occupied within the colonial relation by the coloniser, and he piled up the diagnoses of the coloniser's paranoid and neurotic disorders.

In *The Order of Things* Foucault places psychoanalysis within the human sciences, through which 'Western culture had given itself in one century a certain image of man' (1970: 361). Foucault thus implicates psychoanalysis in precisely what Fanon takes as his object of critique. Foucault does this by reading the disciplines of psychoanalysis and ethnology – the precursor to anthropology and the colonial discipline par excellence, concerned with the creation of Western man through what he is not, the racial other, the 'primitive' – alongside one another, as 'sciences of the unconscious', inasmuch as they both take as their object, although in slightly different ways, man's 'outer limits' (1970: 379). While the rest of the human sciences construct the consciousness of Western man, what he is or ought to be, towards which he is always developing – and here developmental psychology is paradigmatic – psychoanalysis and ethnology address that which cannot be admitted to 'civilisation', its repudiated origins, and, in Foucault's words, in both psychoanalysis and ethnology, 'we see the destiny of man being spun before our very eyes, but being spun backwards; it is being led back by those strange bobbins, to the form of its birth' (1970: 381).

The psychoanalytic 'talking cure' is, as Foucault sees it, different from the 'civilising mission' of colonialism. Indeed, Freud is frequently read as a critique of western European society, and Foucault can to a degree be included here; not only did Freud propose that infantile 'primitivity' persists into adulthood, in neuroses but also in those aspects of everyday life considered healthy, mature, he also suggested that 'primitivity', in the evolutionary sense, against which western Europe was defining itself, persists in what are taken to be markers of western European civility. However, psychoanalysis and ethnology do bear, as Foucault puts it, a 'profound kinship and symmetry' (1970: 378), being issued from the same episteme. That is to say, the conditions of possibility for psychoanalytic thought are the same as those that made colonialism possible: an opposition between 'civilisation' and that which it cannot admit, the 'primitive', and a linking of 'primitivity' to the past.

We aim to traverse this tension within Fanon's strategic deployment of psychoanalysis: that the frame he uses to critique the colonial situation, psychoanalysis, is resonant with the very object of his critique. We argue that the history of the frameworks that are deployed in the service of political critique within psychology be examined closely, genealogically, drawing attention to the stakes of the theory set to work. Psychoanalytic concepts, like any others, have histories – not only histories of deployment, but histories in which they were forged, from which they derive their form and force – and marshalling them for political critique without careful genealogical work is bound to repeat, to act out, the concept's unremembered past (Foucault, 1970; Fuss, 1994, 1995; Khanna, 2003).⁵

Of course, this argument itself bears the marks of psychoanalytic thinking. Indeed, the notion of repetition is one of the very cornerstones of psychoanalysis, finding its clearest articulation in Freud's (1914) clinical paper, 'Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through', the central theme of which is that a repetition of the past, which plays itself out in the transference relationship between analyst and analysand, is at once a form of remembering and of resistance to remembering; that is, a repetition of the past is a kind of memory acted out. As Freud puts it, 'the patient repeats *instead of remembering*' (1914: 151, emphasis added; see also Freud, 1920).

It is the notion of repetition that marks, for Foucault, the crucial difference between ethnology and psychoanalysis, and, by implication, the difference between the 'civilising mission' and the 'talking cure'. While ethnology is 'traditionally the knowledge we have of people without history' (1970: 376), psychoanalysis is a form of knowledge about those whose past is both held and withheld in the repetition of the past in the transference relationship. And it is with the notion of repetition – precisely what psychoanalysis interprets and seeks to transform into memory – that we can treat psychoanalytic interpretations themselves as a form of acting out of the colonial past at an epistemological level (Khanna, 2003). Following the trajectory between Freud and Fanon's ambivalent repetition of Freud, we suggest – and we could well have focused on Fanon's reworking of a number of other psychoanalytic theorists, for instance, his critique and use of Jung, Adler, Mannoni, Lacan or Sartre's work – that it bears witness to a kind of transference space within which psychoanalysis begins to work through its own disavowed relation to its colonial conditions of possibility.

In doing this, we refer to the South African context. South African colonialism may have been in certain respects different and – in its apartheid incarnation – more extreme and prolonged than in other places in the world, but the contemporary South African situation is exemplary of the persistence of the colonial past. We use it as a point of focus, then, not only because it is a context with which we are familiar but also because it dramatises the challenges in

developing a postcolonial psychology. The working example we refer to is a narrative submitted online to the Apartheid Archive, an interdisciplinary research project that 'aims to examine the nature of the experiences of racism of (particularly "ordinary") South Africans under the old apartheid order and their continuing effects on individual and group functioning in contemporary South Africa',⁶ everyday racism as opposed to the gross human rights violations of a strictly political kind that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission heard in the 1990s. The narrative is used to demonstrate what a more orthodox Freudian reading might look like, focusing on an individual diagnosis. We then move to a Fanonian psychoanalytic 'sociodiagnostics', making occasional reference back to the narrative.

Psychoanalysis and the diagnosis of individual psychopathology

We quote the narrative at length here as it provides a textured and quite florid impression of how the apartheid past is frequently remembered by white South Africans:

A black man in blue overalls – the 'standard issue' uniform of black labourers – was walking towards me as I left a cafe. The cafe was just across the road from a public toilet, essentially a black man's toilet...an intimidating, squalid little building where I never saw any whites go. The toilet was opposite a bottle store.... Black men would buy milk stout beer there, a type of beer (castle milk stout) somehow marked apart – black man's beer. Even that was an upmarket product compared to that perfect marker of difference, 'leopard beer' I think it was called, a very cheap mass-produced beer which seemed perhaps to be a more traditional form of beer.... It looked toxic, too under-marketed, I would never drink that – you only bought that, presumably, if you had no other choice.

Alongside the bottle store was a little bicycle repair shop, grubby and uncared for.... Next to it was a greasy pie shop, likewise unclean, smelly. This row of shops, along with the 'African toilet,' which always smelt bad and whose walls seemed stained with piss, was a kind of infra-zone, a grey-area that somehow existed below (but within) the norms of a white suburb. The man who ran the bicycle shop was a tiny Greek man – 'very Greek' we would have said – perhaps like the cafe owner across the road (or perhaps Portuguese), a racial designation that didn't matter all that much as long as one understood that it was one degree apart, at the edge of the degree-by-degree differentiation of white from black. Low income whites made for something of a difficult-to-place category. It would be only later that I would be introduced to 'poor whites,' pointed out to me by my

mother in Vrededorp, Johannesburg. They seemed more socially distant, more anxiety provoking even than blacks...

The toilet was scary – I always wondered what it looked like on the inside of those brick walls... I was frightened, a little disturbed, I guess, of their 'rights' to be there. I was always too young, too small, too innocent, not man enough (not black man enough?) to go in there. There was also an open-air barber nearby... The question that sometimes presented itself to my mind but that went always unvoiced was whether I would ever get my hair cut there or at a place like this; whether it would even be possible, whether these were different clippers for different hair ('peppercorns' was the word used to describe black hair); or that this was ridiculous because such unhygienic conditions – dirty clippers, unclean scissors – would simply never be an option... There were often bits of black hair scattered around this ungrassy, dusty section of ground that I crossed between my bus-stop and home. These little 'scalped' bits and squares of 'peppercorn' hair – which manifested themselves as throwaway tokens of worthlessness, of lives that didn't matter, bodily scraps that connoted moral inferiority, a closeness to thingness – seemed always so different to my own.

He came towards me, heading into the cafe, in his blue overall. This was always a bit of an anxious moment, where one needed to obey the right rules of disinterest, to maintain a measured distance, nothing by way of confrontation. A kind of professional distance, in short, suitable for interactions with those who worked for you. I only realized afterwards what had happened. He had moved his hand awkwardly, putting something away, obscuring something. His overalls had been open all the way down to the waist, open too low, and he had tucked himself back in. This was the first time I had ever seen (but had not seen, because it was black), a black penis. That question, never quite resolved, had come back once or twice after glimpses of black men in pornography: how could they not have a pink head, a pink *glans*, how could *that* flesh be black too? A question which seemed to suppose that actually, as when you saw a black man's, a black woman's hands, the less dark side, their palms, their fingernails, *there* bodily difference was minimal. The lightened areas, fingernails, that zone of the body closest to pink, to pale, those places could have been the opening possibility, the anxiety-deflating proof that ('they'), black people, seemed similar – similar but different too, no doubt – that there was a kind of reassuring, common-denominator similarity. That those parts of the body were more absent than present became the proof of difference.⁷

Freud's (1900) approach to the interpretation of dreams offers one way of reading narratives, such as this one, elaborated as a part of political discourse.

As Claudia Lapping has suggested, 'symbolic associations between elements in diverse discursive artefacts can be interpreted in a similar way to the patient's associations to the elements of a dream' (2011: 43; see also Bhabha, 1994; Silverman, 1983; Žižek, 1989). And it is precisely the highly reflexive, politically censored elements of the narrative, alongside its erotics of simultaneous curiosity, allure, aversion and disgust, that Freud's approach to dreams can help address.

Freud's central argument in *The Interpretation of Dreams* is that a dream is a kind of wish fulfilment, but a fulfilment of a wish disguised through the mechanisms of 'condensation' (Freud, 1900: 122–136) and 'displacement' (137–158). Regarding condensation, Freud notes how the manifest-content of a dream is 'meagre, paltry and laconic' (122) when compared to the associative material it produces. This disproportion, Freud argues, 'justifies the conclusion that a considerable condensation of psychic material occurs in the formation of dreams' (123). Through condensation, there occurs a compression of various ideas – among these not only banal thoughts from the previous day or memories quite accessible to consciousness but also, if one follows the associations, forbidden wishes. Under the force of displacement, forbidden wishes are lodged, inconspicuously, in minor elements of the manifest-content of a dream, thus disguising a forbidden wish by providing it with an insignificant but associated surrogate. Displacement thus works by substituting an element acceptable to psychic censorship for one that is unacceptable, substituting an element that stands for the memory of an unacceptable wish or its gratification, with one which is harmless according to social and cultural norms, and it treats the replacement as the original, as being identical with it.

Condensation and displacement, then, are the mechanisms by which the dream is assembled, by which forbidden wishes are articulated, disguised and censored in the manifest-content of the dream. And in the retelling of the dream, further distortions take place, producing further condensations and displacements; indeed, accessing the dream itself, as perceived during sleep, is impossible. One reads a narrative in this way by paying attention not simply to its content but also to its form: each element within a narrative may signify multiple lines of association, that is, each element is overdetermined, determined by various lines of thought, some of which may exceed its stated intentions (condensation), while a single forbidden wish may be figured in minor, seemingly unimportant elements of the narrative, the wish it gratifies only emerging in its relation to other elements of the narrative (displacement). This enables a reading of what can be called a narrative's associative unconscious. Much like a dream remembered, the Apartheid Archive narrative is, we would suggest, less an account of the apartheid past itself than a reconstitution of the past, telling us much more about the post-apartheid present and the conditions according to which one can narrativise the past. And if we trace

the condensations and displacements of the narrative, at least two prominent psychoanalytic themes can be read in the text.

Following the first sentence, where the narrator alludes to what this story is about – how, for the first time, he ‘had ever seen (but had not seen, because it was black), a black penis’, an event that may or may not have actually occurred, alerting us immediately to the operation of fantasy and the utility of psychoanalysis – he goes into a four-paragraph digression, picking up again at the start of the final paragraph. The digression is not without its significance, as we will see below; it will suffice at this stage, though, to point to how there is a formal replication here, in the first and last paragraphs, of how Freud described little boys encountering for the first time their mother’s absence of a penis, or, at least, how his adult neurotic patients recounted childhood memories of this formative event.

In ‘The Sexual Theories of Children’ the first fantasy Freud outlined, a fantasy little boys have when confronted with sexual difference, ‘consists in *attributing to everyone, including females, the possession of a penis*, such as the boy knows from his own body’ (1908: 215, emphasis in original). Confronted with a body without a penis, the little boy disavows its absence, ‘the boy’s estimate of its value is logically reflected in his inability to imagine a person like himself who is without this essential constituent’ (1908: 215–216). Here, though, the scene is framed in racial terms. Of course, the black penis is a familiar cast member in the theatre of white racial fantasies, and here it takes on an overdetermined role, at once threatening castration in its implied largeness (‘I was always too young, too small, too innocent, not man enough’), but also, in its absence of white skin, a phallic signifier in a racialised society like South Africa, it comes to stand for the social castration described throughout the rest of the narrative. This might be read as a displacement of anxieties around social inequalities; the seeing and not seeing of the black penis, then, can stand for the poverty and abjection that is both seen and not seen, which is disavowed in an overly intellectualised narrative. And although it may be a stretch to propose palms and fingernails, those parts of the body ‘closest to pink, to pale,’ as a kind of fetish object, there is nevertheless, around these body parts, an anxious search for a ‘reassuring, common-denominator similarity’, again anxieties over racialised social inequalities displaced and bound to the corporeal.

For Freud, the reason the absence of the penis is disavowed – and here the reason social castration is seen but not fully appreciated – is not primarily concern for the other who bears this loss, but fear of castration. ‘If this other person has no penis’ – and along with this, the child imagines, the woman may well have been on the receiving end of violence from the father, which lead to this loss – ‘I, too, may lose mine’. We see in the narrative an analogous process, the relating of racialised inequality to the possibility of the misfortune of inhabiting such a social space, the assertion that ‘I would never drink that’, the question

of 'whether I would ever get my hair cut there or at a place like this', that is, the threat to one's own position posed by one that 'seemed always so different to my own'. It is perhaps for this reason that poor whites, 'socially distant' and cut off from the white social body, are 'more anxiety provoking even than blacks'.

This, however, is to focus only on the first and last paragraphs; between them is a parenthesis that bears a heightened awareness of markers of racialised difference, as well as a preoccupation with dirt associated with blackness and disassociated from whiteness. Accompanying these concerns is also a marked focus on the rituals performed when confronted with this difference, the need, for instance, 'to obey the right rules of disinterest, to maintain a measured distance, nothing by way of confrontation'.

Useful in framing this aspect of the narrative is J.M. Coetzee's (1991) essay 'The Mind of Apartheid', where he employed a Freudian metaphors of obsessional neurosis to read the texts of Geoffrey Cronjé, an apartheid ideologue plagued by fears of racial mixing and the contamination of white racial purity. Although the Apartheid Archive narrative is not of the same racist tone as Cronjé's writings, Coetzee's essay assists not only in reading its more 'obsessional neurotic' features but also in providing a picture of a more orthodox Freudian individual diagnosis in the service of a postcolonial agenda.

One of the characteristic features of obsessional neurosis is a reaction formation, the turning around of a forbidden wish into its opposite, from which a compromised form of gratification is derived. And, as Freud (1926b) noted, 'in order to achieve this end it will often make us of the most ingenious *associative paths*' (1926b: 112, emphasis added). The last part of Freud's (1926b) formulation, italicised above, is exactly what Coetzee focuses on in his reading of Cronjé's texts: he traces the condensations and displacements of Cronjé's texts, the way they are 'continually bursting at the seams and leaking' (Coetzee, 1991: 20) with precisely what is so vehemently denied. Thus, Coetzee reads apartheid segregation policies, which Cronjé's writings informed, as not merely a 'counterattack upon desire' (1991: 17); on Coetzee's reading, 'the redrawing of the maps of cities, the redivision of the countryside, the removal and resettling of populations' (1991: 17), all of this declares, symptomatically, desire displaced, lodged, that is, in its negation.

It is not simply the case, though, that Cronjé's obsessions with racial purity, with strict prohibitions on racial mixing, with the segregation policies that would make racial mixing if not impossible then at least unlawful, *conjures* this forbidden desire with each prohibition. Certainly Coetzee suggests that Cronjé is fascinated with what he forbids – mixing, contamination, miscegenation – and in this way what he repudiates he is 'again and again returned to by his imagination' (1991: 16). More than this, though, in the theory of obsessional neurosis prohibitions are thought to be *animated* by precisely the desire that is repressed. As Freud puts it, obsessional rituals 'always reproduce something of

the pleasure they are designed to prevent; *they serve the repressed instinct no less than the agencies which are repressing it*' (1907: 125, emphasis added). Thus, if the displaced path for the satisfaction of desire is its prohibition, if it is prohibited desire that pulses through the prohibition, then this 'counterattack upon desire' could only have led to further anxiety, to a horrified sense of contamination, creating further need for rituals of purification, for stricter, tighter controls on segregation.

Anal erotism in Freud's writings is central to his conceptualisation of obsessional conduct (see e.g. Freud, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1918). And the conflicts of Freud's obsessional patients frequently coalesced around issues of money. Money, as Freud puts it, is 'a valuable substance, which in the course of the individual's life, attracts the psychic interest which properly belongs to that product of the anal zone, faeces' (1918: 82). On Coetzee's reading, this is the site, the erotogenic zone, of Cronjé's conflicts too. It is around a 'mishmash *mengelmoes* of races' (Cronjé, 1945: 18; cited in Coetzee, 1991: 9) that Cronjé's texts continually circle. And as Coetzee puts it, 'In everyday usage the term *mengelmoes* is always derogatory. It implies a mixture in which not only individual character but all original structure has been lost; what is left behind is shapeless, undifferentiated and pulpy – much like faeces, in fact' (Coetzee, 1991: 10).

What Cronjé fears most, then, is undifferentiation, the loss of racial difference. It is not, however, a loss of racialised privilege that Cronjé fears, not in any simple sense and not primarily; in addition to these concerns over financial power, and conducted through them, are a set of anxious repudiations, aversions, that ward off death: if different races are allowed to mix, and if whites are allowed to intermarry, then 'we as white people will eventually cease to exist' (Cronjé, 1945: 7; cited in Coetzee, 1991: 8). And if this 'counterattack upon desire' was also a neurotic mode of satisfying what was prohibited, then this could only, with each forced removal of the object of forbidden desire, bring the obsessional subject ever nearer to death, the death that this desire spelled for whiteness, a contamination of its purity, constituting in the true Freudian sense a repetition compulsion – not simply a repetition of the past but one that leads towards that inorganic, undifferentiated state from which all living matter has come, a 'circuitous path to death' (Freud, 1920: 50–51).

At the risk of belabouring the point, we would certainly stop short of diagnosing the narrator of the Apartheid Archive a racist in the mould of Cronjé; the obsessional features of the text, though, revolving around difference and sameness, mixture and separateness and the centrality of sexuality in the narrator's anxieties about racial difference are certainly striking. We could also make a link here between castration anxieties and the obsessional features of this narrative, a connection made most clearly by Freud (1918) in the Wolfman case. Freud's patient had the overwhelming need to exhale whenever he saw beggars,

cripples and ugly or disfigured people, and this was connected to his ritualistic breathing in of the Holy Spirit, and breathing out of evil spirits. He thus associatively linked the act of inhaling and exhaling to obsessional concerns with anal expulsion. More to the point, faeces and dirt, money, fears of misfortune and concerns about mixing and contamination with the dirtiness of the wretched, all these things are condensed within a single moment that is determined from two sides: that of castration anxiety (ending up in their position) and obsessional neurosis (mixing, undifferentiation, irreconcilable aggression towards the unfortunate). It is not too hard to propose, then, that an encounter with those living in abject conditions could provoke both castration anxieties and obsessional concerns over what must be cast aside to live as one does insulated by racialised privilege, producing a narrative shot through with both the disavowal of difference and a compulsive framing of the scene in terms of rigid segregations and differences.

This is, then, how a Freudian analysis of this narrative might proceed, the key point being that the problem, the 'pathogenic nucleus', would be located within the individual; that is, however wide the sphere of influence appreciated, it is the singular ego that forms the focus of attention. The risk here is that individual diagnoses may prove a political impediment inasmuch as they lead away from more structural, sociological and economic modes of engagement and analysis.⁸ Through the reification of psychological notions – obsessional neurosis, fetishism, castration anxiety and so on – such factors come to be viewed as foundational, as the primary mechanisms that establish and maintain structures of dispossession and inequality. Fanon, as we show below, steers away from the psychological reductionism that characterised many earlier attempts to use psychoanalysis beyond the clinic, attempting to direct his diagnostic attentions to pathological socio-historical conditions rather than to 'colonial personalities'. He nonetheless does not give up the locus of the individual and his diagnoses still pertain to subjectivities. As we will see, though, Fanon's unorthodox borrowings from the history of psychoanalytic thought mean that his is a strategic utilisation of its concepts in order to produce a set of transformative theorisations.

Fanon's ambivalent appropriation of psychoanalysis

As noted earlier, Fanon focuses on two overarching desires, which are worth reiterating: 'The black man wants to be white. The white man is desperately trying to achieve the rank of man' (1952: xiii). Fanon tracks the implications of the desire to be white across the domains of language, sexuality, dreams and behaviour, finding in each instance the persistence of this wish. As an unconscious desire, it is one that is never stated as a verbal proposition; it is closer to the fantasmatic urge that underlies a variety of behaviours – from taking on

white European language and culture, to the desire for a white spouse or sexual partner, cosmetic treatments of skin whitening, hair-straightening and so on. It is for this reason that Fanon draws inspiration from the clinical approach that Freud developed for the treatment of neurosis.

Fanon's critical relationship to psychoanalysis, though, means that he revises crucial Freudian conceptualisations.⁹ This gains pace as his arguments build, so much so that the ostensible 'neuroses of lactification' – the wish to be white – he describes is perhaps better understood within the ambit of 'epidermalisation', the internalisation of broader inequalities. As Fanon says of the black man's sense of inferiority, 'The inferiority complex can be ascribed to a double process: First, economic. Then, internalization or rather epidermalization of this inferiority' (1952: xiv–xv). For Fanon, concrete social and political inequalities – structural causes – lie at the root of what may otherwise be seen as the more idiosyncratic or subjective constituents of neuroses. Fanon thus privileges what he calls 'sociogeny' or a 'sociodiagnostics'. In this way, it is more the pathological nature of society, 'the neurotic structure of colonialism itself' (Fuss, 1994: 20) that is diagnosed, than an individual subject.

Important an assertion as this is, politically, in avoiding a simplistically individualising register of analysis, things are perhaps not always quite so clear cut. For although Fanon clearly departs from much of Freud's meta-psychology, many of his theorisations in *Black Skin, White Masks* are not easily separated from a Freudian understanding of neurosis, particularly so in view of the constituent factors of sexuality, trauma and singular psychological disturbance that the use of the concept of neurosis commits one to.

Clinically, neurosis connotes a variety of irrational behaviours and symptoms that need to be understood as the outcome of psychical conflict between unconscious urges and the social or cultural need to keep these urges outside of the conscious mind. Or in Fanon's own description:

The neurotic structure of an individual is precisely the elaboration, the formation, and the birth of conflicting *knots* in the ego, stemming on the one hand from the environment and on the other from the entirely personal way this individual reacts to these influences.

(1952: 62, emphasis in original)

One appreciates then the intractability of the psychical dilemma that Fanon sketches, that of the 'dream of turning white', the wish to attain the level of humanity accorded to whites in racist or colonial contexts, as it comes into conflict with being in a black body, within a racist society, which make this wish impossible.

In searching for the cause, and thereby the potential cure, of neurotic disturbances, one is obliged – following Fanon's reading of Freud – to turn to the

childhood history of the individual. The symptoms of neurosis, furthermore, will always be linked to a trauma of sorts, which lends these symptoms their own distinctive, individual character. More than this, we are not necessarily looking for a single event, for the cause of the symptom most often arises out of 'multiple traumas, frequently analogous and repeated' (Freud cited in Fanon, 1952: 123). More importantly, this trauma need not have been that of an objective, empirical reality, an 'actual' event; it may just as well have been fantasised. It is this important conceptual leap that means that psychoanalysis can focus its curative efforts almost completely on elements of fantasy, on 'psychical reality' rather than on the facts of consensual objectivity. Then again, one might argue, traumatic examples of racist violence, abuse and denigration would seem quite commonplace in the colonial domain.

Describing this trauma, Fanon states, drawing on Sartre, 'It is the racist who creates the inferiorized' (1952: 73). For Fanon, what makes a black person 'an object among other objects' is the white gaze; as he states, in a frequently cited passage, recounting how he was interpellated by the fearful gaze of a white child: 'Look! A Negro!' (1952: 89), the child says, 'Maman, look, a Negro; I'm scared!' (1952: 91). There is a misrecognition of the black man here; but – and it is here that Fanon's notion of 'lactification' emerges – it is through a 'total identification with the white man' (1952: 124), an identification with this white gaze, that the black man begins to misrecognise himself too: 'I cast an objective gaze over myself, discovered my blackness, my ethnic features; deafened by cannibalism, backwardness, fetishism, racial stigmas, slave traders' (1952: 92).

One way to frame the Apartheid Archive narrative is as an instance in which the black man is phantasmatically produced, objectified, becomes a repository for sexual and aggressive instincts, for corporeality itself; as Fanon puts it, 'no longer do we see the black man; we see a penis' (1952: 147). However, one might suggest, following Fanon, that the potentially neurotic element of this encounter lies in the degree to which this is how the 'black man in blue overalls' walking towards the narrator comes to see himself too, not only as belonging within certain racially designated zones, doing things that are characteristically black, but also *through the white gaze*, with which he has identified: blackness to the black man, as Fanon has it, is no less associated with 'filth', 'thingness', 'squalor', 'worthlessness', 'moral inferiority' than it is for the white man. It is, in Khanna's terms, 'a violence done to the black man so that he too sees other black men through white eyes' (2003: 173); but the key insight Fanon offers is that the black man comes to see himself through the same white gaze.

As noted above, it is not simply one encounter such as this that precipitates the neurosis Fanon describes. For Fanon, the colonial environment is so characterised by racism, by epistemic, psychological and physical types of oppression that these *material and cultural forms of trauma* may themselves, as opposed to

more individual circumstances posited by Freud, act as the triggers of neurosis. Through the myriad racialised stories told to black and white children alike – stories in which ‘the Wolf, the Devil, the Wicked Genie, Evil, and the Savage are always represented by the Blacks or Indians’ – the black child, Fanon argues, ‘identifies himself with the explorer, the civilising colonizer, the white man who brings truth to the savages, a lily-white truth’ (1952: 124–126). It is for this reason that Bhabha (1994) counts the young Fanon’s experience of racist Hollywood stereotypes of black men as one of the key ‘primal scenes’ of *Black Skin, White Masks*.

The neurotic quality of what Fanon is describing here results from forced identifications with whiteness. As Fuss puts it, ‘Forced to occupy, in a white racial phantasm, the static ontological space of the timeless “primitive,” the black man is disenfranchised of his very subjectivity’ (1995: 21). Fanon (1952) sketches this dilemma in the following terms: if it is the case that, within colonial discourse, all that is repugnant and undesirable is black, and that I, as a black man or woman, order my life like that of a moral person, then ‘[t]he only thing I know is the purity of my conscience and the whiteness of my soul’ (1952: 169). Whiteness here functions as a moral category, as the basis, the template, of all that is positive. As Fanon puts it, ‘If I behave like a man with morals, I am not black’ (1952: 191). This process will always be a jarring one, because race is not, like other variables of discrimination – such as religion and ethnicity – easily hidden; it remains patently visible, particularly so in colonial regimes. It is for this reason that Fanon states that ‘the black man lives an ambiguity that is extraordinarily neurotic’ (1952: 169).

The concept of epidermalisation bears some resemblance to the psychoanalytic notion of introjection, the psychic process of taking into the ego objects from the external world, prototypically parental objects or parts thereof.¹⁰ Fanon’s concept of epidermalisation, though, has a far more politicised epistemology than that of introjection. Epidermalisation, offers Hall (1996), is ‘literally, the inscription of race on the skin’ (1996: 16). In Khanna’s words, it is a conception of how ‘the *historical* and *economic* shape the perception of the *biological*’ (Khanna, 2003: 172, emphasis in original). We are better placed, then, to appreciate what Fanon attempts by way of his ‘sociogenetic’ diagnoses. These are diagnoses that have departed from the psychoanalytic premises that initially informed them. They are not predominantly clinical categories, and they pertain less to individuals than to the sociohistorical conditions in which the oppressed find themselves, a form of analysis that cannot easily be accused of vulgar psychologisation. This makes for an important warning for a postcolonial psychoanalysis more broadly: in his recourse to a psychoanalytic interpretative approach, Fanon insists that such neuroses, despite being ‘wired through’ the sexual realms, through unconscious processes, are ultimately derived from inequalities present in wider social structures

and cannot be linked to personality factors of the colonised or reduced to the internal psychical workings of individual subjects.

In the psychoanalytic literature Fanon draws on, neurotic symptoms, like dreams, are theorised as a kind of wish fulfilment: a symptom speaks – at least it is addressed to an Other – and it communicates that which the laws of sociality cannot admit, enabling for the neurotic the disguised, displaced fulfilment of a forbidden wish. Certainly, Fanon goes along with this line of thinking when, in discussing the black man as a phobogenic object for white women, he states – controversially – ‘we discover that when a woman lives the fantasy of rape by a black man, it is a kind of fulfilment of a personal dream or an intimate wish’ (1952: 156). The neurosis of lactification consists in the wish to be white, which confronts the reality of being in a black skin. However, this wish does not emanate from a set of instinctual drives but from a particular historical formation that accords humanity only to whiteness. Indeed, ‘primitivity’ is taken to be a product of colonial discourse.¹¹ But this does not mean that Fanon forgoes, in all instances, the category of psychoanalytic ‘primitivity’, even if he carefully reframes it – as in phobic projection – as ‘prelogical rationality and affectivity’ (1952: 133). The fantasy of the black man as a sexual brute, as ‘primitive’ sexuality, as in the Apartheid Archive narrative, entails a regression. ‘The white man who endows the black man with a malefic influence’, Fanon states, ‘regresses intellectually’ (1952: 154).

It is this notion of regression in Fanon’s writing, which is not his own but a function of the philosophical tradition in which he works, that recalls what Foucault designates the ‘kinship and symmetry’ (1970: 378) of psychoanalysis and ethnology. Commenting on the psychoanalytic conception of ‘primitivity’ on the one hand, and racialised ‘primitivity’ as found in ethnology and early anthropology on the other, Celia Brickman (2003) argues compellingly that they are not separable: ‘Because the developmental trajectory in psychoanalysis was itself mapped onto an evolutionary trajectory’, Brickman writes, ‘regression was believed to retrace not only the steps of individual development but also of human evolution’ (Brickman, 2003: 86). Thus, neurosis in Freud’s thinking is figured as a regression to an earlier phase of development, to infantile ‘primitivity’, but the regression of obsessional neurosis, for instance, would be not only to anality and its attendant preoccupations with separations and distinctions, insides and outsides, but also to the authoritarian age of human evolution (see Freud, 1907), to an ‘erotics of authority and subjugation’ (Brickman, 2003: 101). There is, as Brickman sees it, no way of referring to psychic regression without invoking a latent colonial discourse, as ‘the idea itself carries with it the imprint of the evolutionary premises with their racial entailments on which it was originally constructed’ (2003: 76–77; cf. Lacan, 1977; Parker, 2011).¹²

Rather than being limited to a few unfortunate references to the racial 'primitive' – Freud's (1913) *Totem and Taboo Resemblances between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics* being perhaps the most unfortunate – Brickman reads Freud's entire oeuvre, including his clinical and metapsychological papers, as being underpinned by evolutionary theory. While a critique of racism can certainly be offered within this frame, racism – as in Fanon's formulation of phobic racial fantasies that 'primitivise' the black man in the attainment of the 'rank of man' – is formulated as a neurotic disorder, a form of psychopathology. The critique, though, must re-inscribe the very forms of thought that enabled the fraught colonial relation in the first place. Thus, even in the hands of Fanon, in his anti-colonial sociodiagnostic deployment of psychoanalysis, there is an indissoluble element of colonial thinking.

Conclusion

What we can say now, with the benefit of genealogies of psychoanalysis that had not been written at the time Fanon was alive, is that he made some of the first steps towards addressing psychoanalysis as a part of the very social structure he diagnosed. And this is precisely the point, to conceive of postcolonial critique not as a new vocabulary after colonialism, as one that marks an obsessive rupture with the past, or a disavowal of the historicity of the concepts through which one speaks, but as a counter-discourse that dwells within the logic and grammar of that which it seeks to unsettle. What Fanon's work demonstrates, then – despite the fact that he devoted as much time to reworking psychoanalytic concepts as he did using them to analyse the colonial situation – is the impossibility of an un-colonial psychoanalysis. Indeed, in deploying psychoanalysis as a form of postcolonial critique, the thing one is looking for – repetitions of the colonial past – resides, also, displaced, in the very practice of looking for it.

It is, however, in the distance between Freud and Fanon's ambivalent appropriation of the conceptual apparatus of psychoanalysis, as well as the trajectory that forms between them – a trajectory begun in Freud's work itself – that there lies the possibility not only of bringing into focus the politics and the power relations of colonialism's persistence but also of discerning the politics and the power relations of reading colonialism's persistence psychoanalytically. What we propose here, then, is an argument for the centrality of psychoanalysis in a critical psychology of the postcolonial that not only deploys it to read the unconscious aspects of colonial and neocolonial subjectivities but also foregrounds the coloniality of psychoanalytic thinking, rendering psychoanalysis both object of and accomplice to political critique (see also Khanna, 2003). This is what lies at the heart of this chapter's contribution to political psychology: an awareness of the types of theorisation and critique that both psychoanalysis and postcolonial thought might offer together.

Notes

1. Fanon's ideas are not, of course, beyond reproach, and this becomes important particularly when one considers those less celebrated aspects of writings, such as his passages on homosexuality and black women, which have put him on the sharp end of feminist and gender studies critiques.
2. Painter, Terre Blanche and Henderson suggest that there was during late-apartheid in South Africa political mobilisation by black psychologists who took their bearings from Fanon and Steve Biko. 'Apart from introducing these novel theoretical ideas to critical psychology in South Africa', they state, 'the black psychologists grouping contributed significantly to an important alternative body of knowledge, and alternative publications and conferences' (2006: 221). They cite Chabani Manganyi's (1973, 1991) writings (see Hook, 2012 on the significance of Manganyi's work), as well as the edited collections by Nicholas (1993) and Nicholas and Cooper (1990). Certainly, these are important scholarly contributions, but they do not necessarily take the work of Fanon as their focus.
3. Admittedly, it is a heterogeneous body of psychological scholarship drawing on the notion of discourse; arguably, very little of it fully adopts a Foucauldian position on the discursively constituted subject (Hook, 2001, 2007), a significant amount of attention being granted to individual agency, privileging a pre-constituted subject's deployment of discourse, over their formation as a subject of discourse, usually being a matter of how a subject is shaped and positioned by, rather than produced by, discourse.
4. It is worth noting that there have indeed been attempts to append psychoanalytic concepts to the frame of discursive psychology (Billig, 1998, 1999; Gough, 2004; Riggs, 2005; Saville Yong and Frosh, 2009), as well as link psychoanalytic notions to types of interview methodology (Frosh et al., 2000, 2003; Hollway and Jefferson, 2000).
5. In this regard, Diana Fuss provides a particularly powerful argument by suggesting that the psychoanalytic notion of identification 'be placed squarely within its other historical genealogies, including colonial imperialism' (1994: 20). The notion of incorporation, frequently associated with Hegelian dialectics but also inseparable from psychoanalytic formulations of identification as introjection, as Fuss argues with reference to Robert Young, 'mimics at a conceptual level the geographical and economic absorption of the non-European world by the West' (Young cited in Fuss, 1994: 23). Identification, Fuss suggests, is a kind of psychic geopolitics, 'an imperial process, a form of violent appropriation in which the Other is deposed and assimilated into the lordly domain of Self' (1994: 23).
6. See http://www.apartheidarchive.org/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4&Itemid=4
7. Apartheid Archive narrative no. 59, white South African male, in his thirties.
8. Of course, this is not a new problem; such an engagement with mechanisms and psychologies of power is emblematic also of earlier forms of psychoanalytical social psychology that, as in the case of Adorno's 'Authoritarian personality', targeted patterns of anti-Semitic prejudice as they occurred within particular individuals and character types.
9. For this reason, one is tempted to side with Fanon against Macey's (1999: 12) charge of a 'quite extraordinary misreading of Freud'. While there is some truth to Macey's assertion – Fanon arguably does not select the most appropriate Freudian text to grapple with dilemmas of neurosis – the point it would seem is that Fanon's is a strategic use of psychoanalysis; his is a precisely inventive recourse to Freud.

10. Frequently defined in opposition to projection – the expulsion of unpleasant impulses, most often through repudiation – introjection usually denotes a merging with the object; as such, introjection is closely associated with psychoanalytic formulations of identification, a phantasmatic process that finds its bodily analogue in orality, ingestion, as opposed to excretion. At a basic level, then, it is through introjection that a subject is able to assert, ‘I am like this’ (I have taken this in, I am identified with it), and through projection, ‘I am not like that’ (I have spat that out, excreted it) (Freud, 1925).
11. Although our focus is on Fanon’s use of Freud here, what he states of Jung’s notion of the collective unconscious puts things more explicitly:

We need quite simply to demonstrate that Jung confuses instinct and habit. According to him, the collective unconscious is part of the psyche; the myths and archetypes are permanent engrams of the species. We hope we have shown that this collective unconscious is nothing of the sort and that, in fact, it is cultural, i.e., it is acquired.

(1952: 165)

12. Whether or not this taints all psychoanalytic interventions is open to debate. Parker argues that ‘Lacan stripped out the particular contents of vulgarised Freudian theory’ (2011: 11–12), and would clearly disagree with Brickman here, or at least suggest that she read further than Freud. And indeed, in *The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis*, Lacan is unequivocal on the stakes of likening stages of development and ages of evolution (1977: 54). Although this argument that Lacanian psychoanalysis resolves the problem of ‘primitivity’ is beyond the scope of this chapter, for a Lacanian perspective on race and colonialism see Seshadri-Crooks (2000) and Hook (2012).

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9

Conflict Analysis and International Relations

Karin Aggestam

Introduction

Conflict analysis concerns the systematic study of the causes, actors, processes and resolution of conflicts around the globe. It draws upon a number of disciplines and strives to be conflict sensitive while generating relevant suggestions on how to manage and resolve conflict. The broad focus of conflict analysis is also reflected in the multitude of methodological approaches which are utilised (see, e.g., Druckman, 2005). This diversity partly relates to the differences in the overarching purpose of research. For instance, some studies strive to predict conflict behaviour and attitudes with the utilisation of game theory and/or simulation (Colaresi and Thompson, 2002; Maoz and Mor, 1996). Other studies aim for policy relevance and to bridge the theory–practice divide (Fisher, 2009). In such studies, structured focused comparison and/or single case studies methods are frequently used not only for theory advancement of conflict analysis, but also for generic and normative prescriptions. For instance, it may concern when and how specific conflict-resolution strategies are considered most efficient to be applied during a conflict cycle. Finally, a growing number of studies use ethnography and narrative as methods to unravel the complexities between identity politics, specific contextual features of conflict and global structures (Auerbach, 2009; Jutila et al., 2008; Nesbitt-Larking and Kinnvall, 2012). In short, the fields of research and practice of conflict analysis are vast (Monroe et al., 2009).

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of conflict analysis in relation to political psychology and discuss how it resonates with the challenges posed by the characteristics of contemporary conflicts. By way of delimiting the scope, the chapter will first discuss how (mis)perceptions in conflict have been problematised and theorised by drawing on social psychology and cognition theory. From this strand of research, the field of conflict resolution has advanced with its ambition to bridge the theory–practice divide. Second, it will

focus on the intractable nature of some of the contemporary conflicts and discuss in what ways political psychology provides insights to these contextual dynamics and how these barriers can be overcome. In recent times, there are an increasing number of scholars who argue that contemporary conflicts need to be understood as identity-based conflicts (see, e.g., Fisher, 2009; Kaldor, 2001). These conflicts pose a major challenge to effective conflict management and resolution as they often touch upon existential concerns and historical grievances, which are difficult to negotiate and compromise on (Aggestam, 2013, 2009; Lupovici, 2012). Such a *problematique* corresponds with the strong drive within political psychology to offer solutions to 'real' political problems (Hammack and Pelicki, 2012: 75).

The disciplines of international relations (IR) and political psychology have largely developed in synergy and parallel to each other from the 1950s and onwards. However, within IR, realism came to dominate and conflict analysis was for a long time mostly concerned with strategic security studies and crisis management. With a Hobbesian world view of international politics, IR scholars at the time underlined the primacy of states in international politics and the power struggles that emanated from the anarchy that characterised such a decentralised international system. The underlying assumption of political realism is that conflicts basically are driven by a continual aggressive nature of human beings and their desire for power and domination. Particularly during the Cold War and with the looming risk of a nuclear war, IR and conflict analysis were mainly preoccupied with strategic security studies, which focused on how to cope more efficiently with international crisis, coercion, arms race and escalation ladders (see, e.g., Colaresi and Thompson, 2002; Schelling, 1960; Snyder and Diesing, 1977).

As a reaction and alternative to the dominant power-political paradigm of IR, the research on conflict resolution emerged from the 1970s onwards (Burton, 1969; Kelman, 1979). Deviating from the state-centrism found in IR, the point of departure for conflict analysis has been to illuminate how the rationalities of political actors in conflict are constrained due to their world views, perceptions, motives and belief systems (Monroe et al., 2009). Since then the field of conflict resolution has expanded dramatically. Drawing upon social psychology, a generic approach to conflict is nurtured, which underlines that conflict exists on all levels, from interpersonal, societal, to international, and include states as well as non-state actors. Conflict, it is argued, does not originate in the instinct of human beings to dominate, as realism claims, but is an outcome of misperceptions and dysfunctional behaviour between parties. Furthermore, such conflict dynamics are triggered mainly by unfulfilled human needs, such as identity, security, autonomy, dignity and bonding. Furthermore, these human needs are viewed as universal. However, if they are unfulfilled, they will most likely cause frustration, dissonance and ultimately

violence and conflict (Avruch and Mitchell, 2013; Kelman, 2009; Rothman, 1997; Tidwell, 1998).

Human-needs theory derives from Abraham Maslow's theory of motivation and needs hierarchy, which has been developed and integrated within conflict analysis, among others, by John Burton (1969, 1990). Conflict is primarily defined here on the basis of the actors' subjective perceptions of their environment. Hence, conflict resolution is concerned with the ways adversaries are reassessing their conflicting perceptions more 'accurately' through the recognition of similar needs to that of the other party (Burton, 1995: 122). There is also a sharp distinction made between disputes and conflicts. Disputes are seen as being concerned with material and distributional issues, which the parties more easily can negotiate and compromise upon. Conflicts differ in that regard since they involve ontological human needs and existential concerns, which are non-negotiable (Burton, 1993: 55; Rothman, 1997).

Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen a growing number of intra-state conflicts, which frequently take place within fragile and/or collapsing states. These conflicts reflect antagonistic identity politics, which in many cases have turned rife and destructive as, for instance, in the Western Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990s, and Iraq and Syria by the turn of century. As a response, an overriding concern, by both the international policy community and academia, has been to find ways to address and rebuild these war-torn societies and enable reconciliation between various ethnic groups to take place. This development has generated an upsurge of studies and research which link conflict to memory, identity, religion, history and ethnicity (see, e.g., Anastasiou, 2009; Cook-Huffman, 2009; Korostelina, 2009). In the following sections, an overview of (mis)perception and change is discussed and situated in conflict analysis in the first part, while the second part relates more specifically to the *problematique* of protracted conflict and reconciliation.

(Mis)perceptions of conflict

If one's primary concern... is to understand the dynamics of conflict and the strategies most likely to be effective in transforming destructive into constructive processes, then it is also crucial to focus upon the differences in perceptions of parties to conflict. Then one needs to analyze the differences with which parties perceive the same issues, events, policies, and peoples.

(Kaplowitz, 1990: 56)

From the outset, conflict analysis has primarily been concerned with perceptions and misperceptions that are seen as triggering and aggravating conflict behaviour and attitudes. Hence, it has been deemed essential not only

to generate greater knowledge and theories about adversarial perceptions, but also to understand how these perceptions may alter and mitigate in order to resolve conflict. This section will therefore discuss how IR research on enemy images and (mis)perceptions has drawn upon social psychology and cognition theory to deepen the understanding of the psychological features of conflict as well as how these processes may be altered to enable conflict resolution.

According to Michael Brecher (1972), in order to study and classify ‘misperceptions’ of conflicting parties, an analytical distinction needs to be drawn between two types of ‘realities’: one, subjective/psychological and the other, objective/operational. When such a distinction is made, subjective perceptions of political elites and decision-makers are evaluated and compared to an ‘objective’ reality. Hence, it strives to illuminate how the parties’ perceptions correspond to an external environment and to what extent the two ‘realities’ may stand in dissonance. As such, misperceptions in IR may be identified as well as to what extent the parties perceive a conflict differently (Vertzberger, 1990: 37; see also Jervis, 1976).

Dominant frames and perceptions of political elites are assumed to be influenced by individual attributes, such as cognitions, values, attitudes, political culture and ideology. Enemy images and perceptions of conflict are generally known for their perseverance, since political actors tend to interpret and understand their political environment from theory-driven perceptions, which are derived from pre-existing knowledge structures (Jönsson, 1990: 52). As Alan Tidwell states (1998: 91), ‘perception simply refers to the way in which an individual interprets the world. As social actors we constantly decode messages from the world around us. The codes we break, however, are not written in stone; we decode messages according to our internal standards’. Consequently, there are numerous studies which analyse the belief system of political leaders in conflict from various perspectives, such as operational codes, images, belief systems, cognitive maps and attitudinal prisms (George, 1969; Larson, 1994).

Cognitive enemy images

Cognitive beliefs descriptively point to the perceived realities of political actors. Understanding dominant frames involves a reconstruction of how political agents reason about their strategic interaction. Furthermore, an analysis of adversarial perceptions of conflict highlights images of self and other. Actors tend to hold rival and contrasting views and images of what constitutes the conflict. Consequently they ‘act in accordance with their perception of reality’ (Brecher, 1972: 12). The use of cognition theory highlights how individuals in conflict frequently act as ‘cognitive misers’ while processing information. This helps to explain why the social–psychological divide between adversaries and barriers to conflict resolution are so great. Furthermore, individuals acting as

cognitive misers tend to reject new information if it contradicts pre-existing beliefs in order to avoid dissonance (Larson, 1985: 29–34).

Cognitive beliefs are formed from personal experiences, history and empirical events, which political actors then use to reason, frame and interpret conflicting interaction and antagonistic contexts. Hence, they are inclined to act as 'practical-intuitive historians' by drawing selective lessons from the past (Vertzberger, 1990: 298). The frequent use of historical analogies is one way for actors to interpret, categorise and understand the complexities of conflict (Brändström et al., 2004). An illustrative example of historical analogical reasoning is the way the American president George Bush (senior) framed the Persian Gulf Crisis in 1990–1991 and the actions by the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. As part of the effort to mobilise international opinion and military alliance against Iraq, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was compared with the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938. This way of historical reasoning provided a suitable frame to castigate Saddam Hussein as a dangerous leader with similar characteristics to those of Adolf Hitler – a dictator who could only be deterred by power, not through appeasement.

In his seminal work on national and enemy images, Ole Holsti (1962) differentiates between open and closed belief systems in which new information can either produce change (open system) or adjust to a pre-existing belief system (closed system). Obviously, this has implications for the change and continuity in belief systems. Particularly, self-images are resistant to change as they often 'draw upon myths and embellished memories of past achievements as palpable examples of the national purpose' (Lebow, 1981: 197). Political elites are inclined to be locked in their own national self-image, which may induce them to believe that others see them in a similarly idealised way as they understand themselves, that is, 'images of others' images of oneself' (Lebow, 1981: 202–203). Noel Kaplowitz (1990: 57) also underlines the importance of studying self-images in conflict and sees a clear link between how political elites frame their own national purpose and aspiration to that of the enemy's legitimacy and authenticity. Yaacov Vertzberger (1990: 125–126) refers in a similar way to the 'judgmental heuristic' and the conjunction of self and other. Hence, part of the process of constructing national self-esteem and self-image is to separate self from the other, which is done by distinguishing between 'us and them' and 'friends and enemies' (Jabri, 1996: 133–141).

Attribution theory has frequently been applied in conflict analysis as it explains and problematises how political actors actively attempt to interpret and understand their own behaviour as well as that of other actors. The theory shows how intertwined such knowledge is with images of self and other. Daniel Heradstveit (1979), in his insightful study on the psychological obstacles to peace in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, claims that beliefs of self and other are based on a mutual contingency interaction. The interaction and

behaviour of the enemy have direct consequences for the self-understanding as well as that of the enemy and conflict in general. The driving force here is not consistency, as stipulated in the theory of cognitive dissonance, but rather a search for validity in order to understand and provide reasons for the conflicting action of others as well as that of oneself (Larson, 1985). Furthermore, attribution theory emphasises the distinction between dispositional and situational factors. Dispositional factors are understood as enduring and internal characteristics of an actor, whereas situational features are external, contextual and transient. Political actors in conflict have a tendency to overemphasise dispositional factor when explaining the behaviour of enemies, whereas situational factors are accentuated when interpreting their own behaviour. As a consequence, there is a tendency among adversaries to have negative anticipations about the behaviour of the enemy and positive expectations about the action of oneself. In theory, this is called the 'fundamental attribution error' (Heradstveit, 1979: 23–26; Thompson et al., 2006). To sum up, in the quest for meaning and interpretation of the conflict, political actors are disposed to act as 'intuitive scientists', utilising a kind of 'naive epistemology' (Heradstveit, 1979: 22).

Changes in perceptions and the reframing of conflict

Since misperceptions in conflict are considered an obstacle to conflict resolution, perceptions need to be altered. Hence, a major challenge to conflict analysis is therefore to understand and theorise about change. Attribution theory, as discussed above, underlines how political actors are guided by their quest for meaning and validity. The theory stipulates that actors form attitudes on the basis of their own diagnosis of an event. Change may consequently appear as a result of a learning experience, which can lead to cognitive adjustment, and/or by the construction of new beliefs. In a similar vein, the so-called Hovland approach assumes that beliefs of actors may change, and actors may learn if they are exposed to persuasive communication: that is, new information, arguments and reasons put forward by a credible and trusted source (Larson, 1985: 25–29). Cognitive dissonance theory stipulates change in perceptions owing to the dissonance that actions and events may create in pre-existing beliefs and self-images. The argument is that change in perceptions can take place after an alteration in behaviour. In other words, conflict is reframed following a shift in policy or strategy since political actors strive to rationalise their actions (Auerbach, 1986; Festinger, 1957; Larson, 1985).

Janice Gross Stein, who has conducted several studies on image change and conflict resolution, stresses the importance of including in conflict analysis the political context of action and criticises cognition theory for failing to do so. 'Theories of social cognition do not explicitly model the processes that link changes in the environment to cognitive constructs or explain how images

change' (Stein, 1996: 99). According to Stein (1996: 100–105), image change is an incremental process of trial and error in which political leaders learn and change images through experimentation. From her in-depth studies of the Soviet president Michael Gorbachev (who initiated a reorientation in security relations with the United States in the end of the 1980s) and of the Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat (who commenced peace negotiations with Israel in the mid-1970s), she concludes that the type of reinterpretation of the political environment is triggered primarily when there is a need for domestic reforms and when previous unilateral strategies have failed. Consequently, these factors encourage political leaders to engage in political learning, to be more adaptive and receptive to new information.

Originating from human-needs theory, the interactive problem-solving approach not only attempts to explain changes in perceptions of conflict, but it seeks actively to reframe a conflict that consequently may result in its resolution (Avruch and Mitchell, 2013). The problem-solving approach was initially outlined by the game-theorist Anatol Rapoport (1974) by his emphasis on 'empathetic understanding', that is, a joint and integrative search for mutual understandings and shared gains. 'Ending' conflict is possible, according to this approach, if one is directing attention to the basic needs of the conflicting parties. These fundamental needs, as discussed above, cannot be compromised on or bargained over in a competitive process. Rather, they should be addressed within an analytical, supportive framework using problem-solving approaches and with assistance of a neutral third party acting as a facilitator (Burton, 1995; Hoffman, 1995; Jeong, 2008; Kelman, 1992; Väyrynen, 1995). For example, with track II diplomacy, which is an informal and unofficial form of interaction, the conflicting parties may come to redefine and reassess, through a joint analysis and a non-confrontational process, their perceptions and relationship by a mutual recognition of each side's basic needs (Broome, 2009; McDonald and Bendahmane, 1987; Montville, 2010). Mutual recognition and change of perceptions may therefore promote mutual trust and enhance the chances of locating integrative solutions to conflict. Herbert Kelman (2009) with his decades-long experience from problem-solving argues that it is best advanced in an interactive workshop. In such a setting, the participants are able to redefine negotiation away from zero-sum to win-win thinking. These non-binding problem-solving workshops are facilitated by social scientists who encourage the parties to share and exchange information in a flexible and frank manner about their interests, preferences, demands, needs and fears (Kelman, 1992: 62–66). In short, conflict resolution is understood as an 'end' to conflict since the underlying and deep-rooted causes of conflict are addressed. By promoting conditions for cooperative relationships, the approach acts as conflict 'provention' since 'satisfaction of human needs that are universal must be the ultimate goal of survivable societies' (Burton, 1993: 60).

The last section will address more specifically the dynamics of identity politics and how it relates to the growing number of intra-state and protracted conflicts, which we have seen in the last decades.

Protracted identity-based conflict and reconciliation

The persistence of protracted conflicts and their resistance to negotiations have puzzled scholars for decades. Hence, this section will first discuss the seminal work on protracted conflict by John Burton and Edvard Azar and then move to more recent research on identity-based conflicts, which highlight how history and memory interact with conflict dynamics as well as with efforts to reconcile and resolve conflict.

Protracted conflict

The influential work of Azar and Burton (1986) on deep-rooted conflict had a major impact on the development of conflict analysis and resolution. In contrast to most theories at the time, which were preoccupied with the Cold War and interstate conflict, these scholars focused on the inter-communal dimensions of intractable nature of conflicts and relations between identity groups and states while recognising the influence of the international context. Their main argument and explanation for the protracted nature of conflict and why they tend to resist efforts of being resolved peacefully is, as mentioned above, that they spring from unfulfilled, underlying universal human needs, such as security, identity, recognition and autonomy. In recent years, the protracted nature of contemporary conflicts has also been linked to the ongoing debates in IR on whether these conflicts are to be seen as 'new' or 'old' (see, e.g., Kaldor, 2013; Kalyvas, 2001, Newman, 2004).

Protracted conflict is often described as a zero-sum conflict, which is exhausting and costly in human and material terms. Yet, as Daniel Bar-Tal (2000) and others (Coleman, 2006; Kriesberg, 1989) have shown in numerous studies, societies learn over time to cope with abnormal, violent and insecure situations. By various social and psychological mechanisms, societies adapt accordingly, which is one important reason why a conflict becomes protracted. Shared societal beliefs may turn into some kind of ideology that supports the prolongation of conflict and serves as an important identity marker of who we are (as well as who we are not). Hence, perceptions become embedded in overarching cultural rationales that invoke symbols, rules and meaning to the conflict as well as to shared identities. They provide meta-frames for what constitutes conflicts and the legitimate grounds for conflict. Because of its linkage to identity, such societal beliefs tend to be resistant to change and reinforce vicious and self-perpetuating circles of violence that become normalised as part of everyday life. At the same time, different groups within a country may diverge in

their interpretations of conflict and consequently an important question to raise in conflict analysis is to what extent these meta-frames are shared or resisted (Aronoff and Aronoff, 1996: 4; Ripley, 1995: 90; Strömbom, 2010). In a protracted conflict, such as the one in Israel–Palestine, the parties have accumulated and institutionalised discourses of hatred, prejudice and animosity towards the other over many decades. Hence, to resolve the conflict may therefore paradoxically be seen as a threat to their identities as such and peaceful process will require a re-evaluation of relations with the other side.

Identity-based conflict and historical grievances

Identity-based conflicts have in recent years received much attention since these conflicts tend to resist conflict settlement and resolution. According to Mary Kaldor (2001), what is ‘new’ in many contemporary conflicts are the claims to power that are made on the basis of identity politics and thus tend to focus more on history, ethnicity, religion, justice and recognition than ideology (see also Fisher, 2009: 328). Myth-making, as a shared sense of meaning that guides action, also tends to play into identity politics. Hence the mobilisation of the past acts as a powerful force because it relates to emotions and motivation. These types of conflicts are likely to become protracted since the parties frame the conflict in existential terms and therefore adapt to a violent and insecure environment rather than seeking compromise (Coleman, 2006: 533).

Historical grievances are embedded in identity politics and can fuel conflict dynamics. The sense of injustice and victimhood is often ingrained and thus constitutes a mobilising force for the continuation of conflict (Montville, 2001; Welch, 1995). To generate legitimacy, identity-based conflicts often draw upon a constructed and idealised nostalgic past and on discourses of historic enmity, hatred and insecurity. As a result, they can trigger politics of fear for group survival, expulsion and ethnic cleansing.

The politics of fear and the strong sense of existential insecurity are the main reasons why parties in identity-based conflicts are risk averse and tend to perceive conflict resolution and concession-making as detrimental to their group survival. Furthermore, the existential framing of conflict in combination with an uncertainty about the direction of such a process may result in a growing sense of subjective insecurity. This way of consolidating and cementing images of self and other is furthered by the demonisation of the other, which inhibits recognition of one’s own role in conflict as well as that of a potential role as victimiser (Atran and Axelrod, 2008: 227). Hence, until assurance of the existence of oneself is secured, insecurity poses a major barrier of resolving identity-based conflicts.

Collective memories and national myths are deeply embedded in the (re)construction of self and enemy images. The perceptions of a community of itself in both past and present determine how it imagines itself in the future.

As Janna Thompson (2009: 186) underlines, memories serve as a motivating force and thus political activities in post-conflict settings involve which lessons should be learned from the past violent conflict. Jenny Edkins (2003: 16) underlines that struggles over memories often take place after traumatic and fierce conflicts. They become part of selected narratives, which remember and frame the conflict in a particular way. It may also lead to a competition between 'truths' and diametrically opposed claims among groups concerning who is to be seen as the 'righteous victim'. As such, it can generate reduced empathy for the other and a reluctance to admit shared responsibility for past actions.

Political leaders can manipulate this sense of victimisation and memories in order to preserve a positive view of the self while refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the other side's suffering (Devine-Wright, 2003). Hence, the pre-occupation with historical and 'chosen' traumas can turn into a psychological wall that obstructs long-term conflict resolution and reconciliation (Devine-Wright, 2003: 15–17; Volkan, 2006). Groups rely on past memories of violence and victimisation, which is validated in new situations. Time 'collapses', as Vamik Volkan (1997) points out, and meta-narratives of conflict may therefore pass on to the next generation. These processes are easily identified, for instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina where many actors and groups, who claim to be the righteous victims, resist acknowledging that their own ethnic group has committed war crimes. This serves as a stumbling block in the way towards reconciliation.

Reconciliation

Various attempts at conflict resolution beg for innovative and effective strategies in managing these kinds of conflicts. To meet the challenges of resolving protracted identity-based conflicts, a large number of studies in conflict analysis are focusing on the underlying causes to conflict and perceived injustices by the actors (see, e.g., Deutsch, 2006; Fisher, 2009). Reconciliation, in particular, has become an increasingly applied notion as a remedy of managing the difficult and precarious transition from conflict to peace (Hermann, 2004). As part of the reconciliation efforts, grievances and memories of violence and conflict are addressed. Yet, reconciliation has multiple meanings, which are reflected in the broad range of practices and strategies suggested by both academics and practitioners (Auerbach, 2009; Bar-Tal, 2000; Clark, 2008; Ledarach, 2005; Murithi, 2009; Rousoux, 2009; Staub, 2010). Reconciliation ranges from holistic, pragmatic to top-down and bottom-up approaches and takes place on an interpersonal, social, national and international level. Hence, there are both 'thinner' and 'thicker' forms of reconciliation.¹ Yehudit Auerbach (2009: 291) synthesises these various efforts by proposing a pyramid of various stages of reconciliation, which are not preordained or of equal importance, but address the 'wounds of injured people'. These phases include acknowledging the other

side's narratives; empathy for the other side; taking partial responsibility for the other's suffering; readiness to make restitution and reparation; publicly apologising; and opening for opposing narratives that can lead to the acceptance of mutual accounts of the past.

As part of the expanding reconciliation paradigm, restorative justice plays a central role and is frequently applied at community levels, but also in broader political conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland, South Africa and Rwanda. According to Carrie Menkel-Meadow (2007: 162), restorative justice is a social practice that provides a structured and participatory environment and space to communicate, explain, acknowledge, apologise, make restitution and recompensate. Most importantly, it is a collective process that intersubjectively determines how to deal with the past as well as the future. As such it promotes community building, legitimacy and the development of new social, political and legal norms (Menkel-Meadow, 2007: 163–165). Restorative justice aims basically to empower victims and offenders through a direct dialogue and recognition, which can transform the understandings of the past, present and the future. Through mutual reciprocity and empathy, moral responsibility may therefore be enhanced.

Processes of recognition and acknowledgement figure prominently in the literature on political psychology and reconciliation as it concerns dealing with the past and addressing historical grievances and injustices (Abu-Nimer, 2001; Staub, 2010). Acknowledging and recognising historical narratives of suffering and grievances through apology, symbolic gestures and concessions may trigger mobilisation for peace and decrease support for violence. Acknowledgement involves recognition that a group has suffered past injustices. Acknowledging the other side's historical traumas therefore touches and may validate the emotional core of historical memory and narrative of the other (Ross, 2004: 209–210). Howard Ross (2004: 198, 211) argues that symbolic and ritual actions may be powerful tools, particularly at times when apology and reparation are not feasible due to political circumstances. Symbolic actions may also be viewed as more sincere, because apologies are more cognitive, whereas symbolic actions are more affective. In such circumstances, symbolic actions of acknowledgement may be used as an alternative, which may open up new prospects for resolving conflict (Ross, 2004: 208).

Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Bennick (2004) underline the importance of reconciliation efforts to change societal beliefs in protracted conflicts. The difficulties of shifting frames from victimhood and injustices of the past are frequently huge since acknowledging the past and re-examining historical narratives are perceived as weakening the core identity of oneself. Consequently, such moves are frequently met with powerful resistance (Rousoux, 2009: 550). In most protracted conflicts, the politics of fear and existential concerns are deeply rooted among the parties who tend to view themselves as victims.

To acknowledge the other side's historical grievances is a first step towards recognising the fact that there are several narratives of the conflict. In many conflicts, this is, as mentioned above, particularly troublesome as it touches on the parties' societal beliefs and collective memories of their own history (Bar-Tal and Bennick, 2004: 18).

Institutionalised images of the other and rigid construction of memories and narratives of conflict are particularly difficult to change. They contain sacred values and are framed as absolute and inviolable as they define who we are as a group and people. To give up on the identity of the group can therefore be seen as a betrayal. As a consequence, there is an almost automatic rejection and emotional unwillingness to compromise for conflict resolution since it is seen as involving sacred entitlement and rights (Margalit, 2010: 46–47).

As a way to bypass conflicting historical narratives and to avoid addressing historical grievances, several peace processes in recent years have instead outlined interest-based peace negotiations with material incentives. For instance, such approach was reflected in the negotiations leading up to the Dayton Accord for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and in the Oslo process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993. Yet, as Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod (2008: 223–224) underline, these interest-based negotiation strategies may generate counterproductive results. Offering material benefits in compensation for deeper psychological and social needs, which are linked to identity, may be seen as a gross insult. In their research, they have observed that violent opposition may arise as a result of compromises over issues that people consider sacred.

Conclusion

As a strand of research within political psychology and IR, conflict analysis and resolution has expanded rapidly in the last decades. Most of the research, however, has focused on conflicting perceptions, images, cognitive belief systems and their effects on conflict dynamics as well as on conflict resolution. Consequently, there has been growing concern that not enough attention is given to wider power-political and economic contexts of conflict. First, the strong emphasis in the field of conflict resolution on universal human needs has at times taken precedence over politics of difference and cultural diversity (Schaap, 2008; Tidwell, 1998). Second, there has been a tendency of viewing conflict in a linear way, which is reflected in the large number of studies on contingency models, focusing on conflict cycles, distinct phases and strategies of 'ending' of conflict. However, several scholars argue that there is a need to re-conceptualise conflict in theory and to recognise much more its transformative dynamics in practice (Dayton and Kriesberg, 2010; Lederach, 2005; Ryan, 2009). Third, despite the current widespread popularity in using

the notion of reconciliation rather than resolution among academics and practitioners, it is still a rather vague concept with some important limitations of being successfully applied in post-conflict societies. One major concern is that the concept is very broad and thus also unclear in its precise definition and aim. Moreover, its quest for harmonious relations and restorative justice tends to downplay the continuation of antagonism, power and politics in so-called post-conflict settings (Aggestam, 2013; Schaap, 2008).

Yet, despite these critical remarks, they have at the same time contributed to open up and enable an exciting research agenda to flourish. More studies now situate individual and meta-narratives within wider societal, political and global structures (see, e.g., Hammack, 2008; Herrmann et al., 2009; Kinnvall, 2004; Rubinstein, 2009). Many identity-based conflicts are deeply affected and intertwined by the global forces of political and economic liberalisation, which at times aggravate conflict and trigger insecurity in a broad range of areas from resource scarcity, migration to political instability. Yet, the strong link and urge to bridge theory and practice has enabled the field to adapt, develop and expand in order to reflect the transformative nature of conflict and to present new constructive ways on how peace ultimately may prevail. In sum, with theory advancement, context-sensitive methods and thick empirical analyses, new interesting avenues are thus observed in the field of conflict analyses.

Note

1. To illustrate the diversity and multitude of reconciliation efforts, these may include acknowledgement; confession; apology; forgiveness; harmonisation of tension; restoration and building new relationships; coexistence; mutual trust; confidence building and cooperative community engagement; truth-telling (e.g. truth and reconciliation commissions, public trials); collective healing and compassion; cultural, behavioural and attitudinal change (via education, mass media); social, economic and political, structural and institutional change; pursuit of justice (reparation payments, rectification, restitution, equality, rights); and envisioning a peaceful future (shared vision of an interdependent society).

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10

‘Do Terrorists Have Goatee Beards?’ Contemporary Understandings of Terrorism and the Terrorist

James W. McAuley

Introduction

On 5 February 2005, the *Washington Post* revealed the latest image of terrorism in the United States. It took the form of Edgar Morales (a.k.a. ‘Puebla’), a member of the Mexican ‘St James Boys’ street gang, resident of the Bronx and described as about five feet tall with a goatee beard and dressed in baggy clothes. Morales had been arrested following the fatal shooting of a ten-year-old bystander after the outbreak of inter-gang violence at a Church christening in August 2002 and was later convicted of attempted murder, manslaughter, possession of dangerous weapons and conspiracy to murder.

Crucially, however, at his trial District Attorney Robert T. Johnson argued that the actions perpetuated by gangs such as the St James Boys lay within the remit of terrorism (Buettner, 2012), and thus Morales also became the first person to be tried and found guilty under New York State’s new anti-terrorism statutes (Williams, 2006), introduced as George Bush rallied support for a ‘war against terror’ in the wake of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks in the United States. In December 2012, however, following a series of appeals, New York’s highest court overturned the decision and ordered a new trial for Morales. In so doing, the lead Judge Victoria Graffeo declared:

[T]he concept of terrorism has a unique meaning and its implications risk being trivialized if the terminology is applied loosely in situations that do not match our collective understanding of what constitutes a terrorist act.

(cited in Greenwald, 2012)

Morales’ story is a clear example of the complex matrix, some would say conceptual quagmire, of meaning and counter-meaning, classification and counter-classification, surrounding what does and what does not constitute an

act of terror and who may or may not be defined as a terrorist. Such debates are longstanding. Writing almost two decades ago, Jeffrey Simon (1994) identified over 200 different uses of the term 'terrorism' that variously sought to identify terrorism by the choice of targets, the strategies and tactics used, whether it was undertaken by state or non-state actors, the individuals involved, its communicative or propaganda functions, the ideological or political focus for the violence and so on.

But none of these approaches has been able to assert primacy of definition. Hence, those working within the contours of political psychology, like others from related disciplines, have become drawn to and engaged in a myriad of dispute and contestation involving wide-ranging and multiple attempts to delineate, characterise, classify and categorise terrorism (see among many others, Agnew, 2010; Crenshaw, 1981, 1985, 1988, 1992; English, 2009; Gibbs, 1989; Griset and Mahon, 2003; Guelke, 1998; Laqueur, 1999; McCauley, 1991; Richardson, 2006a; Ruby, 2002; Schmid, 2004b; Schmid and Jongman, 2005). It is little wonder that Leonard Weinberg et al. (2004: 777) conclude that few concepts 'in contemporary political discourse have proved so hard to define as terrorism'.

Responses to events of recent years, such as 9/11 in the United States, the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004 and the 7 July 2005 attacks on the London transport system, have only added more grist to the mill, precipitating as they have a huge outpouring of journalistic, policy and government publications on the subject of terrorism. The expansion of writing on terrorism has also been notable in the academy; Pete Lentini (2008) estimated, for example, that between 2001 and 2007 peer-reviewed journal articles on the subject of terrorism increased threefold.

Yet, despite the intensification of scrutiny by academics, journalists, NGOs, security agencies, policy-makers and other government organisations covering almost every conceivable aspect of terrorism and the terrorist, we remain at some distance from arriving at any sense of exactness for the term. None of the definitions produced, nor the variety of terminology used across disciplinary perspectives, or the numerous debates about its causes (Krieger and Meiericks, 2011) or motivations (Abrahms, 2008) have brought us closer to a consensus on the meaning of terrorism, forcing Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (2005) to conclude that the concept of terrorism remained so intangible that it was impossible to encapsulate all of its usages into a single definition.

Throughout the chapter, while recognising that the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' remain both 'politically powerful' and 'analytically elusive' (Tilly, 2004: 5), I adopt a working definition of terrorism as 'the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change' (Hoffman, 1998: 43). Without implying the absence of overlap, the chapter highlights the fundamental distinction between those

explanations that employ individual or actor-based approaches and those that adopt more structural or political-orientation-based perspectives. The chapter makes no claim to succeed where others have failed by providing a concordant definition of terrorism. It does, however, seek to highlight some of the major contours within the debates surrounding terrorism, to give primacy to some arguments and explanations over others, and to challenge a seemingly ever-flexible approach to its definition. Finally, the chapter suggests some ways in which our understanding of terrorism and terrorists may be moved forward from within the perspective of political psychology.

Terrorists

Much everyday conjecture presents terrorism as a manifestation of 'insanity or mental illness' (Martin, 2010: 72) and/or actions conducted by irrational and evil people (Coleman, 2003). The suggestion that only the unhinged undertake terrorist action (Cooper, 1978; Corrado, 1981) has often been given prominence in popular media and finds an academic basis in the idea of the terrorist personality (Kent and Nicholls, 1977). Central here is the understanding that terrorists are 'disturbed people' who 'almost invariably prove to be psychotic' (West, 1982: 104) and that the terrorist is likely to be 'an aggressive psychopath, who has espoused some particular cause because extremist causes can provide an external focal point for all the things that have gone wrong in his life' (Pearce, 1977: 172).

In the 1970s, such views were reinforced by the psychiatrist David Hubbard, who produced a typology of those involved in aircraft hijacking, arguing that they were psychologically unstable and shared common traits, including having a violent alcoholic father; a deeply religious mother; being sexually shy, timid and passive; having younger sisters, towards whom the terrorist acted protectively; and who were poor social achievers (Hubbard, 1971). Around the same time, Gustav Morf, working on the *Front de libération du Québec* (FLQ), promoted the view that many terrorists 'reject the father and the values he represents', and although they may have above-average intelligence, this was combined with 'emotional immaturity', driven as they were by instincts such as sexual lust, the craving for notoriety and a thrust for power (Morf, 1970).

Such thinking was further reflected in the classification proposed by Frederick Hacker (1996) defining terrorists as either 'crusaders', 'criminals' or 'crazies'. Crusaders were ideologically driven; criminals were violent individuals who attached to a cause in order to find an outlet for their violence; and crazies were those terrorists with some mental disorder, largely rootless, anomic and disgruntled individuals who were attracted to the certainty of group terrorist philosophy which in turn channelled individual psychopathology for its own purposes.

Ideas that those who engage in terrorism suffer from a prior pathology or psychosis have largely been rejected as a causal factor (Ginges, 1997; Livingstone, 1982; Strentz, 1988; Weatherston and Moran, 2003). Even with what may be thought of as the most irrational and inexplicable of all terrorist actions, suicide bombing (Hassan, 2011a, 2011b; Pedahzur, 2005, 2006), evidence of any identifiable degree of psychosis or mental illness among those involved remains difficult to find (Moghaddam, 2005; Silke, 2003; Soibelman, 2004; Sprinzak, 2000). Instead, what has been demonstrated is how groups such as Hamas (Gupta and Mundra, 2005; Pape, 2003) and the 'Black Tigers' (Hopwood, 2006; Reuter, 2004) within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) devised and utilised suicide attacks as a key tactic. Recruits to Hamas, for example, rather than fitting some pathological psychological profile are largely bound and motivated by their vision of a future Palestinian state with full sovereignty (Masters, 2012) and see suicide bombing as a legitimate tactic (Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, 2002) as well as a weapon of mass resistance, in what they see as an occupied region (Pape, 2006), in pursuit of the specific strategic goal (Pape, 2006: 4) of political change (Khashan, 2003). Broadly, therefore, Schmid and Jongman urge caution in declaring terrorists 'prematurely insane', pointing to the

examination of some members of the German Rote Armee Fraktion by a German psychiatrist led him to the conclusion that they were 'intelligent' and 'humorous' and showed no symptoms of psychosis or neurosis and 'no particular personality type'.

(Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 92)

Further, those suffering from psychosis, or who are seriously mentally ill, are highly unlikely to either command the legitimacy necessary for leadership or to effectively take part in often-complex terrorist activities (Livingstone, 1982). Moreover, while some terrorist groupings have a reasonably loose recruitment policy, this is far from true in all cases. In Ireland, for example, those seeking to join the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were often subject to a phased vetting process (McKearney, 2011: 76), lasting sometimes weeks or even months (McKeown, 2000: 51–53). Even then, the probable consequences were made clear to prospective recruits at the point of enrolment. A one-time IRA member, Shane Paul O'Doherty recalls what he was told immediately before his inauguration as follows:

If you have any doubts about joining the Provisional Irish Republican Army, then don't join. We are not promising you a pleasure trip. If you do join, then there is every likelihood that you will be imprisoned or killed within

a short time.... There will be no material rewards whatsoever, now or in the future. This is about armed force and freedom struggle against the oldest enemy of Ireland's freedom... Remember, that you will inevitably come into conflict with your families, girlfriends and friends. This is not an easy thing.

(O'Doherty, 2011: 46)

While attempts to distinguish psychopathology among terrorists have been seriously undermined (Shaw, 1986), a range of other psychological theories and approaches has also commonly been applied to terrorist behaviour (Ross, 1996; Schmid and Jongman, 2005). These include 'identity theory', 'narcissism theory', 'paranoia theory', 'absolutist/apocalyptic theory', 'cognitive theory', 'novelty-seeking theory' and 'humiliation-revenge theory' (Miller, 2006: 261–267; Victoroff, 2005). Elsewhere, in the major 1999 report to the US government, Rex Hudson (no date) includes several variants of the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Davies, 1973; Margolin, 1977) derived from the original hypothesis by John Dollard et al. (1939) and later on Robert Gurr's (1968, 1970) relative-deprivation hypothesis.

Others, such as Jeanne Knutson (1981) with Maxwell Taylor and Ethel Quayle (1994), have adapted some of Erikson's work on the formation of negative identity to suggest that the motivation for terrorists emerges from the feelings of anger and helplessness over the lack of social and political alternatives. Thus, Peter Olsson (1988) argues that the base for terrorist recruitment rests with young people who lack self-esteem and that those who engage in political violence do so in seeking a sense of self-worth and purpose.

The narcissism-aggression hypothesis has been advocated by writers such as John Crayton (1983), Richard Pearlstein (1991) and especially in the works of Jerrold Post (1990, 2004, 2005a). Post contends that terrorists draw on a special psycho-logic to justify their actions, arguing that the psychological motivation for terrorist behaviour arises from frustration with their life and the 'need' for revenge creates a deep negative-world outlook of 'us versus them', part of which involves dehumanising those perceived as the enemy. Post characterises those who are likely to adopt this logic as particularly reliant on the psychological mechanisms of 'externalisation' and 'splitting' found in individuals who have failed to integrate the self, which instead is split into the 'me' and the 'not me' and then projected 'onto others all the hatred and devalued weakness within' (Post, 1990: 27). Splitting is characteristic of those whose personality has been moulded by psychological damage during childhood and it produces what clinicians have characterised as 'narcissistic wounds'. As a consequence of previous trauma, individuals do not resort to terrorism through rational choice, rather terrorists 'are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence

of psychological forces', and their psycho-logic 'is constructed to rationalise acts they are psychologically compelled to commit' (Post, 1990: 25, emphasis in original).

Alongside those explanations outlined above are those that suggest that an understanding of terrorism is best found at the level of group psychology. Post (1986) argues that terrorists submerge their individual identities into the group, and because of the need by alienated individuals to belong to a fraternity of concurring individuals they subsequently follow a moral code that requires unquestioned obedience to the group. The social status of the individual is therefore defined and confirmed by group approval and their actions by group goals (Post, 2005b: 7–8). Such circumstances are clearly seen in the following description of the workings of a terrorist training camp by Ausaf Husain, a former Squadron Leader in the Pakistan Air Force:

The training of a terrorist and the development of such a mindset begins quite early on in life in most terrorism related camps. The age group of ten or eleven is considered to be most appropriate by the terrorist leaders as this is the stage when children like to indulge in a tit for tat kind of behaviour. The leaders make sure that these children are stuck in a rut regarding this mindset and never outgrow it even as they become adults. They are taught to fight against injustices through violent activities. The kids do not really know a different way of life and by the time that they can realize the difference between good and bad, it is most definitely too late for them to escape their respective groups or terrorist camps.

(Pakistan Observer, 3 February 2011)

Post (2005b: 7–8) also identifies those societies where hatred 'bred in the bone' through strong patterns of political socialisation transmits dominant frames of thought across generations. Northern Ireland gives a clear example of strong patterns of differential socialisation and structured segregation. Experiences there, however, belie any simple categorisation of the terrorist and terrorism. As Lennon points out, the relationships that developed between paramilitaries and the communities were multi-layered, and although not elected by their communities, neither were they excluded from them (Lennon, 2004: 57). As I have examined with others elsewhere, many of those who became involved in political violence explained their contemporary involvement in rational terms, recognising that many of their views and actions had been structured by particular readings of the past, involving both personal experiences and broader political events, and through 'turning points' and 'transitions' in their own life history (Shirlow et al., 2010: 45–68). As Gupta (2008) indicates, we should not underestimate the altruistic motives of those joining terrorist organisations.

Terrorism

Other approaches to defining terrorism challenge the emphasis placed on the actor and highlight other important motivating factors, including their ideological or political convictions (Robison et al., 2006) and responses to the social structure or key events within the society (Laqueur, 1977, 1987). Thus, terrorism is seen as a rational choice adopted by a group for political and strategic reasons (Neumann and Smith, 2008), rather than the outcome of psychological background of those involved (Crenshaw, 2011: 111–123). Terrorist organisations are diverse, but it is possible to identify shared features, such as the methods they employ, their command structures or the tactics they choose. To do so, however, misses the core common characteristic of the political nature of their origin, proclaimed purpose and motivation of their membership (Club de Madrid, 2005; Crenshaw, 2005).

Such motivations obviously differ from group to group, and hence another broad approach to categorising terrorism is to catalogue organisations by their political orientation, ideologies, causes, strategies and objectives (see, e.g., Neumann, 2009; Neumann and Smith, 2008; Rapoport, 2001; Shultz, 1978). For Shultz, terrorism involves the use of violence, ‘with the objective of achieving certain political objectives/goals. Such goals constitute the long range and short-term objectives that the group or movement seeks to obtain’ (Shultz, 1978: 45–46).

In cataloguing terrorism in this way, it is important to note a range of activities, including state-sponsored terrorism, which has often been excluded from ‘sustained analysis’ (Jackson, 2009), especially by those who define terrorism as a sub-state phenomenon. Indeed, Stohl (2008: 5) suggests that three of the biggest myths surrounding terrorism are that the activity is restricted to non-government actors; that its central purpose is to produce chaos; and that governments always oppose terrorism. Contemporary state terrorism can take many forms (Jackson et al., 2010), including not just the framing of what is and what is not defined as legitimate violence but also direct actions by state military forces, both within and without its borders, and support for pro-state counter-terrorist groups (Cochrane, 2013; Punch, 2012). In December 2012, for example, the Sir Desmond deSilva enquiry found extensive evidence of state collaboration with Loyalist pro-state paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, including the selection of targets, leading the UK Prime Minister David Cameron to issue an apology for ‘shocking levels of collusion’ between sections of the UK security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries.

It is also essential to note temporal changes in the main dynamics of terrorism (Bergesen and Lizardo, 2004). David Rapoport (2001, 2004) has added to our understanding by indicating different waves of modern terrorism, each characterised by phases of ‘expansion and contraction’. Rapoport (2004)

identifies these phases as the Anarchist wave of the 1880s–1920s; the anti-colonial wave, 1920s–1960s; the New Left Wave from the 1960s to the end of the twentieth century; and the Religious Wave, from 1979 to date.

So, for example, the existence of left- or Marxist-motivated terror organisations (Alexander and Pluchinsky, 1992) has dramatically reduced, with organisations such as Baader-Meinhof, the Rote Armee Fraktion in West Germany, the Brigate Rosse in Italy, Action Directe in France, or the Japanese Red Army, and the Weathermen in the United States having either been disbanded or obliterated by state forces. Across the globe, only groupings such as the ‘17th November’, the ‘ELA’ groupings in Greece, and ‘Dev Sol’ in Turkey in Europe, and elsewhere the Shining Path in Peru and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) now offer any serious threat of political violence motivated by left-wing ideology. Overall, it is clear that leftist terrorism lost much ideological momentum (not to mention material support) with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, which, as Robison et al. (2006) argue, ‘changed the geopolitics of international insurgency’, depriving Marxist-inspired groups of ‘legitimacy and the ability to play on superpower rivalry to mobilise military and political support’.

On the other hand, recent times have witnessed an expansion of political violence driven by single-issue groups (Monaghan, 2000) and right-wing ideology (Gable and Jackson, 2012; Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2012; Wilson and Hainsworth, 2012), including ‘lone-wolf’ terrorism (Gill et al., 2013), attributed to both the extreme right and Islamist terrorism (Pantucci, 2012). While single-issue group violence is aimed at changing specific practices, or sometimes reversing societal change, rather than bringing down a whole socio-political system, it remains an important category and the potential should not be underestimated.

In the United States, anti-abortion groups such as the ‘Lambs of God’ and the ‘Missionaries to the Unborn’ have consistently advocated violence against the clinics and hospitals where abortions are undertaken, resulting in a series of sometimes fatal attacks against medical staff. Other single-issue groups like the Animal Liberation Front and the Animal Rights Movement, and environmental groups like Earth Liberation Front and Earth First, have engaged in violence in seeking to further their aims. Elsewhere, the killing of more than 80 of his fellow Norwegian citizens by Anders Brevik has writ large the potential of the radical right for violence. More broadly, extreme right ideology has motivated wide-scale political violence across Europe and the United States (see material in Taylor et al., 2013). Goodwin et al. (2012) and Goodwin and Evans (no date) note that in recent years across Europe there has been a large number of prominent acts of violence by individuals and groups connected to right-wing extremist ideology and networks, setting the context for the rise in the number of votes for far-right xenophobic political parties (McAuley, 2013: 87–89) (Table 10.1).

Table 10.1 Political orientation of terrorist groupings

Political orientation	Examples
Nationalist/separatist	In recent times, these have included organisations such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers), the Basque <i>Euzkadi ta Askatasuna</i> (ETA) or <i>Al-Fatah</i> (within the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization).
Revolutionary/left wing	For example, in the 1970s organisations such as the <i>Rote Armee Fraktion</i> (Germany), <i>Action Directe</i> (France) and <i>Brigate Rosse</i> (Italy). More recently, the <i>Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan</i> (PKK) and <i>Devrimci Sol</i> (Dev Sol) in Turkey and <i>Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas</i> (ELA) in Greece are also examples.
Reactionary/right wing	Examples of which are the Ku Klux Klan, Turkish Grey Wolves, Japanese Shield Society, the radical militias in the United States, C18, the British National Party (BNP) and the English Defence League (EDL) in the United Kingdom.
Individual terrorism/lone wolves	Usually assassins, at best they have some vague obsession, perhaps which is remotely socio-political (usually far-right) in its justification; more recently the term 'lone wolf' has been applied to individuals undertaking terrorism outside a command structure.
Single-issue terrorism	Key examples are anti-abortion campaigners in the United States and some animal rights activists in the United Kingdom.
Religious terrorism	Those involved regard the violence they engage in as a response to a God-given religious command. Examples are <i>Aum</i> group in Japan along with a variety of Islamic fundamentalist organisations, including Hamas (Islamic Resistance), <i>al-Jihad</i> (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) and <i>al-Qa'ida</i> (al Qaeda).
State sponsored terrorism	Classic examples remain the sinking of the Greenpeace ship <i>Rainbow Warrior</i> in New Zealand by the French authorities in 1985, or the Lockerbie bombing by Lybia. The Syrian government has provided support for Hamas and Hizballah in Lebanon. The East German Stasi gave support and safe-haven to members of both the <i>Rote Armee Fraktion</i> and neo-fascist groups operating in West Germany.

Source: Adapted from McAuley, 2003.

'New' terrorism

Although it has been questioned (Duyvesteyn, 2004; Spencer, 2006), some academics have suggested that contemporary terrorism can be seen as adopting a 'new' (Field, 2009; Laqueur, 1998, 1999; Tucker, 2001) or even postmodern form (Horgan, 2009; Laqueur, 1996). This is based on an understanding that the structure, aims and methods of many terrorist groupings today so differ with what has gone before as to mark an identifiable break (Lesser et al., 1999; Neumann, 2009: 14–28) and a move towards new forms of 'fourth-wave' terror (Rapoport, 2004).

In part this argument rests on differing trends of political violence that have emerged. First, the late 1980s and early 1990s, albeit for very different reasons, saw the end of several long-standing terror campaigns. The PLO recognised the Israeli state and renounced violence, the IRA called a permanent ceasefire as it engaged in the broader Irish peace process and the *Rote Armee Fraktion* also abandoned violence, proclaiming guerrilla warfare to be a part of history. Around the same time, however, other terrorist groupings emerged, seemingly different in both scale and tactics, their actions typified by the first attack on the World Trade Center by Islamist extremists in 1993 and the *Aum Shinrikyo* nerve gas attack on Tokyo, both of which had the potential to take many lives. These new terrorist groups are seen to have dynamics and structures that differ markedly from those previously existing, with tactics focused on 'spectaculars' – major catastrophic events threatening large areas or populations.

Much of this new terrorism is religiously motivated terrorism organised through a highly diffuse leadership network, often based more on personal relationships rather than hierarchical structure. Moreover, the new terrorists are amorphous in organisation, transcending the nation-state, to stretch far beyond old territorially based conflicts in both ideological and practical terms and where the World Wide Web and other electronic media are used as fundraising, propaganda and recruitment tools. At a minimum, the established distinctions between local and national terrorism are blurred. The *Jihad* of al Qaeda, for example, and the *fatwa* called against 'Jews and Crusaders' by bin Laden had a completely de-territorialised focus which was to form the core ideology of the new radical Islam (Escobar Stemann, 2006).

This point has been expanded by Olivier Roy (2011) in arguing that what is new about al Qaeda is that its violence and organisation has become de-territorialised, suggesting that for typical al Qaeda members 'the country where their family comes from, the country of residence and radicalisation, and the country of action' (Roy, 2009) are all different. Further, he points out how the group's 'centre of gravity' and point of attack has constantly shifted from country to country depending on where members can be rallied.

For Roy (2009), the process of radicalisation has occurred because al Qaeda has set in place a compelling broad transnational 'narrative' through which conflicts in the Middle East are reinterpreted to make sense elsewhere. Thus, the bombings undertaken in the European cities of Madrid and London illustrated that the movement is not directed from the top-down hierarchical structure. Rather, it rests on grassroots groupings linked through personal bonds and relationships, which operate to give al Qaeda its transnational network (Lesser et al., 1999). Hence, David Tucker identifies the key features of new terrorism as a 'network, facilitated by information technology, (within which) the new personnel are amateurs, who often come together in ad hoc or transitory groupings... (displaying) an increased willingness to cause mass casualties' (Tucker, 2001: 1).

Terrorism as crime

Others have sought to understand terrorism through the frames of criminality and criminological theory (Agnew, 2010). Following 9/11, for example, there was a marked output in work, suggesting a 'natural partnership' existed between organised crime and terrorism (Thompson and Turlej, 2003; Turnley and Smrcka, 2002). In particular, it has been argued that the actions of traditional street gangs can be seen as a new form of urban insurgent terror (or at least have the potential to evolve into such) (Bunker, 1996; Sullivan, 2000, 2001; Sullivan and Bunker, 2002) because such gangs directly challenged state sovereignty, or even the workings of the free market (Manwaring, 2005).

What are the strengths in such claims? In the United States, organised street gang culture has a long history (Howell and Moore, 2010). The more traditional gangs are characterised by a loose leadership and a 'turf-oriented' focus, emphasising loyalty to, and protection of, an immediate neighbourhood. They are limited in political scope and engaged at the low end of extreme violence. Other, 'second-generation' gangs have, however, emerged with a leadership that largely treats illegal drugs as a commercial entity, engaging in drug trafficking and market protection across a broader geographic area, perhaps with some involvement with transnational criminal organisations, involving drugs. While most street gangs remain firmly within the first or second generation, with their emphasis on loyalty to district, a small number of gangs (in particular in the United States and South Africa) are moving towards what may be seen as a third generation, focused on power and financial acquisition and with significant politicisation, more internationalised (Williams, 1995) and sophisticated in structure and leadership (Sullivan, 1997).

For some, a blurring of the boundaries between terrorism and organised crime is readily apparent (Cilluffo, 2000; Jamieson, 2001), and current trends indicate a deepening of the relationships between them (Lee, 1999; Sanderson, 2004;

Shelley, 2001, 2002; Shelley and Picarelli, 2002). However, the extent of any engagement between crime and terrorism varies considerably (Dandurand and Chin, 2004), and while both terrorist and criminal groups may share similar organisation and/or methods (Sanderson, 2004), it remains an open question whether long-term alliances are really being forged (Makarenko, 2003, 2004). That cooperation which does exist between terrorist groups and organised crime often occurs only on a sporadic basis (Schmid, 1996, 2004a), taking the form of 'marriages of convenience' (Curtis and Karacan, 2002), involving drug trafficking (Ruggiero, 2002) and/or the smuggling of migrants (Dishman, 2001; Helfand, 2003).

Evidence of organisational alliances between terrorist and organised criminal groups based on anything other than short-term gain is difficult to find (Dishman, 2002; Préfontaine and Dandurand, 2004). Certainly, there is little to point to any ideological or political allegiance or coherence between terrorism and organised crime. While Sylvia Longmire and John Longmire (2008) argue that Mexican drug traffickers should be regarded as terrorists, because the tactics, strategy and organisation of the Mexican drug cartels are consistent with recognised terrorist organisations, they also readily concede that the cartels lack any motivating political or religious ideology. But it is the very presence of ideology that distinguishes terrorism as 'ineluctably political in aims and motives' (Drake, 1998; Hoffman, 1998: 43).

Does 'terrorism' have a meaning?

Given many of the issues raised above, it seems legitimate to ask whether we can ever achieve a meaningful understanding of the term 'terrorism'. Certainly, it is possible to identify many of the components involved in a meaningful definition. Indeed, Jeff Victoroff (2005) has provided an extremely useful typology addressing varying 'dimensions of terrorism', as set out in Table 10.2. The problem lies in trying to assemble these component parts and essential attributes into an agreed concept. Moreover, in widening the understanding of terrorism in order to seek to encompass its seemingly ever-expanding theoretical and empirical facets, the obvious danger is that what we reach is a definition that becomes so loosely applicable as to be meaningless. Further, such definitions tend to exclude, or at best marginalise, the essential political aspects of terrorist violence.

The task of defining 'terrorism' continues to be made more difficult because of its continuing use as a pejorative term, and as a form of explanation and description applied only to political enemies, or particular activities to which others are politically opposed (Richardson, 2006b). While official and governmental definitions of terrorism are by no means based on a coherent set of ideas, a constant theme directed towards those engaged in such actions is that

Table 10.2 Dimensions of Terrorism

Variable	Classification
Perpetrator number	Individual vs. group
Sponsorship	State vs. sub-state vs. individual
Relation to authority	Anti-state/anti-establishment/separatist vs. pro-state/pro-establishment
Locale	Intrastate vs. transnational
Military status	Civilian vs. paramilitary or military
Spiritual motivation	Secular vs. religious
Financial motivation	Idealistic vs. entrepreneurial
Political ideology	Leftist/socialist vs. rightist/fascist vs. anarchist vs. nationalist/separatist
Hierarchical role	Sponsor vs. leader vs. middle management vs. follower
Willingness to die	Suicidal vs. non-suicidal
Target	Property (including data and symbolic) vs. individual vs. masses of people
Methodology	Bombing, assassination, kidnapping/hostage taking, mass poisoning, rape, other (e.g. bioterrorism, cyberterrorism)

Source: Adapted from Victoroff (2005: 5).

they are denied legitimacy and their actions are characterised as essentially unlawful and undertaken by evil people. Events were witnessed in Northern Ireland in the early 1980s surrounding the hunger strikes by Irish Republican prisoners seeking to bring to a head opposition to the criminalisation of those engaged in politicised violence. This was rightly understood as a government tactic 'to isolate the perpetrator of acts of violence from the rest of society and deny him or her the defence that his or her actions had a social or political justification' (Guelke, 1998: 21–22).

Resistance from those who see themselves as having been involved in politicised violence to what they regard as processes of criminalisation crosses the political divide in Northern Ireland (Shirlow et al., 2010). The response of one leading Loyalist former paramilitary member in Northern Ireland, who took part in a meeting with former leaders of Los Angeles gang members, is worth noting:

[B]ecause of the experience here in Northern Ireland where there has been a deliberate strategy to criminalise and demonise political prisoners and those engaged in the conflict – was to ask myself: could this be used to

reinforce that criminalisation process, by somehow equating us with 'gang' members.

(Eddie Kinner, former Red Hand Commando,
cited in Hall, ed., 2001: 9)

Long before the events of 9/11, Connor Gearty (1991) argued that the term 'terrorism' had become so shaped by strong political interests that it had deteriorated into little more than a widely understood term of abuse for those opposing dominant groups. Hoffman (1998: 31) is another who also remains sceptical about the analytical usefulness of the term 'terrorism', suggesting that if 'one identifies with the victim or the target of the act, then the act is considered terrorism; whereas if one identifies with the actor, the act is not terrorism, although perhaps regrettable'.

Given some of the difficulties outlined above, it may well be that the search for any agreed and universal definition of terrorism is impossible. That does not mean that the social sciences do not have important things to say. John Horgan and Max Taylor (2006) have, for example, developed a conceptual framework that, in part at least, moves away from the problems of definition by considering the development of terrorism and the terrorist as a process. This model projects involvement with terrorism as a process engaging individual pathways into, involvement with and then disengagement from terrorism (see also material in Bjørge, 2005; Bjørge and Horgan, 2009; Cronin, 2009; Weinberg, 2012). In a later work, Horgan (2009) has expanded on 'the individual in context' through developing the notion of terrorism as a 'community of practice', to explain how people become involved in terrorism, how that is sustained and eventually how individuals may disengage from terrorist organisations.

Conclusions

The literature on terrorism and the terrorist is now vast. There remain many challenges for those seeking to study terrorism, not least of which is the continuing failure to find any agreed definition or theoretical perspective on terrorism. The lack of a consensus may not be an issue per se, but crucially the continuing contestation over meaning has led to its inconsistent application, not just within the academy, but also in the wider public arena, where its use is often highly politicised and used as a means of delegitimising political actions by those groups deemed to be problematic. Core to this process is the branding of terrorism as irrational and/or pathological, but there is now considerable evidence to suggest that any wide-ranging assumptions concerning the psychological characteristics of those involved in political violence must, at best, be treated with huge scepticism.

Recent trends have also witnessed attempts to expand existing definitions into a more composite or universal notion of terrorism. One manifestation of this is found through those academic works that seek to explain the development of a terrorist–criminal axis mirroring those in the public arena who claim that ‘the war against terrorism cannot be separated from the fight against transnational crime’ (Shelley, 2002: 91). This too must be questioned. Terrorists do not form a heterogeneous group, and even within the same organisation there are those with different motivations and reasons for joining and who seek to develop different strategies and tactics. Most importantly perhaps, the understanding of terrorism as crime ignores, or at best marginalises, key ideological factors central to understanding the political motivation of many involved in terrorism.

Finally, it is important to note that much that is written about terrorism continues to draw heavily on secondary sources, rather than direct contact with those who are, or have been, engaged in political violence. As Walter Laqueur (1999: 79) suggests, there is no such thing as ‘terrorism’ per se, ‘only different terrorisms’ and to fully understand the motivations of individual terrorists much more consideration must be given to those directly involved in such actions. Whether even that can result in a single meaningful definition of a social phenomenon so expansive as terrorism, which can include not only Osama bin Laden, Edgar Morales from the Bronx, Mexican drug cartels and Northern Irish paramilitary groups (to name but a few), remains highly questionable.

As yet, no single disciplinary approach has been able to fully account for the multi-faceted relationships between broader society, political violence and terrorism, or capture in a nuanced way the workings of the terrorist mind. That said, drawing as it does from across other disciplines, adopting an interdisciplinary approach, using multiple methodologies with a focus both on the situations in which individuals find themselves and the cognitive and social factors of those involved means political psychology may be uniquely placed to advance our understanding of terrorism and the terrorist.

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11

Gender, Race and Ethnic Relations

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Introduction

After the Second World War, 'prejudice' became an object of the new science of social psychology. Gordon Allport's *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954) was both the defining text of this field and its most enduringly influential synthesis. In spite of numerous theoretical and terminological alternatives, 'prejudice' has remained prominent. The long-standing treatment of women as subordinates to men, usually termed *sexism* or *misogyny*, has been sometimes subsumed within the overall category of prejudice. As an increasing range of groups make collective claims for equal treatment, *homophobia*, *fat prejudice*, *ableism*, *mental illness stigma* and *ageism* have all become objects of study for social and political psychology (Nelson, 2009). In this chapter, we will be using the terms *discrimination* to designate the unfair treatment of certain groups (e.g. employers' reluctance to hire ethnic minority individuals) and *stereotypes* to describe persistent overgeneralisations about groups (e.g. the belief that women are inherently nurturing). Overall, terminological nuances and disputes are beyond the scope of this chapter (for a discussion, see Dovidio et al., 2010). We aim to review and evaluate the attempts of social and political psychology to make sense of conflicts based on group identity.

French Encyclopaedists of the eighteenth century introduced 'prejudice' as a general term for 'false judgements' (Jaucourt, 1765: 283), that is, ideas contrary to the Enlightenment. This definition, as well as the Encyclopaedists' comparison of prejudice with an epidemic disease survived well into the twentieth century (Danziger, 1997; Kitinger, 1987). Then as now, scholars have seen prejudice as irrational, self-centred and morally objectionable (Billig, 1991). However, the twentieth century witnessed violence and genocide on a greater scale and with more systematic organisation. In the post-war period, the Holocaust was recognised as a definitive infringement of the ideals of the European Enlightenment. Innumerable scholars searched for and authored explanations

of the Holocaust, drawing on knowledge of individuals, societies, cultures and ideologies.

Prejudice has been approached by researchers from three broad angles (for a three-levelled analysis of sexual prejudice, see Adam, 1998). First, scholars across a range of disciplines have examined how prejudice shapes institutions, policies and society at large. Second, psychologists have looked at the thoughts and feelings of people who practice prejudice and of those who suffer from it. Third, we can analyse science, the arts, the media and other cultural producers in order to understand how both prejudice and tolerance are ingrained in our taken-for-granted ways of representing other people. In the following three sections, we illustrate each of these levels of analysis by summarising historically influential lines of research. We conclude with a case study of ethnic and sexual prejudice in Romania, examining how these three levels may be brought together to provide a better understanding of concrete examples of prejudice.

Social and political accounts

Genocide

Ethnic relations are at their worst when people kill each other on a large scale, in organised and systematic ways, in the name of group identity, often enacting sexual violence on women, men and children in the process. Since the Holocaust, social psychologists have attempted to understand how *genocide* occurs and have been particularly vexed to make sense of how people can engage in such large-scale collective actions.

Contemporary explanations of genocides are highly complex. Staub (1989) posited that economic, political and cultural factors all contribute to the gradual deterioration of interethnic relations that eventually degenerates into genocide. Based on a very broad review of the literature, Monroe et al. (2000) developed a similar multi-step model. A background of ethnic conflict is an important prerequisite but does not necessarily lead to violence. Genocide is generally preceded by a disruption of the social order through war or revolution, as well as a psychological shift from excluding 'Others' to construing them as less than human (i.e. dehumanisation). While such ideologies may seem extreme, social psychologists have found that people often implicitly dehumanise out-groups by attributing them fewer distinctly human emotions than to in-groups (Leyens et al., 2001). The brain regions involved in thinking about other human beings are also less active when thinking about certain out-groups (Harris and Fiske, 2006). The prerequisites of genocide may therefore be more widespread than we commonly think.

Laws and institutions

Laws and policies often prompt exclusion and violence. Allport (1954) noted that laws that promote inequality will usually have dire consequences. So-called Jim Crow laws in the United States, for example, promoted segregation and implicitly legitimised lynchings of black people (Jones, 1997). Today, bans on marrying someone of the same gender lead to increases in mood and anxiety disorders among gay, lesbian and bisexual populations (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2010).

In many societies, however, laws aim to prevent both genocide and more subtle forms of prejudice, such as employment discrimination (Barron and Hebl, 2012). However, interventions to promote equity must communicate their goals and strategies effectively; otherwise, both the majority and the (protected) minority become suspicious and perceive the policy as unfair (Crosby et al., 2006).

Work and employment

Opportunities for adults to work and earn money, as well as the fair treatment of people in the workplace, are central to well-being and social equality. Wage work has long been scripted as a male activity, creating the stereotype that women are not predisposed to work, or at least are unfit for certain jobs (Eagly and Steffen, 1986). In spite of the laws and policies of many governments and organisations, inequalities remain a reality to this day. In the European Union (EU), for example, women still earn less than men by an average 16.4 per cent (European Commission, 2012), and ethnic minorities also earn less than majorities do (Metcalf, 2009). Such inequalities do not simply diminish over time; the recent budget cuts in the United Kingdom have actually worsened gender inequality in the workplace (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2012).

Several social scientists have described career-related inequalities using glass as a metaphor, since it conveys both the hardness and the invisibility of these phenomena. The *glass ceiling* denotes barriers to advancement to top-level positions for both women and ethnic minority men (Morrison and Von Glinow, 1990). Stereotypes of effective leaders as agentic tend to favour men for leadership positions, since women are not perceived as typically strong and active (Schein, 1973). However, a lack-of-fit is not always a disadvantage; men who work in professions such as nursing or education – in which most employees are women – experience career advantages that Williams (1992) has named the *glass escalator*. Most recently, Haslam and Ryan (2008) have also described a *glass cliff*: women are often promoted to positions of leadership that are likely to involve failure and blame, for example, when the organisation is in a crisis.

Psychological explanations

The person and the situation

Shortly after the Second World War, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950) tried to understand the racism underlying the Holocaust. They used questionnaires to survey a large number of people in the United States and concluded that racism was part of a complex *authoritarian personality*. In line with then-dominant psychoanalytic theories, Adorno et al. attributed this disposition to early experiences: repressive parenting prompts children to strictly control both others' and their own behaviour. Fascism, superstition, conventionalism and prejudice are but facets of this need for control (Fromm, 1965). More recent research has further refined Adorno et al.'s work (e.g. Altemeyer, 1981) and integrated it with other theories of prejudice and personality (Sibley and Duckitt, 2008).

Situationist theories brought about a very important theoretical turn arguing that all of us can espouse prejudice in certain contexts. *Dispositionist accounts*, such as the authoritarian personality, cannot explain wars and genocide on their own (Houghton, 2009); although psychological authoritarianism is widespread, extreme violence is fortunately rare. In a classical study, Hovland and Sears (1940) showed that black people were more frequently lynched in the southern part of the United States during economic downturns, thus demonstrating how social (and not just individual) factors played a role in prejudice. Laboratory studies later found that experimenters could easily induce distrust (Tajfel, 1970) and even violence (Haney et al., 1973; Milgram, 1963) in people with no particular disposition. Moreover, as dispositionist theories see prejudice as ingrained in one's personality, they leave little basis to guide efforts for change. Indeed, the proponents of such theories often recommend situationist strategies for prejudice reduction (see e.g. Altemeyer's, 2006, advice on educational and legal reform).

A classic situationist explanation of prejudice emerged when Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues (1954) divided a group of boys on a summer camp into two teams. When the teams had to compete for rewards, they showed intense loathing for each other; however, when they needed to cooperate for common goals, their feelings changed accordingly. Based on this study, Sherif proposed a Realistic Conflict Theory of prejudice: groups detest each other because they compete for scarce resources – or at least construe the situation as such. Henri Tajfel (1970) later showed that competition was not necessary for group tensions. He randomly assigned strangers to two groups and asked them to allocate points to members of their own and the other group. Although there was no interaction or common task, people clearly favoured members of their own group. Such results led Tajfel to formulate a Social Identity Theory of prejudice: people become prejudiced when they identify with an 'in-group' and assign

others to an 'out-group' (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Later research in this tradition showed how changing the way people categorise others and themselves can effectively reduce prejudice (Crisp and Hewstone, 2007).

More recently, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) attempted to integrate situationist and dispositionist accounts. They described the relevant personality dimension as Social Dominance Orientation, an individual preference for a hierarchical, inequitable society. The theory also incorporates situationist elements such as cross-cultural differences and social change. Such integrative approaches (see also Stephan and Stephan's, 2000, Integrated Threat Theory) have been met with mixed reactions. For some, they are a much-awaited synthesis of previously fragmented prejudice research (Dion, 2003), and they contribute towards pluralism in this field (Dovidio et al., 2010). For others, integrative theories seem 'vague and confusing, [...] a mishmash [...] difficult to falsify' (Houghton, 2009: 175).

Reducing prejudice

We noted above that dispositional theories of prejudice leave little ground for action. In contrast, Allport (1954) proposed early on that positive interactions between groups could reduce prejudice. Allport qualified his 'contact hypothesis' with a list of conditions: contact has a positive effect if the two groups have equal status, people can cooperate and make friends, and authorities promote tolerance. In a large meta-analytic review, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) found that contact was indeed moderately effective in reducing prejudice. As predicted, Allport's conditions facilitate prejudice reduction, but contact remains effective even when these criteria are not met (Pettigrew et al., 2011). Gaertner and his colleagues (1990) found that the effect of contact was mediated by social categorisation processes: meeting people from an out-group changes the way we categorise them, leading to a more inclusive world view (see also Chapter 3 in this volume). Contact also reduces intergroup anxiety, by familiarising people with out-group members, and making future encounters less awkward (Pettigrew et al., 2011; Stephan and Stephan, 1985). Negative encounters, on the other hand, may increase prejudice (Paolini et al., 2010).

Beyond contact, a range of other approaches has proved effective in reducing prejudice (Paluck and Green, 2009). Numerous educational programmes seem effective, but research has not satisfactorily explained how or why they work (Paluck and Green, 2009). More recent experiments have often attempted to make tolerance and empathy more salient to their participants (e.g. Monteith et al., 1996). The effect of the mass media on prejudice is a particularly relevant question today: seeing cross-group friendships in the media can promote tolerance (Pettigrew et al., 2011), but the mechanisms behind this effect remain unclear (Paluck and Green, 2009). Overall, a great deal of research is needed to

understand *whether* and *how* strategies other than contact can reduce prejudice (Bartoş et al., 2014; Dovidio et al., 2010).

Responding to prejudice

In the wake of Black, women's and gay liberation movements 'the target's perspective' on prejudice has received less attention (Swim and Stangor, 1998). During that period, many social scientists moved their attention away from the target groups, who were previously studied as 'deviants', and towards the majority groups that were now made responsible for inequality¹ (Duckitt, 2010). Prejudice, however, has a number of well-documented effects on those targeted. The expectation that women and black people have inferior performances on some intellectual tasks often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: those being tested are made aware of the stereotypes about their groups, and this awareness leads them to underperform (Spencer et al., 1999; Steele and Aronson, 1995).

The impact of prejudice on health probably has the most complex policy implications. Marginalised groups tend to fare worse than the majority on health indicators. Large-scale surveys and systematic reviews have found that black Americans (Williams et al., 2003), women (WHO, 2009), as well as lesbians, gay men and bisexual people (Cochran, 2001) have poorer health outcomes. On the one hand, people in marginalised groups may have less access to adequate health care (WHO, 2001). On the other hand, discrimination increases stress, which both impairs health and prompts hazardous behaviours such as substance use (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2009; Meyer, 1995; Pascoe and Richman, 2009).

Those who suffer because of prejudice, however, are not always passive; they can organise themselves, pool their resources and systematically defend their interests. Movements for gender, racial and sexual equality have all achieved media visibility and at least some policy change (Amenta et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the actual merit of social movements is far from clear: the success of political action is difficult to define and measure, and the outcome depends both on the movement itself and on a favourable social and political context (Amenta et al., 2010; Giugni, 1998).

Cultural and philosophical reflection

Measuring prejudice

Most psychological theories we discussed in the previous section depend on the assumption that self-report measures can validly assess a person's prejudice. Large-scale research projects often rely heavily on the easy application of questionnaires. The World Values Survey, for example, regularly assesses the attitudes of thousands of people over the world (Inglehart and Baker, 2000),

and has led to claims about the reduction of societal sexism and heterosexism in western Europe over the last two decades (Inglehart, 2008).

However, when assessing prejudice with self-report measures, there is always a risk that people may be insincere in order to appear tolerant. In response, researchers have created so-called modern measures: rather than explicitly asking people whether they loath a certain group, such measures ask whether the group has too many rights or has gone too far in demanding equality in regard to race (McConaghy, 1983), gender (Swim, 1994) or sexuality (Morrison and Morrison, 2002). More subtle measures are available as well. The implicit association test (IAT) is a simple computer-based task in which participants' response times are measured. It is assumed that people who are prejudiced towards a specific group give quicker responses when they have to associate that group with negative stereotypes than positive attributes (Greenwald et al., 1998). Prejudice may also be assessed through behavioural tasks, for instance, by asking participants to help a person who belongs to a marginalised group. However, these measures are subject to contextual variation (Saucier et al., 2005), and it may be difficult to demonstrate their validity. They are also more time consuming, more costly and less portable than pencil-and-paper methods.

Prejudice is, of course, not always conceptualised on an individual level. Sociologists and political scientists use the income gap between men and women and between white and non-white people as a measure of societal prejudice (see the section 'Social and political accounts'). Achebe's (1977) analysis of racism in English literature and Friedan's (1963) book on sexist stereotypes in women's magazines showed how cultural prejudice often goes unnoticed and is accepted as natural. In recent decades, more social psychologists in Europe have focused on talk and texts, rather than on the individual psyche, in order to grasp prejudice. We discuss their work next.

Prejudice and discourse

Discourse analysts emphasise how researchers and laypeople actively construe such notions as 'prejudice' through their talk (see also Chapter 5). In a seminal study, Margaret Wetherell and her colleagues (1986, discussed in Wetherell and Potter, 1992) interviewed white New Zealanders on their views of the Maori. In these interviews, people often made prejudiced statements preceded by a disclaimer ('I am not racist, but...'); the same person would offer a mix of both very positive and very negative opinions. People seemingly selected their arguments in order to appear balanced and unprejudiced. Such disclaimers and contradictory statements were also identified in talking about non-white immigrants in western Europe (van Dijk, 1992), gay people in the United Kingdom (Gough, 2002) and others.

Discourse analytic research emphasises that talk is highly variable and that the construction of events, people and objects depends on context. Thus, the

New Zealanders in Wetherell's study probably did not construct themselves as non-racist in every social encounter: talk occurs in a specific situation (e.g. a research interview) and fulfils specific goals (e.g. to make a good impression). Discourse analysis aims to provide a critique not just of prejudice but also of its constructed opposite, that is, 'tolerant' talk. People in our society try to present themselves as rational, unprejudiced beings; they use disclaimers (Wetherell et al., 1986) and offer makeshift arguments when they berate a group (Kleiner, 1998). People also tend to present prejudice as a characteristic of small, 'extremist' groups, and they often emphasise that most people (including themselves) are above irrational loathing of others (Billig, 1991; Sedgwick, 1994: 141–150). One powerful form of discourse is to construct marginalised groups' claims as excessive in relation to 'normal' rights (Peel, 2001). Moreover, arguments against prejudice may subtly confirm it. Those who claim, for example, that women are as good as men in leadership positions tacitly agree that men are the benchmark of competence (Bruckmüller et al., 2012). Similarly, claims that families with gay parents resemble families with straight parents imply that the latter are the 'norm' (Clarke, 2002).

Biopolitics and 'the Other'

Discourse analytic research prompted Potter and Wetherell to reject both dispositionist and situationist accounts of prejudice in favour of a theory of discourse as actively achieving social inclusion and exclusion. Thus, the construction of oneself as 'not a racist' exemplifies how 'categories [of people] are selected and formulated in such a way that their specific features help accomplish certain goals' (1987: 137). Wetherell (1998) went on to argue that discourse was explained by looking at both the dynamics of conversation and the 'interpretive repertoires' that people draw upon to accomplish goals in their talk. Discourse then serves social, economic and political interests. This discursive approach puts the social psychology of prejudice in more explicit dialogue with critical theory and post-structuralist thought.

Marxist thinkers of the twentieth century have typically assumed that long-standing forms of labelling and exclusion have economic explanations (Parker, 2004). French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir (1949) remarks that women had become *the Other* in philosophical thought, whose existence was described by positioning women in contrast with or secondary to men. Misogyny fulfils the interests of men, just as racism and anti-Semitism serve white people. Beauvoir's partner Jean-Paul Sartre later analysed dehumanising race relations in French Algeria in related terms, concluding that racism is the psychological internalisation of (economic) colonialism. Specifically, exploitation leads to a 'hate and fear' that turn the colonised into the 'Other-than-human' (1960: 676).

Michel Foucault later contested Sartre's and others' assumptions that Othering had primarily economic explanations, in favour of a theory that discourse had a self-organising character. Modern states, Foucault argued, aim to regulate their citizens' health, sexuality and mortality, resulting in increasingly common forms of *biopolitics* that focus on bodily difference and productivity (Foucault, 2009). Since biopolitics occurs within modern, rational societies, it relies on claims with a scientific aura for its legitimacy. While racism was useful for justifying economic exploitation in the colonies, biopolitics was the enterprise that really needed racist, sexist and homophobic justifications: by arguing that non-white races were inferior, that homosexuals were mentally ill, that women were hysterical, nineteenth- and twentieth-century governments could legitimise measures like forced sterilisation, segregation, starvation and eventually mass murder (Stoler, 1995). Foucault himself wrote a three-volume study to the *History of Sexuality* (1976–1984) in which he examined how law and medicine created such categories as the 'homosexual' in order to regulate private life.

Case study: Sexual and racial prejudice in Romania

In this section, we illustrate how different theoretical approaches can be brought to bear on ethnic and gender-related prejudices in a European nation, Romania. If several types of prejudice are widespread in Romania, Romanians themselves face exclusion in a European context. Unlike most EU citizens, Romanian nationals still need (as of 2013) special permission to work in the United Kingdom and a number of other EU countries. The mass media in western Europe often represents them as felons, beggars and prostitutes (Mogoş, 2009).

Racial prejudice

The Gypsies (also called Roma) were historically enslaved in parts of present-day Romania, and nomadic communities were often forced to settle. During the Second World War, a large number of Gypsies were deported; the subsequent communist regime, despite its egalitarian ideology, was largely unsympathetic to this group. Only in the 1990s was the Romani language allowed in schools, and only then were Roma political and cultural organisations permitted (Achim, 2004). After racial and ethnic discrimination was banned in the 1991 Constitution of Romania, several groups and organisations became active on behalf of the Gypsies, including an emerging Roma feminist movement (Oprea, 2005).

Despite these developments, Gypsy people and Roma ethnic identity are widely rejected in Romania. Surveys show that many people in Romania associate Gypsies with violence (64 per cent) and felonies (74 per cent); agree

with segregation in schools (31.2 per cent) and commercial venues (20.4 per cent); and would not accept a Gypsy person as a spouse of kin (53.3 per cent; INSOMAR, 2009). As in other parts of Europe, anti-Gypsy prejudice in Romania is closely tied to dehumanisation and claims of cultural inferiority (Rodríguez-Pérez et al., 2011): Gypsy traditions are construed as 'primitive' in opposition to the allegedly progressive culture of the majority (Oprea, 2005). Tileagă (2005) found that his (non-Gypsy) interviewees, whether they were more or less tolerant, saw Gypsies as being outside the Romanian nation, both culturally and biologically; participants even suggested that Gypsies may not be fully human. Consistent with these discourses, Marcu's (2007) experiments showed that fewer human characteristics were attributed to Gypsies than other ethnic groups, and that dehumanisation was related to Gypsies' poverty and distinctive culture. As in the case of other groups, real and imagined contact may break down anti-Gypsy prejudice in Romania. Cernat (2011) found that reading about interethnic friendships reduced Romanian people's intergroup anxiety and anti-Gypsy prejudice.

Sexual prejudice

Less is known about the history of Romanian gay people than about Romanian Gypsies. 'Sexual inversion' was criminalised in Romania only in 1936. Sodomy laws were abolished and replaced by an anti-discrimination bill in 2002 (Spineanu-Dobrotă, 2005). The relation of Romanians to western Europe is material to this history: it has often been noted that Romania only embraced anti-homophobia policies as a means of becoming a member of the EU (on the Romanian media, see Crețeanu and Coman, 1998). Gay pride parades have been taking place in Bucharest since 2005, sometimes amidst violent opposition (Woodcock, 2009); and Gay Movie Nights are organised annually in Cluj-Napoca.

Surveys have shown gay people to be one of Romania's most marginalised minorities (INSOMAR, 2009; Institute for Public Policies, 2003). More than two thirds of the respondents to the World Values Survey in Romania stated that homosexuality is never morally justifiable, as opposed to one quarter in the United Kingdom (Inglehart, 2008). An overwhelming majority of Romanians would not accept a lesbian or a gay as a spouse of kin (90.5 per cent; INSOMAR, 2009), and 40 per cent would not even allow gay and lesbian people to live in Romania (Institute for Public Policies, 2003). Unsurprisingly, many non-heterosexuals in Romania experience such forms of abuse as insults, battery or false complaints to the police (ACCEPT, 2005).

Psychological research has been mostly silent on Romanian sexualities: a search for *Romanian AND (gay OR homosexual)* in PsycINFO returns only nine results as of May 2013. A recent study on gay men found that experiences of prejudice are associated with less emotional well-being; this link is partially

explained by discriminated gay men feeling less supported and cared for by others (Bartoş, 2010). Unsurprisingly, contact with non-heterosexual people is associated with less prejudice (Moraru, 2010).

A discourse analysis has been recently performed on the news reports of a gay pride event (Bartoş et al., 2013). Those who protested against the pride event argued that a Christian Romania must reject 'diversity' as a Western, foreign value. Gay rights organisations and the media also construed gay people as a minority that has distinct political goals and receives support from the West. While several different voices are represented in these reports, all of them converge to construe gay people as a political group outside the Romanian nation.

Discussion

Our case study of prejudice in Romania illustrates the interplay of different levels of analysis. First, a look at the social and political level reveals a history of discriminatory laws and policies that have significantly improved over the past few decades. In the context of more political freedom after the fall of Communism, marginalised groups such as Gypsies and gay people also started organisations to promote social change; the success of these endeavours is yet to be determined, as much change was arguably achieved through external pressure from the EU. Second, research with self-report methods provides an insight into the psyche of both the bigot and the target of prejudice. As in many other contexts, contact with marginalised groups seems helpful to reduce prejudice (Cernat, 2011; Moraru, 2010); unfortunately, however, contact with gay people and Gypsies is avoided by most Romanians (INSOMAR, 2009). Third, discourse analyses of both everyday talk and the media reveal that differences between groups are overplayed: both Gypsies and gay people are systematically excluded from constructions of the Romanian nation (Bartoş et al., 2013; Tileagă, 2005).

Finally, different types of prejudice intersect. Both surveys (Institute for Public Policies, 2003) and discourse analyses (Bartoş et al., 2013) have pointed out the connections between ethnic and sexual prejudice. However, approaches disagree on why different forms of prejudice co-occur. In the case of Romania, the Institute for Public Policies (2003) study resorts to individual personality traits such as authoritarianism (but does not fail to discuss its social underpinnings), while discourse analysis assumes that history and power relations create discourses that exclude Others (Bartoş, et al., 2013).

Conclusions

In this chapter, we discussed three approaches to prejudice, and we summarised several lines of research that differ in terms of discipline, method

and epistemology. However, we find that these approaches often converge. In Romania, the dehumanisation of Gypsies was flagged up in both experimental (Marcu, 2007) and discourse-analytic research (Tileagă, 2005). Survey studies on 'modern heterosexism' (Morrison and Morrison, 2002) and discourse analyses of disclaiming prejudice ('I'm not homophobic but'; Gough, 2002) obviously investigate the same phenomenon. While we argue for pluralism in research, we do not propose any model or scheme to integrate all approaches. Different lines of research often rely on contradictory views of science and society; we agree with Stainton-Rogers (2003, chapter 1) that students of prejudice must decide on their own what they find credible and useful in context.

In closing, we warn our readers against reifying the notion of prejudice. It is usually assumed that prejudice is a coherent concept, with racism, sexism and homophobia as its (fairly similar) subtypes. Research is often performed mostly on one form of prejudice, and the conclusions are assumed to be easily extrapolated to the others. Phenomena like the glass cliff, for example, have been studied primarily in relation to gender (Haslam and Ryan, 2008), while racism has often been treated as a paradigm for all forms of prejudice (Billig, 1991). In everyday life, however, different groups face different challenges: black people, for example, are often born into a community that can support them, while women and gay people are commonly victimised by their own families (Beauvoir, 1949). Enlightenment in this field has often followed from breaking with convention and received views. Therefore, we urge scholars interested in prejudice to learn from other lines of research, to avoid hasty generalisations, and to remain 'unprejudiced' about the nature of prejudice.

Note

1. Goffman's work on *stigma* – 'the situation of the individual who is disqualified from complete social acceptance' (1963: 9) – is a notable exception to this trend.

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12

Voting and Not Voting: The Principal Explanations

Henk Dekker

Introduction

What are the principal explanations for voting or not voting? This is one of the intriguing questions that we address in this chapter. We present the reader with the main theories, summarise the empirical evidence collected so far and discuss the remaining research questions. In many countries, turnout is in decline, although there are clear exceptions from this pattern. Voting, however, is important for democratic legitimacy and an unrepresentative turnout can lead to an unrepresentative group interest representation. Generally, turnout is lowest among the youngest age group, and through generational replacement these newly enfranchised citizens influence overall turnout. In many countries, there have been efforts to increase turnout and reverse a downward trend. An important motivation for research on this topic is the desire to create clarity about the determinants of voting, so that these can be used in future attempts to positively influence voter turnout. The main scientific motivation for this type of research is to test the various theories in order to explain voting behaviour.

Research on voting behaviour

In empirical voting studies the dependent variables are voting, frequency of voting and the intention to vote. A fairly standard approach to constructing the dependent variable *voting* is to use a post-election survey item asking the respondents 'Did you vote in the most recent... [year and presidential, parliamentary, regional, local] election?' This self-reported vote is the dependent variable in most studies. For *frequency of voting*, a survey item is used as for instance 'How often do you usually vote in local, regional and national elections [never, sometimes, often, or always]?' Answers to this question make it possible to distinguish between core voters, infrequent abstainers

and non-voters. To measure the *intention to vote*, a survey item is often used, such as 'As far as you know, do you expect to vote in the elections this [month]?' with possible answers being 'no, probably not, probably yes' or 'If there were an election today, and you had the right to vote, would you vote certainly, probably, probably not or certainly not?' The intention to vote is often the dependent variable in surveys among young people who will be eligible to vote during the next election and in studies intended to monitor campaign mobilisation effects. Because of the secret ballot principle, it is hardly possible to observe and measure actual voting. Vote validation is legally forbidden or administratively impossible in many countries, and in countries where validation is allowed it is very time-consuming and hence expensive. The reported vote is not identical to official records and validated turnout. Respondents tend to over-report their voting behaviour in post-election surveys; abstainers frequently misreport their actions and voting intention is commonly vulnerable to social desirability and political correctness bias.

Two perspectives can be distinguished in voting studies: the aggregate and the individual perspective. Overall turnout is the object of study at the system level, where turnout – the percentage of those registered who cast a vote – is compared and explained over time and/or across countries. The key question here is mainly focused on why some countries have a higher voter turnout than others? Explanatory factors for differences in turnout are situated at the political system level; via cross-national studies scholars try to find out what system works best for turnout. However, turnout is actually the result of decision-making by millions of individuals on the actual election day. It is these individual voters or non-voters who are the object of study in the second, individual approach where one of the key questions has to do with the reasons for why one individual votes while another does not? The explanatory variables in the first instance include individual variables, either in combination (or not) with system variables and context variables that are related to the particular election.

Most data are quantitative, although a few studies do collect qualitative data by conducting focus groups, interviews and content analyses of, for example, Internet forums. Most quantitative data are acquired via surveys. In some surveys, the respondents are asked to self-report their reasons/motivations for voting or non-voting by either open- or closed-ended questions. The open-ended self-reported question often asks the respondents to state the reasons/motivations for voting or abstention in their own words. The closed-ended self-report question frequently asks the respondents to agree or disagree with a set of given answer options representing the various theories and their independent variables. For example, 'If you do not vote in the elections of . . . , will it be because . . . You are not on the electoral register, You are not interested in politics, You are not interested in the elections, . . .'. In most surveys,

the respondents are asked to answer questions that are measurements of the various explanatory variables selected by the researcher. The resulting data are usually analysed by regression analysis. Logistic regression is used because of the dichotomous character of the dependent variable and its skewed distribution in most parliamentary elections and because it yields an estimate of the influence of a particular variable on the chance that a person will vote, given all the other variables. Various models, including different sets of variables, are regressed in order to uncover possible mediation effects. Because these studies are correlational, they cannot provide empirical 'proof' that one variable actually causes the other. The designation of one variable as 'dependent' and others as 'independent' is easy when one variable clearly precedes the other in time or in case of controlled experiments. Otherwise, causal order is attributed on the basis of theory.

Theoretical approaches to voting behaviour

Voting is a form of complex behaviour and the aetiology of such behaviour is obviously complicated as it includes multiple causal mechanisms. This may constitute one of the main reasons for why there is no single dominant theory to explain voting behaviour. There are several different theories/models/approaches, and corresponding sets of variables, aimed at explaining individuals' voting or non-voting. They differ, for instance, in the original disciplines that are the main 'suppliers'. Some overlap, sharing one or more common explanatory variables because these variables influence voting through multiple theoretical pathways. All give partial explanations and are important in one way or another and together the theories and their explanatory variables offer a wealth of explanations.

We may assume that an individual's voting and intention to vote are influenced by system attributes (studied in political science, economics, sociology), individual characteristics (studied in psychology if focused on cognitions and affects and in biology if focused on brain and body) and the interaction of system and individual variables. Systemic voting theories shed light on independent variables related to the political system; individual theories focus on individual personal and social characteristics and include demographic, socio-economic, personality, cognitive, affective, biological/genetic, habitual and socialisation voting theories. In the following subsections, we will outline the main characteristics of each theoretical approach.

Systemic theories

Systemic or institutional voting theories focus on system and institutional attributes to explain variance in voting behaviour in different countries (Blais, 2006; Franklin, 2004; Geys, 2006). The independent variables are related to the

political system as a whole, the party system and the electoral system. Political system variables include the level of democracy, the level of proportionality of representation and the degree to which the outcome of an election is likely to have consequences for the executive. Party system variables include the number of parties in elections, the degree of differences between parties, the level of competitiveness between parties and the strength of relationship between parties and other social groupings. Electoral system variables include automatic or voter initiated registration, time since previous election, compulsory or voluntary voting, election salience, simultaneous elections, opportunity to express a preference for a candidate and easy voting arrangements. Systemic variables are relevant for the explanation of voting behaviour if they are understood and connected with individuals' characteristics, because the effects of institutional variables are different for different individuals (Jusko and Shively, 2005; Perea, 2002). What is important is how individual citizens perceive and experience the system.

Demographic and socio-economic voting theories

Demographic and socio-economic voting theories, in comparison, are designed to explain voting or not voting via variables such as age, gender, level of education, marital status, long-time residence, being a parent, class, being (un)employed, income and home ownership. Research has shown that these variables are, in large part, mediated through individual psychopolitical characteristics (Gallego and Oberski, 2012). This is also confirmed in research testing the 'resource model' of political participation (Verba et al., 1995). The key hypothesis in this theoretical approach is that people do not participate (vote) because they cannot (capacity), will not (motivation) or are not asked to (recruitment); in other words, people do not participate (vote) 'because they can't, because they don't want to, or because nobody asked' (Brady et al., 1995: 271). The authors' own analysis of voting data has shown that motivation – political interest – matters most.

Personality voting theories

People have different personalities; different personalities interact differently with their environments; and these different interactions have different effects on behaviour. The interaction of personality with environment affects a wide range of cognitions, affections and behaviours across many domains, including the political. Personality as an explanatory variable for voting behaviour is measured by individual personality characteristics such as self-efficacy (Condon and Holleque, 2013), self-esteem, achievement motivation, internal locus of control and altruism. Research has confirmed that personality characteristics have an effect, although an indirect one, on voting/non-voting behaviour and that these are mediated by attitudes such as political interest and the feeling that

voting is a civic duty (Blais and St-Vincent, 2011). Personality as an explanatory variable for voting behaviour is most frequently measured by the so-called Big Five personality traits: conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness, extroversion and neuroticism. Research results show that none of these traits have a direct effect on voting/non-voting, while three have only indirect effects. The effects of conscientiousness on voting are fully mediated by a sense of civic duty, openness is motivated by political interest and internal political efficacy and extroversion is similarly motivated by internal political efficacy (Schoen and Steinbrecher, 2013; Shang et al., 2013).

Cognitive voting theories

Knowledge voting theory states that people will go and vote if they have, and/or think they have, enough political knowledge. Objective political knowledge refers to knowing the correct answer – without any aid or assistance – to factual questions about, for example, the election, the parliament, the parties and the candidates. This has a direct effect on voting and/or the intention to vote. However, the great majority of people score low on knowledge tests. Subjective political knowledge, in comparison, refers to people's own perception of how politically knowledgeable they are. This also has a positive direct effect on voting. Although subjective knowledge is easier to measure, both objective and subjective knowledge are included in studies because of the fact that congruence between them is not self-evident. The effects of subjective knowledge are usually stronger than those of objective knowledge (Dekker and Portengen, 2000; Krampen, 2000).

In rational choice voting or economic voting theory (Downs, 1957), it is assumed that individuals behave rationally; that is, they are directed towards the achievement of conscious goals and that these goals reflect the individual's perceived self-interest. According to this theory, voting or non-voting is the result of a cost-benefit calculation based on the individual's beliefs/perceptions/expectations about benefits and costs of voting. A person will vote if the expected benefits of voting outweigh the costs incurred in voting. A benefit could be the probability of one's vote actually affecting the overall outcome of the elections. In a large electorate, however, this probability is close to zero. Voting is rational if people believe in this probability and irrational if people are aware of the close-to-zero chance of their vote deciding the outcome. The resulting 'paradox of voting' means that many citizens do turn out and vote while the probability that their vote affects the overall outcome of national elections is close to zero. Rational choice theories of voting have been criticised in several publications, and it has been especially argued that they 'have done a very poor job predicting political participation' (Brady et al., 1995: 272). Such criticisms have resulted in modifications of the theoretical assumptions, most notably through a change in the pay-off assumptions by introducing variables

of altruism and of seeing voting as accomplishing a responsibility of citizenship and one's civic duty (Blais, 2000). But 'if the range of self-interested benefits is, as it must be, expanded to encompass such psychic benefits as the satisfaction of doing one's civic duty, then the theory becomes much less potent' (Brady et al., 1995: 290).

The 'reasoned action theory' and its successor the 'theory of planned behaviour' (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) are also based on the assumption that human beings are usually 'quite rational', and that 'human social behaviour is not controlled by unconscious motives or overpowering desires, nor do we believe that it can be characterized as capricious or thoughtless' (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980: 5). In these theories, the most immediate determinant of voting is the intention to vote or not to vote. This intention is in turn determined by attitude towards voting, perceived behavioural control and the subjective norm. The individual's attitude towards voting is a function of beliefs about possible positive or negative outcomes of voting (behavioural beliefs). These beliefs may be grounded in beliefs about the effects of previous voting or non-voting behaviour. Perceived behavioural control is the individual's perception of the ease or difficulty in terms of performing the actual behaviour; participation in an election can be difficult in case of, for example, illness and lack of transportation. The subjective norm is a function of the beliefs about social pressures from relevant others to perform or not to perform the behaviour and the corresponding motivations to comply. 'External variables' are social-demographic variables, personality traits and the attitude towards the 'behavioural object' (in the case of voting, the body to be elected). 'Generally speaking, individuals will intend to perform a behaviour when they evaluate it positively and when they believe that important others think they should perform it' (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980: 6).

Research has shown that the correlation between voting and the intention to vote is indeed relatively strong (Blais et al., 2000; Hooghe and Wilkenfeld, 2008) and that the attitude towards voting is an important predictor of the intention to vote (Dekker and Portengen, 1995). In these theories, the main independents of voting are beliefs about possible positive or negative outcomes of voting, behavioural control of voting and social pressures from relevant others to perform or not to perform the behaviour: 'It is at the level of beliefs that we can learn about the unique factors that induce one person to engage in the behaviour of interest and to prompt another to follow a different course of action' (Ajzen, 1991: 207).

Affective voting theories

Affective voting theories assume that voting is mainly the effect of affections, that is attitudes and emotions, which are more or less corrected by cognitions. Rational voting theories are considered outdated because of their one-sided

rational, cognitive basis, and it is argued that the separation of rationality and emotion is an old-fashioned duality (reason and passion, body and soul, mind and heart) and constitutes a false dichotomy (Hanoch, 2002). Neuroscientific research shows that rationality and affect are closely intertwined and that the cognitive and emotional portions of the brain cooperate closely (Marcus et al., 2011). Emotions are products of extensive complex cognitive processes and, once developed, emotions affect the way people look at reality and enhance further learning (Miller, 2011).

Numerous studies have shown that attitudes such as partisanship, party attachment, electoral concern, voting as a civic duty, political interest and political efficacy have a strong positive effect on voting (Denny and Doyle, 2008). Other attitudes that have been shown to have a positive effect on voting are positive attitude towards the body to be elected; being supportive of democracy; and trust in the body, parties and politicians to be elected. A negative effect on voting has been observed in terms of political alienation (Southwell, 2012) and political cynicism (Dekker and Meijerink, 2012). Individuals are socialised into many of these attitudes during early adolescence, and the persistence of these attitudes can explain repetition in turnout (Campbell, 2006: 5).

Voting or non-voting can also be influenced by positive or negative emotions. People who anticipate positive emotions, such as enjoying the right to vote, will probably have the intention to vote. People who anticipate both positive and negative emotions will probably be undecided, while people who anticipate negative emotions, such as stress because they are uncertain in terms of which party to vote for, may not have the intention to vote. Studies of individual emotions with respect to voting, the body to be elected, the parties and the candidates have, however, been relatively scarce. Besides individual emotions, categories of emotions and cross-emotional constructs also have been studied for their impact on voting/non-voting. Categories of emotions based on factor analyses are positive emotions such as enthusiasm and hope, leading to participation; negative emotions such as anxiety, resulting in more attention to political information; and negative emotions such as aversion, anger, bitterness and fear, setting in motion the keeping of distance or some other protective behaviour (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993). An 'emotion differential' is the difference in an individual's favourable emotions towards competing candidates (Wang, 2013). Emotions are potentially important variables because they can be acquired at an early age and are not easily 'forgotten'.

Attitudinal and emotional explanations for an individual's decision to vote or not to vote are usually based on self-reports. However, much that goes on in the human mind, and in the human nervous system in particular, is outside the realm of conscious thought and cannot be captured by survey self-reports (Gruszczynski et al., 2013: 148). Sometimes people 'have already made up their mind, even though they do not know it yet' (Galdi et al., 2008: 1102).

Evolutionary psychology tells us that quick and direct brain activities outside conscious thought were and still are needed for survival and to prevent cognitive overloading. One way to measure automatic mental associations of which the individual is not aware is by implicit measures, based on participants' performance on computer-based, speeded categorisation tasks. Another way is to use biological, and especially physiological, measures of autonomic nervous system activity that rely on readings from sensors. An increase in autonomic nervous system activity is widely accepted as a reliable indicator of emotion and manifests itself as an increase in the secretion of sweat at various points on the body. However, it cannot indicate the positive or negative valence of the emotion.

Biological and genetic voting theories

Biology not only helps us to observe psychological variables by using physiological measures but also proposes biological variables such as health, hormones and drugs to explain political behaviour. One of the new variables is the cross-emotional construct of an individual's electrodermal activity responsiveness, which has contributed substantially to the explanation of variance in a political participation index that included 'usually voting in elections' and had the greatest effect among the least educated individuals (Gruszczynski et al., 2013: 148). The genetic voting theory focuses on possible genetic origins of voting behaviour (Hatemi and McDermott, 2012; Loewen and Dawes, 2012). Individuals react to politics with long-standing predispositions (conscious or unconscious), which may be partly the result of genetics. The study of a possible genetic basis of political behaviour started with twin studies (Alford et al., 2005), where the design used in these early studies suggested that genes may matter in political orientations and behaviour. The first 'candidate gene association' article reports that two genes – MAOA u-VNTR and 5-HTTLPR – are significantly associated with self-reported voting (Fowler and Dawes, 2008). A replication using new data has shown that there was only a relation between turnout on the one hand and an interaction between 5-HTT and church attendance on the other (Fowler and Dawes, 2013). However, an independent test in which an original dataset was used containing 5-HTT data and records of actual voting in six recent elections showed no association of the HTTLPR genotype with actual voting frequency, either on its own or in interaction (Deppe et al., 2013). A preliminary conclusion may be that 'there is likely no single "voting gene"' but 'there is some (likely large) set of genes whose expression, in combination with environmental factors, influences political participation' (Fowler and Dawes, 2008: 590). The search for genes that can predict complex human behaviours (such as all political behaviour) is heavily criticised because 'behaviour is the integrated output of an integrated biological system interacting with a particular environment' (Charney and English, 2013: 393).

Habitual voting theory

Habitual voting theory stresses that behaviour is partly determined by earlier behaviour and that a particular behaviour can become a habit. Habit 'involves repetition of a response under similar conditions so that the response becomes automatically activated when those conditions occur' (Aldrich et al., 2011: 536). Voting is also, in part, a gradually developed habit (Franklin, 2004; Gerber et al., 2003). People's voting history explains and predicts their actual and future voting behaviour, according to this theory. Individuals with strong voting habits will vote regardless of the particular body, parties or candidates to be elected, issues in the election as well as regardless of their political cognitions, attitudes and emotions. For people with a voting habit, the responses involved in voting (such as driving to the polling station) are activated in memory when they perceive simple context cues (such as political signs posted in the neighbourhood). Abstention in one's first election increases the probability of non-voting in subsequent ones, resulting in a habit: 'once people have decided not to vote, they are extremely unlikely to change their mind and to go to the polls' (Achen and Blais, 2010: 5). People develop these patterns of voting or not voting by the third election after they have reached voting age (Butler and Stokes, 1974). Major life disruptions can interrupt the voting or non-voting habit but only temporarily (Plutzer, 2002). It is difficult to stop the non-voting habit because people have to admit to themselves that the decision not to vote in the past may not have been a good one. Biology helps to explain why overriding a habitual response takes effort. Established patterns hardwired into physiology can become 'behavioural defaults', and evidence indicates 'a stickiness to physiological variables that can be seen as parallel to the stickiness of political orientations' (Gruszczyński et al., 2013: 140). However, correlations between voting/non-voting across time can also be explained as stability in attitudes such as civic duty, increased positive attitude towards the act of voting, lower information costs, 'being a voter' having become part of one's self-image and identity and having received more campaign mobilisation messages as a known voter (Green and Shachar, 2000). Habitual voting theory is not applicable in research among young, newly eligible citizens who have not yet had any possibility to vote regularly and develop this habit.

Socialisation voting theory

Political socialisation theory says that political behaviour is learned behaviour. Citizens turn out to vote because relevant others do so and because they are willing to comply, with or without social pressure (Gerber et al., 2008; Jennings, 2004). The cognitions and affections that underlie behaviour are also learned from 'relevant others'. This learning takes place mainly (but not exclusively) during childhood, adolescence and young adulthood. The 'relevant others'

include family; church; school; peers; mass media; employers and trade unions; social movements; and the political, economic and cultural elites. Theoretically, the most influential messengers of information and emotions are the persons who are the first to exert influence on the subject (parents), who exert influence for the longest period of time (parents, best friend, partner), who are rated the highest by the subject as to credibility (parents, teachers, television news, non-partisan experts), who have the most power over the subject (parents, teachers, partner, employer) and who have the most resources and skills to influence and manipulate information and emotions (mass media, elites).

Parents' voting has the largest effect on the offspring's initial turnout, while parental partisanship has an enduring effect on voting (Plutzer, 2002; Van Deth et al., 2011; Verba et al., 1995). Parents try to persuade their children to go and vote, stress voting as a social norm and induce norm-conforming behaviour, show their political involvement, discuss politics which may raise political interest, evoke political emotions, inform their children politically and facilitate reading about politics by offering newspapers and political books at home or not (Cutts and Fieldhouse, 2009; Gerber and Rogers, 2009). Background variables are parental educational levels and parental socio-economic status (Pacheco and Plutzer, 2005). In the United States, growing up in an absent-parent household seems to have a negative effect on black voter turnout but not on white voter turnout (Sances, 2013).

School political education varies considerably within and across countries (Ainley et al., 2013; Hooghe and Claes, 2009). Recent studies show not only positive effects on intention to vote and the cognitions and affections that underlie this intention (Claes, 2010; Dassonneville et al., 2012) but also several weaknesses (Haste, 2010; Hoskins et al., 2012; Niemi and Niemi, 2007).

Mass media consumption (reading newspapers, watching television news and listening to radio news) is also positively related to voting. A portrayal of politics as a 'game' or 'horse race' may also have a positive effect on voting if a close race is predicted. The more coverage the media devote to the elections and the more televised leader debates are offered, the more people are expected to vote. However, research has shown that cable television and the Internet increase gaps in turnout between people who prefer news and people who prefer entertainment (Prior, 2005). There are two hypotheses about the effects of Internet use on voting: mobilisation of non-voters or reproduction of existing inequalities. The latter has found the most empirical evidence (Oser et al., 2012).

Church membership or religiosity, measured by frequency of attendance at religious services, shows a positive relationship with voting in some studies but not in others. The relationship is explained not by religion but by membership of a group, which creates a sense of belonging to a larger community. Church attendance and voting may be indicators of a general propensity to participate in community life (Plutzer, 2002). Trade unions also adhere to a norm of voting

as a civic duty, stimulate members to vote, provide recommendations for the party or parties to vote for and also arrange transportation to the polling station (Leighley and Nagler, 2007). Membership of other formal and informal organisations, such as peer groups, work teams and voluntary groups also correlates positively with voting (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita, 2013). The decline in voter turnout has been attributed to a general decline in membership figures of these groups (Putnam, 2000).

Voting behaviour is also influenced by political context (Pacheco, 2008). Governments try to mobilise voters by different strategies. Canvassing has been found to be most effective (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009). Party campaigns are primarily directed at vote choice but may also have an effect on turnout (Karp et al., 2008). High negativism in 'status quo campaigns' decreases turnout, whereas high negativism in 'policy change campaigns' increases turnout (Nai, 2013). In general, campaign contact has become less personal (there is less canvassing), which in one study is seen as one of the key reasons for lower turnout (Gerber and Green, 2000). In another study, however, no evidence was found of a decline in mobilisation activity or for mobilisation techniques having become less effective (Goldstein and Ridout, 2002).

Explanatory power

Pooled-survey analyses, panel studies and meta-analyses are important tools to assess the relative strength of the many variables and to find out which theory or theories and variables have the most explanatory power. A relatively recent study, in which surveys conducted in several democratic countries were pooled together, showed that at the system level, the closeness of the contest and, at the individual level, partisanship, civic duty, political interest and group membership are the main predictors of voting (Fieldhouse et al., 2007). A panel study aimed at assessing the relative strength of the many variables over time showed that parental voting, parental average education, respondent's political knowledge, level of education, political engagement and residential mobility were the best turnout predictors (Plutzer, 2002). A recently published meta-analysis – an analysis of analyses – included empirical studies of individual-level voter turnout in national parliamentary or presidential elections in established democracies, published in ten top journals in political science and political behaviour during the past decade. The analysis focused exclusively on main effects, disregarding interaction terms. The 90 articles reviewed in the analysis included 177 different independent variables. Variables with a consistent effect on turnout include age, education, income, marital status, residential mobility, religious attendance, media exposure, partisan and non-partisan mobilisation, vote in previous election, party identification, political interest and political knowledge (Smets and Van Ham, 2013).

Conclusion and perspectives

Our analysis of voting theories seems to indicate that there is a multi-step funnel of causality in which systemic/institutional, demographic and socio-economic, personality and socialisation variables influence political cognitions and affections, which in turn are the most proximate causes that affect voting/non-voting or the intention to do either.

Systemic and institutional theory is relevant for the explanation of voting behaviour if its variables are understood and connected with individuals' cognitions and affections, such as political knowledge, political interest and partisanship. What is important is how individual citizens perceive and experience the system. Systemic variables that have a positive indirect effect on voting are proportional representation, elections with consequences for the executive, clear programmatic differences between the parties and their candidates, automatic registration, compulsory voting and easy voting. Many demographic and socio-economic variables such as age, education and income are also, for a large part, mediated through individual psychopolitical characteristics and are relevant for explaining voting behaviour if they are connected with these variables. Personality variables such as self-efficacy, consciousness, openness and extroversion also have an indirect effect. Cognitive variables with positive direct effects on voting behaviour are objective and subjective political knowledge and positive beliefs about possible outcomes. Affective variables with positive direct effect on voting are positive attitude towards voting, having a clear party/candidate preference, electoral concern, feeling that voting is a civic duty, political interest, political efficacy and positive emotions with regard to voting and a party or candidate. The behavioural variable is the habit or routine of voting. Socialisation creates the most proximate cognitive and affective variables and includes parental voting, parental political involvement, political education in school, exciting media coverage of the election, campaigns with high positivism giving hope and campaigns with high negativism promising a 'change' and personal campaign contact. Parents, schools, mass media, civic groups, parties/candidates and governments seeking effective strategies to promote voting in general and voting by young citizens, in particular, can all benefit from the list of variables that positively relate to voting.

Although much progress has been made in research, many questions still remain to be answered. We need research that includes all variables that theoretically seem to be important. Path models should explicitly address direct and indirect effects. Panel studies are needed to reveal causality. Sophisticated methods, for example the Solomon four-group design, are needed to test the various methods to promote voting. The ideal research programme is cross-national, cross-election and cross-time.

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Part IV

Hot Issues

13

Political Emotions

Nicolas Demertzis

Introduction

In the background of a contemporary emotionology, 'political emotions' have been employed as a means to designate the crucial role affectivity plays in politics. Notwithstanding the novelty of its use in political psychology and sociological literature, the concept stands largely unclear and under-theorised. The aim of this chapter is twofold: First, it offers a theoretically driven definition of political emotion with minimal vagueness and ambiguity abiding to normative criteria. Second, this chapter provides examples of political emotions with important repercussions in political life. In determining reactions to unjust and therefore affectively charged political events, resentment and *ressentiment* are analytically discussed and differentiated as against the reluctance of many political psychologists to do so. Furthermore, as political psychologists and sociologists usually conflate cynicism and distrust or even mistrust, this chapter provides some theoretical and methodological tools for keeping the two concepts apart, suggesting that this respecification leads to more conclusive analysis of electoral politics.

Societal and discursive context

An 'emotional' or 'affective turn' (Clough and Halley, 2007; Hopkins et al., 2009; Turner and Stets, 2005) has been taking place since the mid-1990s, first on the western and later on the eastern side of the Atlantic. This turn seems to engulf almost all major disciplines and sub-disciplines in the humanities and the social and political sciences. It is likely to succeed the 'linguistic turn' of the late 1970s, 1980s and the early 1990s (Sheehan, 2004; Yeatman, 1994). The linguistic turn was a postmodern challenge to the structural-functionalist paradigm in social and political science. In the wane of postmodernism and within a thoroughly pluralistic theoretical *milieu*, the emotional turn directs

theoretical attention to neglected areas of research bridging modern and postmodern social theorising.

This turn has fundamentally altered the way the academic community conveys political analysis (Thompson and Hoggett, 2012); for many decades, political analysts had to choose between two theoretically divergent paths: either the rational choice or the political cultural approach rooted in the 'behavioural revolution' (Almond, 1996; Eckstein, 1988; Lane, 1992; Offe, 1996). Notwithstanding the multiplicity of either approach, the 'rationalist' theorising of political affairs (be it political change, voting, opinionation, decision-making and so on) draws heavily from the Western ideal of reason *vis-à-vis* passion, according to which individuals and humanity alike will progress to a better world if they rely on reason and interest rationality (Marcus, 2003; Marcus and MacKuen, 2001). Democracy is sustained when reason beats passion. On the other hand, the 'culturalist' account of continuity and change in political systems and sub-systems is premised on the postulate of orientational variability; people engage in politics in different modalities through the interplay of cognitive, affective and evaluative predispositions (Almond and Verba, 1965). In this vein, the Michigan School underscored the affective dimension in electoral behaviour by the notion of 'party identification'. The first approach exorcised emotion and affectivity from the theorising of political action altogether, while the second treated emotion in a more or less metonymic way. 'Affective orientations' and 'party identification' served as sweeping categories that accommodate distinct emotions (for instance, pride, gratitude, joy, solidarity, enthusiasm, devotion or loyalty).

In the meantime, this 'emotional turn' has ameliorated these drawbacks. Advocates of the 'rationalist' approach have integrated emotions in their analyses in important and path-breaking ways. For example, Jon Elster has ingeniously accommodated emotionality and rationality into his explanation of different socio-political phenomena such as electoral behaviour, revolutions, public opinion, group antagonism, the function of democratic institutions and social norms (Elster, 1999). The once overriding paradigm in the social movements literature, resource and mobilisation theory (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), lost much of its hold during the 1990s in favour of the culturally informed framing theory (Gamson, 1992; Tarrow, 1998: 109ff); but as the latter was cognitively biased, since the 2000s the study of social and political movements has been oriented more openly towards the sociology and psychology of emotions (Flam and King, 2005; Goodwin and Jasper, 2006).

The emotional turn has had more impressive after-effects at the micro analytical level carried out by political psychologists and political neuroscientists. Substantive work has been done on the way cognitions and emotions interact consciously and unconsciously in the formation of attitudes and political judgements and predictions are made regarding citizens' reactions during

electoral campaigns, political tensions, policy decision-making and so on (see *inter alia* Iyengar and McGuire, 1993; Kuklinski, 2001; Neuman et al., 2007; Redlawsk, 2006).

But this affective turn under discussion does not make for a dominant paradigm, a new grand narrative; it rather serves as a universe of discourse and, consequently, as an additional lens for seeing social and political phenomena. As the Other of rationality, affectivity in its multiple manifestations was already included all along the history of political doctrines and political science. All major political and moral philosophers were great theoreticians of emotion as well; take for instance Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, Smith and Arendt, who dealt with affectivity under different designations expressing different historical and cultural understandings of the human psyche: passions, appetites, affections, feelings, sentiments, emotions (Dixon, 2003). Also, for major political thinkers the importance of the emotional factor was self-evident: Gramsci (1971: 138–140) referred to ‘organized political passion’ which prompted the overcoming of individual calculations in a ‘incandescent atmosphere’ of emotions and desires; Marx (1844/1978: 27–28) maintained that for the identification of the particular interest of a class with the interest of society as a whole there has to be ‘a moment of enthusiasm’; de Tocqueville (1974) analytically explained the role of envy in democracy, Weber (1978: 241ff) consistently coped with charismatic leadership and politics as vocation; Benedict Anderson analysed the nation as an imagined community in modernity which gains ‘profound emotional legitimacy’ (Anderson, 1991: 4).

Against this background, the contemporary ‘emotional turn’ has contributed to the postulation that in all its modalities, that is, action, thought, discourse, rhetoric, institutional setting – be it contentious or consensual, politics is ultimately affective in nature. Consequently, what is currently of interest is how political sociologists and political psychologists are theorising the politics-emotions nexus. Adopting a psychologically informed approach of the political sociology of emotions (Demertzis, 2006), we first discuss some conceptual issues concerning the analysis of the politics-emotions nexus giving emphasis to the notion of ‘political emotions’. The second and the third sections of the chapter deal with two complex and timely political emotions: resentment and cynicism. Resentment contributes to the setting of populism and political extremism, be it of secular or fundamentalist kind; political cynicism features large part of people’s political experience in Western societies and affects the quality of democracy.

Conceptual probes

To a certain extent, the emotional turn represents the ‘return of the repressed’ in social and political studies (Goodwin et al., 2000). Or, it can be argued that

it resembles a sort of revenge of Hume¹ over Kant. However, it is more accurate to say that it reconstitutes the linkage between emotionality and rationality in political analysis. What matters then is the nature of the linkage and the blend of cognition and emotion in political action and thought in different time and space settings. In this respect, political structures (parties, governments, legal systems and so on) are interwoven with 'structures of feeling' that are procedural experiences of individuals and collectives understood as 'not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought' (Williams, 1978: 132).

This general framework of the politics-emotion nexus, seen from a higher level of abstraction, begs for more concrete conceptual tools, not always easy to invent. One of the most vexing issues is the very definition of emotion. Notwithstanding the elusiveness of the concept (Kleinginna and Kleinginna, 1981), most psychologists and political psychologists endorse a componential definition of emotion according to which *emotion* is made of (1) an appraisal of an internal or external consequential stimulus; (2) physiological changes leading to action readiness towards something; (3) facial, voice and paralinguistic expressions; (4) a conscious subjective feeling; (5) an adaptation function to the environment (Fontaine et al., 2007; Scherer, 2009). Sociologists of emotions add (1) culturally provided linguistic labels of one or more of the first three elements and (2) socially constructed rules on what emotions should be experienced and expressed (Turner and Stets, 2005: 9). Evidently, each of these components involves a huge variety of dimensions and disputed sub-issues such as the nature of the appraisal, the relation between emotion and motivation, motivation and action, the direct and indirect effects of emotion on political judgement and so on. This may be one of the reasons why political psychologists often oscillate between 'emotion' and 'affect' (Cassino and Lodge, 2007; Clore and Isbell, 2001; Isbell et al., 2006; Marcus et al., 2006; Ottati and Wyer, 1993; Sears, 2001).

In addition, quite often sociologists treat 'emotion', 'feeling', 'sentiment' and 'affect' interchangeably (e.g. Turner and Stets, 2005: 2); albeit this may be congruent with their research agendas, it compromises interdisciplinary communication. To give an example, for most psychologists 'emotion' is a sort and transient experience which, in terms of duration, is at variance from 'mood' and 'emotional climate' (Oatley and Jenkins, 1996: 124). This difference is often played down by many sociologists and political scientists under the general category 'emotion'.

Moreover, the emotions literature is replete with typologies constructed according to various dimensions stemming oftentimes from different theoretical premises (Thamm, 2006). With these types of concerns in mind, which

should be the main tenets in the conceptualisation of political emotions? I comment briefly on three points:

(1) Political emotions should not necessarily be consciously felt; one may be thoroughly proud of one's country while at the same time unconsciously hating other nationalities. Or, as Scheff (1994) has demonstrated, one's conscious anger against a political opponent may be symptomatic of suppressed shame. Although they speak of unconscious affective systems rather than distinct emotions, theorists of 'affective intelligence' have convincingly shown that much of political judgement and decision-making is taking place below the threshold of awareness (Marcus et al., 2000).

(2) Despite the focus of political psychological experimentation on short visceral emotional reactions to political stimuli, political emotions per se are not necessarily short and transient. Party loyalty, political trust or traumatic vengeance after a civil war is a durable affective disposition of trans-generational nature. They work out as 'programmatic emotions' (Barbalet, 2006) in the sense that they sustain the political institutions and practices, shaping thus public culture.

(3) Some typologies are more suitable than others in theorising political emotions; for example, the distinction between primary and secondary (or mixed) and positive and negative emotions does not seem to be as germane to politics as other typologies such as 'relational', 'moral', 'anticipatory' or 'other-targeted' emotions. General descriptions of fear or anxiety as negative emotions might be less conclusive for the understanding of political turmoil than designating them as relational or anticipatory emotions elicited by differential distribution of power resources within concrete time-space coordinates.

Towards a definition

Ultimately, however, what is the definition of 'political emotions'? As cautious as one might be regarding the previous tenets, defining political emotions is not that easy. In general, they pass under-theorised in commentaries or academic pieces of work (e.g. Staiger et al., 2010). As a notion, it is used more often and systematically by political philosophers (Koziak, 2000; Nussbaum, 2006; Sokolon, 2006) than by political psychologists or sociologists. As the term is not widely used,² one cannot offer a lexical or declarative definition (Sartori, 1984: 29); political emotions can be defined as the kind of emotions enacted in political processes (Koziak, 2000: 29). But vagueness and ambiguity cannot be evaded since the *definiens* 'emotions' and 'politics' are underspecified. It is too late, though, for a stipulative definition of the term, that is, an arbitrary assignment of meaning for the first time, since

the concept is already in use notwithstanding its under-theorisation (Hurley, 2011: 93). On these provisos, it is impelling to assume a theoretical definition; theoretical definitions do not simply assign a meaning to a word, they grant a way of conceiving the phenomenon at hand (Hurley, 2007: 98) – in our case the politics-emotions nexus. While theoretical definitions minimise vagueness and ambiguity, they also implicitly or explicitly abide to normative criteria.³

For the purposes of our discussion, I provide here a genus and difference intentional (or connotative) theoretical definition: *Political emotions are lasting affective predispositions supported reciprocally by the political and social norms of a given society, playing a key role in the constitution of its political culture and the authoritative allocation of resources.* Accordingly, political emotions are inherently (but not exclusively) relational and social: They are elicited from asymmetrical figurations of power and are triggered by appraisals that make a reference to other people (Elster, 1999: 139) or institutions engaging people – fear, hope, gratitude, anger, vengeance, disgust, awe, trust, distrust are only some of the extant affective reactions within a polity.

Political emotions are also programmatic, in the sense that they are long-term affective commitments and dispositions towards political figures (e.g. the adoration and devotion for a charismatic leader), political symbols, ideas or institutions (Sears, 2001). Take for instance patriotism and solidarity when it comes to the nation-state and social movement activity, respectively. Broadly speaking, legitimacy and the discrediting of political power is a highly emotional process.

As lasting affective states, political emotions include what Goodwin and Jasper (2006) call ‘affect’, ‘moods’, as well as what De Rivera (1992) calls ‘emotional climate’. Interwoven with elaborate cognitions, affects are positive and negative investments towards political objects (people, persons, ideas, places, things, symbols); they are forms of attraction and repulsion that foster collective solidarities and animosities alike. Trust, respect, love, hatred, cynicism, resentment, shame, pride are examples of affects. Moods or emotional climates are equally lasting and stable experiences differing from affects in not having a definite object.

At this point two clarifications are required, a semantic and an analytical one: First, since political emotions are not occasional episodes but lasting affective dispositions, they might be better described as ‘political sentiments’; in the psychological vocabulary, ‘sentiments’ are enduring emotional experiences that have to be treated differently from ‘hot’, impulsive, brief, partial and unstable ‘emotions’ (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000: 32–33, 43). Yet, as indicated above, in the sociological vocabulary this is not the case. Second, to the extent that there are no exclusively political emotions but only ‘scenarios’ of political involvement and affect (Kozziak, 2000: 29) occurring in various figurations wherein any emotion may acquire political significance, disregarding altogether short-term

emotions is erroneous. Apart from enduring programmatic (political) emotions, short-term reflex emotions play a considerable role too, especially in periods of political tension (demonstrations, riots, petitions, and so on) as well as in information processing and impression management. The above-mentioned definition encompasses 'higher-order' emotions or sentiments linked to central functions of a political system and the basic tenets of a political culture (or subculture). They may be designated as political emotions proper or as 'salient political emotions' (Sokolon, 2006: 181), differentiated from what I would call 'politically relevant emotions', that is urges, reflex and highly transient affective experiences, which in general play a marginal role in the *longue durée* of the Political. The political emotions proper are culturally socially constructed and have a strong cognitive and moral component (Goodwin et al., 2001: 13).

According to the genus and difference intentional theoretical definition advocated here, political emotion (in the singular) can be seen as an abstract conceptual category or as a general phenomenon that accommodates a variety of specific emotions. The media philosopher Brian Massumi (2002) refers generally to 'affect' not only as the primary feature for the understanding of the user's experience in the new media environments but as a central 'medium' for the understanding of our information- and image-based late-capitalist culture. Inspired by Spinoza's notion of passion, as something which acts upon the body and as something which is acted upon by consciousness, Massumi assumes that 'affect' is a pre-social, unnamed and never fully conscious nonlinear complexity, prior to passivity and activity, which makes for 'synesthesia', that is the connections between the senses and 'kinaesthesia', that is feelings of movement through moving images and icons on the screen in our computer and media saturated society. Seen in this light, Massumi's affect serves as a whole and overarching emotional climate that is linked metonymically to the particular emotions that can spring from it. In a similar vein, Deborah Gould, drawing on Massumi's work, makes a distinction between '*affect*, as bodily sensation that exceeds what is actualized through language or gesture, and an *emotion* or *emotions*' (2010: 27). A cognate approach of political affect is pursued by John Protevi who conceptualises it as a non-individualistic affective cognition and as an 'imbrication' of the sociopolitical, the psychological and the physiological. In concretising this highly abstract notion, he analyses specific cases where fear, rage and love sit at the centre of what he calls body politic (Protevi, 2009).

In the remainder of this chapter, two durable, complex and not entirely conscious political emotions, quite widespread in late modern western political systems, will be discussed, illuminating the theoretical definition put forward herein.

Resentment versus *ressentiment*

Every now and then, 'resentment' has been used as independent or intervening variable for the explanation of civic confrontations and styles of political action. Aiming at a theoretical account of populism, Edward Shils (1956) employed resentment for the interpretation of the American political scene of the 1950s. He understands resentment in terms of moral rage and indignation and points that populism is 'an ideology of resentment against the social establishment imposed by the long-term domination of a class, which is considered to have the monopoly of power, property and civilization' (Shils, 1956: 100–101). Forty years later, in his attempt to explain the emergence and the chances of the far-right European populist parties (i.e. FPÖ, Ny Demokrati, Republikaner, Front Nationale, Schweizer Volkspartei, Lega Nord, Vlaams Blok), Hans-Georg Betz brings the concept of resentment into play. In the early phase of their appearance, Betz claims (2002: 198–200) that these parties were greatly buttressed by the diffuse resentful grievances of working and lower middle-class electorate against globalisation, immigrants, the fiscal crisis of the welfare state, political corruption and so on.

In a systematic attempt to explain ethnic violence in the Eastern European countries during the twentieth century, Roger Petersen develops an emotions-based theory of conflict and employs resentment as an 'instrumental' emotion that facilitates individual action to satisfy a particular desire or concern. Resentment prepares for the rectification of perceived imbalances in group status hierarchies and in this sense places someone against a group that stands in the way of achieving a blocked desire (Petersen, 2002: 19, 24, 29, 40–41). Resentment functions either as a perpetuating factor of group animosities or as catalyst of violence. Similarly, Dennis Smith (2006) sees resentment as an emotional reaction to humiliation experienced as an undeserved social displacement that may occur by conquest, exclusion or relegation.

Two traditions

In all these cases, resentment is actually understood as righteous moral indignation; they can be classified to what I would call 'non-nietzschean' approaches to resentment (Demertzis, 2006). A few more examples are useful here: Peter Frederick Strawson defined resentment as a negative reactive attitude that a person develops in the face of another person's indifference, insult and injury towards him (Strawson, 1974: 7, 14). It implies a disapproval of the injurer who is considered responsible for his/her actions with good reason (we cannot feel resentment towards a small child or a mentally deficient person). Similarly, John Rawls conceptualises resentment as a 'moral sentiment' together with guilt, shame, trust, obligation, infidelity, deceit and sympathy. Moral sentiments are defined as families of dispositions and propensities regulated by a

higher order desire (Rawls, 1971/1991: 192, 484, 487), which touch on the very sociability of the individual and one's ability to judge when wrongs are done to us. For Jack Barbalet, resentment is not directed towards power per se, but towards the normative content of the social order, in the sense that someone (1) judges unworthy the position that someone else has in the social hierarchy and (2) thinks that someone else – a person or a collectivity – deprives them of chances or privileges that they themselves could enjoy (Barbalet, 1998: 68, 137).

It seems that this notion of resentment is so powerful that not infrequently scholars and translators lose sight of its next of kin 'nietzschean' *ressentiment*, an equally commanding notion. It is indicative that the translator of Marc Ferro's *Le ressentiment dans l'Histoire* translated *ressentiment* into resentment (Ferro, 2010). The same holds true in the translation of Tzvetan Todorov's *La peur des barbares. Au-delà du choc des civilisations*, where his 'countries of *ressentiment*' (as primarily against what he calls 'countries of fear') were converted into 'countries of resentment' (Todorov, 2010). To be sure, however, resentment and *ressentiment* are not identical.

As we discussed above, according to the non-nietzschean approach, resentment is an unpleasant moral sentiment that leads to an active posture. On the contrary, the nietzschean approach of resentment (resentment qua *ressentiment*) is linked to passivity as it captures the morality of weak creatures 'who have been forbidden of the real reaction, of the act' (Nietzsche, 1970: 35). For Nietzsche, the 'resentful man' is governed by a frightened baseness that appears as humility, his submission to those he hates becomes docility, his weakness is supposedly transformed to patience or even virtue. His fundamental characteristic is vindictiveness in disguise that leads to inaction (1970: 133). For Nietzsche the genealogy of *ressentiment* lays in the Christian morality; for Max Scheler it rests upon the bourgeois morality that reached its peak in the French Revolution (Scheler, 1961: 81–82).

There appear to be two necessary conditions for the stirring of *ressentiment*: on one hand a not acted out vindictiveness, an unfulfilled and repressed demand for revenge, and a chronic interiorised powerlessness on the other. So, while one wants to take revenge one feels that one cannot do anything about it. It is not just repressed vindictiveness that leads to *ressentiment*; it is the repression of the imagination of vengeance too that contributes to a particular state of mind where the very emotion of revenge is ultimately evaporated (Scheler, 1961: 49). As for the sufficient conditions, Scheler points to the gap between the perceived equality of social position and the rights that emanate from citizenship and the real power of the individual to enjoy them (formal vs. substantive equality). This gap functions as a psychological dynamite (Scheler, 1961: 50, 69) and it would by itself lead to envy, class hatred or moral indignation, if it was not overdetermined by chronic interiorised powerlessness.

Second, *ressentiment* is made up out of comparison; one cannot feel vindictiveness, envy, jealousy or rancour (ingredients of resentful mentality) if one does not compare oneself to others, especially in settings characterised by upward social mobility. Third, *ressentiment* is buttressed by the individual's conviction over an unjust destiny.

Following the above, *ressentiment* manifests itself as 'transvaluation'. Since the resentful person does not possess the moral virtues and the psychological abilities (e.g., faith, high self-esteem, sublimation mechanisms) nor the social resources to manage the pressure her/his inferior social position exerts on her/him (Scheler, 1961: 52), she/he proceeds to a chronic withdrawal to herself, thus avoiding to act out the revengeful attitude. At first this person admires the wealthy, the handsome, the aristocrat, the educated, the famous, and so on. But since this person cannot become like them or compete with them, a silent hostility and a repressed vindictiveness for something that was unrightfully taken away from her/him are instilled. So, this person starts slowly to undervalue what he/she once admired. In psychoanalytic terms, this is a reaction formation, a defence mechanism against pressures.

Morally, the resentful person is not the rational but impotent actor who reacts according to the logic of the 'sour grapes' seething with bitterness. *Ressentiment* has nothing to do with cynicism either; it is not as if the resentful man knows and recognises the values but acts as if he didn't. But nor is the hypocrite a model for the 'resentful man', since the latter does not pretend to reverse the values (Scheler, 1961: 77). What Scheler means by resentful 'transvaluation' is literally a substitution: The old values stay in the unseen back stage of the psyche, while the resentful man operates within another level of values. The positive values are still felt in an obscured way, but they are overcast by the false ones, a process called by Scheler (1961: 59–60) 'value blindness' or 'value delusion' which renders the person normatively mutated. Psychoanalytically, this results from a 'splitting' due to an intense narcissistic trauma, which displaces and/or negates the object of desire. Thus, *ressentiment* is a chronic and complex emotional disposition with unclear recipients. It is moulded by the endless rumination of repressed negative affective reactions, and it entails a reversal of values, so that the person can stand and handle her/his frustrations.

Political uses

Apparently, both resentment and *ressentiment* are unpleasant moral feelings triggered by a lived experience of injustice. The main difference is that the link between emotion, motivation and action (Fridja, 2004) is blocked or ruptured in *ressentiment*. This, plus transvaluation, are two things many commentators tend to overlook when using either concepts interchangeably. Of course, it is highly probable for *ressentiment* to shift into resentment when structural

transformations facilitate the link between motivation and action. There are, however, scholars who acknowledge the conceptual difference. At a more general level, it is argued that in late modernity politics is the result of generalised *ressentiment* as the uncertainties of capitalism and the surveillance of the state create in the individuals a diffuse sense of powerlessness, the public expression of which is not positive and self-grounded praxis but a hasty and dependent reaction, which usually takes the form of 'identity politics' (Brown, 1995: 21–76; Connolly, 1991: 22–23, 207). In an even wider scope, Ferro (2010) connects *ressentiment* with religious wars, pogroms, revolutions and postcolonialism on the condition that structural changes make possible for the weak to valorise their impotent anger into the present.

Pierre-André Taguieff has paid considerable attention to *ressentiment* as a constituting element of populism and racism in contemporary European societies. The moralistic character of populism is fuelled by the sense of injustice created by the effects of global neoliberal policies (Taguieff, 2007: 75). This theme is taken up as well by Betz (2002) who, nonetheless, oscillates between a nietzschean and a non-nietzschean conception. Yet, it is not *ressentiment* itself that leads to populist and ethno-populist mobilisations; rather, it contributes significantly to the incubation of populism. As soon as populist movements and parties emerge and occupy sound positions in the public realm, *ressentiment* has already been transformed into resentment, namely moral indignation. That is, the victimised powerless shift into angry activists.

Political cynicism: The *as if* politics

Contemporary political systems are facing pertinent legitimacy crises expressed in decreasing electoral turnout and volatile voting behaviour, negativism and dissatisfaction with politics and political personnel, political apathy, civil disobedience, decreasing civic engagement or even *incivisme* (Dalton, 1988: 225–244; Gibbins, 1990; Pharr et al., 2000).

Addressing the public's cynicism is regarded as one of the cardinal objectives of today's electoral politics. Usually, political cynicism is understood as disbelief in the sincerity, honesty or goodness of political authorities, political groups, political institutions or even the entire political system (Listhaug, 1995; Milbrath and Goel, 1977). According to Miller (1974: 952), political cynicism refers to the degree of negative affect towards the government and is a statement of the belief that the government is not producing outputs in accord with individual expectations. Also, it is conceived as a lack of civic duty, that is the obligation and responsibility to engage in public affairs (Woshinsky, 1995: 118). For Cappella and Jamieson (1997: 19, 141–142, 166), the germ of political cynicism is the absence of trust independently of evidence pro or con. In political life, the cynic, sealed within her/his own self-reinforcing assumptions,

begins with mistrust and must be persuaded to the opposite view. As a kind of judgement, they define political cynicism as distrust.

More than distrust

Political cynicism cannot be analysed properly when detached from the Greek cynical tradition, as well as from the wider context of contemporary cynicism which is actually a cultural condition of late modernity. Cynicism in general is a phenomenon to be found in more than a few stages of Western civilisation (Dudley, 1937). The contemporary cynical stance is not an eccentric choice of the few, as it was in the times of Diogenes; rather, it tends to become the backbone of a new type of social character (Sloterdijk, 1988: 4). In late modernity, individuals lose a steadfast rational and – what is more – a moral canon guiding their judgement (Bauman, 1993: 9–10). The so-called grand narratives have lost their credibility bringing on de-legitimation and radical suspicion towards pre-established rules (Lyotard, 1984: 37, 81; Rosenau, 1992: 133–137; Žižek, 1989: 7, 28–30). In the absence of stable orientations (Baudrillard, 1983), the moral situation of postmodernity is comprised in the standpoint that ‘yesterday’s idealists have become pragmatic’ (Bauman, 1993: 2) and that ‘liars call liars liars’ (Sloterdijk, 1988: xxvii). The lack of a universal moral code renders our era as ‘post-deontic’ and ‘post-ideological’ (Lipovetsky, 1992).

The post-ideological state of mind in contemporary societies lays exactly in that; despite all the distrust towards ideologies and ‘great narratives’, people continue to act *as if* they believed them. Even though one is aware of the illusionary nature of ideology, one behaves in everyday life as if one had never gotten rid of it. In this sense, at best, one is left with a *cynical disillusionment*. At worst, this state of mind leads to decisionism, to floating responsibility and to a fortification of the blasé feeling; furthermore, it is conducive to negativism, narcissistic frustrations and light commitment to principles (Bauman, 1993: 21ff; Lash, 1979: 47–48, 91–92). But why is that so?

Late modernity is replete of insecurities, frustrations and demystifications. In such a milieu, one is compelled to think and feel that social reality exists, not in the name, or for the sake, of moral principles but simply because this is the way things are; and yet one cannot but behave as if these principles were really operative. This *as if* attitude is perhaps one of the last resorts for the search of meaning in everyday life. For Giddens (1990: 136), cynicism is a mode of dampening the emotional impact of anxieties through either a humorous or a world-weary response to them. Even if traditional ideologies have not vanished, they are mediated by contemporary cynicism as an *emotional climate*. Hence, cynicism, and political cynicism for that matter, is something more than simple distrust or mistrust; it consists of a number of interwoven negative emotions and cognitions such as melancholy, pessimism, latent desperation, irony, self-pity, hopelessness, scepticism, sarcasm, guffaw, mocking, cheering,

aloofness, distrust, mistrust, calculating behaviour, misanthropism, blasé relativism, bad faith, fatalism, nihilism, discontent, indignation, *ressentiment*, resignation, amoralism and powerlessness. It is actually a cluster concept and a complex political emotion.

Yet, the cynical stance is 'insufficiently contemptuous' as it accepts the account of the world conveyed by various ideologies, while rejecting it (Bewes, 1997: 166, 171, 199). Derived from the bureaucratisation and the technologisation, cynicism makes things worse than they are as it perpetuates the current condition, leaving the individuals with no hope (Stivers, 1994: 13, 90, 180). The common feature of cynicism and idealism is that both accept reality as it is; the cynic masquerades as a realist, and the idealist pretends to be hopeful. Thus, cynicism becomes a form of legitimacy through disbelief (Goldfarb, 1991: 1).

A uniform style?

For all its complexity, (political) cynicism is not uniform. Different positions in societal hierarchy may lead to different experiences of political cynicism. Although cynicism is shared by the haves and the have-nots, there exist distinct economic foundations of cynicism (Goldfarb, 1991: 14). As mocking and amoralistic as it may be in the first place, cynicism of the elites is quite different from the cynicism of the powerless. The top-down cynicism of the powerful is a disregard for conventions and ideals to further accumulate power (Goldfarb, 1991: 16). Democratic principles become ostensible and are observed for the sake of appearances as 'the cynical master lifts the mask, smiles at his weak adversary, and suppresses him' (Sloterdijk, 1988: 111). The phrase 'Labour is liberating', inscribed above the entrance to the concentration camp at Auschwitz is one of the most striking examples of this kind of mocking cynicism. Perhaps, Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor in *Karamazov Brothers* is the best example of the top-down cynicism, a cool facilitator of power.

On the other hand, the bottom-up cynicism of the underclass represents a disillusioned miserable fate, a resentful stance towards conspicuous consumption and a resignation from a political order that the powerless feel they cannot influence. Their ironic detachment and apathetic cynicism is more or less a defensive mechanism, a strategic resistance in the form of indifference and refuge, a way to maintain distance from a remote and immoral social and political order (Dekker, 2005; Rosenau, 1992: 141). Hence, the powerless cynics may gain an appearance of control of something they cannot influence in the first place (Eliasoph, 1990: 473).

The top-down and bottom-up political cynicism roughly corresponds to the notorious distinction between 'cynicism' and 'kynicism' forwarded by Sloterdijk (1988: 217ff): The first is the mocking and repressing cynicism of the rulers and the ruling culture; the second is the provocative, resisting and self-fulfilling polemic of the servants. As he puts it, 'kynicism and cynicism

are constants in our history, typical forms of a polemical consciousness “from below” and “from above” (1988: 218). Alongside this distinction, it might be possible that political cynicism is not detrimental to democratic politics altogether. As I argued elsewhere (Demertzis, 2013), for all pessimism, sarcasm, guffaw, irony and suspiciousness, a combination of healthy scepticism and distrust makes cynical citizens open to innovation and change without driving them to radical relativism and to the nihilistic belief of ‘anything goes’. Cynical individuals who convey these attributes still defend their citizenship and keep an eye to public affairs; they doubt rather than deny politics. In this respect, one could call upon a ‘constructive’ sort of political cynicism.

On the other side, however, the cynical individuals swamped in bad faith and disdain find every political argument pointless, they lack reflexivity and exhibit an almost paranoid distrust to political personnel and decision-making processes (Krouwel and Abts, 2005). At their best, they are Nietzscheans and Karlschmitteans: The will to power and the aesthetisation of the Political are all they think of public life (Harvey, 1989: 117, 209–210; Rosenau, 1992: 143). At their worst, they are bearers of *ressentiment*: withdrawn, inactive and alienated individuals, no discussants, know-nothings, whose political mentality is replete with negativism. Those who follow this kind of cynicism do not just deny politics, they disavow it. Hence, this may be designated as ‘destructive political cynicism’ incompatible with democracy.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we discussed political emotions away from colloquial uses. A crucial distinction was made between salient or proper political emotions and politically relevant emotions, precisely because in late modern societies the boundaries between the political field and the other fields of social and private activities are porous. We defined political emotions proper as *lasting affective predispositions supported reciprocally by the political and social norms of a given society, playing a key role in the constitution of its political culture and the authoritative allocation of resources*. This genus and difference intentional (or connotative) theoretical definition was supported by the brief analysis of two important political emotions in contemporary western societies: resentment and political cynicism. We noted that these emotions are systematically activated in capitalist countries currently facing financial crisis as well as in less-developed societies, especially during post-conflict periods. In addition, *ressentiment* and resentment flourish in Arab and Muslim countries directed both at the West and the indigenous elites, contributing thus to the so-called Arab Spring and Islamic radicalism.

It is my conviction that adequately analysing political emotions demands the interplay of political psychology and political sociology of emotions

approaches, to say the least. Among others, an interesting interdisciplinary area of research would be the link between political emotion, motivation and political action. Another one would be the interconnection between political ideas, interest and political emotions, something that actually touches upon the triple of thought, will and affect, an ever-lasting feature of the human condition that goes back to Plato.

Notes

1. Hume (1969/1739: 462) was convinced that since reason alone can never give rise to volition and motivation, it is and ought only to be the slave of the passions.
2. The Google search gives only 18,900 results for 'political emotions' and just 8,470 for 'political emotion' (accessed on 14 January 2013).
3. Theoretical definitions are produced through some definitional techniques that lead to different typologies: Extensional or denotative theoretical definitions assign meaning to a term by indicating the members of the class that the definiendum denotes. Extensional theoretical definitions, then, are subgrouped in demonstrative (or ostensive), enumerative and definitions by subclass. Intentional or connotative theoretical definitions assign meaning to a term by indicating the qualities or attributes the word connotes. These definitions are broken down in synonymous, etymological, operational and definitions by genus and difference (Hurley, 2007: 100ff; Sartori, 1984: 28–35).

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14

Group-Focused Enmity: Prevalence, Correlations and Causes of Prejudices in Europe

Beate Küpper and Andreas Zick

The present chapter builds upon European and North American traditions in the study of racism, ethnocentrism and prejudice. In the tradition of studies in prejudice, Social Identity, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Authoritarianism, the chapter profiles a new concept of antagonism towards out-groups, a *syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity* (GFE; Heitmeyer, 2002; Zick et al., 2008, 2011). We will examine patterns of prejudice in Europe, discussing the concept and then present an empirical test of the interrelatedness of different types of prejudice. We report on the prevalence of different types of prejudice and test a range of factors commonly cited to explain the devaluation of out-groups. Our data on prejudice towards immigrants, Jews, Muslims, ethnic minorities, women, homosexual and homeless people as well as people with disabilities was collected in a cross-cultural European survey conducted in 2008 in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal. This approach offers a new understanding of the facets and roots of prejudices in Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The European context is particularly relevant and interesting for a test of cross-cultural similarities and differences in GFE as different nations share a common history and strive to agree on democratic values and political action, but differ in their cultural heritage and national politics. If we can demonstrate

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a syndrome of GFE in the diverse European context, it seems likely that it might be found in other cultural contexts too.

European history has been strongly shaped by racism and fascism, which stopped the growth of democratic cultures for decades in some countries. In the Amsterdam Declaration of 1997 the European Union (EU) agreed to take joint action against prejudice and discrimination: 'the Council [...] may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation'. Nevertheless, as documented regularly by the *European Anti-discrimination Law Review*, European countries vary greatly in their understanding of the importance of combating prejudices, in their political responses and national laws and in their implementation and realisation of European norms of equality (see also Chopin and Gounari, 2009). The devaluation of multiple groups still seems to be present in all countries, as indicated by the high rates of everyday discrimination and exclusion reported by members of target groups (European Commission, 2008). Moreover, right-wing extremist and populist parties have established roots in certain communities, entered national and regional parliaments (Harrison and Bruter, 2011) and won votes with hate speech against immigrants, Jews, Muslims, Roma and/or homosexuals (Mendelberg, 2001). Hate crimes against these target groups are regularly reported (Gauci, 2009).

A syndrome of group-focused enmity

Psychology defines prejudices as negative evaluations of groups, or of individuals as members of out-groups. They may be expressed openly and directly, for example through negative remarks and stereotypes, or subtly, for instance denying sympathy for an out-group or overstressing intergroup differences (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995). When social norms suppress the overt expression of prejudice, it can also appear in symbolic (Kinder and Sears, 1981), modern (McConahay, 1986) or aversive (Gaertner and Dovidio, 1977) forms, for example, as rejection of affirmative action or stressing the equality of all while ignoring structural disadvantages. Finally, prejudice towards out-groups helps to legitimise discrimination (and even violence) that serves to maintain or exacerbate social inequalities, as postulated by Social Dominance Theory (SDT; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999).

Even though different types of prejudice towards particular target groups have their own specific history and special connotations, they nevertheless seem to be interrelated. This was already noted by Gordon Allport in 1954: 'One of the facts of which we are most certain is that people who reject one out-group will tend to reject other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any out-group' (1954: 68). Numerous studies support Allport's observation and show that prejudices towards different

target groups correlate (e.g. Kogan, 1961; Stangor et al., 1991; Weinberger and Millham, 1979). However, for a long time, prejudices towards different groups have been discussed and analysed separately without much exchange of theoretical approaches and empirical findings. While other authors have advanced the idea of generalised prejudice connecting prejudices towards different specific target groups (Bäckström and Björklund, 2007; Bierly, 1985; Bratt, 2005; Ekehammar et al., 2004; Guimond et al., 2003), GFE is the first elaborated theory to precisely formulate a concept of an interrelated syndrome of prejudices sharing a common kernel.

Going one step beyond the work of Allport and others, Heitmeyer proposed that different types of prejudice are joined within a *syndrome of GFE* (2002; Zick et al., 2010). Zick and colleagues (2008) refined this hypothesis with the proposal that different expressions of prejudice are connected in a stable structure (while levels vary across time, cultures and individuals) that shares a common core of a generalised ideology of inequality that leads to devaluation of specific target groups. Extending the findings of SDT, we expect the syndrome of GFE to exhibit a similar pattern and dynamic across cultures and historical periods, in the sense that particular social groups will recur as targets of prejudice. However, the levels of inequality experienced by specific groups and the specific legitimating arguments are expected to vary (the latter may include economic incompetence, inferior civilisation or morality, restricted intellectual abilities or abnormal sexual orientations or religious practices).

While in some cultures and eras devaluation adopts subtle forms such as simple antipathy, it also has the potential to swell to severe discrimination or even violent action against out-groups. Anti-Semitism is the most horrendous example of such a dynamic in European history. Times of economic and/or social crisis seem to play a crucial role here (Hovland and Sears, 1940; LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Olzak, 1992; Sherif, 1966). However, even though many studies point to negative economic circumstances as an explanation for intergroup conflicts, it is by no means clear if prejudice and violence towards out-groups increase at the peak of economic crises, during times of stagnation or when times slowly become better but fail to meet expectations (Chandra and Foster, 2005; Grofman and Muller, 1973). Recent findings from the German GFE survey suggest that the feeling of threat engendered by economic crisis predicts prejudice towards immigrants better than the actual financial circumstances of the individual (Küpper and Zick, 2011). It appears that throughout history populist actors have been able to pick up subtle animosities towards out-groups and connect them to economic and/or social crises.

The German project on GFE set out to test the theory empirically with a ten-year representative national survey and panel study (2002–2011). Zick and colleagues (2008) found strong correlations between several types of prejudice (ethnic racism, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes,

established/newcomer precedence, anti-Semitism, sexism, homophobia and devaluation of homeless persons) that share a common core (second-order factor) whose linked structure is highly stable (over two years). An ideology of inequality, operationalised by SDO (general support of group-based hierarchies; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), strongly predicted the common factor of the eight types of prejudice examined. It appears that other types of prejudice may also fit into such a syndrome. Recently, we also found the devaluation of Roma, asylum-seekers and the long-term unemployed to be part of a GFE syndrome (Zick et al., 2012). Authoritarianism and perceived relative deprivation (compared to immigrants) predict several types of prejudice statistically via the common core, while discrimination towards specific out-groups (immigrants and Muslims) is predicted not only by anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes but also by the general core of GFE.

These findings imply that intervention and prevention need to address prejudices towards different groups jointly with a focus on multiple types of prejudice and also a general ideology of inequality, rather than (as is presently generally the case) focusing on single groups. It is well known from social psychology that attitudes can be transformed into behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) and that this is more likely when social norms support the individual's opinion; when important others such as peers, family, friends, teachers and colleges hold similar attitudes; and when opportunities present themselves for translating such attitudes into action. This highlights the importance of the overall climate within society permitting diversity and equality for different social groups.

Major target groups of prejudice in Europe

Immigrants. About two million people from all over the world migrate into the EU each year. Immigration varies with respect to rate, origin, legal status and citizenship. The proportion of foreign-born residents is highest in Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (9–12 per cent), and lowest in Poland (2 per cent) (Muenz, 2006). Prejudice towards immigrants seems to build in particular on economical competition.

Other ethnic groups. Unlike cultural minorities, ethnic minorities (of African or Asian ethnicity) are comparably small in number in Europe, but disproportionately visible; many came originally as labour migrants from former colonies, while recent arrivals have tended to be political asylum-seekers. With overt references to 'racial' differences between groups officially taboo in many European countries, racist prejudice often focuses on cultural differences (Vala et al., 2009). Alongside racism towards individuals of non-European ethnicity, discrimination against Roma has gained serious attention in Europe in recent years, in particular in connection with migration from eastern to western

Europe. Even though Roma have lived in many European countries for centuries, they are generally perceived as ethnic strangers and experience harsh racist prejudice.

Jews. Traditional anti-Semitism is a racist ideology that has given rise to violence against Jews since medieval times (Voigtlaender and Voth, 2012; Zick, 2010). Even though modern anti-Semitism differs superficially, it is still based on – and often still contains – old-fashioned political, secular, religious and biological stereotypes serving to legitimise negative attitudes towards Jews (Zick and Küpper, 2005). Less than 1 per cent of the European population is Jewish (DellaPergola, 2010).

Muslims. Anti-Muslim attitudes became particularly apparent after 9/11. Protests against mosque-building plans and harsh criticism of Islamic rituals and traditions such as the headscarf and circumcision clearly reflect a widespread idea that Muslims, like Jews, are not a natural, integral part of European societies. Muslim populations in the surveyed countries range from less than 1 per cent in Hungary, Poland and Portugal to 10 per cent in France (Kettani, 2010).

Women. Although the EU claims gender equality as one of its core values and assigns it high priority, the Global Gender Gap Report finds differences in gender equality between European countries, as measured by indicators of economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, political participation and health and survival (Hausmann et al., 2012). Sexist arguments justifying gender inequalities point to real or imagined biological gender differences associated with different characteristics and abilities that explicitly or implicitly present inequalities as a ‘natural state of affairs’.

Gay and lesbian persons. The devaluation, discrimination and persecution of same-sex love has a long and sad history in Europe (Crompton, 2003). Even today, most European countries are still far from realising full equality of marriage, adoption, tax and inheritance rights for gays and lesbians, and elected members of certain national parliaments can be found disseminating blatant hate speech. Negative attitudes towards gays and lesbians, commonly labelled as homophobia, include charges of immorality and the denial of equal rights.

People with disabilities. All over Europe disabled people face discrimination and stereotyping. In a Europe-wide study 8 per cent of respondents with a chronic physical or mental problem reported experiencing discrimination on grounds of disability during the year preceding the survey (European Commission, 2008).

Homeless people. The European Commission identifies people lacking a permanent, secure, reliable home as one of the most excluded and vulnerable groups (2012). There is no comparable standard definition or European dataset for homelessness, but national reports suggest a serious increase, as well as a changing profile of the homeless in the wake of the financial crisis. Recent reports

estimate 133,000 people to be homeless in France and 50,000–60,000 in Italy, while Poland registered 40,000 people using shelters in winter (European Commission, 2012). Alongside negative stereotypes, negative sentiments towards homeless persons seem to circle around blaming those affected for their plight.

Group-focused enmity in Europe – empirical findings

Methods

For the study, we selected eight European countries, including old and new EU member states, representing a wide range of geography, politics, migration history, composition, size and legal status of ethnic/cultural minorities, and socio-economic wealth and development (e.g. per capita GDP in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) in 2008 ranged from 56 in Poland to 134 in the Netherlands; the mean value for the 27 EU member states at this time was set at 100) EU-27 = 100); for details, see Zick et al., 2011, table 3).

Standardised telephone interviews. To measure the prevalence of prejudice in Europe we conducted standardised telephone interviews with a representative adult sample ($n = 1,000$ persons aged 16 and older) in each country. Computer-assisted telephone interviewing employing the same method was used in every country. Altogether, we can report findings on a total of $n = 8,026$ European citizens representing a population of about 270 million aged 16 and older. The average age of respondents was 47 years (varying from 44 in Poland to 48 in Germany); the sample included 52 per cent women (varying from 51 per cent in the Netherlands to 55 per cent in Hungary). Migrants made up 15 per cent of the sample (defined as born abroad or at least one parent or grandparent born abroad; ranging from 32 per cent in France to 3 per cent in Italy). Refusal rates vary from 38 per cent in Hungary to 78 per cent in Poland. Response rates cannot be compared across countries due to national differences in recording and categorisation of failed calls.

Measures. The questionnaire covered prejudice towards the most prominent target groups of discrimination, as well as several constructs that could potentially help predict the individual level of GFE. Participants were asked to state their agreement or disagreement with each statement using a four-point response scale ranging from 1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *somewhat disagree*, 3 = *somewhat agree* to 4 = *strongly agree*. Each type of prejudice was measured by at least two items summarised in scales ranging from 1 to 4, with additional questions probing anti-Semitism, anti-immigrant attitudes and anti-Muslim attitudes (for a complete list of items and frequencies, see Zick et al., 2011).

To measure anti-immigrant attitudes we chose one item proposing that ‘there are too many immigrants’ in the country and one focusing on the

presumed strain that immigrants place on the economy. Ethnic racism was measured in terms of perceived natural differences between black and white people and the rejection of interethnic marriages; an additional item measured antipathy towards Roma. Anti-Semitism was addressed in its traditional form including anti-Jewish conspiracy myths, and in the modern version that turns victims into perpetrators by arguing that Jews instrumentalise the Holocaust for their own benefit. In addition, we considered anti-Semitism expressed through criticism of Israel's policies towards the Palestinians. Anti-Muslim attitudes were also measured by responses to statements that 'there are too many Muslims' in the country, that Muslims make unjustified demands and that Islam is intolerant, with additional items exploring perceived deficits in Muslim attitudes to women. We measured sexism as support of traditional gender roles and sexual prejudice by the rejection of two positively worded items calling for equal rights for homosexuals. The pre-test found that open and direct prejudices towards disabled people are difficult to measure. We therefore chose measures analogous to those used for modern ethnic racism, involving rejection of specific efforts to assist disabled people and of their demands for full participation (McConahay, 1986). Unfortunately, length restrictions precluded differentiating between attitudes towards physical and psychiatric disabilities. This might be one reason for the measurement problems mentioned above. Finally, the devaluation of homeless people was measured with two items: an attribution of blame to homeless people themselves and an explicit request to exclude them from public space.

The items were pre-tested in all countries and scale qualities were confirmed by explorative and confirmatory factor analyses with multiple group comparisons. We tested each type of prejudice for measurement equivalence across all countries (for details, see Küpper et al., 2010). Cross-cultural comparability was confirmed for six prejudices (by at least partial scalar invariance of the construct): anti-Semitism, anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Muslim attitudes, ethnic/racial racism, sexism and sexual prejudice. In other words, respondents in different countries interpret the meaning of most types of prejudice in a similar way regardless of the prevalence of the different groups in their country or other contextual differences. The measures of devaluation of homeless and disabled people failed in the equivalence test in the full survey, and therefore we did not summarise the items to scale.

When social norms hinder 'blatant' expression of negative sentiments towards out-groups, prejudices can be communicated subtly, for example by denial of positive emotions such as sympathy (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995). We therefore asked respondents to also state how often they felt sympathy towards certain groups on a four-point scale ranging from 'often' to 'never' (this question was put to a randomly selected half of each sample).

Table 14.1 Mean prejudice values and differences between European countries

	Anti-immigrant attitudes	Racism	Anti-Semitism	Anti-Muslim attitudes	Sexism	Sexual prejudice
United Kingdom (UK)	2.48 ^{bc}	1.76 ^c	1.95 ^a	2.54 ^{ab}	2.02 ^b	2.33 ^b
Germany (D)	2.37 ^b	1.83 ^c	2.26 ^c	2.65 ^{bc}	2.11 ^{bc}	2.23 ^{bc}
France (F)	2.14 ^a	1.85 ^c	2.18 ^{bc}	2.52 ^a	2.13 ^{bc}	2.39 ^c
The Netherlands (NL)	2.20 ^a	1.61 ^b	1.89 ^a	2.48 ^a	1.86 ^a	1.75 ^a
Italy (I)	2.42 ^{bc}	1.48 ^a	2.15 ^b	2.69 ^c	2.21 ^c	2.72 ^d
Portugal (PT)	2.40 ^{bc}	2.18 ^d	2.46 ^d	2.44 ^a	2.43 ^d	2.66 ^d
Poland (PL)	2.44 ^{bc}	2.10 ^d	2.68 ^e	2.69 ^c	2.77 ^e	3.31 ^f
Hungary (HU)	2.68 ^d	2.20 ^d	2.72 ^e	2.69 ^c	2.86 ^e	3.07 ^e
Country	(7, 7518)	(7, 7417)	(7, 7233)	(7, 6932)	(7, 7504)	(7, 7400)
difference: df, F	51.00	116.56	204.07	14.97	178.56	251.27

Note: Mean values for each type of prejudice; higher values indicate more prevalent prejudice (each type of prejudice was measured by two or three items summarised to a mean scale, ranging from 1 = low to 4 = high). Mean values for each type of prejudice were compared between countries (within each column): the superscripted letters a to h indicate significant differences between countries as identified by post-hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD); countries with the same letter do not differ significantly (e.g. the United Kingdom and Germany do not differ significantly in the level of anti-immigrant attitudes, but the level in both countries is higher than in France and the Netherlands).

Prevalence of prejudices in Europe

For cross-cultural comparisons we selected the six prejudices that demonstrated cross-cultural equivalence. With respect to devaluation of homeless and disabled people, we restrict reporting on frequencies of agreement to single items. Scale means and the statistical test of country differences are presented in Table 14.1.

Anti-immigrant attitudes. The proportion of respondents who somewhat or fully agreed that 'there are too many immigrants' in their country ranged between 27 per cent in Poland and 62 per cent in the United Kingdom and Italy. About one fifth of respondents in Portugal and Poland, but nearly half in the United Kingdom and Hungary, agreed that they 'sometimes feel like a stranger' in their own country because of the number of immigrants. Between 25 per cent of respondents in the Netherlands and over 70 per cent in Poland and Hungary agreed with giving the autochthonous population preference over immigrants in the job market if work was scarce. At the same time, a majority in every country agreed that 'Immigrants enrich our culture.' In general, we observe relatively small but significant differences between countries, with the lowest levels of anti-immigrant attitudes in France and the Netherlands; medium levels in Germany, Portugal and Italy; somewhat higher levels in Poland and the United Kingdom; and the highest in Hungary.

Ethnic racism. We measured ethnic racism in terms of claims of 'natural' differences between ethnic groups that are used to assign more or less 'value'. In all the countries except Italy, 30–40 per cent of respondents somewhat or fully agreed that 'There is a natural hierarchy between black and white people'; in Italy the figure was 19 per cent. In all the countries many people oppose inter-ethnic marriage, ranging from 5 per cent in the Netherlands to 30 per cent in Hungary. We found significant national differences, with the lowest values for ethnic racism in Italy, followed in ascending order by the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Poland, and the highest in Portugal and Hungary (see Table 14.1).

Anti-Semitism. Traditional forms of anti-Semitism are comparatively less frequent in western Europe, but are still encountered in central, southern and especially eastern Europe. For example, 6 per cent of Dutch and 14 per cent of British respondents agreed that 'Jews have too much influence in [country].' Between one in five and one in four agreed with that statement in Germany, Italy, Portugal and France, nearly half in Poland and 69 per cent in Hungary. A particularly insidious legitimisation of inferiority often used with respect to Jews is turning victims into perpetrators. This legitimisation of inferiority is often used with respect to Jews. Figures ranging from approximately one fifth of respondents in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to over two thirds in Hungary and Poland believed that: 'Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era.' When we combined four items measuring anti-Semitic attitudes to a scale, significant differences emerged between the countries (Table 14.1). The lowest rates of anti-Semitism are recorded in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, followed by Italy and France, a medium in Germany, a slightly higher level in Portugal and the highest levels again in Poland and Hungary. However, differences between the countries diminish when it comes to anti-Semitism communicated via criticism of Israel that needlessly employs anti-Semitic stereotypes, comparisons with the Nazis or descriptions of Israeli policies as 'typically Jewish'; 36–55 per cent in all countries except Italy agreed with the statement: 'Considering Israel's policy I can understand why people do not like Jews' (Italy: 25 per cent), and 38–63 per cent agreed with a wording using terms reminiscent of Nazi crimes: 'Israel is conducting a war of extermination against the Palestinians.'

Anti-Muslim attitudes. Europeans are fairly unanimous in their dislike of Muslims. About one third of respondents in France and Portugal and about half the sample in all the other countries in the survey agreed that 'there are too many Muslims' in their country, irrespective of the actual proportion. About half the respondents in all the countries agreed that 'Islam is a religion of intolerance.' Statistical analyses revealed only minor differences in absolute mean levels between countries, with the lowest values in Portugal and the Netherlands and slightly higher values in Germany, Italy, Hungary and Poland.

Sexism. The level of sexism varied strongly from country to country, with the lowest level in the Netherlands and the highest in Poland and Hungary. A majority in every country except the Netherlands – and nearly 90 per cent in Poland and Hungary – supported traditional gender roles and agreed that ‘Women should take their role as wives and mothers more seriously’ (the Netherlands 36 per cent). More than one in five respondents in Italy, Portugal, Poland and Hungary thought that for employment men should have priority over women in times of job scarcity, while only 12 per cent in the United Kingdom shared this opinion.

Sexual prejudice towards gay and lesbian people. The level of sexual prejudice varied quite remarkably between countries, with the lowest figures in the Netherlands, higher in Italy and Portugal and the highest again in Hungary and Poland. Except in the Netherlands, more than one third of respondents in western Europe and more than two thirds in eastern Europe rejected equality for homosexuals, disagreeing with statements such as ‘There is nothing immoral about homosexuality’ and ‘It is a good thing to allow marriages between two men or two women.’

Devaluation of people with disabilities. Remarkable national differences appear in the results for single items indicating devaluation of disabled people. In most countries, roughly one in ten agreed that ‘disabled people are too demanding’, but the figure was 18 per cent in Poland and 23 per cent in Portugal. Even though overwhelming majorities in all countries also agreed that ‘not enough effort is put into supporting disabled people’ in their country, about one third of respondents in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands disagreed. Even though these countries are wealthy compared to many other European countries, the differences in social participation between people with and without disabilities (measured by major indicators such as unemployment rate, access to public transport) are still substantial (Grammoneos, 2011) and there is no obvious relationship between measured attitudinal support for disabled people and the participation gap between disabled and non-disabled people in a given country.

Prejudice towards homeless people. A total of 65 per cent of respondents in Poland and one quarter to one third in the other countries agreed that ‘the homeless quite like to live on the street’. A similar percentage, ranging from 23 per cent in France to 58 per cent in Italy, wanted to exclude homeless people from the public sphere, agreeing that ‘the homeless should be removed from pedestrian zones’.

Subtle prejudices. We also measured the level of sympathy towards a range of target groups. As the wordings remain the same, this measure enables us to compare antipathy towards various groups across countries. As Figure 14.1 shows, the Roma are the least liked group across Europe.




Figure 14.1 Denial of sympathy towards out-groups

Note: Mean values (scaling 1–4). Higher mean values indicate less sympathy; that is, greater subtle prejudice.

Only 43 per cent of respondents indicated that they sometimes or often felt sympathy for Roma (not measured in the Netherlands). Respondents did not express much liking for Muslims (58 per cent) and Jews (59 per cent). The most liked group was immigrants in general (77 per cent), followed by black people (70 per cent; not measured in Poland and the Netherlands) and a prominent country-specific group of immigrants (66 per cent; we selected one prominent group in each country; Asians in the United Kingdom, Turks in Germany, North Africans in France). Looking in more detail at country differences, respondents in Hungary and Poland felt significantly less sympathy for immigrants, Muslims, black people and Jews (the latter dislike being shared by Italians). Roma were the most disliked group in western Europe (where few Roma live), while Muslims were the most disliked group in eastern Europe (where hardly any Muslims live).

Empirical evidence for a syndrome of group-focused enmity

We argue that the reported prejudices constitute a syndrome of GFE. As Table 14.2 shows, there are significant correlations between the six types of prejudice that were internationally comparable across the eight countries

Table 14.2 Relationships between the six prejudice dimensions in Europe

	Racism	Anti-Semitism	Anti-Muslim attitudes	Sexism	Sexual prejudice
Anti-immigrant attitudes	.35 (.23-.42)	.41 (.24-.49)	.59 (.29-.71)	.35 (.25-.41)	.30 (.16-.36)
Racism		.32 (.22-.35)	.28 (.12-.39)	.34 (.13-.41)	.25 (.12-.42)
Anti-Semitism			.37 (.22-.46)	.37 (.11-.35)	.29 (.09-.32)
Anti-Muslim attitudes				.29 (.15-.40)	.27 (.03;ns-.37)
Sexism					.42 (.19-.49)

Note: All correlations are significant with at least $p < .05$.

and within nearly all individual countries. Across the eight surveyed European countries, correlations vary from modest to fairly strong ($r = .25$ to $.59$).

Anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim prejudices correlate most strongly ($r = .59$) in those countries in which a significant number of immigrants are Muslim (here, correlations range from $r = .55$ to $.71$). The correlation is somewhat lower in Portugal, Poland and Hungary, where there is less overlap of the two groups (here, correlations range from $r = .29$ to $.40$). There are also links between anti-immigrant attitudes and anti-Semitism ($r = .41$; ranging from $.34$ in Hungary to $.49$ in Germany, excepting Portugal with $.24$) and anti-immigrant attitudes and ethnic racism ($r = .35$; ranging from $.31$ in Hungary to $.42$ in the Netherlands; but $r = .23$ in France). The interconnectedness of these types of prejudice cannot be simply reduced to an overlapping of groups, as becomes even more clear if we examine the correlations between anti-immigrant prejudices and sexism ($r = .35$; ranges from $.25$ in Hungary to $.41$ in Poland) and between anti-immigrant prejudices and sexual prejudices ($r = .30$; ranges from $.20$ in Hungary and the Netherlands to $.36$ in the United Kingdom; excepting Portugal with $.16$). There are also noteworthy correlations across Europe between anti-Semitism and several other types of prejudice, such as anti-Muslim attitudes ($r = .37$). These are particularly evident in north-western European countries (variation from $.33$ in the Netherlands to $.46$ in France), but less so in Portugal, Poland and Hungary (variation from $.22$ to $.29$). Close connections also emerged between sexism and homophobia in all countries ($r = .42$; ranging from $.19$ in Poland to $.49$ in the United Kingdom).

The concept of a syndrome of GFE also assumes that the interrelated structure of prejudices is universal. Testing the underlying structure by principal




Figure 14.2 GFE in Europe

Note: Summarised GFE index (level of agreement with GFE by country; mean values; scaling 1–4). Country: $F(7, 7518) = 240.13, p < .001$; post-hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD): $NL < UK, F, D < D, I < PT < PL, HU$. The European mean (2.27) is calculated from data weighted for the population size of each country.

component factor analyses, we found that all the six types of prejudice load clearly on the same second-order factor (eigenvalue of 2.8, 46 per cent explained variance). We were also able to confirm the fit and comparability of the GFE syndrome in all countries using confirmatory factor analysis and multiple group comparison (model fit: CFI = .911; AIC = 4,444; RMSA = .023; pclose = 1; $\chi^2/df = 5.21$).

We combined all six comparable types of prejudice in a GFE index with adequate internal consistency (across all countries Cronbach's $\alpha = .76$; ranging from $\alpha = .62$ in Hungary to $\alpha = .79$ in the United Kingdom). Overall, GFE is lowest in the Netherlands and highest in Poland and Hungary. Although the other southern and western European countries hardly differed in their level of GFE, slightly higher levels emerged in Portugal (see Figure 14.2 for mean differences).

Explaining GFE

The GFE survey offers the possibility to predict prejudices empirically by multiple micro-, meso- and macro-social factors. On a micro level, we surveyed ideological orientations (collective political opinions) likely to explain prejudices: authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988), SDO (Duckitt and Sibley, 2006; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), anti-diversity beliefs (van Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007) and religiousness (Hall et al., 2010). Using the GFE Europe survey data, SDO, anti-diversity beliefs (Küpper et al., 2010) and religiousness (Küpper and Zick, 2010) have been shown to predict anti-immigrant attitudes and GFE. Following value theory (Schwartz, 1992) we also surveyed values of

universalism and security, expecting universalism to be negatively and security positively related to prejudice as suggested by Leong (2008).

At the meso-social level of intergroup relations, we surveyed in-group identification (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) and intergroup contact (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). In the GFE Europe survey we were able to confirm that infrequent contact with immigrants represents an important explanatory factor for out-group prejudice (Schmid et al., 2012). Given that several studies have found perceived intergroup threat to have a strong impact on prejudice (Riek et al., 2006; Stephan and Stephan, 2000), we also considered perceived group threats by immigrants. From a macro-level perspective we surveyed indicators of social capital (Putnam, 2000). Putnam proposes that a loss of ties to social networks leads to a loss of norms of reciprocity and inter-individual trust and can thus erode civil society and its democratic values, including tolerance and pluralism. Studies show that intergroup contact increases mutual trust and reduces negative out-group attitudes (Tam et al., 2009). While membership in organisations is also perceived as social capital, Mayer (2003) argues that only those of an inclusive type (that include members from diverse backgrounds) can be expected to promote pluralistic values (Mayer, 2003). The link between life satisfaction and prejudice seems less clear; focusing on sexism, one cross-cultural analysis found complex relationships dependent on overall gender equality (Napier et al., 2010). Finally, we surveyed predictors representing material resources. Many theories focus on the objectively observed or subjectively perceived absence, scarcity or unfair allocation of resources (LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Olzak, 1992), while other authors focus on relative deprivation based on social comparisons (Pettigrew et al., 2008). We also included household income, subjective assessments of the national economy and of the respondent's own financial situation, financial prospects, individual relative deprivation (comparison of their own financial situation with that of other autochthonous citizens) and fraternal relative deprivation (a comparison between the financial situation of autochthonous citizens and immigrants).

We included all predicting variables available in the survey in a single regression analysis, with a GFE index summarising all six types of prejudices with equivalent measures in all countries as dependent variable. All variables were entered in a single step using the data from all countries (non-weighted) and controlled for age, gender and education (see Table 14.3). Together they explained 64 per cent of the total variance across countries; with a few exceptions, most beta coefficients reached a significance of at least 5 per cent. The strongest predictor was perceived threat by immigrants ($\beta = .26$), followed by anti-diversity beliefs, SDO, religiousness, authoritarianism, age and income (β coefficients $\geq .1$ but $< .2$). Contact with immigrants, contact with neighbours, subjective personal financial situation, general trust, membership in organisations, universalism and security values, political orientation (left to

Table 14.3 Regression analysis on GFE across all countries

Predicting variable	Beta coefficient
Religiousness	.13***
Intergroup threat by immigrants	.26***
Authoritarianism	.11***
Social dominance orientation	.15***
Anti-diversity beliefs	.17***
Security value	.05***
Universalism value	-.09***
Political orientation	.05***
General trust	-.07***
European identity	.01
National identity	.04*
Regional identity	-.00
Long-term partner	.01
Membership of organisations (number)	-.09***
Neighbourhood contacts	-.06***
Contact with immigrants	-.07***
Satisfaction with life	.04*
Income (household income per household member)	-.10***
Economic situation in [country]	.02
Personal financial situation	.06***
Personal financial situation in future	.00
Individual relative deprivation (personal financial situation compared to most other [country natives])	.03
Fraternal relative deprivation (economic situation of non-immigrants compared to immigrants)	.05**
Age	.11***
Gender	-.04***
Education	-.08***

Note: Beta coefficients controlled for age, education and gender (male = 1, female = 2). Explained variance (without controlled variables) across countries $R^2 = .64$; UK .67; D .65; F .65; NL .66; I .72; PT .63; PL .38; HU .37.

right self-assignment), fraternal relative deprivation and education were also of some importance (beta coefficients $\geq .05$ but $< .1$). Some other variables were significant but had weak predictive power (national identity, satisfaction with life and gender); six variables did not reach the level of significance (regional and European identity, assessment of the country's economic situation, individual's financial outlook, individual relative deprivation and having a long-term partner). Next, the analysis was conducted for each country separately. Overall, the percentage of explained variance was similar in all countries (lowest in Poland and Hungary). Perceived threat by immigrants turned out to be the most important predicting factor for GFE in all countries, alongside authoritarianism and anti-diversity beliefs. Interestingly, SDO was also important in

most countries, but had only a very weak impact in Italy and Poland, while intergroup contact with immigrants was a predictor in the United Kingdom, Italy, Hungary and Portugal, but not in Germany. More religiousness was linked to more GFE in nearly all countries, but not in Germany.

The level of GFE across Europe is most strongly predicted by four factors that mirror general ideological beliefs: authoritarianism, SDO, anti-diversity beliefs and religiousness (the more religious, the more prejudiced). Nevertheless, the perception that immigrants threaten national and personal wealth and values is the most important factor, predicting not only anti-immigrant attitudes but also prejudice towards other groups. These patterns strongly support the concept of a syndrome of GFE. To some extent, GFE is also determined by further variables that mirror the individual's relationships to various groups, such as contact with immigrants and neighbours and trust in others. Level of income is also an objectively and subjectively relevant factor.

Conclusion

We conducted representative surveys in eight European countries to analyse the prevalence of prejudice, to investigate connections between different types of prejudice and to test the predictive power of possible explanatory factors. This cross-cultural comparison of equivalent measures of prejudice found the largest differences between countries with respect to racism, anti-Semitism, sexism and sexual prejudice, and smaller differences in anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes. Overall, GFE is particularly widespread in new EU member states and young democracies like Poland and Hungary. It is weaker in Portugal, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom and France and weakest in the Netherlands; these are countries where politics has promoted multiculturalism for a long time.

The eastern European countries did not become members of the EU until fairly recently, and democratic values of pluralism and tolerance may need more time and societal effort to become established and internalised. In their comparison of 11 European countries, Hello et al. (2002) found a weaker impact of education on anti-immigrant attitudes in young eastern European democracies than in 'interrupted democracies' such as Italy and Germany, with the strongest correlation in 'trained democracies' such as the United Kingdom and France. They suggest that in recent democracies important agents of socialisation such as school still do not implement and teach democratic values to the same extent as their counterparts in western Europe typically do.

Democratic values demand taking a non-racist position. While some authors argue that social norms of tolerance and non-racism have become widespread and suppress blatant prejudice (Gaertner and Dovidio, 1977; McConahay, 1986; Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995), the GFE Europe data indicates that such social

norms are shared significantly more widely in western European countries than in the young eastern European democracies. Significantly more Italians and French, and notably fewer Hungarians, indicated the personal importance of such social norms, as measured by two items in our survey: 'I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways towards black people because it is personally important to me'; and 'Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about black people is wrong' (both items were summarised to a scale measuring self-indicated non-racist norms; main impact of country: $F(7, 7965) = 156.11$, $p < .001$).

Contrary to this overall pattern, there were only modest differences in the level of anti-Muslim attitudes. Here, the widespread social norm of being non-racist apparently fails even in western European countries. In many European countries, right-wing populists adopt and foster anti-Muslim attitudes for their own purposes, for example campaigning against new mosques (Allievi, 2009). Even long-established democracies cannot simply rely on their traditions, but need to be constantly aware of intolerance towards new or rediscovered target groups.

Despite the striking national differences in the overall level of prejudice we found evidence for a syndrome of GFE in all countries, in the sense of strong correlations between different types of prejudices that can be attributed to a common core ideology of inequality. If such a syndrome of GFE occurs in European countries that differ in their history, politics and overall level of prejudice, it seems likely that it will also appear in other Western countries and possibly elsewhere. Several studies indicating strong correlations between different types of prejudice and their strong relation to SDO in other Western and non-Western countries support this hypothesis (Duckitt and Sibley, 2006; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999).

After considering a range of possible explanatory factors derived from a multidisciplinary perspective, individual ideological orientations, such as authoritarianism, SDO, anti-diversity attitudes and religiousness, and especially perceived intergroup threat – measured with respect to immigrants – turned out to be the most important predictors of GFE. However, the impact of several common predictors of GFE, such as SDO and religiousness, turned out to vary between countries.

From the perspective of political psychology, we believe that societies have to answer at least two critical questions about social groups. Is a given group and its members accepted as a part of society at all? And is a group addressed on an equal footing or placed in a lower social position? The answers define the location of each social group on the dimensions of inclusion (versus exclusion) and equality (versus hierarchical ranking). The answer to the first question may depend mainly on individuals' belief in diversity, the second on their SDO. A third question is: What is regarded as the appropriate way of dealing with

outsiders, with those who differ from 'normality' in norms and values? The answers to the latter question depend on the collective authoritarian attitudes socialised within society. Religious orientations of the majority also influence attitudes about where different social groups should be located on the continua of integration and equality. Perceived threat by identified out-groups mirrors the dominant and most centred groups' fears of losing their privileged status position. These political questions and their impact on the syndrome of GFE must be taken seriously, as the answers have severe consequences for those groups that are considered less worthy.

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15

Political Psychology of European Integration

Ian Manners

Writing over two decades ago, Stuart Hall (1991) first told the story of European identity as contradictory processes of marking symbolic boundaries and constructing symbolic frontiers between inside and outside, interior and exterior, belonging and otherness, which are central to any account of the political psychology of European integration. The study of European integration has come a long way in the intervening decades, but no systematic attempt has been made to weave the stories of European identity together with those of European integration using political psychology. Given that marking inside and outside, interior and exterior, belonging and otherness are both political and psychological processes, and this absence of engagement seems problematic.

Europe's external relations with its others has been central to the European story since its inception, and remains so. The story of European identity is often told as if it had no exterior. But this tells us more about how cultural identities are constructed – as 'imagined communities', through the marking of difference with others – than it does about the actual relations of unequal exchange and uneven development through which a common European identity was forged. Now that a new Europe is taking shape, the same contradictory process of marking symbolic boundaries and constructing symbolic frontiers between inside and outside, interior and exterior, belonging and otherness, is providing a silent accompaniment to the march to 1992.

(Hall, 1991: 18)

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This chapter takes a step towards addressing this absence of engagement by surveying what political psychology and European integration have to say to each other in the understanding of the European Union (EU). Political psychology is understood as the bidirectional interaction of political and psychological processes (Deutsch and Kinnvall, 2002: 17). European integration is understood as the economic, social and political processes of mutual accommodation and inclusion by European states and peoples. The chapter will draw on five strands of political psychology as part of this engagement – conventional psychology, social psychology, social construction, psychoanalysis and critical political psychology. Within each of these strands, a number of examples of scholarship at the interface of political psychology and European integration will be examined in order to understand the merits of engagement.

The chapter does not argue that there has not been any engagement between political psychology and European integration, as the examples will illustrate. But the chapter will argue that there has been no systematic attempt at identifying the merits of a more holistic engagement. The work of Müller-Peters, Laffan, Cram, Mitzen, Guisan, Kristeva, Todorov, Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking all help illustrate some of the work being done at the interface of political psychology and European integration. The first section of the chapter will look at conventional psychology and European integration with an emphasis on individual psychology. The second section turns to social psychology found in the work of Müller-Peters and others on the euro and economic psychology, Laffan on transnational identity, and Cram on banal Europeanism. The third section focuses on social construction with work of Mitzen on ontological security, as well as Guisan's hermeneutics. The fourth section goes into psychoanalysis with a particular emphasis on the work of Lacan on trauma, Kristeva on post-Lacanian psychology and Todorov on dialogicality. The fifth section draws the previous ones together through the work of Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking on the political psychology of globalisation found in Europe.

The chapter concludes with two sets of arguments and reflections on the engagement of political psychology and European integration for the understanding of the EU. Despite the examples discussed in this chapter, it is clear that there has been very little engagement between political psychology and European integration, to the detriment of both fields. The chapter argues that the study of the EU has much to benefit from political psychology in terms of theories and methods of European identity and integration, as the examples suggest. Second, the chapter also argues that political psychology can benefit from the insights of European integration by rethinking the processes that drive the marking of inside and outside, interior and exterior, belonging and otherness.

Conventional psychology

The past decade has seen a number of attempts to use conventional psychology to analyse questions of European integration. The term 'conventional' is used in two senses here – first, to reflect the presumed 'individualism of American psychology' (Bar-On, 2001: 334; see also Nesbitt-Larking, 2003: 247; Nesbitt-Larking and Kinnvall, 2012); second, to reflect the 'strong emphasis on psychological processes as determinants of political processes in American political psychology' (Deutsch and Kinnvall, 2002: 16). Hence conventional psychological approaches tend to read European integration from the perspective of individual psychology.

Three examples of individualistic psychology serve to illustrate this strand of conventional psychology. Kille and Scully's 2003 study of leadership at a distance focused on the personal characteristics of European Union Commission Presidents. It concluded that 'personal traits exhibited by executive heads are connected with important aspects of their behaviour' (Kille and Scully, 2003: 189). Hobolt's 2005 study of information effects and opinion formation in EU referendums drew on insights from the field of political psychology into how information affects the attitude-behaviour relation. Hobolt concludes that 'people with high levels of political awareness rely more on their EU attitudes when voting in European referendums' (Hobolt, 2005: 105). Schafer's 2013 study of European Commission officials' policy attitudes takes the political-psychological perspective that individual calculations of efficiency are mediated by ideological beliefs. Schafer concludes that 'Commission officials seek a Pareto-optimal distribution of EU authority' (Schafer, 2013: 3).

What these brief examples, and others like them, suggest is that a conventional psychological approach to European integration, with a heavy emphasis on individuals, can be problematic. In the past, the strong reliance on individual poll data, such as the Eurobarometer, has created significant problems for these types of conventional approaches to individual psychology. For example, the over-essentialisation of Eurobarometer data tends to suggest that national identities and opinions are fairly homogenous and fixed for any one member state. However, closer examination of variation over time and variation between regions within a member state argues in the opposite direction – that identities and opinions exhibit considerable variation over time and space, raising some fundamental questions about the significant weight placed on such individual poll data in political analysis (Calhoun, 2003; Manners, 2001: 20–23). What such insights suggest is that the political psychology of European integration needs to understand polling data and identity questions as dynamic and situated within changing social contexts. In this respect, it is far more appropriate to talk of complex, multiple, relational identities constructed from

a diversity of differences such as gender, class, race, age, education and locality, rather than nationality or ideology as exhibiting 'trump card' psychology.

Social psychology

In contrast to the work of conventional psychology, social-psychological approaches to the study of European integration are more common. Social psychology has historically been stronger in Europe, reflecting the 'effect of the collective on the construction of identity' (Bar-On, 2001: 335), and in particular the influence of the Social Identity Theory (SIT) of Henri Tajfel (Nesbitt-Larking and Kinnvall, 2012: 52). Similarly, European political psychology has been 'less one-sided' in 'the study of the influence of political processes on psychological processes' (Deutsch and Kinnvall, 2001: 16). Within social-psychological approaches to European integration three broad strands of work can be identified over the past two decades – SIT scholarship, 'transnational identity' and 'banal Europeanism'.

By far the largest area of scholarly engagement between social psychology and European integration is in the area of SIT. The first groundbreaking collection in this area was the 1996 edited volume by Breakwell and Lyons, *Changing European Identities: Social Psychological Analyses of Social Change* (1996). The book focused on differing versions of SIT, as well as including interesting chapters from social psychologists such as Billig and Chrysochoou. By the late 1990s, SIT and its variants were being more widely used in the study of European integration. A second important example is the cross-national research team led by Müller-Peters (Müller-Peters, Pepermans and Kiell, 1998; Müller-Peters, Pepermans and Burgoyne, 1998) looking at the introduction of the euro. Drawing on SIT, Müller-Peters' research team argued that multidimensional constructs of identity, together with European patriotism and nationalism, were important for explaining attitudes towards the euro.

Perhaps more interesting are the attempts by EU scholars to use social psychology to understand identity building and banal Europeanism. Laffan's work on the politics of identity in the EU has been at the forefront of the intersection between social psychology and European integration (Laffan, 1992, 1996, 2004; Manners, 2013a: 484). For Laffan 'the Community's distinctive characteristics are its multi-levelled and multi-cultural nature' where 'shared loyalty, rather than an all-or-nothing shift of loyalty, is more likely than any radical transformation of identity' (Laffan, 1992: 178, 126). Laffan's 2004 contribution on the EU and its institutions as 'identity builders' to the edited volume *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU* (Herrmann et al., 2004) is particularly interesting. The volume brought together social psychologists such as Brewer, Breakwell and Castano with EU experts such as Laffan to interrogate the social and political psychology of European transnational identity.

Drawing on Billig's (1995) work on banal nationalism, Cram (2001) imagines the EU as a case of banal Europeanism. She goes on to argue that 'the role of the EU as facilitator for diverse understandings of collective identities encourages the enhabitation of the EU at an everyday level and the reinforcement of a sense of banal Europeanism which is a crucial aspect of the European integration process' (Cram, 2009: 110). Cram's 2009 themed section on identity, integration theory and the EU brings together a variety of contributions and different insights on banal Europeanism for stateless nations (Scotland, Wales, Catalonia); extra-territorial nations (Hungary); divided territories (Cyprus); and nationless states (Malta).

These four examples of the engagement between social psychology and European integration, using Breakwell and Lyons' 'changing European identities', Müller-Peters' 'psychology of the Euro', Laffan's 'transnational identity' and Cram's 'banal Europeanism' illustrate how the politics of identity entered EU studies in the 1990s. The social-psychological approach is undoubtedly the most common way of engaging with European integration (see also Castano et al., 2003; Chrysochoou, 2000; Genna, 2009; Jonas et al., 2005; Klein et al., 2003; Kohli, 2000). However, it is also clear that the social-psychological studies discussed here are not widely known or engaged with within EU studies, much to the detriment of all. The following sections discussing social construction, psychoanalysis and critical political psychology all take steps further than the conventional and social-psychological approaches described so far – further towards addressing multiple audiences and further in advancing our understandings of the political psychology of European integration.

Social construction

While social psychology has its roots in the work of Tajfel, Turner, Moscovici and Billig, social construction has broader origins in hermeneutics, phenomenology, symbolic interactionism and post-structuralism. Although Berger and Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966) marks the meeting of phenomenology and social construction, it was Giddens' *Central Problems in Social Theory* (1979) and *The Constitution of Society* (1984) that did most to popularise notions of structuration and social construction. For Giddens, '[t]he concept of structuration involves that of the *duality of structure* which relates to the *fundamentally recursive character of social life, and expresses the mutual dependence of structure and agency*' (Giddens, 1979: 69, emphasis in the original; Manners, 2003: 73–76; Manners and Whitman, 2003: 394). Within social construction, there are two psychological approaches to European integration that will be considered in this section – Giddens' concept of 'ontological security', as well as Ricoeur and Arendt's hermeneutics.

Drawing on Giddens' 1991 concept of 'ontological security', Kinnvall (1997/2002) has pioneered its use in the study of political psychology and international relations. According to Kinnvall (2002: 102),

ontological security refers to a person's elemental sense of safety in the world where trust of other people is like an emotional inoculation against existential anxieties: 'a protection against future threat and dangers which allows the individual to sustain hope and courage in the face of whatever debilitating circumstances she or he might later confront'

(Giddens, 1991: 38–39; see also Kinnvall, 2004, 2006).

Three interesting examples of the use of 'ontological security' in the study of Europe and European integration focus on European diplomats, postcolonial Europe and European security. Mitzen's (2006, 2013) work on European diplomats and ontological security suggests that 'what Brusselisation does is to give European diplomats a "European" home to supplement their national home, and this can be seen to provide a secure space for being "Europe" together. That is, having a place devoted to maintaining their conversations gives ontological security' (Mitzen, 2006: 280). Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking (2009, 2010) shift the focus of ontological security from diplomats to Muslim minority populations in postcolonial societies. They argue that 'many Muslims in the diaspora find that their religion assumes new significance, and/or discover that its symbolic connotations have somehow shifted... When the security anchor of home is lost, new moorings – or a new "home" – for ontological security are searched for' (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011: 27). Finally, the concept of ontological security can be found at the nexus of the study of European integration and European security (Manners, 2002, 2013b). As argued, 'this final dimension of analysis presents a central challenge for the EU to achieve security in a sustainable fashion, which ensures peace rather than securitisation, and highlights the need to ensure ontological security among those implicated in European integration' (Manners, 2013b: 413).

Still located broadly in social construction, Guisan's 'hermeneutic analysis' draws on the ideas of Hannah Arendt and Paul Ricoeur to argue the need to understand the internal process of European reconciliation as it has been experienced by those involved (Guisan, 2005, 2012). For Guisan, Arendt and Ricoeur are both indebted to Husserl's 'phenomenological analysis of human consciousness [to] probe how various aspects of the human condition are experienced by people and what can be said/is being told about these experiences' (Guisan, 2011: 542). Guisan is interested in both the cognitive and affective processes of reconciliation involving the 'healing of emotions and the elimination of resentment' (Guisan, 2011: 544). Within this 'hermeneutic analysis', it is argued

that power as action in concert, reconciliation, and recognition of the other constitute the 'lost treasures' of European integration (Guisan, 2012).

Social construction scholars working within traditions of structuration and post-structuralism, as well as phenomenology and hermeneutics, have taken different routes towards bringing political psychology and the study of European integration closer together. Scholars using notions of 'ontological security' and 'hermeneutic analysis' have, since the late 1990s, focused less on the social identity of groups found in social psychology and more on the search for security and meaning through (dis) affective processes of dislocation and reconciliation.

Psychoanalysis

The origins of political psychology as a discipline are to be found in the psychoanalytical work of Freud and Lasswell (Post, 2013: 461–466; Ward, 2002: 62–63). For Nesbitt-Larking and Kinnvall (2012: 49–50), 'Freud's political psychology is about the struggle between desire and order and the challenges of balance.' In the study of international relations, Jacobsen argues that 'the purpose of psychoanalysis is to pry into our unconscious drives and defences to illuminate their influence over the motives and behaviour of the beholder as well as the beheld' (Jacobsen, 2013: 394). Important here is Lacan's linguistic reading of Freud in which 'to be positioned as an outsider, as marginal, as eccentric, engenders a space from which to question the encrusted and obdurate character of the established order' (Nesbitt-Larking, 2003: 248; see also Epstein, 2010). Psychoanalysis is understood as the role of the unconscious in the political, illustrated here with reference to work drawing on Lacan, Kristeva, Bakhtin and Todorov.

Houtum's Lacanian borderwork is interesting here, with an emphasis on psychoanalytical concepts of desire, comfort and the unnameable in the study of EU bordering practices. Houtum argues that Lacan's (1981) post-Freudian psychoanalysis provides insights into the desire for the comfort of a unified self in the EU (2002: 41–42), as well as an understanding of the fear of discomfort from the perception of being overwhelmed by the other at the borders of Europe (Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 297). As Houtum and Boedeltje (2009: 227) put it, 'psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan has in a commanding way argued that the construction of fear has to be explicated from a feeling of being deluged by *unnamable*, potentially immense hordes, masses and streams of "others" who threaten to negate the existing and familiar world, or worse, to make it disappear.'

Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking (2011) interpret Lacan through the psychoanalytical perspective of self in the work of postcolonial scholars, Fanon and Bhaba. Using this approach, they argue that 'the identities of both colonizers

and colonized are defined by one another and reproduced, modified, and changed in relation to each other' when looking at Muslims in Europe and the west (Kinnvall and Nesbit-Larking, 2011: 8–9). Kinnvall (2012: 267) develops the idea of 'European trauma' by using a Lacanian understanding of trauma as 'being both outside our experience and psychologically debilitating'. The research focuses on the European traumas of the events in London 2005 (public transport bombings) and Norway 2011 (Breivik mass murders) within the context of the idea of Europe and its bordering processes.

Developing and moving beyond Lacan's work, Kristeva's psychoanalytical research on Europe argues that the other is always part of the self – an abject foreigner which is part of our conscious and unconscious selves (Kristeva, 1982, 1991). Kristeva's (1982: 4–5, 155–156) work helps to understand the way in which Europeans deal with the horrors of fascism and Nazi crimes, such as Auschwitz, by abjecting (rejecting the abjectness) of their past selves and projecting them onto others. Kristeva (1991: 192–195, 1998) sees European integration as part of a cosmopolitan ethic that recognizes the strangers to ourselves, the othering practices of nationalism and a different type of freedom. As Kristeva argues in terms of the European subject, 'the coordination of European differences... refer not only to visions of society but, more precisely and in the last resort for me as a psychoanalyst, to very different conceptions of the *human person* or *subject*' (Kristeva, 2000: 115, emphasis in the original).

The use of Kristeva's psychoanalysis suggests that European integration symbolises far wider processes of coming to terms with, coordinating and cohabiting with difference and diversity – processes of reconciling and recognising plurality and strangeness in oneself and others (Manners, 2006a: 127–128, 2007: 86, 2011: 249). The rise of the far right across the EU and their portrayal of abject foreigners are important from the perspective of Kristevian psychoanalysis. The projection of otherness onto individuals and the social groups they represent is so strong precisely because they are also an abjected and disturbing part of European selves (Diez and Manners, 2007: 185; Manners, 2006b: 178).

The psychoanalytical works of Bakhtin and Todorov have also proved fruitful in the engagement between political psychology and European integration. Bakhtin's theory of dialogism argues that a person is 'born into meaning through dialogue and proposes a vision of human action in which rationality and relationship cannot be disengaged' (Bakhtin, 1982; Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011: 9; Todorov, 1984). Bakhtin's influence in the study of European integration can be illustrated through three examples of relations between Hungary, the United Kingdom, Turkey and the EU (Borocz, 2000; Mullender, 2006; Nykänen, 2011). In all three studies, the authors argue from the point of view of a dialogic understanding of (potential) member state relations with the institutions of the EU.

Developing Bakhtin's ideas, Todorov (2005, 2008) brings ideas of dialogicality to European integration, specifically to advocate 'plurality as a basis of unity' and the EU as a 'tranquil power' in global politics. For Todorov, the emerging power of the EU can actually be new, opening an unexplored path between imperialism and the deficiencies of isolationism (Manners, 2006c: 40). Todorov puts this connection between psychology, European pluralism and the EU in global politics this way:

[T]he new tensions within and without Europe are tensions that I experience inside myself.... It is often claimed that pluralism is not something you decree, but something you discover to be already present in the situation;... People also sometimes wonder whether a pluralist world would not be condemned to permanent confrontation... The simplistic schema of 'friend/enemy' may be very widespread, but it doesn't explain the diversity of relations between different countries.

(Todorov, 2005: 2–3)

These examples of scholarship working within both psychoanalysis and the study of European integration illustrate the ways in which Freud, Lacan and Bakhtin, as well as the research of Kristeva and Todorov, can illuminate the interrelationships between the unconscious, the self, the plural and the other. Despite the examples discussed here, psychoanalytical political psychology has had little impact in the study of European integration more broadly, which is strange given that integration in any social definition implies the coming together of entities that were formally separate.

Critical political psychology

The final consideration is of critical political psychology at the forefront of the interface between political psychology and European integration. It is undoubtedly here that the most interesting, challenging and yet insightful critical social science is to be found – a crucial arena for trying to understand the dissatisfaction and alienation that many Europeans feel towards politics, politicians, government and the EU in the twenty-first century. Critical social sciences are those that understand the contextual and subjective nature of social enquiry. For Busch (2009: 1, 1993, 1999), working within Frankfurt School critical theory, 'critical political psychology in its narrow conceptual sense can be understood as a product of the alliance of critical political economy and psychology'. For Nesbitt-Larking (2003: 239), discourse and rhetorical analysis facilitates a critical political psychology that contributes 'toward cross-cultural political psychology and the possibilities of political psychology beyond the framework of

possessive individualism'. The engagement between critical political psychology and European integration will be illustrated with reference to two works on the political psychology of globalisation and on European communion.

In many respects, Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking's *The Political Psychology of Globalization: Muslims in the West* (2011) brings together many of the strands already discussed, including the social construction of ontological security and psychoanalysis grounded in Lacan and Bakhtin. As the authors make clear, 'employing broad socioeconomic and political concepts of global forces in combination with critical political psychology, we explore the concept of identity by addressing how events on the global stage interact with the local and particular' (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011: 10). By using critical political psychology the authors conclude that 'a dialectical conception of identity as socially conditioned practice ... brings together meaningfully a diverse range of sources on identity, multiculturalism, globalization, and citizenship' (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011: 17).

In contrast to Kinnvall and Larking's ground-up approach to minorities in European societies, European communion takes a multilayered approach to European integration. By drawing on the psychology of Bakan (1966), Abele and Wojciszke argue that in psychological terms communion is neither selfish nor selfless behaviour, but a consideration of others (Abele and Wojciszke, 2007; Abele et al., 2008; Manners, 2013a: 490). In 'European communion: Political theory of European union' (Manners, 2013a: 474), it is argued that 'the concept of European communion is defined as the "subjective sharing of relationships", understood as the extent to which individuals or groups believe themselves to be sharing relations (or not), and the consequences of these beliefs for European political projects, processes and products'. The article and subsequent research sets out how understanding the projects, processes and products of European union, based on 'sharing' or 'communion', provides a better means of perceiving the EU as a political object rather than terms such as 'integration' or 'cooperation' as is generally used in functionalist-institutionalist European integration studies.

These two examples illustrate the uses of critical political psychology and critical social theory in examining the interface between political psychology and European integration, either with a focus on the micro-social processes of minority-majority relations or on the macro-political processes of sharing and communion within Europe. Although these two examples are very rare in both political psychology and the study of European integration, they are clearly becoming crucial to the understanding of why 'another Europe is possible' (Manners, 2007), indeed even probable in the face of widespread disenchantment and disillusion with the processes of globalisation and Europeanisation. As Adorno and the Frankfurt School questioned in the last century, we still need to understand the political psychology of antidemocratic, nationalistic

and destructive political patterns, whether found in minority or majority populations (see, e.g., Capelos and Van Troost, 2012).

Conclusion: Inside and outside, interior and exterior, belonging and otherness

This chapter began by drawing on the insights of Stuart Hall, the ‘godfather of multiculturalism’ (Butler, 2014), on the relationships between European identity, European integration and the political-psychological processes of marking symbolic boundaries and constructing symbolic frontiers. The discussions in the sections on ‘Social psychology’ and ‘Social construction’ speak to Hall’s inside and outside of Europe’s other self. The section on ‘Psychoanalysis’ examined Hall’s interior and exterior of Europe’s other self. Finally, the section on ‘Critical political psychology’ interrogated Hall’s belonging and otherness of Europe’s other self.

In the context of twenty-first-century European crises of EU governance, the Eurozone, the rise of the far right and the return of neo-racist and xenophobic movements not seen since the 1930s, Hall’s discussions of Europe’s other selves now seems visionary 20 years later. In this respect, the chapter has both illustrated the *potential* for greater engagement between political psychology and the study of European integration and the *necessity* for such an engagement in order to better understand contemporary Europe. But it is also clear that engagement must meet the fundamental definition of political psychology – it must be a bidirectional interaction of European political and psychological processes.

The first direction is the potential for the study of European integration to benefit from political psychology. If a broad understanding of European integration as the economic, social and political processes of mutual accommodation and inclusion by European states and peoples is assumed, then the benefits of engagement are potentially huge. The fields of European integration and political psychology have lots to say to each other about the psychological processes and consequences of globalisation and Europeanisation. The effects of the global financial crisis in Europe have brought home to many just how interlaced the economic processes of globalisation and Europeanisation appear to most inhabitants of Europe. Similarly, the study of European multinational and transnational groups and movements that have been either empowered, such as independence movements, or mobilised, such as xenophobic movements, would undoubtedly benefit from a conversation between European integration and political psychology. In addition, it is certainly clear that many of the methods of political psychology have much to say to the study of European integration. Throughout this chapter, a number of scholars and their engagement with the political psychology of European integration have

been identified, for example, the work of Müller-Peters, Laffan, Cram, Mitzen, Guisan, Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking. However, despite these examples, it has to be said that in general there is virtually no engagement between the two fields. For example, *Political Psychology* and the *Journal of Common Market Studies*, the respective flagship disciplinary journals, have collectively published only five articles on the subject of political psychology and European integration since they began in the 1970s (*Political Psychology*) and the 1960s (*Journal of Common Market Studies*).

The other direction is the potential for political psychology to benefit from the study of European integration. One of the most interesting factors for political psychologists to study must undoubtedly be how the world's most conflict-prone region managed to shift from a condition of centuries-old enmity to institutionalised amity in just six decades. Beyond this broader question of enmity and amity, the chapter has used six examples which talk from European integration to political psychology. The question of attitudes towards the euro (Müller-Peters et al.) raises questions about the political psychology of symbolic exchange. The issues of multiple identities practices (Laffan) within, without and across Europe say something interesting about complex and rapid identity (re)constructions. Beyond the banal nationalisms of EU member states, European integration speaks to the questions of the banality of Europeanisation (Cram) as a political-psychological process. In these processes of enmity and amity between conflict-prone states such as France and Germany, Greece and Turkey, Serbia and Croatia, the hermeneutics of reconciliation (Guisan) are potentially fruitful. Going further towards the unconscious, the recognition of strangeness and reconciliation of difference (Kristeva) within, without and across European societies should undoubtedly be of interest to psychoanalytically informed scholars. Finally, the bringing together of cosmopolitical ethics and communitarian politics through a 'cosmopolitical' engagement within and between minority–majority populations across the EU and its member states (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking) is undoubtedly a crucial issue for scholars concerned with progressing the legacy of Stuart Hall and genuinely multicultural political psychology. If a new Europe is to take shape that neither perpetuates the 'homogenising "indifference" of globalisation' (Hall, 1991: 19) into European integration, nor accentuates twenty-first-century reactionary politics, then the contradictory processes of marking and constructing Europe's other self need to be understood through a political psychology of European integration.

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16

Migration and Multiculturalism

Paul Nesbitt-Larking

This chapter explores the political psychology of migration and multiculturalism. In so doing, it pays attention to those studies that have demonstrated how both majority and minority communities in immigrant-receiving countries have been shaped by patterns of immigration and regimes of citizenship. It further explores how the political agency of those citizens and denizens¹ has contributed to the development of narratives, discourses and identities of belonging and exclusion, as well as community relations. As with other facets of globalisation and globalism, political agencies, from citizens through states to transnational governance organisations, have been both agents of change and subject to change that has occurred elsewhere. The practices of political agencies are both recursive and reflexive (Giddens, 1984). They are *recursive* because through their practices they reproduce consciousnesses, cultures, discourses and the material conditions and structures that support and condition their agency. Such recursivity may be either banal and taken-for-granted or purposeful and strategic. Irrespective of the intentions of the agent, however, recursivity reproduces social structures. On the other hand, agents have the capacity for *reflexivity*. This is the self-aware and purposive monitoring of the circumstances that have conditioned and shaped one's agency and the capacity to engage in practices that either reproduce or modify those conditions (Giddens, 1991).

In the broad context of a turbulent global order of danger and opportunity, both personal identities and institutional forms have become of necessity more reflexive and strategic. As Appadurai (1996) notes, people's identities are now the product of biography across global space rather than the geography of contiguity. Nowhere has this become more evident than in the arena of human migration. The relevant time frame for the contemporary analysis of migration is the half-century or more since the first waves of postcolonial migration

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into European countries in the 1950s and 1960s. If such a framework is frankly Eurocentric, this is deliberate: Europe – and specifically ‘western’ Europe – has been the continent in which immigration has disrupted the taken-for-granted and has therefore resulted in the most acute reflexivity among agencies from the individual through the community, the organisation, public policy agenda and regimes. This chapter, however, moves beyond Europe both analytically and descriptively. First, while looked at from the rest of the world, Europe may be perceived as a homogeneous space, the experiences of migration and multiculturalism across the European nation-states are diverse and distinctive. Second, the analytical framework of the chapter makes use of insights from postcolonial analysis that demonstrate how the initially constructed Orientalist binaries of East–West and North–South, in which millions of formerly colonial subjects took a one-way ticket to the imperial metropolises and in so doing underwent a bodily and psychic transformation into civilisation, have increasingly been complicated by the political economy and political cultures of globalisation. The one-way ticket has become increasingly complicated by the possibility of return visits and family reunification. As part of the same process, the monological order of Western culture has become increasingly dialogical with its Other and therefore heterogeneous and multi-voiced. The ontological experience of migration is decreasingly based on the Westphalian cartography of nation-states and their far-flung empires and is increasingly a matter of navigating through time and space on a global scale of complex networks and permeable borders.

Given this historical and structural setting, the experience of migration in a globalising world has emerged as an important and growing area of research in political psychology. As John Berry notes, the psychological issues surrounding migration are those of acculturation and intergroup relations (Berry, 2001: 615). Among the prominent and more controversial responses to the challenges of acculturation and intergroup relations among migrants is the strategy or policy of multiculturalism. For Berry, when the dominant group in a migrant-receiving country promotes assimilation, the corresponding regime is one of ‘the melting pot’. When it demands separation, the regime becomes ‘segregationist’. When minorities are marginalised, the regime is one of ‘exclusion’. Finally, when cultural diversity is the objective of the dominant society, the strategy of mutual accommodation is ‘multicultural’ (Berry, 2001: 620). Each of Berry’s key conditions – exclusion, segregation, the melting pot and multiculturalism – reflects key experiences in the political psychology of migration. While this chapter represents a theoretical departure from Berry’s model, each of its components is to be found in the ensuing analysis.

From a descriptive perspective, the strategy of multiculturalism takes the chapter beyond its European setting to those countries in North America and Australasia built upon white settlement: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and

the United States. Given their different historical trajectories as countries of diasporic settlement from Europe along with their relations with indigenous peoples and, in the case of the United States, their history of slavery, the nature of acculturation and intergroup relations has been conditioned by distinctive characteristics, resulting in a different political culture of multiculturalism and different citizen regimes of multiculturalism. The third continent to have been a receiver of substantial migration is Asia. The UN International Migration Report states that as of 2002 '[m]ost of the world's migrants live in Europe (56 million), Asia (50 million) and Northern America (41 million)' (United Nations, 2002: 2). As with many other sub-fields of social analysis, the political psychology of migration in Asia and the Gulf States remains underdeveloped and important political psychological analyses such as those related to indentured servitude and to the trafficking of women and foreign brides have yet to be undertaken.

This chapter is organised around three ideal types that profile academic research in the political psychology of migration and multiculturalism. As with all ideal types, the core purpose is heuristic and permits a mapping of the ways in which migrants and receiving populations have experienced and reacted to the challenges of assimilation, integration, separation and marginalisation (Berry, 2001: 618). The first section is entitled 'Immigration and assimilation' and focuses on the challenges of acculturation, with particular relevance to the first generation of postcolonial and other immigrants. The second section, 'Diversity and multiculturalism', presents scholarship in the context of newly settled and second-generation communities around challenges of race, ethnicity, religion and other challenges for intergroup relations. In the final section, 'Integration and the politics of engagement', the chapter explores newer research on the post-diasporic generations (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011a) of immigrants and the politics of integration through dialogue, critical multiculturalism and a politics of engagement in a cosmopolitical and increasingly post-national order.

Immigration and assimilation

Whether as guest workers or as citizens, the first wave of postcolonial immigrants to Europe in the 1950s and 1960s typically manifested conformity, quiescence and superficial assimilation in return for employment, subsistence and basic security. Among the more important characteristics that differentiates the migrant experience and the possibilities of multiculturalism in Europe and beyond is the historical relevance of colonialism in the formation of social relations in Europe (Khan, 2000; Miles, 1989; Said, 1995). The corresponding orientation towards citizenship was the retreatism of those who Castles and Davidson refer to as 'quasi-citizens, denizens and margizens', those who despite

differing degrees of formal residence status are in specific ways excluded from full social inclusion (Castles and Davidson, 2000). Neither majority populations nor ethno-racial minorities themselves regarded new immigrants as nationals with an entitlement to voice in the polity (Castles and Davidson, 2000; Hussain and Baugguley, 2005), even if some of them had the vote. Any conception of multiculturalism, grounded in even a minimal acknowledgement of the recognition of others in their own terms (Taylor, 1994), was absent from the discourses of receiving countries. In their own ways, both the French civic republican model of assimilation and the German model of the visiting guest worker (notably prior to the 2001 German Naturalisation Law) exhibited social closure (French) and legalistic (German) modes of exclusion and segregation.

Billig's concept of banal nationalism generates a political psychological explanation as to how the learned cultural practices that have developed through centuries of imperialism and colonisation came to be reproduced in the daily lives of citizens in the West (Billig, 1995). In the broader tradition of the Social Identity approach, Billig explores the taken-for-granted in the invocation of pronouns of social belonging and personal identity. In so doing, he explains how 'banal nationalism operates with prosaic, routine words, which take nations for granted, and which in so doing inhabit [sic] them' (Billig, 1995: 93). The context of utterance or publication shapes and privileges the preferred meanings of words and does so in ways that have political consequences. Without a great deal of reflexivity, social relations are remade and reinforced through the banal use of everyday language. Billig's scholarship is taken up by Reicher and Hopkins (2001), Skey (2010) and Gibson and Hamilton (2011) in demonstrating how through their daily practices and discourses majority citizens routinely frame criteria of national belonging and boundaries of exclusion. Condor (2000; see also Chapter 3) refers to such discursive practices as a matter of pride (manifesting nationalist patriotism) and prejudice (exhibiting exclusionary and racist sentiments).

The contexts of banal nationalism are those into which the first waves of postcolonial migrants and guest workers settled into western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. The earliest assumptions of both indigenous majorities and newcomer minorities were those of assimilation, in which minorities would attempt to fit in and conform, accepting a lower social status and economic remuneration in return for the right of entry and settlement. In terms of citizenship claims among minority communities, these decades can be characterised on the basis of identity strategies of retreatism (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011a, 2011b). The strategy of retreatism was commensurate with a postcolonial immigration strategy that recursively reproduced social relations established in the colonial hinterland into the heart of the metropolis. Corresponding regimes of citizenship either denied legal citizenship altogether or granted it in the broader context of hierarchical statuses in which both

majority and immigrant populations understood that newcomers were to be socially excluded, segregated and expected to remain gratefully quiescent.

In his work on British Muslims and multiculturalism, Tahir Abbas refers to the limitations of assimilation as a citizenship regime: 'The assimilationist model was based upon an inadequate understanding of the social psychology of group identity, and, in particular, the resilience of ethnic identities in a context where the minority community is marginalized and faces hostility...in effect, Muslims often have had little choice but to retreat into their communities' (Abbas, 2005: 158, 160). The scholarship of racism identifies the era of postcolonial immigration as one in which racial stereotyping and racist exclusion were frank and open in continental Europe (Balibar, 1991; Castles and Kosack, 1973), the United Kingdom (Hall et al., 1978; Miles, 1989), the United States (Davis, 1998; West, 1993), Canada (Bolaria and Li, 1985; Li, 1990) and Australia (Jupp, 2002). The next section incorporates a presentation of how scholarship in the political psychology of migration and multiculturalism has unearthed more subtle forms of racism. Before developing these themes, however, it is important to establish that the traditional, frankly racist, biologicistic and overt forms of racism that predated postcolonial resettlement as well as the arrival of guest workers into Europe have continued to exist. Zick and his colleagues (2008; see also Chapter 14) report widespread levels of ethnic prejudice and discrimination. Prejudice and discrimination levels diminish among European populations as degree of intergroup contact increases and perceptions of threat and identification with the nation decrease (Zick et al., 2008: 242). Therefore, the possibilities for integration and community cohesion are enhanced to the extent that interpersonal and intergroup contact increases and the perspective of all citizens becomes more cosmopolitan.²

Diversity and multiculturalism

As they have integrated into European settings in the 1960s and beyond, these postcolonial diasporas and their post-diasporic descendants (those born in Europe) have established in their very existence a *de facto* multiculturalism. Such a state of 'multiculture', or an empirical increase in diversity (Gilroy, 2005), has necessarily prompted reflexivity around issues of commonality and distinction. If the first wave of migration generated racist exclusionism, the establishment of new minority communities caused a rethinking of citizenship regimes. Having to live together has prompted social organisations, political leaders and regimes to address matters of social order and equity with regard to race relations and community integration. Throughout Europe and North America, the 1960s and 1970s were decades in which certain regimes attempted to develop strategies of ethno-racial accommodation in the face of continued cultures and practices of racist exclusion. Prominent among these emerging

strategies was multiculturalism. Through the extension of the established practice of pillarisation, the Netherlands joined the United Kingdom and Sweden as European countries that experimented with variations of multiculturalism (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011a).

The European model of multiculturalism can be best described as 'accommodationist', as opposed to the more 'integrationist' model of multiculturalism evident in North America and Australasia. The European model of multiculturalism assumes a degree of community separation and is premised on the assumption that any community contact takes place through (often self-appointed) community spokespersons. In the European context, multiculturalism is a public policy and governance strategy designed to cope with already divided communities in order to sustain peace and promote equity. Consequently, some European research has demonstrated that multiculturalism is perceived among minorities and majorities alike as a plausible strategy to sustain group separateness and exclusiveness. Evidence of this is Verkuyten's Dutch research that reveals that multiculturalism is less viable as a regime for those minority group members who are low identifiers with their community than for those whose levels of in-group identity are higher (Verkuyten, 2007; Verkuyten and Brug, 2004). This has resulted in higher perceived in-group essentialism among minority high identifiers. Verkuyten and Brug's (2004) questionnaire-based study of Dutch adolescents makes the overall discovery that white majority Dutch adolescents are less in favour of multiculturalism than minorities. The study reveals that while minorities regard multiculturalism as an opportunity for mobility, majorities regard it as a threat to their culture and status. Decentralisation of the out-group on the part of the majority correlates negatively with support for multiculturalism, while decentralisation of the in-group on the part of ethnic minorities correlates positively with support for multiculturalism (Verkuyten and Brug, 2004: 655). Verkuyten and other European scholars have raised the critical point that forms of exclusivist and segregationist multiculturalism are associated with a politics of essentialism and intolerance both on the part of majority and minority communities. Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007: 26) provide further empirical evidence to support this finding that isolated communities, both majorities and minorities, tend to hold each other at a distance as a consequence of barriers caused by prejudices. Moreover, it is specifically threats to culture and traumas caused by violent incidents of cultural clash that condition threat perceptions among majority communities (Sniderman et al., 2004: 46-47). In conformity with the findings of Sniderman and his colleagues, McLaren and Johnson's (2007) analysis of British social attitudes finds that cultural issues, to do with perceptions of a 'way of life' under threat, are the most important in explaining anti-immigrant hostility. While it is important to note the differences across national experiences within Europe, the entire

continental experience of accommodationist multiculturalism may be usefully contrasted with the North American experience (Berry: 2001). In the latter context, those who are low identifiers with their minority in-group are no less likely to support multiculturalism than those high in group identification. There is therefore less evidence of instrumental and narrowly sectoral strategic support for multiculturalism. Multiculturalism to North Americans does not imply parallel societies and in fact promotes the integration of cultural communities into a coherent and unified political society. In this respect, the melting pot model of the United States shares more in common with Canadian multiculturalism than it does with European models of assimilation.

Across all settings, whether in Europe or beyond, however, the picture is mixed and support for multiculturalism varies. The accommodation versus integration model is ideal typical. A major challenge in comparing the continents is that the word has acquired different connotations in each setting. Contemporary scholarship on migration and multiculturalism using survey data and quantitative methodologies has generated mixed findings when it comes to the analysis of integration and social cohesion in European multicultural societies. Such findings are commensurate with the perspective that contemporary immigrant-receiving societies exhibit elements of both community isolation and malintegration as well as social cohesion and intergroup cooperation. Hooghe and his colleagues (2009) in their multilevel analysis of 20 European countries discover that while at the individual level there is some significant variation in levels of generalised trust (men, older people, those low in education, the unemployed and ethnic minorities are significantly less trusting), at the country level demographic and social indicators of migration and diversity are not significantly related to levels of generalised trust. They conclude that 'the full-blown negative relationship between ethnic diversity and generalized trust does not hold across Europe' (Hooghe et al., 2009: 218). Beyond a range of cross-national survey-based studies that include southern and eastern European countries (Hooghe et al., 2009; Sides and Citrin, 2007; Zick et al., 2008), there is little political psychology of migration and multiculturalism in these settings. Since many of these countries have become recipients of substantial immigrant populations in recent years, there is a need for a series of national studies in the political psychology of migration in those settings.

Given the context of the multi-ethnic and racially mixed societies that have emerged in Europe and North America as a consequence of immigration, as well as shifts in both the political cultures, dominant discourses and anti-racist public policies against overt and biological racism, scholars in the political psychology of migration and multiculturalism have explored those forms of differentiation and discrimination that emerged in the 1970s and beyond. Each of these forms of new racism was grounded in a clear identification of

self and Other and of the in-group and the out-group, with associated criteria for social inclusion or exclusion. Referred to as 'new racism', 'cultural racism', 'covert racism' or 'symbolic racism' and other associated concepts, these modes of discrimination on the part of majority communities did not entirely supplant biological or overt racism, but these constituted new forms of discursive power. Given the symbolic and semiotic character of such new forms of social differentiation, it is to be anticipated that political psychologists have increasingly turned to discursive and rhetorical analyses. Employing insights derived from Freud, Bakhtin, Volosinov and Foucauld in combination with the broad European social psychological foundations of Tajfel and Moscovici, scholars such as Billig (1987, 1995), Durrheim and Dixon (2005), Skey (2010), Hammack (2011), Hopkins and Blackwood (2011), Reicher and Hopkins (2001), van Dijk (1993) and Wetherell and Potter (1992) have generated new sub-fields of enquiry.

Grounded in an extensive set of focus groups with British white majority citizens, Skey (2010) explores the constitution of self and Other in constructions of national belonging. Through discourse analysis, Skey demonstrates how white citizens routinely claim entitlement in the setting of boundaries of national belonging with associated imperatives regarding what constitutes appropriate deportment and norms of conduct. Using rhetorical analysis in a study of British youth, Gibson and Hamilton (2011) arrive at similar findings. The authors find that while their participants reject overt prejudice and racism, they nonetheless construct criteria of inclusion that grant stronger rights of residency and cultural expression to established citizens over those of non-members and newcomers. In so doing, the overt disavowal of racism is trumped by the privileging of a generalised 'British' way of life that covertly disadvantages minorities. Hopkins and Blackwood (2011) explore the experiences of British Muslims, notably how their identities are shaped through the experience of being monitored and under surveillance. Developing Taylor's understanding that a viable multiculturalism depends upon the full recognition of the other, Hopkins and Blackwood reveal that many of their Muslim interviewees routinely experience misrecognition, stereotypy and stigmatisation.

In the Australian context, Every and Augoustinos's (2007) critical discourse analysis of parliamentary Hansard³ reveals forms of new racism among Australian parliamentarians in debates over refugee policy. While claiming to be rational and neither racist nor discriminatory, an analysis of their discourse reveals racist talk containing categorical generalisations, spurious appeals to equality, exclusivist constructions of the nation, the privileging of dominant culture and 'us and them' constructions. They refer to such racist talk as 'dog whistling', by which they mean communication pitched at a level at which those who are being appealed to will be able to decode its messages, while

for others the content will be banal, taken-for-granted and immune from the criticism that it is (biologically) 'racist'.

The continued existence of forms of ethno-racial prejudice and exclusivity has promoted the mutual antagonism of minority and majority essentialisms and has contributed to discourses of 'parallel societies' and the 'failure of multiculturalism' in Europe and beyond. Demands on the part of European elites in the reshaping of citizenship regimes to enforce language and cultural requirements have become entrenched, thereby furthering the isolation and stigmatisation of certain minorities. Despite this, multiculturalism continues as an everyday experience and those minority citizens who are the descendants of immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s, and who are fluent in both language and cultural practices, have identity strategies beyond retreat into isolated enclaves or the mutual antagonism of a politics of essentialism. They have available to them an assertive and creative politics of engagement.

Integration and the politics of engagement

Multiculturalism is a contested concept (Condor, 2011; Meer and Modood, 2012) and its polysemic character renders any claims made in its name always open to question. Critical multiculturalism, as delineated by Frances Henry (2002: 238), is reflexive and dialogical and grounded in a radical and transformative frame that disrupts dominant interpretations of history, structure and discourse. Grounded in Taylor's concept of the politics of recognition, Meer and Modood stress the centrality of dialogue and communication in multiculturalism. As such, their integrationist understanding of the concept contains within it the seeds of a deeper and more critical elaboration of multiculturalism, one that displaces the majority culture from the assumed and silent centre and, through dialogue, opens the way for a process of mutual communication and accountability. To the extent that it can be viable, critical multiculturalism is the very opposite of community isolation and estrangement; it is, in fact, the fulfilment of a political society grounded in cooperation, cohesion, commonality and communication in which people claim membership of certain communities to the extent that they wish, and to the limit of the claims of self-designated leaders, to speak on their behalf. It is such a deep and critical multiculturalism that accompanies the politics of engagement. On the basis of a full and open encounter with the Other (and, indeed, oneself), pathways to community cohesion through effective communication and reasonable accommodation are made possible.

In his Canadian context, John Berry (2001, 2011) has explored how multiculturalism can exhibit both a deep pride in a heritage and cultural origins as well as an enthusiastic engagement with the political society. Key indicators of Berry's construct of multicultural ideology assess the extent to which

respondents regard diversity as a public good for the entire society as well as the value that they place on participation in the wider society and contact among groups: 'In addition, the notion of multicultural ideology incorporates the acceptance of the view that the dominant society and its members should be prepared, themselves, to change in order to accommodate others in the larger society' (Berry, 2011: 286). Berry and his colleagues have reported that support for integration – for sustaining one's original ethnic identity as well as adopting that of the host country – is substantially stronger among immigrants to settler societies such as Canada, Australia and the United States than among immigrants in countries of more recent immigration, notably the European nations (Berry, 2011: 291). As with Meer and Modood (2012), the academic work of Berry and his colleagues situates multiculturalism as an integrationist aspiration. This represents a shift from the accommodationist model of the European experience and opens the way to a self-reflexive critical multiculturalism grounded in dialogue and care.

At the sociological level, Gilroy (2005) identifies two dominant strands of social being in the relationship between majority and minority populations. Majority political cultures and European citizenship regimes have alternated between what Gilroy (2005) refers to as postcolonial melancholia and conviviality. The consequences of *melancholia* are manifested in essentialist identity strategies to recover mythical, pure national heritages and associated public policy bids to enforce standards of citizenship, including immigration/border controls and the 'correct' usage of shared public space. The possibilities of *conviviality* are seen in the emergence of critical multiculturalism, the politics of recognition, dialogue and care that builds upon the possibilities of an emerging cosmopolitical post-national order. Gilroy asks how it might be possible for 'the strangeness of strangers' to go 'out of focus' while 'other dimensions of a basic sameness can be acknowledged and made significant' (Gilroy, 2005: 4). Such a perspective emerges from Gilroy's understanding of race as 'an impersonal, discursive arrangement, the brutal result of the raciological ordering of the world, not its cause' (Gilroy, 2005: 39). The remainder of this chapter explores Gilroy's question about how to achieve social encounters of 'basic sameness'.

Using Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT) Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins' research on British Muslims opens up the nature of social being among minority groups. Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins establish that how one comes to identify oneself is multiple, variable and context-dependent. Identities are not fixed characteristics of persons but the contingent consequences of deliberation and argument (Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004; Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins, 2002). On the basis of such strategically and tactically constructed identities, a range of political projects become more or less feasible and viable. Reicher and Hopkins refer to those leaders who intervene to influence the

course of argumentation as 'entrepreneurs of identity' (2001: 75). Their capacity to establish categories and representations is constitutive of the construction of emergent social realities. In other words, through reflexive definitions of the situation, agents are able to shape and influence the recursive practices that constitute social structures. As Reicher and Hopkins point out, such definitions are particularly powerful in the constructions of nations and nationalisms and the associated categorisations of in- and out-groups.

Along with Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, Pedziwiatr in his article on the Muslim Council of Britain argues that many post-diasporic minority citizens are increasingly demanding full and equal rights of citizenship. They want to be involved in civic life and the public sphere and they possess sufficient internal political efficacy to believe that they can be effective (Pedziwiatr, 2007). Saeed and his colleagues' (1999) research among young Muslims in Scotland exemplifies what the authors refer to as 'hyphenate' and plural identities that have emerged among post-diasporic citizens no longer satisfied with monological self-categorisations. In their words, 'British Pakistanis are within a process of re-definition of what it means to be British' (Saeed et al., 1999: 824). Werbner (2000) confirms such findings, but further demonstrates how British Muslims have integrated into their growing assertive sense of British citizenship a diasporic transnational identity and thereby enriched the post-national and multicultural character of Britain.

Emerging research in the political psychology of migration and multiculturalism explores patterns of intersectionality and multiple constitutions of identity within minority groups. The work of Prins and her colleagues (2012) uses narrative analysis to explore the experiences of young Moroccan Dutch citizens. Both Prins' and Hopkins' empirical data reveal a propensity on the part of Muslim minorities in contemporary settings towards identity strategies of engagement in which a superordinate sense of commonality is combined with community distinctiveness. Wiley and Deaux (2011) refer to the bicultural identity performance of immigrants, who in some ways experience their identities in terms of the place of origin and the place of settlement. Wiley and Deaux raise the important points that immigrants' self-categorisations may be either dual or hybridised. In either instance, the performance of identities is conditioned by both the contextual meaning attached to the performance by the immigrant actor as well as by perceptions of the anticipated responses of those surrounding the immigrant actor, the audience for any performance of identity. Importantly, such audiences may be made up of the ethnic in-group, the out-group or some combination. Perceptions of audience response are particularly important wherever the immigrant group believes the audience to be powerful and where the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion from the dominant culture are definitively drawn. According to Chrysochoou and Lyons (2011), the extent to which immigrant minorities will identify with their host

nation is variable and depends in large part on perceived discrimination and recognition rather than ethnicity per se. With Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins and Reicher, the authors argue that 'Groups strategically construct the content of an identity in relation to their objectives, and these constructions are significantly framed by the context' (Chrysochoou and Lyons, 2011: 78). This propensity to straddle cultures and build bridges between minority and majority communities has been associated in the literature on the political psychology of migration and multiculturalism with the role of women in Islam. Particular emphasis has been placed on the reflexivity of Muslim women themselves and in particular on the political complexity and cultural polysemy of the Muslim veil in its various forms (Cesari, 2007; Kaya, 2009; Soysal, 2000; Thomas, 2006; Werbner, 2007; Withol de Wenden, 1998). Scholars, including Klandermans (1997), Koopmans and Statham (1999), Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking (2011b) and Simon (2011), have emphasised the relevance of identity strategies grounded in collective identities that underpin the making of political claims and mobilisation towards political action. Simon (2011) concludes from his study of German immigrants that the adoption of a dual identification – as both Turkish and German or Russian and German – was significantly and positively related to political engagement.

From a psychological perspective, the politics of engagement requires dialogue. The possibility of alternative and multiple constructions of the self is taken up in the tradition of dialogical and, in particular, self-dialogical analyses (Hermans, 2002; Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007). On the basis of characteristics grounded in the postmodern social order of a globalising world, Hermans and Dimaggio adapt Bakhtin's notion of heteroglossia and stress the increasingly complex multiplicity of cultural, national and ethnic voices within the same individual. Hermans refers to this phenomenon as a 'society of mind' (Hermans, 2002: 147). Ali Hassan Zaidi has conducted important work on the theological centrality of dialogue in Islam and therefore the deep multicultural possibilities of community transformations through dialogue between foundationalist Islamic traditions and secular modernity (Zaidi, 2006, 2007). While Zaidi is not convinced of a Ricoeurian 'fusion of horizons' or a Habermasian coming together of rationalities in free exchange, he regards dialogues as 'the first step in giving voice to an-other critique and in taking seriously the validity of the Other's truth claims' (Zaidi, 2006: 83).

The boundaries of such civic space are not necessarily those of the Western nation-states. As Werbner notes (2000), integration and the politics of engagement are enhanced to the extent that the Westphalian form of the nation-state is supplemented with forms of globalism that emphasise both local and global connections. A cosmopolitical orientation has been emerging that transcends national bonds and in so doing generates greater possibilities for integration at multiple levels. Empirically, the cosmopolitical world is one of social, virtual

and geographical mobility, in which economic production and consumption take place on an increasingly global scale and the sovereign national state is being eroded from both transnational and localised political forces. Culturally, there is greater awareness of global interdependency, with the attendant risks and potentials, and as a consequence cognitive mappings of the familiar and the unfamiliar are in constant flux as people grow in semiotic, linguistic and symbolic sophistication. Normatively, cosmopolitics stresses global solidarities grounded in cultural diversity, democracy beyond the nation-state and distributive justice (Smith, 2007: 38–39; Szerszynski and Urry, 2006: 114–115). From a political psychological perspective, a core disposition is that of what Smith (2007) refers to as ironic detachment, which is that dialogical and self-reflexive capability to stand outside one's own biography and formation and to be sceptical and distanced from what would otherwise be a taken-for-granted and banal way of life. The cosmopolitical citizen may well be attached to a homeland or a culture, but he is also self-reflexive, thereby rejecting grand narratives and recognising that orientations are conditioned by partial cultures and are thereby contingent, a necessary prerequisite to engaging in meaningful dialogue with others (Smith, 2007: 40). While necessary, however, a predisposition to ironic detachment is not enough. A cosmopolitical orientation also entails an orientation of care for the world, understood as Arendt's conception of worldliness (Smith, 2007: 47). Sarah Scuzzarello has developed the concept of 'caring multiculturalism', which brings together the tradition of caring ethics with a feminist analysis of the challenges of existing multicultural practice across Europe (Scuzzarello, 2010). Her three core characteristics of a caring multiculturalism are, first, attentiveness to the context and circumstance of the immigrant minority; second, responsiveness to others in their own voices; and, third, a continued responsibility towards the actual outcomes of policies on the lives of those targeted by them. In the words of Turner, 'One can propose four stages in a cosmopolitan hermeneutics: recognition of the Other, respect for difference, critical mutual evaluation, and care for the Other' (2006: 142). Without a sense of common concern, a determination to support a collective sense of humanity, there can be little basis for trust, and without such trust the dialogical process breaks down. This is effectively what has happened to those countries experiencing the 'failure of multiculturalism'. Mutual mistrust has resulted in the loss of hope for mutually acceptable ways of being together and has thereby entrenched parallel societies, mutual solitudes and the politics of essentialism and retreatism.

Conclusion

The three ideal typical models have encapsulated a range of scholarship in the political psychology of migration and multiculturalism. 'Immigration and

assimilation' reflects the reality of a postcolonial Europe that has either subsumed or marginalised the cultural realities of non-European immigrants. The political psychology of overt racism, social exclusion and banal nationalism illuminates this experience of migration. The introduction of policies of multiculturalism reflects the challenges of accommodating diversity in those countries in which significant immigrant populations have become established. In the section 'Diversity and multiculturalism', I have explored how the mostly European model of accommodation contrasts with the integrationist model of North America and Australasia. The political psychology of support for multiculturalism as well as cultural exclusion and new racism are presented in this section. In the final section, 'Integration and the politics of engagement', I bring together a range of concepts to demonstrate how integrationist multiculturalism might be deepened into a more critical multiculturalism. As the scholarship presented in this section reveals, this is an emerging reality in many diverse countries and is being actively promoted. The political psychology of openness towards others, of contact, conviviality, bicultural and dual identities, strategic and context-dependent identity formation, supports the perspective that post-diasporic citizens are increasingly involved in what they consider to be their own political systems and demand inclusion and positive engagement. This is illustrated in the efforts by women in Muslim minority nations to negotiate social inclusion and to build bridges between communities. The basis for a sustained and critical multiculturalism and an assertive politics of engagement is dialogue, and the chapter explores the principal characteristics of dialogue from the perspective of political psychology. The cosmopolitical moment further opens the possibility of mutual exchange and effective citizenship through calling into question the boundaries of national states and thereby opening up the possibilities of political belonging. Cosmopolitics weakens xenophobia, social exclusion and ethnic nationalism. The chapter concludes by arguing that the necessary ironic detachment of a cosmopolitical orientation must be complemented by an ethic of care in order to ground a critical multiculturalism.

Notes

1. Denizens are aliens admitted to host countries on the basis of limited rights of residency.
2. Triggered by patterns of realistic conflict generated by the Eurozone crisis and attendant upsurges in neo-nationalist pride, the rise of extreme right-wing parties throughout contemporary Europe reflects current tendencies towards segregation and exclusion, in conformity with the expectations of Zick and his colleagues. Given these new tensions, further comparative research into levels of prejudice and discrimination is warranted.
3. *Hansard* is the verbatim proceedings of the parliament of Australia.

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17

Political and Civic Participation among Ethnic Majority and Minority Youth

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This chapter focuses on civic and political participation among youth, primarily in Europe although the review also draws on evidence from non-European countries in areas where European research is limited. Political science and political sociology only started to show an interest in youth participation in the post-Cold War era due to the emergence of new political forces (Youniss et al., 2002). Political psychology and social and community psychology took even longer to show an interest in youth participation. Initially, social researchers examined the political participation of national majority youth either for country-specific reasons (e.g. immigrants were viewed primarily in economic rather than civic terms in Germany due to the *Gastarbeiter* scheme) or because immigrant numbers were negligible (e.g. in southern European countries, which have traditionally been countries of emigration, not immigration). However, as immigrant numbers have risen over the past 20 years, the focus of social scientists studying youth political participation has shifted. Political participation has gradually come to be recognised as an essential aspect of the acculturation of minority youth and their adaptation and integration into their societies of residence (Berry et al., 2006).

In this chapter, 'political' and 'civic' participation are defined using a typology which captures not only conventional political participation, such as voting and standing for office, but also the non-conventional and civic activities of young people who do not have the right to access conventional forms of participation due to either their age (being under 18 years old) or their citizenship status (as migrants) (Martiniello, 2005; O'Toole et al., 2010; Zukin et al., 2006). The term 'political participation' will be used to refer to behaviours that have the intent or the effect of influencing governance, whether this be through conventional means involving electoral processes (such as voting, standing for office) or through non-conventional means which occur outside electoral processes (such as demonstrating, signing petitions, internet activism).

The term 'civic participation' will be used to refer to activity focused on helping others, achieving a public good or solving community problems (such as raising money for charity, helping neighbours, community volunteering).

Early research across many countries revealed very low levels of electoral participation and political interest among both national majority and ethnic minority youth, raising the alarming prospect of the emergence of a new apolitical generation (Franklin, 2002; IDEA, 1999; Youniss et al., 2002). Fears about the consequences of young people's rejection of primary democratic processes led to an increased interest in processes of youth political participation among social scientists. However, later research using broader definitions of political and civic participation (such as those used in the present chapter) failed to support claims about youth political apathy and instead revealed a shift in the participatory behaviour of both national majority and ethnic minority youth, away from conventional forms of participation towards 'unorthodox', more indirect and less institutional forms of participation. These new forms of participation include protesting, boycotting/buycotting, volunteering and using art, new technologies and social networks to express convictions, emotions and views on current public affairs (O'Toole et al., 2003; van Heelsum, 2002; Zukin et al., 2006).

In addition, recent events have revealed that social media in particular constitute a platform not only for the reflection or expression of one's views but also for organising 'real' action in response to political, social and economic reforms/events. The Arab Spring and the movement of 'Los Indignados' in Spain and in Greece in 2011–2012 were organised by young people sending text messages to mobile phones and Internet social network groups, leading to generalised national, political and social unrest, which put pressure on national governments and international institutions to listen and take action.

This chapter will review the numerous factors that are related to political and civic participation by majority and minority youth. These factors range from the macro-political and societal characteristics of the countries in which these individuals live, through demographic and proximal social factors, to endogenous psychological factors.

Political, social and demographic factors

Macro-institutional factors

Political participation in strictly conventional terms (such as voting, standing for elections, joining a political party) is dependent on the availability of institutional opportunities for participation and on the individual choice of whether or not to use these opportunities. People with citizenship status in European countries have the right and in some cases the official duty (e.g. in Greece, where voting is compulsory) to vote and to stand for office in local

and/or national elections. However, in most countries, these rights are only available after 18 years of age. In political terms, people younger than 18 years are deprived of the freedom to choose whether and how they will take up their citizenship rights and fulfil their duties. In addition, citizenship law determines the level of access to institutionalised political participation by immigrant youth over the age of 18. Such youth often remain unable to participate or have restricted access to the political system of their host country.

Another important factor in young people's political and civic participation is their access to civic organisations. The size and the density of the network of civic organisations in a country is a crucial factor for participation, as they provide not only the infrastructure for participation but also for mobilisation and for the development of social and political trust (Putnam, 2000). Focusing on minority groups' civic and political participation in the Netherlands, Fennema and Tillie (2001) found that there is a relationship between the size and density of the network of ethnic- or culture-based organisations in the country of residence and levels of participation among ethnic minority individuals aged over 18 years.

That said, Jacobs et al. (2004) failed to replicate these findings in Belgium among Moroccan and Turkish minority groups. They argue that the influence of ethnic social capital depends on the relationship between a community's organisations and the host society; the closer these organisations seem to be or aspire to be to the host society, either for cultural reasons such as common language and religion, or for historical reasons such as the colonial history of the countries, the higher is the relationship between participation in ethnic-based organisations and civic/political participation in the society of the country of residence.

Proximal social factors

The second set of factors that exert an impact on youth participation concerns not only the institutions that are closer to youth due to their age, especially the school and the family, but also religious institutions, youth organisations and popular discourse.

The school

There are three ways in which the school might influence youth participation: through the educational curriculum, through the provision of concrete experiences of participation and through classroom climate and the type of teaching which takes place within the classroom. In terms of the curriculum, although in most Western countries civic education is part of the educational agenda, research suggests that it is not very effective. For example, American national statistics on students' civic knowledge have shown that despite the provision of civic education, students' civic knowledge is often very low (Galston, 2004).

However, the way this subject is frequently taught is textbook knowledge-based, without involving critical thinking or engagement with practical activities (Losito and Mintrop, 2001).

Another method of teaching is through the provision of practical experience of civic and political participation. Most northern and western European and American educational institutions nowadays provide opportunities for students to engage with different types of civic or political action based on their personal interests and convictions. Certainly, the opportunity to experience and practise democratic processes, such as voting or standing for an election at school level through participation in school councils, has been found to predict both civic knowledge and the likelihood of voting in the future (Torney-Purta et al., 2001¹). However, results from studies in the United States on the effectiveness of educational programmes which combine practical experience and standard classroom-based delivery of lessons are mixed; some studies have found that the effect of service learning on civic responsibility is negligible, or that it does not last for more than a year after the end of the experience, while other studies have found that this effect is significant on a range of civic responsibility measures and the effect is significant even several years after the end of the experience (see Galston, 2001, for a review). This could be due to specificities of the American society and the way these programmes have been developed and implemented, or to the fact that the participation experiences that are provided are not of a sufficiently high quality. Similarly, in their study in Portugal and Italy with 16- to 26-year-old youth, Fernandes-Jesus et al. (2012) found that having experience of participation does not always lead to positive changes in dispositions to participate in the future: instead, only experience of high-quality participation (i.e. forms of participation which involve action and reflection in a supportive environment where pluralism and dissent are valued) fosters the relevant attitudes and dispositions which are required for future participation.

Research also shows that how democratic principles and processes are promoted and applied within the classroom (part of the 'hidden curriculum') is extremely important. For example, Torney-Purta et al. (2001) found that having an open classroom climate (i.e. the opportunity to discuss controversial social issues and to express and listen to differing opinions in the classroom) predicts young people's levels of civic knowledge and their likelihood of voting in the future; Hahn² (1998) also found that an open classroom climate predicts their levels of political interest and trust, while Azevedo and Menezes (2007) found in Portugal that an open classroom climate predicts the interpretation of political messages, dispositions for future political activity, political efficacy and political trust, factors which are all closely related to political participation. Furthermore, students' perceptions of teachers' practices, in terms of their level of democratic ethos within the classroom, have been found in the United States to predict

social justice beliefs and levels of civic commitment (Flanagan et al., 2007), while students who participate in classroom discussions about volunteering are more likely to volunteer on a regular basis, work on community problems, participate in charity fund-raising and try to influence other people's voting (Zukin et al., 2006). It is clear that the classroom climate and the methods that are used for teaching within the classroom are crucial to the success of civic education programmes.

The family

Another social institution which influences young people from both majority and minority backgrounds and which has traditionally been held responsible for influencing young people's levels and type of participation is the family and parental practices. For example, studies have revealed that levels of civic commitment are predicted by a family ethic of social responsibility (Flanagan et al., 1998); youth have higher levels of interest in political and social issues, and higher levels of civic knowledge, when their parents have high levels of interest in political and social issues (Schulz et al., 2010); youth are more likely to engage in protests if their parents engage in protests (Jennings, 2002); parents' political alienation and an authoritarian parenting style both predict levels of youths' political alienation (Gniewosz et al., 2009); and family climate (measured in terms of cohesion/expressivity, cultural/intellectual orientation and organisation/control) predicts young people's political literacy, civic knowledge, trust in institutions and political efficacy (Azevedo and Menezes, 2007).

In a study which examined patterns of participation among 16- to 26-year-old majority and minority youth living in London, Pachi and Barrett³ (2011a) found that ethnic culture plays an important role in moderating family influences, as well as being a direct influence on participation itself. For example, they uncovered differences in patterns of participation between British Bangladeshi and English youth, but also found that, in relation to public affairs, British Bangladeshi boys were more influenced by their fathers, while British Bangladeshi girls were more influenced by their mothers; in contrast, English male and female youth were both more influenced on these issues by their fathers.

Issues related to differences between the culture of the country of origin and the culture of the country of residence are also sometimes salient for ethnic minority youth. These may involve differences in family relationship values and differences in the balance between family obligations versus adolescents' rights to independence and participation in the majority society (Berry et al., 2006). These differences can create conflict between parents and their offspring, as parents try to transmit their heritage culture to their children (forcefully, when necessary), while youth themselves try to find a compromise between

their parents' demands and actively participate in the society in which they live (Pachi and Barrett, 2013).

In short, parental and family discourses and practices concerning civic and political affairs are clearly related to young people's civic and political participation. However, further research is required to ascertain precisely how family discourses and practices interact with the particular cultural situation of specific groups of minority youth in driving patterns of participation.

Other social factors

Participation in religious organisations (i.e. religious capital) is also related to civic and political participation. Much of the existing research on religion has been conducted on adults rather than young people (see Fanning and O'Boyle, 2010; Glynn, 2002; van Heelsum, 2002) and shows that higher levels of participation in religious organisations are often related to higher levels of participation in both civic and political organisations. However, studies with youth have also found links between religious capital and civic and political participation. For example, in the United Kingdom, Pachi and Barrett (2013) found that ethnic minority youth who were religious were more conservative in their political attitudes, more inclined to use conventional forms of political participation and more inclined to use forms of civic participation such as volunteering and donating money. It was also found that religion played an important role both through religious practices, such as attending a church regularly, listening to religious sermons and participating in youth groups organised by the church, and through the spiritual values of the religion itself. For example, religious leaders in African Christian churches in London were described as giving professional, personal and social/political direction to their congregation in relation to their life in the country of residence and in relation to the country of origin, which young people seemed to recognise and appreciate (Pachi and Barrett, 2013).

Reviewing the North American literature, Stepick and Stepick (2002) found higher rates of religiosity among immigrant youth in comparison to native-born American youth. However, in a study with South Florida students, Stepick, Rey and Mahler (2009) found: (1) no significant difference in religiosity between the two groups; (2) a relationship between religiosity and civic engagement both in immigrant groups of different denominations and in native born American youth; and (3) that immigrant youth participated as much as native-born youth. These results collectively show the importance of considering religion when examining youth political and civic participation, as well as the need for further research in this field.

Youth affiliations with voluntary organisations and youth programmes are also important for civic and political participation (Hart and Atkins, 2002; McFarland and Thomas, 2006; Putnam, 2000; Smith, 1999). However, the

availability of opportunities for youth participation and the quality of these opportunities are crucial factors here. Hart and Atkin's (2002) study of American urban versus suburban youth work showed that young people growing up in an urban environment have limited access to youth programmes and the quality of the existing programmes is lower than that of suburban youth programmes, leading to lower levels of adult political participation among urban youth in comparison to suburban youth.

Youth workers also play an important role in young people's levels of political participation. For example, youth workers were important figures of reference for the young people in Pachi and Barrett's (2013) study. Pearce and Larson (2006) also found that relationships with youth workers can be important for effecting a motivational change in young people towards civic activism. Pachi and Barrett's findings were especially pertinent to young people from deprived urban areas whose parents were either not available for discussions or who were not themselves interested in issues concerning social and political participation.

Another source of influence on youth participation is international hip hop/rap music. The role of hip hop/rap music as a means of political expression and action for youth and fans of this genre of music has long been acknowledged in American society (Stapleton, 1998; Tyson, 2004). Pachi and Barrett (forthcoming) also found that citizens' gender, age and race were portrayed in these lyrics as driving their relationship with society and with the state, and that the lyrics communicated the inevitability of a feeling of general social and political distrust. These discourses were adopted by those young people who listened to this music, and were used by them to explain their own lack of civic and political participation. Instead of being a means of political expression and engagement, hip hop/rap music appeared to be related to political apathy and inertia.

Another source of influence on youth participation has been discourse about the Freemasons and the Illuminati (Pachi and Barrett, 2013). Conspiracy theories about a ruling caste of people who control people's lives were found to be prevalent among Muslim young people in particular. These theories were perceived as providing the 'truth' about citizens' 'real' power, revealing that young people are powerless in front of a political system that pretends to be inclusive, responsive and participatory. These theories are also prevalent in hip hop/rap lyrics and appear to be related to specific ethnic and religious popular discourses (Gosa, 2011; Sanneh and Priest, 1997).

These findings together reveal that it is not only the school and the family that influence young people's patterns of participation. Several other social agents are also operative. Peer group discourse about 'powerful significant others' such as the Illuminati is especially interesting in that it is used to justify

political disengagement, social injustice and exclusion from current political processes and social structures (especially the exclusion of Muslim youth), while music is often a preferred and popular means through which youth express their political stance, anger and frustration over utopian images of a better future. It should be noted that these under-researched sources of influence may be just as important as the school and the family for the political and civic socialisation of youth.

Demographic factors

The demographic factors which have been researched the most in relation to civic and political participation are: socioeconomic status (SES), gender and, for ethnic minority people, migration generational status and language proficiency. The explanatory power of SES has been largely uncontested in the existing literature, for both ethnic minority and majority young people. However, some studies have pointed to a positive relationship, others to a negative one, and others have reported that this relationship is dependent on the type of participation (e.g., Lopez and Marcelo,⁴ 2008; Simon and Grabow,⁵ 2010). Future research needs to break SES down into its components (social class, income and education in particular) and to look at the relationship between each component and specific forms of participation, which might yield more consistent results.

Concerning gender, most studies have supported the existence of a gender difference in relation to forms of participation, with girls engaging and planning to engage more with socially focused actions than boys. In terms of levels of participation, girls may be more participative and more supportive of conventional forms of participation than boys (Hooghe and Stolle,⁶ 2004; Pachi and Barrett, 2012a; Stepick et al., 2009).

On examining ethnic minority young people in particular, two factors that have received attention are migrant generational status and language proficiency. The American literature has shown that second- and third-generation minority youth participate more than first-generation parents and national majority youth (Lopez and Marcelo, 2008; Stepick et al., 2008; Stepick and Stepick, 2002). Furthermore, both American and European studies have shown that higher levels of participation are related to higher proficiency in the language of the country of residence (Lopez and Marcelo, 2008; Pachi and Barrett, 2012a; Ramakrishnan and Baldassare,⁷ 2004).

Psychological factors

Political attentiveness, knowledge and interest

Three of the most researched psychological factors in political participation and, in particular, youth participation are political attentiveness, political

knowledge and political interest (Bynner and Ashford, 1994; Keeter et al., 2002; Semetko and Valkenburg, 1998). Knowledge and interest relate positively and strongly to each other and to youth civic and political participation both directly and indirectly (Lyons,⁸ 2008). Many quantitative studies show a gender gap, with females showing significantly lower levels of attentiveness, knowledge and interest in political issues (Mayer and Schmidt, 2004; Wolak and McDevitt, 2011). However, Pachi and Barrett's (2011c) study with girls aged 16–26 revealed a different pattern: girls showed as much if not more interest and knowledge of political issues.

SES (education and social class) is also related to youth political interest and knowledge; however, while studies with adults in the United States (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996) have shown that higher class and more educated people tend to know more and be more interested, research on young people has shown that the direction of these relationships depends on the form of participation (Bynner and Ashford, 1994). Group identification and, in particular, its politicised ideology has proved to be a good predictor of interest in politics and engagement in collective action in response to threat and social injustice among adult populations (Klandermans, 2002; Reicher, 1996). A study on young British Muslims, conducted after the London bombings when Muslim identity was at the forefront of political debates, also found a strong and positive relationship between religious identity, knowledge and interest in politics (Lyons, 2008).

The advent of modern communication technologies and the Internet has generated optimism about their potential role to revive youth interest and knowledge in politics (Kapor, 2003). However, the findings of Keeter et al. (2002) and Pachi and Barrett (2011c) failed to provide evidence for this optimism; Pachi and Barrett (2011c) found that youth use the Internet primarily as a medium for entertainment rather than as a political platform. That said the Internet does favour particular forms and use of information and knowledge. It can be strategically used by stigmatised groups due to its potential for anonymity.

Trust

Trust is also important in the psychological underpinnings of young people's early politicisation and active sustainable civic engagement in social movements. Trust can be conceptualised at three levels: at the interpersonal level, at the social level and at the political level. Interpersonal trust refers to an everyday micro level of trust at an interpersonal level, while social trust refers either to this micro level or to trust in larger social groups, for example, trust in women or trust in an ethnic minority group. On the other hand, political trust works on a macro level, referring to the relationship between citizens and different levels of political institutions, from politicians to an incumbent

government to the political regime of a country (Citrin and Muste, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 1997). Fukuyama (1995) and Levi (1998) have shown that a trustworthy government can actually generate interpersonal trust which, in turn, can help people to be more productive and to live in a more peaceful, cooperative and democratic society. Putnam (2000), on the other hand, argues that the reverse can happen as well: the more citizens interact with each other, the more likely they are to trust each other and the more likely they are to trust civil and political institutions.

Concerning the relationship between political trust and political participation, the traditional literature on trust has not been conclusive on the relationship between trust and participation. Some researchers believe that citizens who trust authorities will participate more, at least in conventional activities like voting, while others believe that it is distrust that stimulates political involvement, at least for those who feel politically efficacious (Levi and Stoker, 2000). In relation to youth political and civic participation, all three levels of trust have been addressed empirically, and there is evidence that they can predict participation in some contexts (Fennema and Tillie, 2001; Putnam, 2000; Torney-Purta et al., 2004). However, neither Lyons (2008) nor Pachi and Barrett (2012a) found evidence for trust operating as the main significant predictor of either conventional or non-conventional participation among youth in Britain.

Efficacy

Another extensively researched psychological factor is efficacy. Efficacy is also a multi-level concept, with distinctions between internal efficacy (i.e. the belief that one understands political issues and feels able to have an effect on the political situation), external efficacy (i.e. the belief that politicians and political institutions are responsive to citizens' demands and needs) and collective efficacy (i.e. the belief that one's group is able to have an effect on the political situation). In most studies, the more efficacious in civic and political terms the individual or group is perceived to be, the more that individual tends to participate; similarly, the more efficacious different political or social actors are perceived to be, the more the individual tends to participate in processes controlled by these actors.

There is an extensive literature on how to measure political efficacy but not on the predictors of efficacy as it is a concept that is most often used to predict other attitudes, behaviours or emotions. Internal efficacy is related to political attentiveness and the scale (local vs. national) of the issue under consideration (O'Toole et al., 2003;⁹ Semetko and Valkenburg, 1998¹⁰). Low external efficacy among youth leads to low political and civic participation (O'Toole et al., 2003; Pachi and Barrett, 2011a), while perceptions of a lack of responsiveness by political actors, politicians' disregard for individual and collective action,

and perceived ineffectiveness of the political system, have all been found to be related to low political participation among ethnic minority youth (Pachi and Barrett, 2011a).

Group identification

A further psychological factor is group identification. Lyons (2008) reports a range of findings concerning the role of group identifications in youth participation, especially participation through the Internet and social media. Research on the Internet, online social networks and youth political participation has increasingly focused on the opportunities and effectiveness of the media of 'e-democracy' to reinvent institutional structures and procedures and to strengthen government's ability to reach out to its citizens (Dahlberg, 2001; Delli Carpini, 2000), especially to the 'hard to reach' groups, such as young people of both majority and minority groups. The Internet and online social networks are not just places for social interaction or for the expression of one's individual views, but also a platform where online political discussions can take place and where mainstream collective action can be organised. In the United Kingdom, Livingstone et al. (2005) have found that young people develop and express their political identities through seeking information or advice using the Internet, visiting civic or political websites, and interacting with or creating a website or Internet groups.

Lyons (2008) also found that computer-mediated action was sometimes preferred over traditional forms of participation by young people from different ethnic origins in Europe, but that different forms of participation related differently to various identifications. For example, for British Muslims in particular, the choice of the Internet was related differently to national and ethnic collective identities. Levels of ethnic identification were related to use of the Internet to support minority political rights, while levels of national identification were related to willingness to engage in peaceful conventional activities to protect minority rights. The latter finding demonstrates the complex ways in which minority groups balance ethnic, religious and national ideologies: it suggests that, in cases of high national identification and high levels of perceived discrimination, ethnic minority groups may not want the majority group to perceive their political protest as a neglect of, or a barrier to, their integration into the host society.

As far as identification is concerned, it is arguable that too much empirical emphasis has been given to the study of single identities that are assumed by the researcher to be the most salient in the contexts under study. All individuals have to negotiate sets of multiple and potentially conflicting identities. As Chrysochoou and Lyons (2010) argue, it is necessary to include measures of the perceived (in)compatibility between national, ethnic and religious identities in explaining political behaviour, as the relationship between them is a

political statement expressing power struggles and ideological debates about biculturalism's viability within the national polity. For example, Lyons (2008) reports that while perceived incompatibility in itself fails to predict youth political participation directly, perceived (in)compatibility between national and religious identities does relate to youth perceptions of the effectiveness of the different modes of participation.

Perceived availability of opportunities for participation

The perception that there are opportunities available for participation is a further important psychological factor that impacts on young people's patterns of participation. Pachi and Barrett (2011b) found that young people, irrespective of cultural background, emphasised the problem of the low visibility of opportunities as well as the lack of an adequate number and quality of opportunities for participation. Indeed, most of the youth in their study, especially ethnic minority youth, reported that they had no knowledge of opportunities for participation other than local and national elections to which they did not have access before 18 years of age. They also reported that even though other opportunities might exist, these had not been communicated to them.

Perceived conflict between heritage and national cultures

Finally, Pachi and Barrett (2011b) also found that perceptions of a conflict between the parental home culture and the culture of the country of residence, both at an intrapersonal and at an intra-family and societal level, was a barrier to political and civic participation by some minority female youth in particular. The young people in their study thought that their battle was on many levels and not an easy one to win. However, support and encouragement to continue fighting this battle was for these young women offered by their religion (Islam), which was seen as supporting and promoting female participation in public issues. This conflict, however, was not raised by all ethnic minority females: only British Bangladeshi females reported it, not Congolese females. The dimensions of culture (including both religion and traditional ethnic culture) which Congolese females experienced as barriers to their political and civic participation included the traditional Congolese female role of submissive apolitical women and the 'laid back' characteristic of their culture.

Concluding remarks

This review has revealed the complexity of youth participation and demonstrates the need for all of the following issues to be taken into account by future research in this field.

First, there is a need for a clear conceptualisation and typology of specific forms of political and civic participation when trying to identify the processes leading to youth participation. For example, voting, demonstrating, participating through the Internet and engaging in consumer boycotts are different forms of participation, and each may well be subject to different influences. However, the influences that operate for each particular form of participation may also differ from one national-institutional context to another, and may differ within any given national-institutional context from one ethnic group to another. Our reading of the empirical findings is that this is indeed the case. For this reason, we would argue that it is necessary to be cautious and to not over-interpret existing findings by making generalised claims about the predictors of each individual form of participation based only on data collected in a limited number of national contexts from a limited number of ethnic groups.

Second, it is important to use clear definitions of the concepts whose explanatory power and role is being examined in relation to youth participation. Concepts such as 'trust', 'efficacy' and 'identity' function on multiple levels and have a different relationship to youth participation depending on their agent (personal/group), their target and the issue under consideration. Therefore, using the psychologically relevant forms of these concepts (such as using youth identity instead of national identity in relation to internet participation, or using social trust instead of interpersonal trust) may be vital for constructing an effective understanding of youth civic and political behaviour. In order to identify psychologically relevant forms, further research is required to examine young people's own thinking and reasoning about different forms of participation.

Third, it is also crucial to take into account the role of culture in the development of participation. As has just been noted, existing research suggests that not only participatory behaviours but also influences on participation vary across ethnic groups. Furthermore, the efforts of parents to transmit their own heritage culture to their offspring are likely to influence the younger generations' patterns of participation. However, ethnic culture intersects with both gender and age, with boys and girls of different ages from different ethnic and/or religious groups having different concerns in relationship to political and civic participation. Complex processes take place during the negotiation of multiple social affiliations/identifications by youth, and the complexity of these processes needs to be taken much more seriously by researchers investigating patterns of youth participation. Youth are not a homogeneous group.

Finally, this review emphasises the need for research to adopt a much more complex multilevel approach to the study of youth participation. As we have shown, youth participation is a product of influences operating at many

different levels, including the macro-political-institutional and societal level, the proximal social level and the psychological level, with variations in patterns of influence occurring according to each individual's own demographic characteristics. An example of such an approach in the research literature is provided by the PIDOP project, in which the macro, demographic, social and psychological levels were all simultaneously studied, with data being collected from both national majority and ethnic minority groups in each of nine different national settings. It is clear that further theoretical accounts need to incorporate factors at all these different levels, and that further cross-national comparative research is vital, if they are to provide an effective explanation of the nature and origins of youth political and civic participation.

Notes

1. This study, the IEA Civic Education study, was conducted in 1999 in 28 countries (Australia, Belgium (French), Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Switzerland, Denmark, England, the Slovak Republic, Sweden and the United States); 90,000 14-year-old students participated in the study.
2. Hahn's (1998) study was conducted in five countries (the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany and the United States) in three waves from 1986 to 1995; it was a multi-methodological study using 5,400 questionnaires completed by adolescents, classroom observations, student and teacher, individual and group interviews.
3. This study was conducted as part of a larger transnational research project 'Processes Influencing Democratic Ownership and Participation' (PIDOP); see <http://www.fahs.surrey.ac.uk/pidop/> for further details of the project. In the first phase of Pachi and Barrett's study, 100 English, Congolese and British Bangladeshi young people participated in ethnic-specific focus groups where they discussed issues related to their perceptions, levels and quality of civic and political participation.
4. Lopez and Marcelo's (2008) study was conducted in the United States with immigrant populations and their children aged 15–25 years old.
5. Simon and Grabow's (2010) study was conducted in Germany with members of the Russian community; there were no age-significant results.
6. Hooghe and Stolle's (2004) study was conducted in the United States with 14-year-old adolescents.
7. Ramakrishnan and Baldassare's (2004) study was conducted with native-born American and immigrant adults in California, the United States.
8. Lyons' (2008) study 'Political Trust and Political Participation amongst Young People from Ethnic Minorities in the NIS and EU: A social psychological investigation', was conducted as part of a larger international project that involved the participation of 1,327 adolescents (with ages ranging from 15 to 18 years old) drawn from ethnic majority and minority groups born and raised in England, the Netherlands, Greece,

- Spain, Russia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Georgia. The project was funded by INTAS, the International Association for the Promotion of Cooperation with Scientists from the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union.
9. O'Toole et al.'s (2003) study was conducted in the United Kingdom with young people aged 16–25 years old.
 10. Semetko and Valkenburg's (1998) study was conducted in East and West Germany with an adult population.

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18

Fear, Insecurity and the (Re)Emergence of the Far Right in Europe

Catarina Kinnvall

Introduction

With their 24 per cent support, the far right party Front National has been described as the largest party in France, larger than the ruling Socialist Party and larger than the conservative bloc. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the EU (European Union)-critical UK Independence Party (Ukip) is stealing votes from the Conservative party and became the biggest party in the 2014 EU elections. In Finland the True Finns, a party striving to keep cultural groups separate, gained almost 20 per cent of the votes in the 2011 election, and in Hungary paramilitary demonstrations have been organised by Jobbik, another far right party, against Roma people. In Greece the extreme right-wing party Golden Dawn (Chrysi Avgi) has entered the city council of Athens for the first time, while extremist militias have taken over law and order in some areas with a dense immigrant population. Throughout Europe, we see how the far right is gaining votes, power and influence at the expense of other, more mainstream parties.

As movements they have been compared to the Tea Party lobby in the United States, mainly because of their tendency to blame economic and social problems on immigrants (and more specifically on Muslims) and for their inclination to encourage resistance towards central powers. In the United States, this means resisting the federal administration in Washington, in Europe it often refers to Brussels and the EU (Sirkes, 2012). However, these parties and movements are not identical and they do not all have the same goals. The True Finns are more Eurosceptic than anti-Muslim for instance, while the Danish People's Party and the Sweden Democrats are obsessed by immigration and Islam. The Northern League in Italy contains a mixture of loathing for immigrants, the EU and Italy's southern regions, while Belgium's Vlaams Belang stands for Flemish independence in addition to anti-Islamic messages. This can be illustrated through Vlaams Belang's constant ideological production of 'Europe' in

opposition to the EU. The EU is held responsible for excessive non-European immigration, whereas 'Europe' is imagined as a positive construct connected with the idea of Flanders as a 'European' nation (Adamson and Johns, 2008). Some, like the Front National are trying to distance themselves from their fascist and anti-Semitic pasts, while others, like Jobbik and Golden Dawn, still use attired uniforms and jackboots as visible symbols of their movements. In general anti-Semitism is higher among parties and movements on the far right in Poland, Hungary, the Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania – all linked to a fascist history (Wilson and Hainsworth, 2012), while Anti-Roma attitudes are predominant in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Italy, France and beyond. Homophobia is also a common far right feature, especially in Eastern Europe and in Ireland – thus drawing upon wider religious conservative values (Mudde, 2007).

What these movements share, however, is a claim to speak for the 'silent majority', those who have been robbed of an 'authentic' voice through majoritarian discourse and who have been ignored by mainstream political parties. A relatively recent *Economist* article (2011) argued for instance that:

Europe has a dissonant new voice. Anti-Muslim, anti-elite, anti-globalisation and increasingly anti-Brussels They come in many varieties, but all claim to represent what Pierre Poujade, France's original post-war populist, called 'the ripped-off, lied-to little people'.

(Löw, 2011: 276)

Helene Löw (2011: 276) refers to these as anti-establishment voices: 'We say what you think – against the political and cultural establishment.' This opens up significant space for what Heather Grabbe from the Open Society Institute in Brussels refers to as the 'politics of resentment against the elite' (*Economist*, 2011). The legitimisation of far right movements thus claims 'democratic' credentials by speaking against the establishment, by professing to speak for those who have been denied a voice. In doing this, they often rely on a constructed and idealised nostalgic past intermeshed with discourses of religious threats and national survival in the light of rapid change and economic insecurity.

In this chapter, I discuss how these far right movements have emerged as social-psychological responses to a politics of fear, insecurity and vulnerability and the reasons behind their affective (as well as electoral) success in Europe and elsewhere. In order to do this, I start by outlining what such a politics of fear and insecurity looks like. I then move on to describe how nation and religion are constructed among the far right as securitised responses to these political discourses of fear and insecurity. Thereafter, I proceed to outline a number of structural and psychoanalytical dimensions of these psychological constructs and how they are related to gendered notions of masculinity

and to the individual search for ontological security. Finally, I provide some general comments on how to prevent the growth of the far right in which a radical de-essentialisation process of nationhood and gender are some of its prerequisites.

A politics of fear and insecurity

Much of the sociological literature on the politics of risk (Beck, 1998, 2008); the politics of belonging (Bauman, 2001); and the existential effects of modernity and liberalisation (Giddens, 1991; Huysmans, 2006) aim to understand fear as a social and psychological construction in which global, often neoliberal, policies affect individuals in their everyday lives. These risks are related to political, social and economic changes in the world but are not reduced to such factors as there is no direct causal relation between real global transformations and their discursive elements. For instance, it would be difficult to argue that the current economic crisis has been a decisive factor in the growth of the far right as much of this already took place in the 1980s and the 1990s. The particular strength of far right parties in prosperous Austria and Switzerland would also be hard to explain on these terms. However, this does not mean there is no relationship between macro-structural change and fear perceptions. Ample warnings about the austerity measures and further rise in far right activities have been given (see Mammone, 2013), and it is possible to discern some general trends in relation to economic and political change that have affected a sense of security and belonging. Hence, across Europe we find how educationally deprived people are experiencing unemployment and loss of prestige. While the employment rate in the EU is 84 per cent among the highly skilled, it is 70 per cent among those with medium qualifications and 49 per cent in the case of low-skilled people (European Union, 2010). We may not be able to establish any direct causation between a low social status and the support for far right politics, but there is a strong documented relation between 'subjective deprivation', that is, the subjective feeling of being unprivileged and far right support (see e.g. Decker et al., 2010).

Hence, the discursive construction of fear, anxiety and threat can be as real to those seemingly affected as are any actual economic and physical dangers. These constructions can be related to a number of reactions to globalisation and post-industrialism, such as economic and political change, party realignment, the weakening of the welfare state, crises of legitimacy for ordinary parties, social marginalisation, migration, unemployment, crime, changed gender relations but also to a more general feeling of cultural and/or national 'loss' – feelings that are often related to living in an increasingly modern and globalised world in which narratives of who we are and where we come from seem to affect everyday life (Betz, 2003; Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011; Mudde, 2007;

Scholte, 2000). Hence, a number of quantitative or experimental studies show that cultural threats to identity are more likely to induce exclusionary reactions to immigrants and multiculturalism than threats to economic well-being (Koopmans et al., 2005; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Sniderman et al., 2004):

These supporters are an ideologically motivated segment of the public which reacts to social and cultural changes [...] by trying to slow down the effects of these changes, and by overcoming their own insecurities by scapegoating minorities, immigrants, leftists, feminists and others as threats to the integrity of the national community. As such, these voters or supporters are modernization opponents or 'subjective' modernization losers.

(Minkenberg, 2011: 14)

In terms of the far right and particularly in relation to the more recent emergence of counter-Jihad movements,¹ predominant narratives are increasingly being related to specific events involving Islam and Muslims, such as September 11 and July 7, but also to more local experiences like wearing the hijab or the niqab, the building of mosques or minarets and freedom of press and publication. The events of 9/11 in many ways opened up a new discursive transformation in much European discourse from a national focus on 'Turks', 'Moroccans' and 'Pakistanis', for instance, to a more or less 'acceptable' xenophobia and Islamophobia focused on Muslims. This, Cas Mudde (2007) says, has been especially evident in Denmark and the Netherlands but has also been the case in many other places. The British National Party (BNP), for example, recently promised a 'Counter Jihad: Confronting the Islamic Colonisation of Britain' (BNP, 2010; in Wilson and Hainsworth, 2012: 11).

Although European far right movements and European counter-Jihad movements often overlap, they do have certain dissimilarities related to security issues and a politics of fear. In contrast to older far right parties, the counter-Jihad movements often reject elections and aim for confrontational and street-based protests that frequently challenge public order. In doing this, their protests tend to be framed within historical discourses of anti-Islamist struggles at the same time as they are portrayed as a response to increased unemployment, debt and the 'forced mixing of the races' (Goodwin, 2013: 3). Counter-Jihad movements also tend to rely on quite transitory groups and memberships and often distance themselves from 'white supremacy' movements by seeking support from non-Muslim communities as well as from the larger gay, lesbian and transsexual communities. As such, their political discourses often lack explicit ideological programs but are mainly framed around issues of intolerance and inequality manifest in Islamic 'fanaticism' which is presented as being incompatible with democratic values and Western culture (Goodwin, 2011b).

However, there are also similarities. Both the far right and the counter-Jihad movements are prolific handlers of media in general and the Internet in particular – a tool increasingly used to spread their messages and to provide inspiration to activists. In the apocalyptic narratives on the website *Gates of Vienna*, one of the inspirations and outlets for the Norwegian extremist and killer Anders Behring Breivik, these views are commonly described as a resistance to ‘Orthodox Secularism’ (or some variant thereof). Orthodox secularism is designated as the new religion of the West. It is blamed for a policy of open borders, for multiculturalism, for the mixing of races, for the lack of any moral absolutes, for free market strategies and for EU interference in internal affairs. As one of its contributors writes: ‘Race trumps border security, preventing us from stanching the flow of illegal immigrants into this country, a flow which may well conceal al Qaeda members’ (*Gates of Vienna*, 5 January 2012). This statement is but one of many examples of how future scenarios are used to further enhance a politics of fear in which exclusionary border actions can be legitimised.

In terms of counter-Jihad movements, the Internet has also played a crucial role for the planning of meetings and gatherings at short notice and for designing identical websites across European societies (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun, 2013). As van Troost et al. (2013) have argued, a successful collective gathering is a process of transforming emotions such as anger and fear into other emotions like hope, enthusiasm and solidarity. The use of social media also provides a selling point in terms of how these parties claim to exist where most people *are* today, on the web, rather than relying on traditional means of communications. In addition, social media allow for far right parties and movements to spread across a wider audience and at a lower cost than their organisational and financial resources might allow. Personal, more or less authoritarian, emotional appeals are also well suited for media performances:

From Jörg Haider and Pim Fortuyn to Pia Kjaersgaard (‘Mama Pia’) and Marine Le Pen (‘Marine’) and now Timo Soini of the True Finns, the far right has in this sense been able to deploy its authoritarian character to advantage, with the cult of the leader’s personality chiming well with the media appetite for larger-than-life figures.

(Wilson and Hainsworth, 2012: 17)

A politics of fear is not simply about manipulating opinion through online websites, media or party propaganda, however, but exists in its own right as well as individuals and groups struggle to cope with uncertainty. This mode of powerlessness and anxiety clearly predates 9/11, but this event has also created a foundation for emerging responses to events like it, thus thriving on the sensibility of vulnerability where the fear of the unknown becomes the product

of cultural imagination. Such imaginations create a sense of living in an era of terror, faced by a new species of terrorist threat (Furedi, 2007). Molly Andrews shows how the events of 9/11 triggered a frenetic patriotism among Americans and the duty to avenge the deaths of the attacks was perceived by many as 'a moral imperative' (Andrews, 2007: 106). Here the dominant narrative became one of patriotism and celebration of American life, and every form of dissent was read as unpatriotic. The protagonists of the 9/11 narrative were also well defined according to gendered and racialised signifiers. Laura Shepherd (2006, in Scuzzarello 2010) shows for instance that the heroes of this narrative were 'decent ordinary citizens' and that they were exclusively male and white.

Being male and white seems to correspond with cross-national findings of those who are most likely to buy into a discursive narrative of insecurity and risk – at least if we look at the European support base of far right parties. Hence, even if we control for other factors, such as occupation, education and age, we find that men are roughly 40 per cent more likely to vote for the far right than female voters. This remains the case even amongst voters of the Norwegian Progress Party and the Danish People's Party (which have both had female leaders), where about two thirds of the voters are male (Heidar and Pedersen, 2006).² This has led some observers to speak about *Männerparteien* (male parties) with regard to the far right, thus emphasising a clear gender gap in terms of voting behaviour (Decker, 2004; Geden, 2005). Such a gender gap is well documented in terms of voter support, while few studies actually analyse the narratives of nationalism and populism from a gendered perspective or constructions of masculinity more generally within far right discourse.

The fact that narratives are constrained by the socio-historical and cultural context does not mean that there is no space for agency. Narrative, in fact, 'requires agency'. People have a position, a place, in a story and they internalise, process and interpret the information that is provided by and to them through narratives. Of relevance is thus not only how categories shape collective mobilisations (which categorisation theory often focuses on), but how these internalisations are both perceptions of the present and attempts to make the future. The definition that best succeeds in ordering the future is more important than whether it accurately represents the present (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). The emotional meaning of these narratives is thus important to the tone and impact they may have on the public sphere. Barry Richards (2013) has suggested that we need to understand the ways in which all leaders, politicians and movements are engaged in reading and responding to current feelings that seem to be out there and how they, in so doing, are engaged in emotional governance. With emotional governance he refers mainly to the work of what he calls 'emotional management' – the everyday emotionally charged utterances and statements made by politicians and other prominent figures.

However, emotional governance can also be read in a larger Foucauldian sense as techniques of surveillance and manipulation. As Foucault (1978) has noted, journalists and other prominent figures have an important role to play in shaping the emotional climate on a national and international level – contributing to what Richards calls the ‘tone of the emotional public sphere’.

This has led a number of scholars writing on the far right to argue that far right movements and parties are not simply bystanders and passive recipients who channel the political climate, but active agents in the narratives about their success and failure in relation to other parties, often by taking ‘ownership’ of controversial issues such as immigration (Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Odmalm, 2011). Hence, the attributes of the parties themselves are a key factor in ensuring their success and internalist and party-centred interpretations of far right performance are important. As Williams (2006: 37) explains, party structure and organisational capacity count: ‘The closer a group gets to sophisticated party organisation, the more likely their prospects for effective policy impact will be.’ This is clearly related to both agency and ownership. ‘Taking ownership’ of an issue comes close to what the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al., 1998; Weaver, 1993) refers to as *securitisation*, defined as the process in which an issue once presented and accepted as an existential threat, prompts reactions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. To securitise an issue (for instance, migration), that has not previously been viewed in security terms is to challenge society to promote its value by committing greater resources to solving the related problems. Without going into the details of securitisation theory, of importance here is how a politics of fear almost always involves clear identity boundaries in which certain people, groups or elements of society become securitised.

The far right and the securitisation of nation and religion

In line with a politics of fear, narratives of the past are often used to supply ontological security in the present. By ontological security I refer to ‘security of being’, a sense of biographical continuity in the light of emerging changes (Giddens, 1991; Kinnvall, 2004; Laing, 1960). Critical of the inhumanity of late-modern societies, Laing writes of the range of threats to ontological security that arise from the often engulfing character of conventional social structures and of the coldness of alienated social relations that commodify and depersonalise individuals. Giddens (1991) takes his point of departure in Laing’s work but is careful to introduce an aspect of ontological security that has to do with basic trust and the mutuality of experience (Zarakol, 2010), thus making more explicit the relational aspects of the term. Hence, individuals act and react to disruptive change by reinforcing a sense of trust and control as a means to re-establish a previous identity or formulating a new one (Erikson, 1959; Kinnvall,

2003, 2004, 2006; Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011; 2013). This search for one stable identity involves what I have previously referred to as the *securitisation of subjectivity*. The securitisation of subjectivity is a process that seeks to build walls of ontological security around an idea of the self through the refusal to permit ambiguity or problematisation in cultures or social structures.

Recreating a past, in terms of a singular, and often linear, reading of the nation, history, culture and people is a good example of this process. One of the most crucial modern identity discourses is reflected in our dependence on linear narratives for telling the stories about ourselves (Somers, 1994). Such narratives seriously impede our ability to move beyond the illusion of consistent, unitary identities and selfhood in which nationalism and other single identifications can supply an anchorage (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011). In the literature on the far right, this longing for the nation has been referred to as *nativism*, meaning ‘an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the “nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the nation-state’ (Mudde, 2007: 22).

Nativism, together with authoritarianism and populism are, according to Cas Mudde (2007), the defining features of the far right. By authoritarianism he means a ‘belief in a strictly ordered society in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely’, and with populism he denotes a ‘thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of [...] the general will of the people’ (Mudde, 2007: 21–23). Mudde’s definitions can be contrasted with other scholars differentiation between what they call resentment to ethno-pluralism (i.e., that different ethnicities should not ‘mix’ as this undermines cultural traditions) and welfare chauvinism (in which immigrants are cast as criminals or living off the welfare state – where immigrants and ‘natives’ are depicted as competing for limited economic resources). The common argument here is that only the former is linked to xenophobia and racism among the voters of far right parties (e.g. Rydgren, 2004, 2005). However, this division fails to acknowledge the re-bordering and securitisation processes of national and European identity that is implicit in both attitudes. Both welfare chauvinists and those objecting to ethno-pluralism display elements of xenophobia if understood as an unreasonable fear of foreigners or strangers or of their politics or culture with the aim to reconstruct borders around the so-called native populations.

In this regard, both the far right and the counter-Jihad movements rest on a political ideology that has as its core myth the homogenous nation – a romantic and often populist version of the homeland and homeland culture. Hence, a key element of the anti-establishment stance is the idea of the homeland of

betrayed people – that the established parties have ‘sold out’ the homeland and/or the welfare state in favour of multiculturalism. In Sweden, parties on the far right look back at Sweden of the 1950s and 1960s as the ‘dream country’ with social welfare, high employment rates, progress and very few immigrants from non-European countries.³ The idea of the ‘people’s home’ – the myth of the *folkhem* – is a vision that has played a central role in Swedish post-war history (Löow, 2011). As Sigel has noted, ‘There exists in humans a powerful drive to maintain the sense of one’s identity, a sense of continuity that allays fear of changing too fast or being changed against one’s will by outside forces’ (1989: 459). Longing for home or homesteading practices thus become social-psychological responses to ontological insecurity among many (predominantly) young European men. Homesteading or homemaking is similar to how Roland Barthes (1973) once wrote about myths as a special kind of narrative that depoliticises and naturalises historical contingencies.

Such naturalisation of history has prompted the argument that a post-9/11 world defined by security and terror discourses is characterised by a re-coupling, rather than a decoupling, of citizenship and nationality (Kofman, 2005; Lister, 2008). This, Joppke (2008) argues, is especially the case in Europe as many European people and states have reacted against politicised Islam. Hence, surveys indicate how across Europe there appears to be a ‘growing fear’ among Europeans of Islam and Muslim immigration (EUMC, 2006; Zick et al., 2011). In Denmark this is confirmed by recent survey results, showing that around 55 per cent of all those questioned viewed Islam as a threat to the unity of Danish society (Meret, 2011), and in an eight-country survey reported in 2011 there was considerable agreement with the statement ‘There are too many Muslims in this country’, ranging from 61 per cent in Hungary, to between 49 and 42 per cent in Italy, Poland, Germany, Britain and the Netherlands, to 36 per cent in France and 27 per cent in Portugal (Zick et al., 2011, see also Küpper and Zick, Chapter 14). Of importance though is how the nativist argument, or the myth of the nation, is not limited to the far right but is an important part of the nation-building process *per se*.

Hence, we must understand how nation-building relies on an essentialist discourse of nationalism as a construction of the *nation-as-this* and the *people-as-one* (Calhoun, 1997), which are supposed to guide social and political action in the name of a particular ethnos (being British for instance) and a certain imagined political space (Britain as the home of Britishness). Such a unity of the nation is constructed in a narrative form by which stories, images, symbols and rituals represent ‘shared’ meanings of nationhood (Billig, 1995; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). The far right’s use of ‘our people’, ‘our homeland’, ‘our traditions and values’ are all examples of ‘emotional governance’ in terms of their affective and emotional appeal. National identity, in other words, becomes a

way of unifying cultural diversity, which per definition relies on the exclusion of some groups from the national imaginary (Kinnvall, 2006). Thus, most far right discourse is concerned with the delineation of internal and external borders in which different enemies are delineated.

One of the key internal enemies in much far right discourse is the elite, often described in terms of 'traitors' and contrasted with 'honourable patriots'. Such elites are commonly linked to a willingness to open the borders to (non-European) immigrants and are viewed as the originators of mass-immigration. They consist of leftists, trade unionists and big business (in need of cheap labour) and favour immigrants or local minorities (like the 'Gypsies' or the 'Turks') (Mudde, 2007). This was clearly an important part of the extremist Anders Behring Breivik's 'manifesto' in which he subscribed to a 'conspiracy thesis,' common among many counter-Jihad groups and movements, to justify the killings of government workers and young social democrats. In this thesis, Western societies are governed by feminist, politically correct elites, so-called 'cultural Marxists', who since the end of the Second World War have systematically deconstructed traditional Western values and traditions and allowed for massive Muslim immigration to Europe. This discourse became enmeshed into a threat against Norway and the borders of Norwegian identity and justified a world worth killing for (Kinnvall, 2012, 2013). Through such narrations, discourses on terror became intimately linked with discourses on 'normality' and with the 'limits of cultural diversity' (Fekete, 2009). Internal enemies of the conservative far right thus often include so-called deviants, 'sexual deviants' (homosexuals), 'perverters' (those described as perverting young people through their behaviour), feminists, junkies and drug dealers. Feminists and homosexuals are particularly singled out as threats to the survival of the nation (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun, 2013; Mudde, 2007), even if it is cultural diversity that has received the most attention.

The external enemy within is mainly the 'newcomers', the 'immigrants', the cultural and religious 'other'. In Western Europe, this space has increasingly come to be occupied by the Muslim other as discussed above, while in Eastern Europe it is often linked to ethnic (national) minorities. In much xenophobic discourse on refugees, immigrants and/or minorities, these are frequently described as not being 'proper' nationals, as 'stealing jobs', as 'bogus' economic immigrants, 'criminal foreigners' and as 'welfare parasites' (EUMC, 2006; Goodwin, 2011). An authoritarian vision of a secure state is propagated, a police state where security and the fight against immorality are central issues and where more direct democracy is needed. A recent study found that far right parties' campaigns tend to be most successful if they are able to relate immigration to crime and as posing a cultural rather than an economic threat (Goodwin, 2011; Mudde, 2007). This cultural threat is specifically focused on the religion

of Islam and Muslims. In such readings religion, like the nation, consists of a discursive, often essentialist view of its realm as an organic whole and is defined in terms of core cultural characteristics (Kinnvall, 2006). Visions of a Muslim takeover have led movements on the far right, especially counter-Jihad movements, to increasingly stress Christian identity themes and a move towards pro-Jewish and pro-Israel positions, framing their supporters as 'the defenders of equality, liberty and tolerance against their main enemy, Islam, described as a religion of fanaticism and intolerance, incompatible with democratic values and Western culture' (Mayer, 2013: 163).

Of particular importance is the extent to which these nationalist and religious narratives have intensified the search for tradition, and women as symbols of such traditions, as people are increasingly becoming categorised into religious and national groups. This tendency reflects a larger political problem as culturalist policies encourage essentialist, often romanticised, singular views of culture as unchanging and unchangeable products rather than processes. Such neo-racism (Volkan, 1997) is not grounded in biology but in anthropology and in an ideological commitment and is commonly disguised in political discourse as being simply a matter of cultural differences.

The far right and gendered notions of masculinity

These cultural differences are discursively constructed in terms of national and religious belonging. They are connected to cultural racism and othering but also to gender and social reproduction. Family metaphors are crucial to much of this discourse, where the family is portrayed as the core institution and where women serve as maintainers of tradition and often religion. In much far right discourse, this is intimately linked with social reproduction to prevent the decline or death of the national and cultural heritage of the next generation. This implies that gender often comes to constitute the essence of religion, tradition and cultures as ways of lives to be passed from one generation to the next (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 2011). Hence, much far right discourse is focused on the gendering of spaces, which is a process through which social systems maintain the organisation of powerful hierarchies based on assumptions about masculinity, femininity and privileges (Hearn, 1998; Horton and Rydstrom, 2011). As noted above, supporters of the far right are also generally young males, belonging to lower or lower middle-class strata of society (Schellenberg, 2011).

This gendering of space does not look the same across Europe, and Cas Mudde (2007) may very well be right when he argues that the discourse on the survival of the nation viewed through the need to protect women in their 'sublime role of housewife and mother' is particularly strong in far right and conservative parties in countries with low birth rates, such as Croatia, France and Russia, but

not prevalent in all far right movements. However, the fact that he considers nativism to be the main mobilising rhetorical tool among the far right seems to counter this argument as nativism cannot be understood apart from the gendering of space and social reproduction. This is especially the case if we look at the counter-Jihad movements and their constant view of Muslim women as 'demographic bombs'. On the websites of all three of the main Scandinavian Defence Leagues, for instance – there are warnings about the rapid growth of Muslim populations in their respective countries (Goodwin, 2011). And in interviews across Europe, references to an 'Islamic threat' and a 'demographic takeover' are constantly being reproduced among these supporters:

It is in these broader narratives that some activists [...] make reference to 'Eurabia' theories [...] and the ongoing 'Islamification' of Europe through immigration and through higher birth rates among Europe's Muslim populations'.

(Busher, 2013)

In much far right discourse, there is often an avoidance of the term 'woman' – rather women are frequently labelled as 'mothers' or as 'future mothers' and are integrated into a family policy that advocates heterosexual nuclear families (Peto, 2013). For instance, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) defends heterosexual marriage as the 'only adequate family living arrangement, as opposed to the "homo marriage" which appears as an "abnormal" and "sick" deviation' (Geden, 2005: 413). One of FPÖ's main priorities is also directed towards improving the status of domestic care-taking labour, thus allowing women to increasingly concentrate on family matters (Geden, 2005). Much of the discourse of the social conservative far right thus relates to family and motherhood and not to individuals. This use of women as the symbols of nationhood and religious tradition has especially affected Muslim women in Europe. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia emphasised, for instance, that 'the most visible symbol of female Muslim identity, the headscarf, is thus often interpreted solely as a sign of gender inequality and used [...] as justification for social exclusion' (EUMC, 2006: 49). The particular focus on Muslim women has been especially evident in a number of controversies across Europe in relation to the hijab, or headscarf, issue. In the 2005 Pew public opinion survey, in answer to a question on 'whether there should be a ban on the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women in public places including schools', 78 per cent of the respondents in France and 54 per cent in Germany saw this as a 'good idea', compared to 29 per cent in the United Kingdom (Pew, 2005). Muslim women's dress has also been a notable point of contention in UK far right discourse, and literature with images of Muslim women in Islamic dress is regularly used to exemplify 'the changing face' of the United Kingdom.

Moreover, the BNP pledged in its 2010 election manifesto to 'ban the burka, ritual slaughter and the building of further mosques in Britain' (BNP, 2010). Geert Wilders, leader of the Netherland's anti-immigration Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) regards Islam as a threat to Western secularism and democracy and recently argued for a halt to non-Western European immigration, calling for a ban on the Koran and the construction of new mosques and for imposing a 'head rag' tax on those that wear the burka (Goodwin, 2013; Mayer, 2013; Sirkes, 2012; Wilders, 2012).

In imagining a core, 'the essential, natural soul of the nation' (Pandey, 1999), many supporters of the far right thus adhere to hyper-masculine notions of what such a nation looks like. In the FPÖ, for instance, a type of masculinity is called upon that sees the continuous 'dedication for [...] one's home, one's people and one's fatherland [*Heimat, Volk und Vaterland*] as its guiding principle, in combination with a willingness to defend the population against internal and external threats' (Geden, 2005: 409). Feminist analyses have shown how different types of masculinity are connected to current power structures in society. To speak about a dominant or hegemonic masculinity, it is not enough to locate this in a cultural context, but it also needs to be set in an institutional power structure. Hence, hegemonic masculinity is most likely to be expressed in powerful institutions, such as the government, the military, the religious leadership or other forms of dominant associations (Connell, 1995; Hearn, 1998; Svedberg and Kronsell, 2003). Furthermore, as Messerschmidt has argued, hegemonic masculinity as manifest in Western society, 'emphasises practices toward authority, control, competitive individualism, independence, aggressiveness, and the capacity for violence' (1993: 82). Such hegemonic masculinity is likely to be portrayed as normal and even natural and becomes an entrenched part of what is considered a community's particular culture, tradition and religion.

Much far right discourse, especially in a post 9/11 context, contrasts this notion of masculinity to that believed to be espoused by Muslim men who are then made into normative deviants, being 'anti-West', 'anti-modern', 'anti-liberal', 'anti-women' and 'dangerous beings'. In a comparative study of the English Defence League (EDL), a counter-Jihad movement that shares some dominant notions of masculinity, the authors are interested in what they refer to as the psychological character of masculinity, 'in so far as masculinity is a kind of identity it must refer us to a study of the person' (Treadwell and Garland, 2011: 624). The attempt is to understand, what they refer to as those 'angry white men' who join far right movements and how social marginalisation intersects with violent masculinities. 'Masculinity as a dynamic risk factor in man to man violence is developed with particular reference to racism and homophobia' (Whitehead, 2005: 411; in Treadwell and Garland, 2011: 625).

The underlying ideological and emotional configuration among the EDL members interviewed by Treadwell and Garland (2011) is a hatred of the Muslim other, but equally important, they suggest, is these members' individual histories of aggressive behaviour and violence, not least because so many of them originate from football 'firms'. Each person interviewed thus revealed prejudicial feelings towards Muslims and directed much of their inner shame, anger and rage towards young Muslim males whom they saw as 'fair game' for targeted harassment and abuse. As van Troost et al. (2013) have argued, people can experience multiple emotions at the same time in response to multifaceted social and political situations. In this sense we may talk about what Connell has termed 'protest masculinity', described as 'a marginal masculinity', which picks up themes of hegemonic masculinity in society at large but reworks them in a context of poverty (Connell, 1995: 114). Hence the leaders of the EDL, in attempts at emotional governance, deploy a discourse which seeks to capture and organise the unease, fear and resentment that is felt among some parts of the British public, cleverly playing upon the 'risky' status of British Muslims to the British homeland (Richards, 2013). This seems to be particularly appealing to marginalised white working-class males. While the connection between a particular kind of masculinity and violence must be understood as symptomatic of men's perception that they are losing power within a constantly changing, multicultural landscape – and that the use of violence may somehow curtail this loss – it also needs to be regarded as a psychological process of individual identity making in response to anger, marginalisation, alienation and frustration felt by many men in similar situations (Treadwell and Garland, 2011).

Conclusion

In 'Securitizing Islam', Stuart Croft (2012) discusses the human defences against chaos and dread from a perspective of ontological security. It is not possible to understand this dread, he argues, if we fail to understand the importance of routines, understood as '[t]he institutions which we have inherited and which we still struggle to maintain: family, household, neighbourhood, community, nation... are those institutions which have historically been the containers of, and provided resources for, our ability to sustain that defence [against chaos and dread]' (Silverstone, 1993; in Croft, 2012: 36). What needs to be secured is the individual, in other words, often in terms of his or her group membership. Within the imagined community of the nation, circumscribed by religion, modernity and masculinity, there is an institution that is supposed to provide a structure for such a self-identity. The agency of the individual can be reflexively constructed through and against this imagined nation which, Croft argues, can be the subject of both self-monitoring and surveillance (Croft, 2012). Of

importance to many far right parties and movements is to position themselves in relation to current institutions and powers, with the aim to (re)imagine another nation through anti-establishment and anti-Islamist rhetoric. In such discourses, the governing class is vilified for its failure to protect its citizens and is portrayed as a traitor that is selling out the country. In comparison, they speak for the 'people' and are thus portrayed as being both more legitimate and more democratic than are those parties which claim representation through elections. Such narratives provide aims to securitise not only subjectivity but also certain issues like migration, asylum seekers, feminists and Islam. Being more or less populist in nature, these parties and movements have the capabilities and the desire to regulate what people hear and see, and how they hear and see it, in order to justify and naturalise their own privileged position (Butler, 2004, 2010).

Of relevance is how others are already included in the construction of this nativist discourse. Minorities and others are not accidental by-products of these imagined nations or communities but necessary ingredients in their making. The other, Bhabha (1990) argues, is never fully outside or beyond us but a constant participant, thus undermining any claims of natural, original or self-sufficient identity. However, as internal externals the other also becomes an easy target, or scapegoat, at times of hardship and anxiety. Bell Hooks (2009) talks about a feeling of too 'much-ness' as defining a neoliberal world order, which makes people long for a safe home of unquestioned belonging. I would like to add too 'little-ness' in terms of the frustration, alienation and subjective marginalisation many of those on the far right (though not all) are likely to experience. As Hall has argued: 'politically pointless detonations of violence that occur among the young men who wander the streets, pubs and clubs of the de-industrialized zones are often triggered by the frustrations experienced in struggles over inadequate material resources... and in some instances can be racially or ethnically motivated' (2002: 44). The fact that mainstream parties are not able to meet the concerns of these groups of (predominantly) young men, have made it increasingly difficult to channel and change perceptions of masculinity, fear and anger. The fact that a number of mainstream parties, especially on the left, have increasingly bought into anxiety-reducing securitisation processes in terms of issues of migration or the EU, has further delimited the ideological choices to be made.

Richards (2013) describes these developments as the failure of politicians in their relationship with their publics to exercise effective emotional governance as well as the effects of increasingly cynical news media. These are all relevant concerns but must be addressed in relation to a focus on ontological security for all involved, which means addressing those aspects of the far right that we know are crucial for preventing its growth. These differ depending on the context and the particular far right movement but gender and education

seem to play a rather large role for determining voter support. In addition, the nativist argument and its normalising, essentialist and gendered dimensions need to be approached and discussed in relation to a more general process of nation-building. In this regard, much of the far right discourse is little more than a radicalised version of mainstream positions promoted by regular parties, and nativism is but a radical interpretation of the Westphalian idea of the nation-state.

Notes

1. This distinction between far right movements and European counter-Jihad movements was made in a recent report by The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR, 2013), where the far right is used as a more general term for anti-immigration movements while the European counter-Jihad movements tend to refer predominantly to movements focused on Islam and Muslims, such as the English Defence League and the various Defence Leagues of Australia, Denmark, England, Finland, Norway, Poland, Scotland, Serbia and Sweden. Other counter-Jihad movements include groups such as Pro-Cologne and the Citizens' Movement Pax Europa in Germany, Generation Identity in France, the 'Stop the Islamization' networks in Europe and the United States, the American Freedom Defense Initiative and the International Civil Liberties Alliance. However, as we will see, the terminologies often overlap.
2. An important exception is the Italian National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN), which appeals to both men and women. This seems to coincide with the party leadership's attempts to re-define the AN as a Christian conservative party that eventually paved the way for the AN's merger with Forza Italia in 2009 (Arzheimer, 2012).
3. This was also a significant theme in Anders Behring Breivik's justifications of his actions.

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19

A Political Psychology of Conflict: The Case of Northern Ireland

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The zeitgeist influencing much contemporary psychology and wider scholarly thought is one that individualises political processes. This is particularly the case when we attempt to understand political violence and conflict. Those engaged in political violence, or even affected by it, are often represented by Western media at least, as terrorists, criminals or mentally unstable (Horgan, 2003; Pupavac, 2004). Drawing on theory and research from political psychology, here we set out to demonstrate that macro-social and collective processes are crucial to any analysis of political violence and conflict. Indeed the individualisation of the problem can and often is in itself a political act (Pupavac, 2004).

In this chapter, then we use a political psychological analysis to understand the dynamics of peace and conflict in Northern Ireland. We begin our analysis with a brief background to the conflict and peace process in Northern Ireland, not least because this is the context with which we are most familiar. Hopefully, this background detail is helpful for those less familiar with the situation. Northern Ireland is a good case study for our analysis for another reason. It is a well-researched conflict so we have the luxury of illustrating our analysis with reference to a wide-ranging literature. Here we do so by examining how structural divisions can have a profound impact on people's sense of identity facilitating the psychological reification of difference. While these identity processes are very evident at population level, they are writ large for those who become actively engaged with militarism. We review the studies relating to activism and consider how identity processes may contribute to the maintenance and transformation of conflict. Next, we turn our attention to the impact that conflict experience has on mental health on the one hand and contact with the 'out-group' on the other. Again our analysis points to the centrality of identity to both intergroup contact and psychological adjustment. We conclude by considering some of the ways in which our analysis might

serve to inform understandings of peace and reconciliation as Northern Ireland looks forward to a brighter post-Agreement future.

The background of the conflict in Northern Ireland

The roots of the conflict in Northern Ireland are tangled and open to conjecture; some cite the Norman Conquest in 1170 as the beginning of Ireland's conflict, and certainly the conflict has its roots in the Reformation and the Plantation of Ulster in the seventeenth century. Indeed, no generation has been spared violence since the Plantation, while the State of Northern Ireland has faced periods of sectarian or political conflict in every decade since its inception in 1921 (Mac Ginty and Darby, 2002). However, the most recent period of sustained conflict that began in the late 1960s and continued until the paramilitary ceasefires of the early 1990s and the signing of the Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement in 1998 (Agreement, 1998) will be the focus of this chapter.

The 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland (as the political violence in the North of the island of Ireland is colloquially and euphemistically known) began just over 40 years ago when a banned march of approximately 400 people on 5 October 1968 to demand electoral, employment and housing reform was confronted by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) who blocked their route at Duke Street in Londonderry and baton-charged the demonstrators. This event proved to be the point when Northern Ireland crossed its Rubicon and began a destructive spiral to near civil war in the following years (Purdie, 1990).

The resulting period of political violence led to the deaths of over 3,600 people and the injury of an additional 40,000–50,000. Given the small population of 1.68 million and the small geographical area of 5,456 square miles, this conflict had a substantial impact on the population (Fay et al., 1998). Indeed it has been argued that this period of violence is by far the worst seen in Western Europe since the Second World War (Tonge, 2005). The conflict involved three sides: the British Army, the RUC and the local militia (Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), later merged into the Royal Irish Regiment (RIR)); the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and other smaller republican armed groups; and pro-British loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA). However, like the bulk of contemporary conflicts, most of the casualties of this three-way conflict were uninvolved civilians (Mac Ginty et al., 2007).

Over the 1970s and 1980s, the political violence in Northern Ireland continued without either side gaining any clear advantage or achieving military domination of the others. Then during the early 1990s, secret dialogue between the British and Irish Governments and the IRA began to lay the foundations for a peace process. The IRA and combined loyalist ceasefires in 1994 built on these foundations, Bill Clinton's visit to and interest in Northern Ireland, coupled

with the election of Tony Blair's Labour Party in 1997 energised the stalling peace process, and in 1998, after protracted negotiations chaired by Senator George Mitchell, the Agreement was reached and accepted by a large majority in an all-Ireland referendum.

The Agreement made provision for the release of prisoners who were part of paramilitary groups on ceasefire within two years of its ratification. There was to be the 'normalisation' of security arrangements, which included the removal of military bases and installations and a reduction in troop numbers to garrisoned peacetime levels, in addition to the reform of the militarised police force and the removal of emergency powers legislation. The Agreement also acknowledged that the decommissioning of all paramilitary weapons was an 'indispensable' (1998: 20) part of peace-building; the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), staffed by international observers, indicated that all illegal armed groups should aim to achieve decommissioning of their weapons within two years.

While the Agreement included provision for decommissioning, security normalisation and the release of politically motivated prisoners, it did not include a detailed strategy or plan for these processes to reach completion. The first step in this process saw the early release of prisoners within two years of their group's officially recognised ceasefire. However, the timely release of political prisoners was not matched by the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. This mismatch between the complete release of combatants and lack of verifiable paramilitary disarmament posed a series of political problems for both the British and Irish Governments and the local political parties, which led to the delay in establishing the political structures associated with the Agreement. Indeed the 'complete' decommissioning of paramilitary groups on ceasefire was not reached until 2010, with the mainstream Provisional IRA disarming in 2005, the UVF in 2009 and UDA in 2010.

These acts of decommissioning were paralleled by military normalisation, which saw the British Army dismantle military installations in reaction to IRA decommissioning, while reducing troop numbers to garrisoned peacetime levels in addition to disbanding the local RIR home battalions, reforming the police force and either removing the intelligence gathering services from Northern Ireland or taking them out of the control of the local police constabulary. Since the mainstream paramilitary disarmament and the restoration of the Assembly in May 2007, the conflict in Northern Ireland has reduced significantly from the levels witnessed in the 1990s. However, it has not vanished; dissident republicans remain involved in shooting and bombing attacks and sectarian tensions around Orange Order parades remain. That said, peace and reconciliation efforts are widely seen as having been successful, and having now brought old political enemies together in government, the conflict is viewed by many as approaching a full resolution.

The chapter will now move on to focus on how the conflict and the structural differences it created impact on social identity. Then we will review how militant activism contributes to both the maintenance and the transformation of the conflict and how the violence created has impacted on mental health. Finally, we will explore how intergroup contact and macro-political events can alter seemingly intransigent identities, before concluding.

Social division, groups and identities

The focus on the conflict as a clash of political aspirations and conflicting identities has led to the social identity approach (Abrams and Hogg, 2004) comprising of Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986) being extensively applied to the conflict in Northern Ireland (Cairns et al., 1995; Trew, 1986; Trew and Benson, 1996). The social identity approach views the instigation of intergroup conflict as arising from a struggle over 'real' resources that is reified. The embedded social division is not just seen as something that affects employment, housing or politics; rather this division is seen as meaningful at a human level and is used to place people into associated groups or categories. According to SIT, individuals identify with particular groups with which they feel they share a common fate (e.g. Protestants) and make comparisons between their in-group and other out-groups (e.g. Catholics) to enhance their self-esteem.

This process of social identification and comparison causes an exaggeration of the similarities within categories and the differences between them, something that is often referred to as the social construction of difference or division. This leads to in-group favouritism, effectively preferring one's own group to another should all things be equal, and in some circumstances, it can also lead to out-group hostility. Further, in-group identification results in depersonalisation or the inclusion of the self in the wider group (Turner, 1982). In this way, SCT argues that the self becomes interchangeable with other group members, so 'we' become stereotypical in-group members and take on the group ideology, culture and values.

The importance of this process to everyday life in situations of political conflict is exemplified by the 'telling' process in Northern Ireland. Group differences in Northern Ireland are not physiognomic, yet individuals in this society have the ability to categorise others as being either Protestant or Catholic through cues such as name (Cairns and Duriez, 1976), surname, school attended and even accent (Stringer and McLaughlin-Cook, 1985). Indeed, as many as 50 different ways of telling the religion of others in Northern Ireland have been documented (Kremer, 1999).

The effects of the psychological processes of social categorisation, stereotyping and social identification are heightened and more readily apparent in

situations of political conflict. For instance, emblems and cultural markers such as language and dance may take on particular significance as groups strive for increased respect and distinctiveness. In Northern Ireland, the difference between the two main communities is often writ large, literally with studies of wall murals highlighting the special significance of these paintings and their relationship to the political violence (Finn, 1997). As well as marking territory, these murals convey messages to members of both the in-group and out-group. They emphasise support for paramilitaries and their activities (Gallagher and Hanratty, 1989), justify political violence and glorify group history (Finn, 1997).

Engaging in politically motivated violence

SIT (Cairns et al., 2006; Ferguson, 2009) indicates that those Protestants and Catholics who show a strong identification to their group differ from weak identifiers, exhibit greater in-group bias and more reliance on solutions which focus on moral obligations to the in-group than those with a weaker identification, regardless of their ethno-religious background. Further research from Northern Ireland (Cairns and Hewstone, 2005), building on the work of Brewer (1999, 2001), demonstrated that individuals with a stronger identification or 'pride' in their group evinced higher levels of prejudice towards the out-group. They also found that when the level of societal political instability was high, all participants, regardless of their identity strength, held higher levels of bias in favour of their in-group. However, the relationship between in-group favouritism and out-group derogation was only modest, suggesting that while out-group 'hate' is not the inevitable outcome of in-group 'love', they are interrelated and inevitably linked to the wider sociopolitical landscape.

Therefore, it is not only the obvious conflict between Irish Catholics and British Protestants that creates division and produces the precursors to conflict. Indeed, while the social polarisation that has accompanied the conflict (Muldoon, Trew, Todd, McLaughlin and Rougier, 2007) has resulted in a tendency to ignore the heterogeneity within the two communities, researchers (Darby, 1997; Ferguson and Cairns, 2002) have demonstrated that another overlooked clash is between those group members who embrace the conflict and ethnocentrism and those who seek co-existence.

Engagement in politically motivated violence or involvement with an armed group clearly involves identifying with the people that the group represents. Indeed, Muldoon et al. (2008) found that young people in Northern Ireland presented social identification with one's own group as an explanation for engaging in paramilitary violence. Further, qualitative research with combatants and former prisoners, who had been incarcerated for politically motivated violence (Burgess et al., 2005a, 2005b), has demonstrated that identity strength

has a significant role to play with many participants pointing to their in-group 'love' or pride in their community as a key antecedent factor for engagement in political violence. However, while levels of in-group identification are high across Irish Catholics and British Protestants, only a very small minority of the population took up arms and actively engaged in violence against the out-group.

Research has demonstrated that engagement in political violence and membership of Northern Irish paramilitary groups are not purely based on the strength of in-group attachments, but instead involve numerous factors which span intra-individual factors, wider social factors and the dynamics of the conflict (Ferguson and Burgess, 2009; Ferguson et al., 2008). This research demonstrates how exposure to communal violence collides with sociopolitical and personal factors to create the conditions which prompt people to join armed groups and use violence against the out-group. Importantly, engagement in political violence is not simply a result of these factors colliding and pushing the individual into action, instead the individual has agency and actively makes conscious decisions about how to act, based on their background, social history and the opportunities for action or inaction available to them.

Since the Agreement led to the release of politically motivated prisoners, many former combatants returned to their communities of origin and many played an important role in maintaining the peace on the streets of Northern Ireland (Rolston, 2007; Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008). In a study of former republican prisoners in Derry, Hamber (2005) found that as many as 62 per cent of ex-prisoners had been involved in some level of political activity since their release from imprisonment, with many involved in positive conflict transformation initiatives. One of the main factors fuelling their engagement in community capacity building and conflict transformation was their strong identification with their community; thus, their 'love' for their community is integral to understanding both their engagement in violence and their involvement in peace building post-release. A former UVF prisoner, interviewed by the first author, succinctly illustrates how identity is at the core of these two seemingly contradictory activities:

What they don't realise is that there are people like me who gave their liberty in defence of their community, rightly or wrongly, and it would be very silly for me to spend 16 years in jail and to leave it at that and not come out and want to try and give something back to the community.

This contradiction supports experimental evidence from political psychology (Huddy, 2002) and Brewer's (1999, 2001) view that in-group love does not necessarily lead to out-group hate and also demonstrates how holding strong attachment to in-group identity can have a beneficial role when the

conflict ends and the peace begins, further supporting the notion that the 'we', 'who' and 'what' in constructed communities is moveable. Indeed, Cairns and Hewstone (2005) reported that when levels of inter-communal conflict were low, Catholics and Protestants showed less out-group bias; thus, if the peace process is maintained, then Protestants and Catholics may be able to develop strong in-group identities without a reciprocal reliance on out-group prejudice.

Negotiating political violence and Trauma: Identity and mental health

Building on the transactional approach to stress and coping (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984), the integrated social identity model of stress (ISIS: Haslam and Reicher, 2006) has argued that social identity is critical to understanding the stress process, not least because stress has important social dimensions. While both models acknowledge the importance of primary and secondary appraisals and coping with stress responses as well as the complexity and dynamism of the stress process, the ISIS differs fundamentally by seeing groups as integral to the experience and perception of stress. Groups are collective resources that can alter the meaning and experience of stress, as well as adaptive sources of social and psychological support. The placement of social identities at the heart of the stress process would appear to be particularly relevant to war and conflict trauma, where identity issues are integral.

Tajfel originally argued that identification with a group was motivated by self-esteem concerns. Those who identified more strongly with their group felt better about the groups to which they belonged and as a consequence felt better about themselves. More recently, researchers in this area have argued that identification motivations may be more wide ranging than this and may include processes that serve to bolster and support mental and physical health (Haslam et al., 2009).

Available evidence in Northern Ireland certainly suggests that social identities mediate the experience of potentially traumatising events (Muldoon and Lowe, 2012). Where such events can be explained as being consonant with social identities, this attribution of meaning appears to lower the traumatic response. Strong ideological commitment has a positive moderating influence on psychosocial well-being and post-traumatic stress (PTS). Results from Northern Ireland would also seem to suggest that ideological commitment and identity may moderate the impact of political violence on psychosocial well-being (Muldoon and Downes, 2007; Muldoon and Wilson, 2001). In effect, it would appear that social identities can provide a framework for making sense of adversity. However, this meaning making will only assist positive reinterpretation where there is a good fit between the identity and the traumatic experience (Muldoon et al., 2009).

It is also worth noting that these processes are shaped by the social and political conditions. In the post-conflict landscape, shifting sociopolitical contexts can devalue identities that were once seen as positive, thereby changing the meaning of experience based on those identities. These changes should, in turn, have consequences for the experience of stress. A clear illustration of this is provided by Mulcahy (2006) in his account of members of the RUC in Northern Ireland negotiating the changing political context in Northern Ireland across the years of the peace agreement and police reform. This reform process opened up a discourse within the police and the Protestant community in which the RUC was no longer presented as protectors of the people and the peace in Northern Ireland, and in many regards they were now seen as party to the conflict. Members of the police who had previously negotiated difficult security contexts with limited mental health consequences (Wilson et al., 1997) began to evidence much higher incidence of PTS once the meaning of their work and the value of their occupational identity were undermined (Mulcahy, 2006). Whether social identities are a resource or an obstacle to individual resilience in the face of traumatic experiences, therefore, depends heavily on the sociopolitical context (Muldoon and Lowe, 2012).

Intergroup contact and group identity: Building bridges

One way to improve group relations in divided societies is to increase the amount of intergroup contact occurring between the groups in conflict. The contact hypothesis claims that under favourable conditions such contact can help to reduce intergroup prejudice and in turn foster positive community relations (Allport, 1954) – an idea that has attained substantial empirical support (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). In Northern Ireland, integrated schools and short-term cross-community initiatives have been two of the major tools used to improve intergroup relations. Integrated education came about in Northern Ireland following campaigns during the Troubles by the Protestant and Catholic parent group All Children Together (ACT, founded in 1974). To date, there are 20 integrated secondary and 40 integrated primary schools in Northern Ireland accounting for 5–6 per cent of the entire school population (DENI, 2009).

In a comparison of pupils attending integrated and segregated schools, research has reported that pupils from integrated schools had higher levels of intergroup contact than those attending segregated schools, held more liberal attitudes concerning ‘mixed marriage’ between Protestants and Catholics (Stringer et al., 2000), were significantly more likely than those who didn’t have more intergroup contact through friendship and residency and were more likely to be optimistic when considering future relations in Northern Ireland (Hayes and McAllister, 2009).

Research examining short-term cross-community contact schemes, which aimed to take children away from the worst affected areas in Northern Ireland during the Summer marching season, viewed as a troublesome time of the year (Robinson and Brown, 1991), has often produced mixed results, yet commentators have argued that they are an important tool to improve community relations (Trew, 1989). Schubotz and Robinson (2006) found that more favourable intergroup attitudes were evident among young people who had attended cross-community groups in comparison with those who had not. Further, Schubotz and McCarten (2008) found that 82 per cent of participants agreed that community relations would be better if there were more cross-community programs and a further 88 per cent felt that their experiences of cross-community programs were either positive or very positive. Thus, even in highly segregated societies like Northern Ireland, intergroup contact can have positive outcomes for intergroup relations.

Paolini et al. (2004) suggested that additional benefits may be gained from the 'vicarious' experience of having in-group friends who have out-group friends. These indirect friendships can have a positive impact on intergroup relations and can be implemented on a larger scale, as each positive direct contact experience has a 'ripple effect' on his or her wider group of friends. Paolini et al.'s results have important implications for integrated education, mainly because one of the major criticisms levelled at the integrated education sector is that due to the small numbers of students receiving an integrated education in Northern Ireland it is likely to only have a modest impact of segregation and intergroup relations. These findings challenge that criticism and indicate that the direct contact experiences of integrated students may be having a much wider impact via the ripple effect caused by the vicarious experience of having indirect contact with the out-group.

To understand how and why contact works (or does not), it is important to acknowledge the interplay between intergroup contact and group identity. This is particularly vital in societies such as Northern Ireland, where even in the post-agreement landscape, competing social identities are evident in everyday life. Research shows that despite salient and competing group identities, it is still possible for intergroup contact to be successful. There have been three complementary models put forward to explain how contact works in light of group identity. The first is the process of decategorisation (Brewer and Miller, 1984) where original group boundaries are de-emphasised thus enabling group members to view out-group members as individuals. It is argued that viewing members of the out-group in a more personalised way should reduce prejudice by reducing category salience. The second model is the process of re-categorisation (Gaertner et al., 1996) where representations of memberships are transformed from two separate groups to one more inclusive group or a superordinate category. This is also known as the development of a

common in-group identity and occurs with accompanying depersonalisation and subgroup salience (Dovidio et al., 1997). The third is salient categorisation (Hewstone and Brown, 1986), where it is argued that it is important to keep group identities salient while fostering intergroup contact to enable generalisations of a positive contact experience to the out-group as a whole.

The effectiveness of each model is highly dependent upon the processes occurring in different contact situations. This is particularly true when considering the problem of generalisation and different contact experiences of minority and majority groups (Hewstone et al., 2002). For example, Paolini et al. (2010) report that negative intergroup contact results in more awareness of group salience than positive intergroup contact. This has implications for the generalisation of contact experiences to the out-group; thus, demonstrating once again that group identity salience can have positive and negative consequences for intergroup relations. Together these models help to explain the importance of group identity in the contact-prejudice relationship. This is especially relevant when considering intergroup relations in societies with a complex history of conflict, such as Northern Ireland. In particular, the common in-group identity model has been applied to explain the emergence of the Northern Irish identity.

The Northern Irish identity: A sign of changed times?

Despite the focus of attention upon the religious basis of division, it is evident that identity in Northern Ireland society is much more complex than the Catholic-Protestant dichotomy (Ferguson and Gordon, 2007; Gallagher, 1989). While religious background remains a powerful source of identity in Northern Ireland, studies have shown that alternative political identities such as national identity and the related political identities of unionist, loyalist, nationalist and republican are relevant to the people of Northern Ireland.

Therefore, uni-dimensional explanations of difference mask both the complexity and social reality of identity in Northern Ireland. In reality there is actually a dynamic interaction of economic, ethnic and political identities that create differences and similarities both within and between the two protagonist groups (Muldoon, McLaughlin and Trew, 2007; Muldoon et al., 2007). So while there is a high degree of overlap between religious and national identification in Northern Ireland, research has shown that a minority of people cross-categorise, endorsing an unexpected combination of national and religious identities such as Catholic-British or Protestant-Irish (Fahey et al., 2005; Muldoon et al., 2007).

In recent years however, and particularly post Agreement, there has been a rise in the number of people in Northern Ireland who see themselves as Northern Irish rather than British or Irish. This newly emerging Northern Irish

category is preferred by a substantial minority of Catholics and Protestants (Muldoon et al., 2007; Trew and Benson, 1996). Arguably then, it could be considered as a common in-group identity that transcends the extant ethno-religious social divisions, as it incorporates individuals from both sides of the conflict in Northern Ireland (Trew, 1998). However, despite the survey evidence for the increasing use of the Northern Irish identity label, it is less obvious whether this common identity label corresponds to a new movement in Northern Ireland towards increased integration and lower conflict. For example, a recent study by Hayes and McAllister (2009) observes the increasing use of the Northern Irish label in their 16–18-year-old sample but finds no evidence that this also represents a positive change in attitudes or community relations.

Despite this, recent research by Lowe and Muldoon (forthcoming) suggests that the adoption of the novel Northern Irish identity is related to a reduction in negative attitudes towards the traditional out-group, but such attitudinal shifts occurred only in limited areas. The research showed an interesting balance of shifting social attitudes (e.g. increasing numbers of both religions are happy to work and live with those of the other religious group) combined with a level of stability within political attitudes (e.g. there is little evidence that either religious group have altered their attitudes to the reunification of Ireland) when comparing the apparently inclusive Northern Irish identifiers with the traditionally exclusive Irish and British identifiers.

On the one hand, it can be argued that the Agreement has provided a degree of structural support to the emergence of this fledgling identity, by instituting direct political representation at the level of Northern Ireland through the Northern Ireland Assembly. On the other, recent analyses of the Agreement and the Legislative Assembly structures suggest that these power structures have served to formalise religious-political divisions in Northern Ireland by requiring elected representatives to identify as unionist or nationalist in the Assembly, therefore requiring them to adopt a traditional stance towards the major source of conflict in Northern Ireland (Tonge and McAuley, 2007). In short then, it would seem while the agreement has facilitated the emergence of this new identity and it would appear to shore up a more inclusive identity and more positive social relations, a macro-political context that continues to emphasise division continues to feed divided political views on the ground.

Conclusion

A political psychological analysis of the conflict and emerging peace process in Northern Ireland demonstrates the centrality of group identification to both the conflict and its transformation. This body of research clearly illustrates how the individual, community and sociopolitical system interact dynamically, with

individual actors exerting an impact on the social system and having an impact exerted on them by the social environment they inhabit. In particular, the chapter has illustrated how the reduction of violence and changing identities brought about by the peace process have produced opportunities and obstacles for individuals and groups to negotiate, as they seek a positive distinctive identity and affirmative self-worth for themselves and their group in a transitional post Agreement Northern Ireland.

This review also illustrates how Northern Ireland is a portentous test bed for political psychology research. Indeed, the studies explored here have utilised a variety of samples and successfully employed a range of methodological approaches grounded in a variety of epistemological and ontological assumptions and perspectives.

While Northern Ireland is still divided and troubled more than 15 years after the Agreement was signed, the violence has subsided, and this political settlement and accompanying reduction in violence have allowed more positive views about the future of Northern Ireland to develop, with 65 per cent of people surveyed in 2008 believing that relations between Catholics and Protestants were better now than they were five years ago and 59 per cent feeling that relations between the two communities will improve further in the future (NILT; Northern Ireland Life and Times, 2010).

Research has demonstrated the importance of looking behind the traditional religious labels of Catholic and Protestant to understand the intragroup dynamics that these badges of convenience conceal. Delving deeper into intragroup identity and exploring differences in identity strength have allowed political psychologists to examine how in-group identification plays a role in both facilitating politically motivated violence and transforming political violence depending on the dynamics and salience of the conflict at a particular time.

Group identity also plays an important role in understanding the impact of the stress and trauma produced by political violence, with studies from Northern Ireland demonstrating how identity can mediate the experiences of conflict-related stress and moderate the impact of PTS on individuals and groups. Yet again, this research highlights how important the shifting sociopolitical landscape is for an individual's symptoms of post-traumatic stress, with research suggesting that whether people perceive themselves as 'winners' or 'losers' in post Agreement Northern Ireland may have future mental health implications.

Employing intergroup contact via integrated schooling, and to a lesser degree through short-term interventions, is having a positive impact on intergroup relations in Northern Ireland. Findings from this research suggest that the education system will play a vital role in the development of positive community relations and the development of complementary or inclusive group identities

particularly as these cross-community initiatives will have a ripple effect that will indirectly impact on the wider community.

Group level identities in Northern Ireland need to be viewed as interdependent and non-confrontational if they are to allow people to develop positive and distinctive in-group identities without a reliance on out-group prejudice. The emerging Northern Irish identity seems to offer a positive development in this respect and suggests that the development of a common group identity that allows the development of positive attitudes towards both traditional out-groups is possible. The positive attitudinal changes ascribed to this common identity and reflected in the 2010 NILT survey also demonstrate that the longer the peace process can be maintained the possibilities for reduced out-group bias improve.

The last 16 years, since the ratification of the Agreement, have not been plain sailing. However, the violence has reduced significantly and modifications to conflicting group identities and attitudes offer a glimpse of a more peaceful future for Northern Ireland. That does not mean that there are no more hurdles to be overcome. Northern Ireland has just entered a decade of significant centenary celebrations, such the Easter Rising in 1916, which will create events that could deepen attachments to the conflicting British and Irish identities, challenge more inclusive identities and produce sociopolitical circumstances, which will foster in-group love at the expense of intergroup relations. How Northern Ireland deals with these challenges will have major implications on group identity and the long-term stability of Northern Ireland.

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20

Narrating Moments of Political Change

Molly Andrews

'Every age has its stories'¹ Eric Selbin tells us, 'as does each individual, stories that shape and form the world we know... Stories essentially reflect the cultural values of their time and place as well of those who tell them' (Selbin, 2010: 24–25). Stories are the means by which individuals and communities make sense not only of their current existence, but of their pasts and futures, both real and imagined. It is through stories, shared and contested, that individuals and groups construct a sense of identity – who is 'us' and who is 'them'. The stories change over time, and even those that remain constant (on the printed page, for instance) change in their meaning and significance, to tellers and audiences alike.

As such, stories play a vital role, not only in constructing the political world as it is, but also as it might be, depicting how it once was. These stories are never consensual – it is the mark of humankind to contest the stories of other individuals and communities. But stories are one of the primary vehicles through which politics are articulated and debated.

Given that this is so, it is surprising that stories have only recently come into focus as a legitimate vehicle for trying to understand the complexity of the political world, and of political change more specifically. In this chapter, I will discuss the growing interest in political narratives, and will offer one elaborated example to illustrate this discussion.

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The opening decade of the twenty-first century has been marked by an increasing interest in what can broadly be termed 'political narratives' (Andrews, 2007; Davis, 2002; Jackson, 2002; Polletta, 2006; Selbin, 2010; Tilly, 2002; Zingaro, 2009), a phenomenon which can perhaps be seen as one manifestation of the ballooning study of narrative more generally within the social sciences. Stories are one of the most effective tools that individuals and communities have for making sense of themselves and the world around them, and as such the study of the relationship between narrative and politics is vital. As Selbin (2010) writes:

People rely on stories to make sense of their world, their place in it, and their (im)possibilities. . . . stories reflect and refract people's lives in a way that almost no other text can, making the abstract concrete, the complex more manageable, and rendering matters 'real.' Stories reduce the immense complexity of the world, involving our daily lives, to human-sized matters, adding information to stores that are already stocked, fitting by and large into familiar pathways.

(Selbin, 2010: 30)

While there is no strict consensus over what is and is not to be regarded as political narrative, there appears to be a general agreement that stories – both personal and communal – are pivotal to the way in which politics operates, both in people's minds (i.e. how they understand politics, and their place within and outside of the formal political sphere) as well as to how politics is practised. For a policy to be effective, there needs to be a reasonable story for why it is needed, or why another response would be inadequate or inappropriate. These stories, as it were, are not just within the domain of the individual, but are built upon the collective memory of a group, just as they help to create how that memory is mobilised and for what purposes. And critically, narratives are central to the machination of politics, for in constructing the stories about what is and isn't working, and how this compares to a notion of 'how it should be' we are invariably deciding what aspects of social/political/economic/cultural life are and are not relevant to the current problem and its solution – in other words, the lifeblood of politics. Thus, political narratives engage the imagination, not only in constructing stories about the past and the present, but in helping to articulate a vision of an alternative world. As Marqusee (2012) writes:

We need utopian thinking if we are to engage successfully in the critical battle over what is or is not possible, if we are to challenge what are presented as immutable 'economic realities.' Without a clear alternative – the outlines

of a just and sustainable society – we are forced to accept our opponent's parameters.

(Marqusee, 2012: 10)

All of these stories – constructions of the past, present and future – only ever exist in relation to other stories, and politics is nothing if not a stage for competing stories to be told about the same phenomena.

Hammack and Pilecki open their chapter in this volume (see Chapter 5) with an extract from Bill Clinton's nomination of Barack Obama for re-election at the 2012 Democratic National Convention. Clinton, a most skilled orator, sets up a choice for those he addresses as 'my fellow Americans'. What kind of America do they want to live in? A 'winner-take-all' country or one in which 'we're-all-in-this-together'? Rhetorically, this is a very effective strategy; while Clinton does not tell a story as such, he does use a storied framework to make his points, and the key question that he raises here is one about the characters who will determine how the plot unfolds. In this way, Clinton instils in his audience a sense of agency; their actions will help to determine which way the story goes. Hammack and Pilecki argue that 'politics is in part a language game'. This chapter shares some of the basic premises upon which that argument is built, but the emphasis is slightly broader; rather than concentrating on linguistic devices, the focus is more on the function of story in the machinations of politics – one of the three traditions discussed by Hammack and Pilecki – or what I call 'political narratives'.

What are political narratives?

So what are political narratives? What do they actually look like, and how can we recognise them when we see them? Elsewhere, I have described political narratives as the 'stories people tell about how the world works, how they explain the engines of political change, and the role they see themselves, and those whom they regard as being part of their group, as playing in this ongoing struggle' (Andrews, 2007: 8). But the meaning of the term 'political narrative' is not limited to stories which are told or untold, lived, dreamed or imagined by individuals. Rather, it can also refer to a larger cluster of national stories, within which individuals position themselves, explicitly or otherwise. Discussion of political narratives always turns to an examination of the relationship between macro and micro narratives, in other words the relationship between the stories of individuals and the stories of the communities in which they live. Political narratives that individuals tell may or may not be explicitly about politics; often the most telling of them are not. But in the stories which they weave, individuals reveal how they position themselves within the communities that they live, to whom or what they see themselves as belonging to/alienated from,

how they construct notions of power, and the processes by which such power is negotiated. For individuals, political narratives are the ligaments of identity, revealing how one constructs the boundaries of, and the connections between, the self and the other.

Hannah Arendt has argued that storytelling is 'the bridge by which we transform that which is private and individual into that which is public, and in this capacity, it is one of the key components of social life' (Arendt, 1958: 50). 'What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them' (1958: 52–53). Political narratives are vital in establishing these relational bonds. However, one could also make an observation of the reverse trend; that is, one of the stumbling blocks to realising social change in modern times has been a tendency to over-personalise issues which should remain in the sphere of the public/political domain. Zingaro (2009) describes an 'emotional economy' in which there is an 'offering up of "the real story" of trauma, pain, or humiliation, from someone who has "been there"' (Zingaro, 2009: 11). While such stories might be able to provide particular insight into difficult experiences, their telling depends upon the existence of a willing, listening audience. Knowledge which is 'too threatening or too different from the listener's experience' is suspect: 'A story without recognizable landmarks, or some measure of a familiar narrative trajectory, marks the teller as lying, or possibly exaggerating' (Zingaro, 2009: 11). Stories always exist in relation to other stories, of individuals and communities, and they rely upon these bonds in order to be 'tell-able'. Political stories, even when they relate to individual experience, are never just the property of isolated selves.

Stories which can be told, be they political or otherwise, are always predominantly the terrain of individuals, but all persons are ultimately part of wider social networks. Thus, while it is individuals who remember or forget, it is communities that heavily influence what is deemed memorable or forgettable. Examples of these abound – as people recall their memories of learning of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, or their encounters with the global Occupy movement. But equally, people engage in political storytelling on numerous occasions that do not appear to have anything to do with politics, at least not overtly so. If by politics one means the negotiation of power, then a significant number of stories could be classified, broadly, as political narratives.

Macro political narratives, in contrast, refer to the 'cultural stock of plots' (Polletta, 2006: 10), in other words the contexts that make some stories more tell-able than others. Although sometimes these are explicitly articulated, in history textbooks, or in addresses made by public officials marking certain events, they derive much of their impact from the fact that often they are simply taken-for-granted. So, passing through Trafalgar Square in the centre

of London, one does not need to know the details of the Battle of Trafalgar to be able to recognise that it must be an important piece of the story Britain tells itself about who it has been, and the outstanding contributions of certain of its citizens. And in 2003, what more iconic moment marked the fall of Saddam Hussein than when his statue was attacked in Baghdad's main square?

The term 'political narratives' often refers to the dynamic movement between individuals and wider social contexts, or, in the words of C. Wright Mills, between biography and history. When Marx asserted that people make history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing, he was remarking upon this fundamental relationship between the micro and macro units of analysis, which ultimately lead to one another. And like the river running to the sea, it is not possible to discern the demarcation between the two. While each of us may deem ourselves as special or unique in some ways – and surely, we hope, at least in the eyes of our family or loved ones – still we recognise that there is nothing that we ever do that is not located within a wider social web of relationships, and all of these within the complex matrices of social structures. Equally, there is nothing of politics that exists independent of identifiable human beings. One does not need to embrace the cult of the individual to recognise that even those persons who are known to us only through the media have private thoughts, desires and relationships. For instance, one would not be able to understand the actions of militant suffragette Emily Davison as she threw herself under the King's horse at the Epsom Derby in 1913 without contextualisation; her suicide would be meaningless in the absence of the broader movement. And while a social movement is always bigger than the sum of its individual members, it is nonetheless comprised of real people with real lives. Sometimes their individual stories, and sacrifices, become transformed into a symbol of the movement.

What do political narratives do?

In the life of individuals and of the community, political narratives play a number of key functions. In times of traumatic rupture, the construction of a story about the past can be regarded as the first and most critical step in moving out of the darkness. This is the basic premise upon which some truth commissions have been established. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa attempted to piece together a 'tell-able past' through the collection of more than 22,000 personal narratives in which individuals recounted what abuses they and their loved ones had suffered during key moments in the apartheid era (specifically between the Soweto massacre of 1961 and the first democratic election in 1994). Desmond Tutu, who chaired the TRC, commented at the first victim hearing:

We pray that all those people who have been injured in either body or spirit may receive healing through the work of this commission . . . We are charged to unearth the truth about our dark past. To lay the ghosts of that past, so that they will not return to haunt us and that we will hereby contribute to the healing of a traumatized and wounded people.

(cited in Field, 2006: 32)

Central to the construction of the TRC was that storytelling, even about horrific events, could perform a healing function, if not for individuals, then at least for communities who must now find a way to live together.

Though the actual act of narrating a painful past may cause additional suffering, it is also true that finding commonality with the stories of others can itself bring a measure of satisfaction, even agency; 'The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of the world and ourselves' (Arendt, 1958: 50). Political narratives play a critical role in creating and recreating history – at the level of the individual, the community, and the nation. Political narratives help to establish the framework through which communities make sense of themselves, and their dynamic nature is such that the past is never really past, but is rather a site of ongoing battle. As Dienstag comments:

Debates over the meaning of history cannot be exorcised from politics . . . Whoever abandons work on memory to others may find themselves imprisoned by the results . . . Human beings fight over history because they conceive their pasts to be an essential part of who they are. And they are right.

(1997: 206)

Political narratives are, then, a key mechanism through which the past is reformulated in light of a desired future.

Political narratives are strategically employed in the construction of national identity. Through the use of political narratives, we tell ourselves and others who we are (and as observed above, these stories change over time). These are the hardships we have endured; these are the principles for which we stand; these are rewards that we as a people have procured. Our group identity claims rest upon our stories. And these stories are then represented in a myriad of ways, including public celebrations, memorialisation, and in history lessons.

National narratives are not synonymous with political narratives, though there is a significant overlap between them. Not all political narratives concern matters of the nation, and many national narratives are about culture, or art, for instance. While politics encompasses the broad spectrum of stories about power – who has it; how it is shared or abused; and the particular

contexts that inform its various manifestations – national narratives are concerned with those negotiations which happen explicitly around questions of the nation. Questions of national identity are invariably linked to national narratives. Nations are communities, both real and imagined, and from the time they are very young, people develop a sense of what it means to be from this place, a sense of belonging and/or alienation, an evaluation of how things run, who has control over what, and how that control is exercised. National narratives are both general (this is who we are as a people) and specific (this is what it means to me to be from here), and are manifest in both formal and informal ways. National identity can be expressed either in a formal, public context (such as the statues, national holidays, and history books mentioned above), but also in more informal ways, through routine cultural practices and in the daily talk of ordinary people, as they reveal the complexities, contradictions, and passions of what this identity means to them as situated individuals and groups.

Political narratives and social change

As has already been made clear, political narratives come in many different hues, but amongst the most important of these – and the focus of the remainder of this chapter – are those that relate to social change. Stories are a critical engine behind the machinations of change, as they demand a temporal sequencing that will build from the past – thus the struggle over history – be anchored in struggles of the day, but will be driven by a vision for an alternative future. Let us examine this in greater detail.

These narratives can be important in terms of igniting political awareness, leading ultimately to political engagement. Critically, there is a potentially powerful relationship between telling and becoming, or narration and agency. Although it is not always so, the articulation of an experience of marginalisation into a public narrative form can contribute to a building of a group consciousness. Having access to the stories of other persons with whom one shares life circumstances, there exists a possibility that one can see oneself in the stories of others, and as a consequence, reduce the often-paralysing sense of alienation. The recognition that ‘I am not alone’ can be accompanied by the birth, or the expansion, of a politicised group consciousness.

There is then a strong relationship between narration and agency, at the level of the individual but also in the wider culture. As Jens Brockmeier writes: ‘Narratives are capable of extending the symbolic space which a culture unfolds at a certain point in history’ (2009: 207). Stories once formulated can begin to change things, the very telling helping to shift what is tell-able. And these stories, critically, are not only about the world as it is or has been, but also about how it might be (either for the better, or worse) and as such function

as a clarion for action. Here the function of the narrative imagination is vital, helping individuals and communities to envision other possible worlds.

Making sense of political narratives

Thus far I have discussed the meaning and function of political narratives in the abstract. I would now like to turn my attention to focus on three political narratives in order to flesh out some of the ideas I have presented here. The first example will be the most extensive, and will be followed by two shorter examples. Although the first two examples come from my own research – the first in East Germany, the second in Great Britain – the third relates to one of the most iconic political moments in political life of the United States in the twentieth century, and sheds new light on a well-worn tale.

First, a word of background. In 1992 I conducted a study with a number of key East German activists who had played an important role leading up to the events of 1989. One of the questions I asked my participants was how they reacted to the opening of the Berlin Wall, on 9 November 1989. Like all persons living in the West, I had seen images splattered across the media of people drunk with happiness, dancing on the wall, champagne popping everywhere. And yet the accounts of those days that I heard told a very different tale.

A powerful example of this is the account given to me by Reinhard Weißhuhn, an East German who had been part of the small underground opposition in his country for more than 20 years, beginning in the 1970s. The interview takes place in the front room of his flat, which is situated 200 meters from the border between East and West Germany. Here he describes how he experienced the opening of the wall, and the psychological challenges this posed for him:

On the way home [at about 10:30 pm] I noticed many people all running into the same direction...they were all running to the end of the world...the street was full of cars and one could hardly walk at all...I then walked with the stream and got to the border crossing, Bonnholmer Strasse...which was the first crossing to be opened. Two hundred meters from here. It was so crammed full with people you couldn't move. And everybody was pushing through the crossing. The policemen were just standing around, they didn't know what to do and were completely puzzled. I asked a few people...what was happening. Of course, I know, I could see, but I didn't actually, I didn't understand. And I stood there for about a half hour in this crowd and then went home and switched the television on. Then I watched everything on television, transmissions from everywhere, Ku'damm and all other border crossings. And I could see that people were coming over, that is as seen from the west.... I was totally paralysed...all

this continued for the next few days and it took me a whole week before I went across, Potsdammer Str. It is difficult to describe... this was such a very elementary transformation of one's existence, of... the whole world in a way.

Weißhuhn's description of how he learned of the opening of the wall is interesting for several reasons. First, it is clear that although he was active in the opposition movement, he, like others, was surprised by what he encountered as he returned home that November evening. While in retrospect it is possible to identify the signs of imminent demise that now seem so clear, it is important to remember that only ten months before the fall of the wall, in January 1989, Honecker defiantly pronounced 'The Wall will still stand in fifty and also in a hundred years', and on 7 October of that same year, the date marking the 40th anniversary of the creation of the country, he again expressed his belief in the future of the country, even in the face of evident growing disquiet. 'Socialism will be halted in its course neither by ox, nor ass' he proclaimed. It was only one month later that Weißhuhn encountered so many people running 'to the end of the world' – that is to say, to the world that lay on the other side of the wall. In Weißhuhn's account, first he followed the flow of the people, until he arrived at the border crossing, the wall. There he stood for a half hour, trying to take in what he observed. The policemen stood around, not knowing what to do, and Weißhuhn himself struggled to make sense of what he saw but could not understand. Ultimately, he returned to his own home, and watched the events through the lens of West German television. From this mirrored perspective, the crowds poured in, rather than rushed out.

But the effect of witnessing these events, even from the once-removed position that Weißhuhn tried to adopt, is paralytic for him. He cannot join the crowds, but neither can he resist travelling across the border. Weißhuhn then elaborates on his response to the opening of the wall. Here one can see that his explanation is framed by his perception of me as someone from outside of the two Germanies. He describes to me in detail the geography of the corner of Berlin upon which his psychological transformation was played out:

I'll try to explain. I have lived... I have been in Berlin since '73 and I have always lived two hundred meters from the wall. And this wall, to me, has become a symbol of captivity in every respect, also in a metaphoric, symbolic sense. And this is what I have been ramming my head against for the last twenty years. And I had, as a way of survival, I had resolved to ignore this wall as far as I could... And I tried to do the same throughout the week, when the wall had gone. I did not only try to suppress the fact that the wall had been there previously, but I also tried to suppress the fact that it had gone. And it didn't work. When I went across the wall for the first time, I did

so at Potsdamer Platz, where there hadn't been a crossing, they had only torn a hole, simply torn a hole into the wall, yes. And that's where I wanted to go through, precisely there. I walked through like a sleepwalker. I could not conceive of the idea up to the moment when I was through, that that was possible. Well, and then I stood for a very long time over at the other side in no-man's land, and could not move forward or backwards. And then I cried, I was totally overwhelmed.

For Weißhuhn, it was important that he cross the border not where there was a clear opening, such as Bornholmer Strasse where he had seen the masses cross on the night of 9 November, but rather at Potsdamer Platz, where a hole had been torn into the wall. Somehow this hole contained within it more evidence of the struggle that had led to these events. A number of respondents with whom I spoke mentioned to me the difficulty of accepting that the wall, which had symbolised the strength of the repression of the people, could be disbanded so suddenly and so totally. To what extent had its strength merely existed in the eyes of those whose lives it restrained?

As a political narrative, the one that Weißhuhn offers here is extremely powerful. Let us examine it by posing some basic questions of who, what, where, when, and why.

The first question is 'who'. The speaker, as already stated, is one of a handful of persons who had been engaged in the East German underground opposition movement. He is clearly not one of the people who were dancing on the wall on the night it opened. And he is telling his story to a real outsider, an American psychologist who sits with a West German translator in his living room, who is unquestionably interested in his story. Weißhuhn's account is also peppered with other people: those who he encountered at Bornholmerstrasse, pushing to get through (who could also be some of the same people who were popping champagne later in the night), and of course the very intriguing policemen – 'standing around, completely puzzled' – who were already sensing that they had lost their role and for whom life would soon become unrecognisable.

The 'what' of the story is its content – what did this opposition activist do on the night the Berlin wall opened, and the days following this event. He is telling this story because that focus has been suggested by me, the interviewer. Weißhuhn offers an identity narrative, through depicting a series of response to the opening of the wall that reveals the complexity of his emotional response to the events as they unfolded. Careful attention must be paid not only to what is being said, but what is not being said. This story, though of one individual's experience, belongs to a larger stock of stories, those about the opening of the Berlin Wall. He does not need to say to me that the opening of the wall was a critical moment both in terms of his own biography and in terms of historical

change. Neither does he need to tell me that the experiences of many East Germans on this night were very different from his own.

The spatial question of where permeates the account. Throughout the telling, Weißhuhn infuses his story with a very precise sense of place, or rather places. First, there is Bornholmerstrasse, which has the dual function of both the street that he lives on, and also the first place where the wall was opened. Second, there is his living room, where he not only retreated the night of 9 November 1989 but also where our interview is taking place. Third, there is the Ku'damm, West Berlin's answer to New York's Fifth Avenue. As he sits in his apartment watching West German television, East Germans on the Ku'damm are visually pouring in to his living room, even as in reality, they are exiting East German, from a place that is less than 200 metres away. And finally, there is Potsdamer Platz, an area of Berlin that would see one of the greatest transformations in the years to come but which at that time had only a small hole in the concrete wall that allowed access to the west.

Weißhuhn offers a very precise temporal framing for this account. In response to a question that asks about a specific night, his initial movement locates his story even more specifically, at a particular hour on that most particular night. He stays at the border crossing for about a half-hour, and then returns home. The next week in this account is a bit of a haze. What is remarkable here is that it takes him a full week to bring himself to be able to cross over in to the West. The narrative itself fits completely within this temporal frame. However, it must be remembered that it is me as the researcher who has also assisted in this framing: not only do I pose a question about a particular night, but when I write about it, I choose where to begin and end the extract. In fact Weißhuhn said much before and after this story, so my role in its framing is not insignificant. There are other dimensions of temporality that are present: when Weißhuhn is speaking to me, the year is 1992, about two and half years after the events he describes. By this time, much had already changed; Germany had been 'reunified', and East Germany was no longer in existence. Those political activists, like Weißhuhn, who had spearheaded political change in the GDR had very different roles in their transformed country. Finally, at the time of this writing, more than 20 years have passed since Weißhuhn told me this story in 1992. In fact he is involved in a follow-up study I am doing with many of the same people I interviewed in 1992. He still lives on Bornholmerstrasse, and our most recent interview took place in the very same living room in which we had spoken 20 years earlier.

Why did Weißhuhn tell me this particular story? Perhaps a prior question is why did I ask him what he did on that night; after all, he told me this story in response to my question, though obviously there are different versions of the same experience which he could have offered. I was interested in personal experiences of this heightened moment as one lens that could offer insight in

to the relationship between micro and macro stories. This story is a powerful story of 'the opening of the wall'. When put in to the context of other stories of this event, it offers a distinct counter-narrative. And if one wishes to understand the deep emotional impact that this political event had on Weißhuhn, one must first try to comprehend the experience of living inside the wall.

We turn now to our second example. The extract that follows comes from an interview with Rose Kerrigan, one of the founding members of the Communist Party of Great Britain in the early part of the twentieth century. I interviewed Kerrigan in the mid-1980s (Andrews, 1991/2008), and asked her about her earliest engagement in political activity. Kerrigan began by describing the poverty in which she and others lived in Glasgow in the early 1900s.

I remember as early as seven or eight years of age, and thinking that it was very odd that here were so many people who could afford to be dressed up. We lived around the corner from the Royal Theatre... we used to go down and watch them go into the theatre from the taxis and wonder... here we could hardly buy our own shoes. That made me feel that there was something wrong, somewhere. Why did these people not share their money with us?... I never felt anger and I never felt envy. I just felt it was wrong somehow.... at 12 years old I took part in the 1915 rents strike in Glasgow. [when Rose tried to convince her mother to withhold the extra rent] she said 'we'll run into debt and we'll never be able to get out of it'. I said to her 'you give the extra money to me and I'll bank it.' Then when I saw I couldn't convince her by myself I went up the whole close which was 16 tenants and got them all agreed to withhold the rent and we never ever paid that increase. When the rent-man came for the rent, we paid the rent but we never paid the increase.... The result was the 1915 Rent Restriction Act which lasted till 1957. There weren't increased rents.

This excerpt, with its rich detail, provides much for one who is interested in political narratives: Kerrigan's perception of her young self; the importance of relative deprivation and responses to perception of social inequality; challenging ideas of childhood and political efficacy; and the nuts and bolts of the birth of an effective social movement.

Freeman argues that 'narratives, as sense-making tools, inevitably do things – for people, for social institutions, for culture, and more' (2002: 9). A critical question is what this story actually accomplishes. Why does Rose Kerrigan tell it? This story positions the young Rose as someone who not only perceived injustice, but who acted to fight against it. Even at the age of 12, she was someone who put her principles in to action (something which would continue to be a cornerstone of her identity for the next seven decades). Neither was

she someone who would shy away from authority, be they the landlord, her mother, or others in years to come.

Rose situates the story of her youth in a very particular setting. Living around the corner from Glasgow's Theatre Royal, she and her siblings would watch people as they arrived at the theatre in taxis. The affluence of others was especially marked in comparison to the economic hardship that her family and her neighbours knew. 'Why did these people not share their money with us' she asks. One can hear in these words the seeds of a socialist consciousness. Rose portrays herself as someone who is not envious or angry, but simply fair-minded. She emphasises time and again that the disparity in wealth was simply wrong.

The construction of the child activist makes a particularly strong impression. Effective activism is always impressive, but it is especially so if that person is not even yet in their teenage years. That she would organise the rest of the close into collective resistance speaks volumes for the importance of small actions. This story derives some of its impact from the retrospective knowledge of the role of the Glasgow Rent Strike of 1915, in which 30,000 people eventually withheld their rent from profiteering landlords.

Let us turn now to our third and final example. The extract comes from an interview with Rosa Parks, who became famous around the world as the woman who, in 1955, refused to go to the back of the bus because of the colour of her skin. This small, defiant act kicked off the Montgomery Bus Boycott, a critical moment in the explosion of the civil rights movement in the United States. Popular folklore has it that Parks was almost an unknowing actor, tired and weary on entry to the bus, and spontaneous in her refusal. That she was the secretary of the Montgomery chapter of the NAACP is not so well known, nor that she had been selected to perform this challenge. But listening to her account of this event puts the 1955 encounter with the bus driver, James Blaike, in another perspective. She recalls:

About 12 years before this, about 1942, this same driver had evicted me from his bus for refusing to hand him my fare and then get off of the bus and go around and try to find my way back in the busy by the rear door. Because I refused to do that, he evicted me from the bus. He didn't call the policemen that time. He just told me I couldn't ride his bus. I told him I was already on the bus, and I didn't see any need of getting off and going around to the back door to try to get in, but that was one of the things he demanded. It was the very same driver, because I never did forget his face from that time on. I don't think he remembered me at the time I was arrested.

(Parks in Wigginton, 1992: 233)

This small passage raises a number of questions for the reader, and a scrutiny of it begins to demonstrate the power of political narratives, which specific focus on three elements: Time and timing; agency; and the intersection of biography and history.

First, the question of time is critical here. Parks alerts her listener to the fact that not only was the refusal in 1955 not her first, but it was not even her first with this bus driver. Indeed, they had already performed their respective roles, though not in an identical fashion, more than a decade earlier. If we take seriously Parks' claim that she had done this before, then we immediately question the myth of her as unknowing actor. This leads us to the second point.

Second, in Parks' account, she is a very active agent in her own destiny. In 1942, she speaks back to the driver who demands her eviction. Although she departs from the bus, she is not 'finished' with him, as history will tell us.

Third, this story, interesting though it is, derives at least some of its impact from the knowledge that we as readers have, that Parks could not have had in either 1942 or even 1955, that this action lit a powder keg of political resistance. There is no school child in the United States who does not know the name of Parks, and in 2005, she died a national hero, the first woman ever to be granted the posthumous honour of lying in state in the US Capitol Rotunda.

In all three examples, the speakers offer accounts that help to shed light on wider social and political processes. All of the speakers position themselves as knowing actors in a heated political contest. The accounts themselves add texture and invite further reflection on key political events, the opening of the Berlin Wall, the Glasgow Rent Strike, and the Montgomery Bus Boycott.

Closing remarks

Selbin concludes his book on social change and the power of stories by asking his readers:

Sometimes there is a passion or a quality harder to describe but which you have undoubtedly experienced when you have talked with someone who has been involved in acts of resistance, rebellion or revolution . . . How does one articulate to a stranger, an acquaintance, even a friend or loved one, a matter at once so complex and so simple?

(Selbin, 2010: 193)

In this chapter, I have tried to offer a framework that will assist in making sense of political narratives which are 'at once so complex and so simple'. Reinhard

Weißhuhn's detailed account about his experiences of the opening of the Berlin Wall is a particularly compelling example of the power of political narratives. In order to make sense of what is being said, the reader must make the linkages between the micro and the macro narrative, between Weißhuhn's personal biography and momentous historical change. He presents a story of the age in which he lives, but also a story about living in these times. And through a close reading of his very personal account, we too come to understand much more about the effects and the meaning of political change.

Note

1. In this chapter, I will use the terms 'story' and 'narrative' interchangeably, recognising that there are others who would caution against so doing.

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21

The Culture of Conflict and Its Routinisation

Daniel Bar-Tal, Guy Abutbul-Selinger and Amiram Raviv

Introduction

Intergroup conflicts are an inherent aspect of human relations and they have occurred repeatedly on a large scale for millennia. But of special interest are intergroup conflicts that are termed 'intractable' with their distinct characteristics. Intractable conflicts occur when groups have conflicting goals that they consider to be essential for their survival. Such conflicts are violent and are perceived by the parties involved as having a zero-sum nature and hence as being irresolvable. They deeply involve the engaged societies, which invest vast resources in their continuation, and they last for at least a generation (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2007a, 2013; Kriesberg, 1993, 2007). The long lasting conflicts with the prolonged and imprinting collective experiences lead to the development of a culture of conflict. The evolved culture of conflict with the continuous violence is the key feature of intractable conflicts. These vicious conflicts figure prominently in the history of civilisation. Examples in ancient times include the protracted struggles between the Greek 'city-states' and Persia and between Rome and Carthage; examples in later periods include struggles between France and England and between France and Prussia. In the twentieth century, some intractable conflicts were resolved; these include the conflicts in Algeria and South Africa. But to this day, such conflicts rage in other areas, for example, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Chechnya and the Middle East.

Intractable conflicts are over real issues: territory, natural resources, self-determination and/or basic values, and these issues must be addressed in resolution attempts. Resolution is so difficult partly because a 'culture of conflict' develops in the societies involved that transforms both collective and individual life into part of the conflict. This culture normalises and sustains the conflict and inhibits a peaceful resolution. In this chapter we elaborate on one of the mechanisms of the culture of conflict – routinisation – that transforms an intractable conflict into part of everyday experience. The objective is to

elucidate the ways in which this mechanism operates: its nature, functions and implications. But first we offer a detailed description of the culture of conflict from which routinisation develops.

Culture of conflict

Intractable conflicts have an imprinting effect on the individual and on collective life. Such protracted struggles that greatly preoccupy the members of a society necessarily lead to the development of beliefs, attitudes, emotions, values, motivations, norms and practices that are functional in coping with the challenges posed by the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2013). They provide a meaningful picture of the conflict situation, justify the society's behaviour, facilitate mobilisation for participation in the conflict and make it possible to maintain a positive social identity as well as a positive self-image and collective image. These elements of the socio-psychological repertoire at the individual and collective levels gradually become consolidated into an organised system of shared beliefs, attitudes and emotions that penetrate the society's institutions and channels of communication and become part of the socio-psychological infrastructure. That infrastructure includes collective memory,¹ an ethos of conflict,² and a collective emotional orientation,³ which provide the major narratives, motivators and goals that society members need to conduct their lives under the harsh conditions of intractable conflict and to support its continuation. Eventually, this infrastructure becomes institutionalised and disseminated and serves as a foundation for the development of a culture of conflict that dominates societies engaged in intractable conflicts.

Nature of culture of conflict

A culture of conflict develops when a society significantly integrates into its overall culture both tangible and intangible symbols that have been created to communicate a particular meaning about the experience of a prolonged and violent conflict (Bar-Tal, 2010, 2013; Geertz, 1973; Ross, 1998). This cultural development is a long societal process and eventually symbols of conflict become dominant elements in the culture of societies involved in intractable conflict: they provide the dominant meaning about the present reality, the past and future goals, and they serve as guidelines for practice. Ann Swidler's discussion of culture as 'a "tool kit" of rituals, symbols, stories, and world views' that people use to construct 'strategies of action' (1986: 273) is an important addition to the description of culture and serves as a foundation for the present discussion. Bond (2004: 62) defines culture psychologically as

a shared system of beliefs (what is true), values (what is important), expectations, especially about scripted behavioural sequences, and behavioural

meanings (what is implied by engaging in a given action) developed by a group over time to provide the requirement of living... This shared system enhances communication of meaning and coordination of actions among culture's members by reducing uncertainty and anxiety through making its members' behaviour predictable, understandable, and valued.

These elaborations fit perfectly the present attempt to describe the development of a culture of conflict.

The consolidation of the socio-psychological infrastructure, which is an indication of the development of a culture of conflict, involves the following four features:

- 1) *Extensive sharing*: The beliefs of the socio-psychological infrastructure and the accompanying emotions are widely shared by society members.⁴ Individuals acquire and store this repertoire at an early age, as part of their socialisation. They share it as members of a society who identify with its goals, experiences, history and narratives.
- 2) *Wide application*: Society members do not only share the repertoire; because it is always accessible, they use it in daily conversation. It also appears to dominate public discourse through channels of mass communication. It is often used to justify and explain the leaders' decisions, policies, and courses of action. And it finds institutional expression, for example, in ceremonies, commemorations and memorials.
- 3) *Expression in cultural products*: The elements of the socio-psychological infrastructure are also expressed through cultural products, such as literary books, TV programmes, films, plays, visual arts and monuments. They become a society's cultural repertoire, relaying societal views and shaping individuals' beliefs, attitudes and emotions. Through these channels the elements of the infrastructure can be widely disseminated and can reach every sector of the public.
- 4) *Appearance in educational materials*: The elements of the socio-psychological infrastructure appear as central themes of socialisation in textbooks used in schools and even in higher education.

We assume that the development of a culture of conflict is unavoidable because the intensive socio-psychological experiences during intractable conflicts are powerful and leave their mark on every aspect of societal life. Nevertheless, societies differ in the degree of dominance of the culture of conflict. In some societies, at the height of the intractable conflict the culture of conflict may be absolutely dominant (as in the Jewish and Palestinian societies in Israel during the 1950s and 1960s), but in other societies its dominance may be more limited and restricted to certain segments of the society even during the

climax (e.g. in Northern Ireland). Also, a culture of conflict may not be consistently dominant throughout the intractable conflict; the degree of dominance is dynamic and may change in either direction, because the development and continuation of a culture of conflict is not linear. It may even compete with a culture that provides alternative symbols promoting the value of peace and practices of peacemaking (as is happening in Cyprus and in Israel). And it may lose its dominance if the majority of society members embrace an alternative culture that promotes peace-building (as happened in Northern Ireland in the 1990s).

The important point is our basic premise: that the learned, absorbed, shared and institutionalised repertoire of the socio-psychological infrastructure – the basis of the culture of conflict – serves as a prism through which society members collect information and interpret new experiences. This means that society members look at the world through lenses that provide meaning, order and predictability.

Characteristics of culture of conflict

A culture of conflict has six general characteristics. First, we suggest that its general themes, as reflected in the collective memory and ethos of conflict, are universal. Themes like the justness of a society's goals, the importance of security, individual and collective glorification, individual and collective presentation as a victim in the conflict, delegitimisation of the adversary, an emphasis on patriotism and unity and the valuing of peace can be found in the culture of most, if not all the societies involved in intractable conflicts. These eight themes appear in different conflict supporting narratives and serve as an organising framework for viewing the reality of the conflict and even beyond – they form part of the general worldview that influences information processing.

Second, a theme that becomes particularly significant in the culture of conflict and therefore needs special attention is the glorification of violence. Violence is the main element that characterises intractable conflicts. Such conflicts, by their very nature, involve physical violence in which group members are killed and wounded in wars, small-scale military engagements and/or terror attacks. Not only soldiers are wounded or killed, but also civilians, including women and children; civilian properties are often destroyed; civilians flee or are expelled, thus becoming refugees; the economy is badly hurt; and society members bear psychological scars. Additionally, such conflicts frequently involve atrocities, including mass rape, mass killing, ethnic cleansing and even genocide. Nevertheless, the culture of conflict generates praise for the personnel, organisations and institutions that carry out the violence, and also commemoration of battles, wars and other violent encounters. Victories are

glorified and defeats are presented as lessons to be learned and events that must be avenged. Because many of the societal activities in the course of an intractable conflict are related to violence, and because violent acts are the core of the dynamics of intractable conflict, it is natural that those society members who perform the acts of violence on behalf of the society and the organisations and institutions that are responsible for their performance receive focal attention, a large part of the societal resources and glory. The fighters and their support staff are the front-runners of the society. As individuals who are willing to sacrifice their lives, they are considered the ultimate patriots. It is thus not surprising that they are seen as societal models, and their acts are viewed with reverence and glorification. This focus is reflected in many different ways: the violent events, such as battles or wars, and the fallen are noted in mass media; leaders talk about them; they are commemorated in ceremonies, rituals, monuments and street names; they are memorialised in various cultural products (songs, poems, visual arts, films and literature); and they figure saliently in educational materials and curricula. Violent events and the fallen give particular meaning to the conflict by symbolically representing beliefs, values and attitudes towards the violent conflict that perpetuate the collective memory of conflict, making the ethos of conflict dominant, and expressing emotions of conflict. Thus these elements contribute greatly to what is also sometimes referred to as a culture of violence (Bar-Tal, 2003; Rupesinghe and Rubio, 1994).

Third, each society has particular content that fills out the general themes with narratives that include its specific symbols, including experiences, history, conditions, events, heroes and myths (for Israeli society as an example, see Bar-Tal, 2007b). Thus, each society accumulates throughout its history, and especially during the years of an intractable conflict, specific content that fills out the eight general themes and provides cultural meaning to the conflict.

Fourth, the specific symbols of the culture of conflict (e.g. sacrifice, heroism, the sacred value of the goals, suffering or victimhood) are expressed through various types of content (such as stories about heroes, myths, aspirations and narratives of major events). This means that the same symbols reappear in different narratives.

Fifth, some content of the culture of conflict is expressed through a variety of cultural modes and channels, such as books, ceremonies, art, film, speeches and monuments. That is, various institutions and channels, in different ways, play an active role in socialising society members and disseminating the content of the conflict among them.

In this chapter we focus on a sixth, additional characterisation of the culture of conflict – the routinisation of the elements of conflict in daily life – and the remainder of the chapter is devoted to it.

The nature of routinisation

One of the clearest reflections of living with protracted, intractable conflict is the routinisation of its symbols in daily life. Society members constantly encounter these symbols, which become part and parcel of their daily experience. We are not referring to the occasional, often salient, symbols of conflict, such as acts of violence, inflammatory rhetoric or preparations for the eruption of violence. We are referring, instead, to the mundane and low-key symbols, which, over time, are no longer recognised as unusual signs of conflict because they have become an integral part of life and cannot be separated from the normal routines of daily experience. A whole complex of 'beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices' are reproduced in a 'banally mundane way' (Billig, 1995: 6), because an intractable conflict is a lasting, stable and continuous part of everyday life.⁵ Through these routinised beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices, the culture of conflict attains an even tighter grip on individuals. This is because these everyday routines shape the mindset, emotional state, behavioural tendencies, preparedness and even identity of society members.

The above observations are grounded in the philosophical argument that human beings construct their world on the basis of experiences absorbed through the senses, which serve as a kind of a priori lens through which the world is revealed to them (Harding, 1992; Steinitz, 1987: 92). Foucault (1991) has pointed out that subjective experiences enable people to know themselves and their world, to understand their desires and to acquire their individual identities. Feminist literature and labour-history literature, too, have noted that everyday experiences function as central forces in shaping identity (Eley, 1989; Smith, 1987). These are personal experiences that transform subjectivities into a kind of truth, in the way that individuals get to know the natural real world, including themselves (Mohanty, 1992). Furthermore, Scott (1991, 1992) has noted that social systems and collectives construct the positions through which individuals experience their social reality. These constructed experiences are then taken as self-evident validations of the corresponding subjectivities, thereby reinforcing the social order. Bourdieu (2002), too, has recognised the importance of mundane routine discourses and practices as experiences through which the hegemonic social order is filtered and absorbed into daily life. These are the experiences that eventually shape cognitive and behavioural dispositions.

Returning to the discussion of experience in the context of conflict, we note specific ways in which a conflict is routinised.

The routinisation of intractable conflicts in everyday life

There are at least four ways in which conflicts seep into and become routine in everyday life and thus shape the experiences and identities of society members: the flow of information about the conflict, society members' exposure to images and symbols of the conflict that appear in public and private spaces, everyday practices and public use of military language and the language of conflict in everyday speech (see Vered & Bar-Tal, 2014).

Flow of information: The everyday experience of intractable conflict involves exposure to information about the conflict, information that has a central place in the society's discourses. The exposure may be to news, commentaries and knowledge presented in newspapers or on the radio, television or Internet (Arno, 2009; Cottle, 2006; Kolsto, 2009). Almost no day passes without reference to the conflict in public or private discourses. Often, channels of communication have at least a few items referring to the conflict in a single day. On some days, the public channels are overloaded with information and commentaries in light of a particular large event, such as a war, terror attack or violent encounter. On other days, society members may receive a great deal of information from discussions and commemorations of past events in the conflict. On yet other days, the information may pertain to potential threats and to evaluations of the situation. In addition to public discourse, many of the interpersonal private discourses touch on the conflict. This is because the conflict is an integral part of individual life and involves many personal aspects, such as the fate of the participants (e.g. sons, husbands and fathers, but also daughters, mothers and wives). These experiences mean that society members live in the shadow of a continuous flow of information that makes the conflict a part of everyday life.

Exposure to images and symbols: Society members are exposed in their everyday lives to images and symbols of the conflict that appear in public and private spaces. These symbols and images are widely disseminated in high density, so that society members inevitably perceive them in the course of their daily routines and they become an inseparable part of the landscape. These symbols and images may have a variety of content, modes and forms, but all of them refer either directly or indirectly to the conflict. Examples include military forces seen in public spaces, weapons carried by members of the armed forces, military planes and helicopters flying overhead, statues and sculptures related to the conflict, checkpoints, street names commemorating battles or fallen soldiers, bomb shelters, gas masks, memorial sites, military cemeteries and monuments scattered throughout the country, plaques in schoolyards and on public buildings that contain the names of the fallen and advertisements whose contents are related to the conflict. The common characteristics of this

category of routinisation are that the symbols and images are related to the content of the conflict, appear in the daily course of life and are visible (see e.g. the effect of murals in Northern Ireland, in Ross, 2007). They provide constant reminders that the conflict is continuing, even on days without salient cues of conflict. In fact, many of the images and symbols encountered by society members become internalised schemas (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). They provide knowledge about events, individual figures, processes, places and objects, all related to the conflict. Examples of such symbols can probably be found in every country engulfed by intractable conflict.

Everyday behavioural practices: Every day society members engage in practices that are related to the conflict situation and that are established either formally or informally (Essed, 1991; Gorringer, 2006; Jones, 2011; Karner, 2007). Formally established practices are imposed by the authorities and may even be required by law, as, for example, security searches in train stations and airports. Informally established practices may emerge as norms observed by society members, as, for example, searching for suspicious objects in public places. Also, society members may develop individual repertoires of routine practices, for example, listening to the news on the radio every day to be informed about conflict-related events. These conflict-related practices are a series of acts that society members perform routinely as part of their daily lives. Thus, they may be performed even unthinkingly, because their repeated performance makes them part of the normative sequence of life. As Bourdieu (1990) notes, motoric practices performed automatically neither require nor exhibit conscious reflective thinking. Conflict-related practices are based on scripts of behaviours that society members acquire while living in the conflict context (Abelson, 1981; Schank and Abelson, 1977). The scripts are learned, rehearsed, memorised, stored and retrieved, often automatically and unconsciously. These scripts not only emphasise specific behaviours that they reflect, but also eventually influence attitudes and a variety of other behaviours (Abelson, 1976).

Society members in different areas of conflict perform different sets of routine practices. In many of the areas, society members must pass through checkpoints in the entrances to public spaces, such as malls, banks, soccer stadiums, restaurants or cultural halls, at which guards check bags and bodies with electronic devices. In other cases, society members who are suspected of carrying means of violence may be searched with different methods at checkpoints. In some societies, routine searches for weapons or wanted individuals are conducted at roadblocks. In many societies, a variety of practices are instituted regularly; these include preparations for various states of emergency and the examination of suspicious objects in the street or in public buildings.

Use of military language and the language of conflict: Another way in which the conflict is routinised is the wide public use of military language and the language of conflict in everyday speech. These vocabularies originate in the

military establishment but are often adopted by societies engaged in intractable conflict and then used in public and personal discourses (Babones, 2012), for example, in the civilian press and by society members. Thus, in many societies that live with intractable conflict, military words, metaphors and expressions that portray the conflict become part of everyday civilian speech (Lakoff, 1993). These words and expressions become a slang used to describe daily events and routines that are unrelated to the conflict. They penetrate into such everyday spheres as sexual relations, biological science, hospital discourse, work and the state's attempts to cope with ('battle') drug addiction (Larson, 2005). Moreover, conflict-related words and expressions influence and shape the dominant language anew (see e.g. Tsur, 2013, which describes the use of the Hebrew language in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). The emergence of new, conflict-related words in everyday speech reflects linguistic economy, a process that reduces the description of a complex subject or action to a single word or phrase and thus affects dominant language structures (Murray, 1986 – e.g. 'suspicious object' in Hebrew which refers to an object that may contain explosives).

According to Reddy (1993) and Lakoff (1993), the metaphorical character of language is a major and indispensable part of our ordinary and conventional way of conceptualising the world. This is because speakers insert thoughts and meanings into words and sentences and thus express their understanding of reality. Moreover, language not only constructs individuals' social reality by organising their thoughts, conceptions and emotions, it also shapes how they act in their social environment. This is because the everyday behaviour of society members reflects their metaphorical understanding of their experiences (Reddy, 1993). Pursuing this argument that language dictates how reality is perceived and reproduced by society members, we may assume that the embedding of conflict-related words and expressions in the everyday language of societies imbues the social reality of society members with the values, ideology and behaviour patterns of the conflict (Lakoff, 1993; Mowery and Duffy, 1990).

In these four ways in which conflict-related elements are introduced into daily life, conflicts are routinised and even ritualised. This routinisation has several important social functions, to which we now turn our attention.

The functionality of routinisation

In the lives of society members involved in intractable conflicts, routinisation has important functions that have meaning at both the individual and collective levels. We discuss three examples.

Normalisation of intractable conflicts

The routinisation of media information, images, everyday practices and language normalises the unusual and anomalous aspects of living with intractable

conflicts. That is, the saturation of physical and social spaces with conflict-related routines leads to habituation to them and thus makes them appear normal. The term 'normalisation of the conflict' refers to the social processes by means of which beliefs, attitudes, values, norms, ideas, meanings, knowledge, perceptions, worldviews and behaviours that are related to the conflict come to be seen as routine and natural parts of everyday life. Furthermore, in the process of social construction of the conflict, these schemas, images, scripts, ideas, meanings, words, sentences and behaviours come to be part of the shared repertoire and then become embedded in the institutional fabric of the society (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; May and Finch, 2009). Becoming entrenched in the social reality of society members, they shape the human-produced and human-constructed conflict objectivity as 'natural facts of life' (Berger and Luckmann, 1991).

Regarding the ways in which routinisation takes place, Subirats (2006) and Pérez-Anzaldo (2011) point to the strong relationship between the flow of conflict information in the media and the normalisation of conflicts. According to this idea, normalisation is the result of two processes. First, it originates in the quantitative proliferation of information about the conflict in everyday expressions. The news related to the conflict and violence is so common that brutal and violent acts no longer shock the habituated civilians (Subirats, 2006). Second, Pérez-Anzaldo (2011) argues that the media frame and represent conflict events, mainly violence, as both natural and trivial.

Normalisation of the conflict also occurs as part of the routinisation of everyday practices. Continuous rehearsal of conflict practices allows the conflict to permeate everyday life while erasing the traces of the conflict construction and its negative consequences for society members. Moreover, because everyday practices are not confined to single major events such as wars or other national crises, they enhance the normalisation of the conflict. Through their ability to penetrate every aspect of daily life, these routine practices also make possible the automatic awareness of conflict-related beliefs, attitudes, values and norms (Billig, 1995; Coles, 1986). At the same time, because society members come to think about and understand their social reality through the prism of these stored repertoires, the conflict becomes naturalised and normalised.

Language also plays a central role in the process of sedimentation and normalisation of the conflict reality through routinisation (Lakoff, 1993; Skey, 2011), by means of which words, expressions and metaphors from the military and the conflict filter into the public sphere. The daily and continual use of conflict-related language by society members normalises and naturalises for them the existence of violent acts (Gavriely-Nuri, 2012). That is, society members come to view the situation of the conflict as normal and as reflecting a natural aspect of social reality (Babones, 2012).

Psychological adaptation to intractable conflicts

Routinisation prepares society members to cope with life under conflict, which is characterised by threats and dangers. Through repeated rituals, routinisation increases the psychological resilience that makes it possible to overcome stress. Routinisation creates a particular mindset attuned to conflict-related cues and thus makes individuals constantly alert to dangers and threats. It thus facilitates the development of sensitivity and awareness, which are necessary for avoiding surprise negative acts by the enemy, whose evil intentions are a given. Therefore, a society that has undergone routinisation is continuously prepared for any threat.

According to Hadjipavlou, these everyday symbols of conflict help individuals 'adapt to the conflict and the status-quo especially when there is no daily interethnic violence' (2004: 200). Everyday routines operate in a manner that is similar to that in which the narrative of the ethos of conflict creates coherency, order and meaning within the unclear and ambiguous flow of conflict events. The routines create a sense of security, certainty and predictability in societies living with intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2013). By clarifying the flow of conflict events and by creating a stable representation of the conflict reality, everyday routines provide a meaningful view of the conflict and thus enable adaptation. Indeed, according to an established view in psychology, in order to adapt in times of stress and deprivation, individuals need to form a worldview that provides meaning (see e.g. Antonovsky, 1987; Frankl, 1963; Greenberg et al., 1997).

The use of military language and conflict-related language facilitates the psychological adaptation of society members to intractable conflicts in two main ways. First, the use in daily speech of conflict-related language that suppresses the evil and the horrific cost of intractable conflicts desensitises society members. Desensitisation to violence is defined as a reduction in emotion-related physiological reactivity to real violence (Carnagey et al., 2005) and thus can be seen as a psychological mechanism that facilitates adaptation. The seeping into the language of conflict-related words, metaphors and expressions makes it possible for society members to live normal lives and avoid seeing or being moved by acts of violence (Mowery and Duffy, 1990).

Desensitisation to the negative implications of intractable conflicts also results from the everyday practice of conflict-related acts. For example, Carnagey et al. (2005) examine the effect of everyday practices, such as playing violent video games, on physiological desensitisation. Their results indicate that individuals who play violent video games habituate or 'get used' to violence. Individuals, who live under the conditions of intractable conflicts, interact with the conflict intensely in their daily lives – in their homes, on sidewalks, and in malls, schools and stores. These individuals are actually rehearsing their contact with the conflict through their everyday routines.

It could be said that violence becomes banal to them because they practice routines daily that are related to violence and conflict. It is through this performing and practicing of the conflict in their immediate and everyday environment that society members become deeply involved and experienced in the conflict and thus become habituated and secure.

Second, society members use various words and expressions to euphemise the conflict, such as *soften up* (bombing in preparation for a ground engagement) and *clean bombing* (bombing with pinpoint accuracy). The milder, indirect or vague expressions of euphemised language diminish or conceal the damaging impact of these aspects of the conflict. These two ways of suppressing and diminishing the implications of intractable conflicts enable society members to avoid the constant psychological burdens that attend conflicts. A softened and normalised conflict reality helps society members cope with the negative implications of intractable conflicts and to experience these implications with resilience. But this psychological adaptation also helps pave the way for the continuation of the conflict, because routinisation to some extent reduces distress, stress and discomfort.

Formation of solidarity

Routinisation reinforces solidarity, cohesiveness and the sense of a shared fate. Society members share a particular and unique way of life that includes experiences, images, practices and language. They know that they live in a context of conflict and are aware that this is a unique situation that is reflected in their routine lives. Shared routines of conflict are among the markers for drawing boundaries of bond formation and belonging. That is, routinised expressions of conflict unite society members by emphasising their similarity in contrast to out-groups and provide one of the criteria for differentiation between one's own society and out-groups. As Sherif (1951) notes:

The most important consequence of group structuring is the delineation of *in-group* from *out-group*. The development of in-group and 'we experience' is accompanied by the demarcation and setting of boundaries from out-groups.

(1951: 395)

A routinised and unique way of life provides the glue that binds the individual to a society and to that society's geographical location. A sense of belonging, sharing, solidarity and common fate is an integral part of social cohesiveness. Moreover, these daily experiences contribute to the formation of a unique collective identity. Individuals construct the meaning they attribute to a society not only through self-social categorisation but also through shared common practices (Bauman, 2001; Foucault, 1991; Hall, 1996).

The conception of David and Bar-Tal (2009) is relevant to the analysis of the way in which routinisation also consolidates collective identity. It suggests that beyond the basic characteristics of social identity and identification, the strength of collective identity depends on its generic characteristics. Some of these characteristics are expressed in routinisation. The feature that pertains to the perception of the uniqueness of the collective and its distinction from other collectives is very salient, because the routines of conflict differentiate the society well from other groups. This is an essential mechanism for the consolidation of collective identity. Also, routinisation greatly strengthens *the sense of a common fate*, which is another generic feature of collective identity. That sense includes the feeling of unity and of mutual dependence that prevails among members of a collective. This is the feeling of 'togetherness', the 'cement' that unites individuals and social groups (Brown, 2000) and enables them to define themselves as belonging to the same collective despite variability in values, beliefs, attitudes and patterns of behaviour. Finally, routinisation is also related to *coordinated activity of the collective's members* as they are carried as routinised practices. This feature related to the common and coordinated practices aimed at achieving the goals of conflict as they are seen to be necessary for coping with the conditions of the threatening conflict (van Zomeren and Iyer, 2009).

We have outlined the various functions of routinisation in times of intractable conflict. In the last section of the chapter we will discuss a number of implications of routinisation for the conflict and our conclusions.

Implications and conclusions

After considering the phenomenon of routinisation, which consists of the penetration and embedding of conflict-related symbols into everyday life, we suggest that it facilitates the perpetuation of the conflict. On the basis of Bourdieu's (2002) conception, we argue that the routinisation of everyday conflict-related discourses and practices enables the culture of conflict to penetrate into the internal life of society members and consolidate its dominance. Because identity is not only an inner psychological state of individual self-definition but also a form of life that is lived daily, the constant encounters with the symbols of the conflict shape society members as latent bearers of the culture of intractable conflicts. This process, which tightens the grip of the culture of conflict on society members, reinforces and perpetuates the conflict.

Thus, as we have noted, the shaping of individuals' identities through the routine saturation of physical and social spaces with boundaries, conflict-related events and practices and a broad array of conflict representations leads society members to perceive the conflict as normal and natural. Society members come to think in terms of the concepts and meanings of intractable conflicts. Moreover, the penetration of the intractable conflict into social

activities in the home, on sidewalks, and in malls, schools, stores and cafes makes society members interact intensely with the conflict (Brubaker, 2008). Individuals are not only watching conflicts in the media, they are performing and practicing a conflict in their immediate and everyday social and physical spaces. This intense interaction with the conflict leads individuals to make it a central part of their common-sense knowledge, cultural idioms, cognitive schemes and interactional cues. Thus the conflict becomes a central part of their cultural fabric (Brubaker, 2008; Gorringer, 2006; Tambiah, 1996).

This analysis illuminates a particular aspect of the culture of conflict that dominates the lives of individuals and of the collective. It provides an additional explanation for the deep embedding of the culture of conflict in the life of society members. It also explains how national hegemonies are able to mobilise their members quickly for acts of conflict and violence. In many societies that live in the context of intractable conflict, 'salient violent situations' such as wars occur seldom (Billig, 1995: 69). Under these conditions, it is only through the embedding of the conflict in everyday routines that national hegemonies are able to contend with intractable conflicts. Because of the wider rhythm of banal life that constantly reminds individuals of the conflict, individuals persist in thinking and behaving in terms of the conflict's concepts and meanings.

At the same time, these social processes block other ideas, meanings, knowledge, perceptions, worldviews and behaviours from being possible alternatives to the ones that have been normalised (Bar-Tal, Oren, & Nets-Zehngut, *in press*; Laclau, 1990; Skey, 2009; Therborn, 1980). These alternatives become unacceptable and deviant interpretations of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013; Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2011). In other words, the absorption of the conflict into daily life and the shaping of daily life as a central part of the culture of conflict enable societies to sustain intractable conflicts. Routinisation ensures support for wars and violence. It makes both collective and individual life part of the conflict and thus normalises and sustains the conflict while also serving as a major inhibitor of peaceful resolution.

In this vein, Mitzen (2006) proposes that the situation of conflict, which is full of threats, paradoxically leads to ontological security. That is, in times of intractable conflict, society members seek to satisfy the need to live in certainty and stability, as part of their identity fulfilment. This need is met by the establishment of routines that are familiar, trusted and well-practiced. The established routines become embedded into the culture of conflict. But this integration perpetuates the conflict, because the routines prevent movement towards a different situation – a situation of peacemaking – that requires risk-taking and uncertainty. The above analysis suggests that society members involved in intractable conflicts develop a mindset that enables them to live relatively adaptively – knowing what is going on, what is accepted and how to

cope with the conditions. They have difficulty imagining a peaceful situation after living through years of conflict, in which the patterns of thought and behaviour have become well established and continuously used, and thus continue dogmatically to pursue the familiar line of conflict-related societal beliefs and behaviours, without examining alternatives. This way of life consolidates support for the culture of conflict because the routines of life are based on the ideology of conflict. As Schröder and Schmidt point out, the 'dynamics of violence easily take precedence over original motivations' (2001: 20); that is, violence is seen as inevitable. Routinisation is thus one of the mechanisms that perpetuate violence in conflicts.

We have illuminated an important mechanism of the culture of conflict and have shed light on how it functions: on the one hand, aiding adaptation to the harsh context of intractable conflict, but on the other hand, playing a destructive role by perpetuating the conflict. Awareness of this double-edged sword may lead to a better understanding of the socio-psychological dynamics of intractable conflicts and of how to move societies onto the road of peacemaking.

We realise that changing culture of conflict with its normalising mechanisms of routinisation is a major societal change that lasts many years and is arduous, nonlinear and complex. But these types of processes have a beginning and some even reach an end with the construction of a culture of peace, as testifies the successful building of peaceful relations between France and Germany after the Second World War. Other cases as in Northern Ireland, South Africa or Guatemala are moving in the direction of building a culture of peace. In focusing on the routinisation factor, we think that one of the conditions for facilitating the process of peace building is realisation about the destructive nature of a culture of conflict with its mechanisms. Routinisation contributes to perpetuation of the conflict, by normalising the violent way of life and thus one of the challenges is to persuade participants in intractable conflict that this normalisation stands as an obstacle to an achievement of peaceful, normal and prosperous life.

Notes

1. The collective memory of conflict describes the outbreak of the conflict and its course, providing a coherent and meaningful picture of what has happened, from the societal perspective (Bar-Tal, 2013; Devine-Wright, 2003; Papadakis et al., 2006; Tint, 2010).
2. The *ethos of conflict* is defined as the configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society for the present and the future (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2013). It is composed of eight major themes concerning issues related to the conflict, the in-group and its adversary: (1) *Societal beliefs about the justness of one's own goals* outline the contested goals, indicate their crucial importance

and provide explanations and rationales for those goals; (2) *Societal beliefs about security* stress the importance of personal safety and national survival and outline the conditions for achieving them; (3) *Societal beliefs regarding a positive collective self-image* reflect the ethnocentric tendency to attribute positive traits, values and behaviour to one's own society; (4) *Societal beliefs of victimisation* involve the self-presentation of the in-group as the victim of the conflict; (5) *Societal beliefs delegitimising the opponent* involve beliefs that deny the adversary's humanity; (6) *Societal beliefs regarding patriotism* generate attachment to the country and society by propagating loyalty, love, care and sacrifice; (7) *Societal beliefs regarding unity* refer to the importance of ignoring internal conflicts and disagreements during intractable conflicts, so as to unite the society in the face of an external threat; and finally, (8) *Societal beliefs concerning peace* refer to peace as the ultimate desire of the society.

3. Collective emotional orientation refers to societal characterisation of an emotion that is reflected at the individual and collective level in the socio-psychological repertoire, as well as in tangible and intangible societal symbols, such as cultural products or ceremonies (Bar-Tal, 2001, 2013).
4. It is recognised that not all members of societies involved in intractable conflicts share the repertoire equally. Societies differ in the extent to which beliefs in the ethos and collective memory of conflict are shared. Moreover, there are societies in which two, contradictory, types of ethos evolve even at the height of the conflict, and others may develop them over time.
5. Billig's term 'banal nationalism' refers to 'ideological habits which enable nations of the West to be reproduced' (1995: 6).

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22

Narrative Constructions of Conflict and Coexistence: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Johanna Mannergren Selimovic

It was an awkward moment. Emir and Dragan had only met in passing since the war. Now they sat in silence in Emir's sofa, sipping glasses of juice that Emir's wife had served. Dragan was a Bosnian Serb in the small town of Foča in southeastern Bosnia whom I had struck up an acquaintance with. He had given me a ride to the community of Ustokolina, a pleasant village on the banks of the river Drina that used to be part of Foča municipality. Today, however, the line that divides Bosnia into the two entities Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation meanders between Foča and Ustokolina.

The two men were in their late thirties and had been school friends in Foča. After the war Emir, a Bosniak, had settled in Ustokolina, not wanting to return to Foča where his house had been burnt down. When Dragan had seen whom I intended to interview, he had joined me in entering the house. It was not an ideal situation. Dragan had earlier carefully outlined his strong ethnonationalist views and belief that Serbs and Bosniaks should live as separately as possible. 'The hatred goes back for generations', he had said.

Emir welcomed us all into the house and despite my misgivings I felt it would be rude to try to prevent Dragan from joining us. After some stiff comments about work, eventually finding common ground in complaining about the economy, Dragan started to tell a story that I had not heard before. He said that a few weeks earlier he had received a phone call from a mutual Bosniak friend who now lived in Australia. They had lost touch during the war, but now the friend had managed to track him down, in order to thank him for saving his life. When the conflict broke out the two of them had been up hiking in the mountains, as they had done so many times before, and had been stunned to arrive back to a chaotic Foča. Dragan had eventually managed to find space for his Bosniak friend on a bus leaving for neighbouring Montenegro, thereby helping him to escape. Emir listened to this story with a guarded expression,

but in the end asked for the phone number of the mutual friend in Australia. Emir then proceeded to talk about the relief he had felt when his brother's remains had been located in a mass grave that had been excavated two years earlier only a few kilometres outside Foča.

On the return journey, Dragan was in a chatty and light mood and said that it had felt good to once again be able to talk about saving his friend. He was also interested to hear what Emir had been through: 'I absolutely agree that Emir's brother was a victim. But I cannot agree that they were the only victims' (Fieldnotes, April 2008).

After violence, questions about remembering and forgetting are brought to the fore: what to remember, what to forget; what to speak about, what to be silent about? A decade and a half after war ended in Bosnia-Herzegovina, meanings and memories of the conflict are fractured. Although no violence has occurred since the internationally brokered peace in 1995, the country and its inhabitants are deeply divided between conflicting stories that compete for precedence. The Dayton Peace Accord has created an ethnified administrative and political structure, and collective narratives in media and in politics promise security through practices of ethnic separation according to the same exclusionist logic that drove the war. Physical markers such as street names and other symbols maintain a divisive and nationalist public narrative.

Stories of ethnonationalism may appear overpoweringly loud. But while they to a large degree define Bosnian society today, they only provide a partial understanding of post-conflict everyday life in BiH. Importantly, such narratives never manage to be 'whole'. As this chapter will discuss, inhabitants constantly use their limited narrative space to create a different type of moral coherence that subtly questions the ethnicisation of the everyday. The encounter between Dragan and Emir recounted above is one example of how the meaning of public narratives is renegotiated through ongoing, pragmatic interactions with the ethnic other.

The two (former) friends, whose meeting I will return to below, are inhabitants of the small town of Foča in eastern BiH. Empirical research in this staunchly ethnonationalist community was carried out during several stays in 2008.¹ The chapter, building upon this research, demonstrates how a narrative analysis accesses strategies for constructing and maintaining everyday peace in a contentious and polarised political setting. Hence it attempts to move beyond the binary understanding of post-conflict societies and provide a 'thicker' description of everyday post-war life by focussing on the micropolitics of coexistence (Theidon, 2009). Ultimately, the chapter engages with the issue of how societies can recover from mass atrocities and build sustainable peace.

From here the chapter proceeds by presenting the analytical frame for the narrative enquiry and methods. The national and local political context is then described, and dominant collective narratives that ethnonational actors

on both 'sides' embraced are outlined. The fissures in these stories are analysed and examples are given of ways in which people negotiated and (partly) challenged them. The chapter concludes with a discussion on how a narrative reading may deepen understandings of the multifaceted processes towards peaceful coexistence in deeply divided post-conflict contexts.

A narrative reading

Narratives are here understood as a particular mode of discourse, which orders and creates meaning through a particular rendering of events and experiences that is coherent, temporal and moral (White, 1990: 3, 9). Narratives hence organise a morally coherent relationship between the past, present and future. As we all make meaning through particular understandings of what happened to us in the past and how we anticipate the future, we in this sense live 'storied lives'. But there is never just one story told. Our individual storytelling is done in relation to collective narratives that recount 'who we are' as a social category and tell of a common past. Collective meaning-making processes are particularly intense in post-war contexts, when questions of who is a victim and who is a perpetrator are up for discussion, and power in the present is produced through hegemonic claims on particular versions of the past. Meaning-making stories around the war and around post-conflict everyday life stories are thus played out at both a collective and an individual level, and in the encounter between the different stories, new meanings and practices are constructed.

To access this dynamic and unstable process as it played out in the everyday practices of coexistence in Foca, open interviews were conducted with 53 persons, during four stays in the town in the period of January–July 2008. The informants were 'ordinary' citizens found through snowball sampling and strategies of 'gradual selection' (Flick, 2007: 29). Roughly half of the informants were Bosniaks and half Bosnian Serbs. There were slightly more men than women, and the youngest informants were in their late 20s, the oldest in their 80s. In addition to interviews, data collection was conducted through participant observation of social interactions outside the interview situation, which deepened understandings of the dynamics of coexistence. For example, I observed the way people greeted each other, how the young interacted in cafés and how the old talked while tending their gardens. I took part in spontaneous conversations, I watched relations between colleagues at work and took note of visible displays of, for example, 'yugostalgia' or nationalist symbols in people's homes. Further, the 'snippets' of narratives that people in various contexts shared with me in the everyday fitted into a broader pattern that supported the long, open interviews (see for example Malkki, 1995: 49 for similar methodological experiences).

The text transcripts from the interviews were analysed and searched for common themes, as well as for contradictions and 'breaks'. From this reading the tensions between collective and individual narratives clearly emerged. As I will discuss below, the collective narratives of ethnonationalism that dominate public discourse in Foča attempt to turn plural and heterogeneous experiences and expectations within a particular group into a coherent story. They are produced by political elites and media and embraced by people who seem to turn to the security and belonging that these 'narrative performances' offer. They build upon certain understandings of the past war that makes it necessary to imagine a future built around separate, ethnic lives. These narratives were often dominant in the way informants framed how they – at least to start off with – narrated their own understanding of the events of the war, and of how the fragile peace should be solidified and coexistence performed. At the same time the analysis of the material also revealed how the informants continuously used, refused and/or transformed the exclusionist collective narratives in relation to their personal experiences. The close narrative reading thus accessed the 'voices in the margin' that are hard to hear in the polarised climate of post-war BiH, where ethnonationalists are the 'privileged storytellers... to whom narrative authority is granted' (Campbell cited in Milliken, 1999: 236).

Ethnopolitics in Foča and beyond

The brutal conflict in BiH was driven by ethnopolitical entrepreneurs who targeted civilians through tactics of ethnic cleansing that unravelled multi-ethnic communities. While the situation in BiH today is secure in terms of physical security, refugee return and property restitution, the political situation remains highly unstable. Political representatives of constituent ethnic groups are in constant disagreement, and political parties cling to, and get their power from, different interpretations of the war. There is little political motivation or institutional contexts to bring forth a shared narrative of the past or a vision of the future (Eastmond and Mannergren Selimovic, 2012). Time and again, the political process has been brought into paralysis as the very construction of the Bosnian state is questioned. A background to the recurring political stalemates is the Dayton Peace Agreement which institutionalised the division between constituent ethnic groups into two entities (The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a majority of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, and Republika Srpska, with a majority of Bosnian Serbs) with a highly decentralised structure, ensuring that constituent groups are guaranteed representation in elected positions (Bose, 2002). The Peace Agreement also provided for one of the most extensive peace-building interventions ever. The Office of the High Representative has executive powers to oversee the implementation of the peace accord,

which gives Bosnian politicians an oft-used excuse for not taking responsibility for the future of the Bosnian state.

The polarised situation at the national level is well reflected in the local politics of Foča as they played out in 2008. This quiet little town in north-eastern BiH was the site of some of the gravest mass atrocities during the 1992–1995 war. On 7 April 1992 the war's first wave of ethnic cleansing hit Foča, as Bosnian Serb forces and paramilitary troops from Serbia moved along the Drina valley. Hundreds of people were killed and the rest of the Bosniak population was driven away, leaving only a handful of Bosniak residents in the actual town.² All Bosniak inhabitants were forced to flee, infamous rape camps were set up and thousands of people were killed. There were also Bosnian Serbs who were killed in raids against villages on the Bosnian Serb side of the frontline. For example, a massacre of more than 40 civilians allegedly occurred in the village of Jošanica just outside Foča (ICTY Report, 2004). Following the Dayton Peace Accord the entity line between the two entities of Bosnia, the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), was drawn through the municipality, and the actual town ended up in Republika Srpska. At the time of fieldwork in 2008, about 25 per cent of the Bosniak population had returned and shared the physical space once again with their Bosnian Serb neighbours.³ Soaring unemployment and staunch ethnonationalist local politics kept return levels low.⁴

The intimacy of the violence performed in Foča meant that people on a daily basis had to negotiate a complex web of guilt and innocence. Many of the people I interviewed had been direct targets of violence, some had been wounded, others had lost children, parents, siblings. Others had fought in the war. Most of them had been, in one way or another, bystanders. It was therefore not surprising that collective ethnic categories were embraced by most informants. Their narratives, nourished by the separatist message of politicians and local media, defined who was a victim and who was a perpetrator, and inscribed a collective grid on the everyday interactions in the town. For example, during an interview with one of the survivors of the Jošanica massacre mentioned above, the informant pointed across the steep valley towards some other houses. Those were homes of Bosniak returnees, she explained and stated that she wanted them to keep out of her way, since 'they slaughtered us' (interview no 30). Another informant, a Bosniak middle-aged woman, doctor by profession, made a similar comment concerning possibilities of reconciliation: 'Would you seek to be with someone who ... raped you and killed you?' (Interview no 50). A younger Bosnian Serb man who had been a soldier during the war and who had lost his brother and sister-in-law in an attack on his village just outside Foča, offered his own explanation why there had not been many Bosnian Serb victims found in mass graves: 'Very often the Muslims burnt our bodies in order to hide the

crime' (Interview no 17). These assertions illustrate the collective inscriptions of the grid of victim – perpetrator, which to a certain degree informed all relationships in Foča. You survived, but were slaughtered. You escaped, but were raped and killed. You were alive, but your body was burnt.

They formed an important part of the dominant collective narratives among both Bosnian Serbs and Bosniak returnees. The dichotomies played out at the national level in politics and in the media were echoed by the informants from both groups. Bosnian Serbs almost unequivocally adhered to the dominant exclusionist discourse in Republika Srpska, a discourse empowered temporally by representations of Serbhood through the centuries, linking battles against the Ottomans in the fourteenth century to the Second World War and the latest war, and spatially through the striving for a homeland; a geographical place that belongs to Serbs. The hegemony of this narrative is articulated through media, in political statements, as well as in the physical representations of commemorations and in the bureaucratic administration of the Serb entity. As with all hegemonic narratives it performed a strong disciplinary function, steering what could be said or not. With only a couple of exceptions my Bosnian Serb informants said they agreed with the exclusionist principle of separate lives and separate areas for the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia.

Collective narratives among Bosniaks were more ambiguous. Some of the interviewed returnees gave voice to a particular strand of Bosniak nationalist discourse, which maintains that after the war one can never again trust the Serbs, and that Republika Srpska should cease to exist since it was understood to have been founded on genocide (ICG Report, 2009). On the other hand, Bosniaks who had returned to Foča had taken practical steps towards sharing a physical space and were cautious not to be too harsh in their criticism. The fact that they had decided to once again live in Foča was in itself a challenge to ethnonationalist, separatist narratives on both sides.

These narratives shared the rationale that peace could only be maintained in BiH if the three constituent ethnic groups lived 'side by side' instead of recreating the pluralistic and mixed pre-war BiH. Mehta and Chatterji, writing on a different post-conflict context, have described how the future was regarded in 'fearful anticipation of similar events' (Mehta and Chatterji, 2001: 228). The temporal logic of ethnonationalist narratives articulated among my informants in Foča fed on such 'fearful anticipation' and framed the war as 'necessary' for preventing a relapse in the future. The internationally driven attempts to remake a multi-ethnic BiH was according to this logic understood as a threat of war, instead of a promise of peace. A young man in Foča elaborated:

We should live side by side, but not together. That's the only way we can have justice. The way you (the international community) are doing it, it will just create more problems. You are doing the same thing that Tito

did, forcing us into something that will not last. Because it creates a lot of fear and resistance, and people feel badly treated, and then war can begin again.

(Interview no 7)

Challenges and leaks

In many analyses of contemporary BiH, these dominant discourses of exclusion, separateness and fear serve as a full description of Bosnian life today. 'Discourses of danger' (Campbell, 1998) are certainly inscribed into the everyday politics of Bosnia, daily expressed in media and deeply folded into local power stakes. Nonetheless, when doing research in Foča among 'ordinary' people it became clear that these discourses were not as rigid as one might be led to believe. It became obvious that while 'symbolic strategies' (Eastmond, 2007, 256), powerfully narrativise 'the experience of the social category to which the individual belongs, rather than telling the particular individual's story' (Richardson in Elliott, 2005, 13), they are leaky and cannot contain the individual experiences of the people that supposedly are included in the category. Although many informants industriously 'taught' me the logic of the ethnonationalist stories of separateness, it was clearly hard work to maintain moral coherence. When probed further, the informants all displayed different ways of negotiating or partly challenging the hegemonic nationalistic discourse, in contrast to what they first told me. Fieldwork showed that many people refused the ethnopolitical divisive narratives as they fitted ill with their own past experiences as well as with the structure of daily life.

Returning to the encounter between Dragan and Emir recounted above, it was a telling example of such negotiations. The eagerness of Dragan to see Emir contradicted his 'public' arguments about separation between the ethnic groups. He had at first made great efforts to 'teach' me the grand narrative of the Bosnian Serbs, portraying the Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic and the political leader Radovan Karadzic as great heroes who had fought for a 'Serb homeland' (both of them currently under trial in the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY)). Then he shared his experiences of being best friends with a Bosniak before the war, helping him and most probably in that action risking his own safety. Further, on his own initiative he had made an effort to take up contact with Emir again, displaying curiosity about his life today as well as presenting a story of inclusion, which could be read as an attempt to activate common ground. Emir, on his part, while being a polite host, took the opportunity to tell the story of his murdered brother.

Similar contestations and negotiations of the collective separatist narrative were evident in the lives of most of my respondents. Despite the common insistence that the two groups should stay apart, people nonetheless engaged

in relationships across the boundaries drawn up by the exclusionist discourse. In doing so, they tapped into rich cultural competences for living with difference that inhabitants of historically multi-ethnic BiH have developed. The maintenance of interethnic relations in the neighbourhood, *komšilik*, has formed a very important aspect of Bosnian life, as has been richly explored elsewhere (Bringa, 1995; Kolind, 2007; Maček, 2007; Stefansson, 2007). Bringa gives a detailed account of pre-war village life in which women did their daily visiting rounds of coffee drinking; an arena for meeting across the ethnic lines, and a stage for showing 'what we do among us' (*kod nas*) and 'what you do among you' (*kod vas*). It was a way of taking pride in cultural differences and displaying knowledge and respect for traditions of the familiar other (Bringa, 1995: 68). A common culture was formed from this context of diversity and 'eliminated otherness and changed it into familiar difference' (Kolind, 2007: 138).

Although most people in Foča no longer engaged in ongoing social visits with the ethnic other in the manner that Bringa describes, they were still keen to show that they were hospitable. Even people who were quite vehement in their exclusionist ideology took care to show their hospitality and stressed that they helped neighbours and were generous towards people in need – irrespective of national belonging. They activated the intercultural competences of before, pointing out with some pride that they still respected their neighbours' cultural habits, for example by practising the old custom of making gifts of a piece of lamb meat at Bajram (Ramadan), or eggs at the Orthodox Easter. Even people who agreed with the principle of the less contact the better, took care to maintain social relations and appreciated such interactions. A Bosnian Serb woman in Foča who came from a village a few kilometres out of town, now in the Federation, said that 'when I see the Muslims I try to step aside. I don't want to have any contacts with them' (Interview no 8). Interestingly, a bit later in the interview she described what pleasure it gave her when she saw her old neighbour and friend, a Bosniak woman whom, she said, never failed to send a greeting, and 'worries about me and my (handicapped) daughter'.

These are some examples of private, everyday leakages in the collective, exclusionist narratives that otherwise so overwhelmingly dominated public space. Further, there were also some people who more actively challenged and opposed the separatist logic of ethnonationalism. Although largely invisible in public arenas such as local media and memorial manifestations, they took care in their everyday life to uphold a different moral coherence. This was evident in how these individuals related to the issue of war criminals. Ethnonationalist narratives closely guarded collective definitions of victims as only belonging to one's own group, and perpetrators as belonging to 'the others' (Mannergren Selimovic, 2010a). But several individuals dared to challenge this binary logic and argued that people should not be defined according to ethnic categorisations but according to the individual's actions – good or bad. One of the

prominent members of the Bosniak returnee community spoke out against the collective production of victims, perpetrators and heroes:

Some war criminals are actually heroes for some people. That is a problem. No one had the right to do something in my name. For me such a person is not a hero, he is a criminal... War criminals who committed crimes in the names of Croats or Serbs are not heroes.

(Interview no 2)

Stories of goodness

This moral rationale challenged the collective homogenisation inherent in the ethnonationalist stories. It was underpinned by the telling of oft-silenced 'good stories'. Instead of betrayal and violence the 'good' narratives spoke of courage and inclusiveness. Several informants told me stories that they seem to highly treasure. They were narratives of people who had taken great risks in order to help them, people who 'showed that they were humans'. For example a Serb neighbour had put up a sign on his Bosniak neighbour's house that said that it was a Serb house, thereby saving it from destruction. One person explained that when he came to Foča from Sarajevo during the war he had been told that he could just walk in and take over any of the houses that had been abandoned by the Bosniaks. But he had refused, it simply did not feel right, he said. There were also several examples of Bosniaks having been warned by Bosnian Serb friends, for example this story told by a female doctor:

In April 1992 I left. It was because I was called by my friend xx, who was a dentist in the town. She said that they are talking in café DOM, saying that they are throwing Muslims in the (river) Drina. She told us we had to run. That person is now living in Novi Sad (in Serbia). They left. She had a divorce because her husband was a great leader of the Serbs, organising the killings. And because she did not agree with that she took the children and left for Novi Sad. Thanks to that person I am alive. I had a call from that person in the last minute and that is why I could escape.

(Interview no 50)

Such stories have been conspicuously absent from the public discourse, not only in Foča but all over BiH. The 'good stories' are dangerous because they make several discursive breaks. They are a threat against the coherence of the ethnopolitical story and challenge discourses of danger, as well as discourses of the collective innocence of bystanders (after all, if some could help, why not others?). Individuals in Foča used stories of goodness in order to support and make sense of ongoing interactions with the ethnic other in the present, just

as the exclusionists used stories of fear and violence in order to make sense of separate lives.

Stories of Yugoslavia

Stories of a more distant past included reminiscence of the Yugoslav period. Here different interpretations fought for precedence. Some dismissed the past and the practices of multi-ethnicity under socialism and interpreted their own pre-war personal experiences of living a multi-ethnic lifestyle as 'false'. One person told me that when he was a teenager in the 1980s he had a girlfriend with a different ethnic background. His grandmother had taken him aside and said that he should be careful; mixed marriages were potentially problematic. At that time he thought she was talking nonsense. He had been brought up in an urban, Yugoslav discourse and the categories 'Muslim' or 'Serb' did not hold any meaning to him. But today he knew that he should have listened to his grandmother: 'Now of course I know she was right', he said. Instead of interpreting the fact that he had shared his life with someone from 'the other side' for several years as a challenge to the ethnonationalist discourse, he instead chose to see the earlier period as false (Field notes 24 July 2008). However, it was just as common to re-activate a discourse of yugoslavism. The older generation maintained a nostalgic image of the socialist past; a perspective that stressed how in that period an overarching unifying identity was constructed, as this man in his 60s put forth with great vigour:

The communists did not make the borders (of the republics of Yugoslavia) according to nationality, comrade Tito said these are just scratches in the map, they do not mean anything, we are all one country. And I still think that we are one people, one nation.

(Interview no 35)

Sometimes the nostalgia went further back than socialism. While Dragan contended that the conflict between Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks had been going on for hundreds of years, there were others who imagined a Bosnia of before as a place where people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds had lived in peace and created a common culture. This discourse thus supported Bringa's claim that 'cultural pluralism was intrinsic to the social order' in pre-war Bosnia (Bringa, 1995: 83).

Using silence to negotiate the everyday

The above analysis shows that the rigid, public narratives were continuously challenged in people's private and individual practices, which they supported

by stressing 'the good stories' from before and during the war, in order to hold on to relations that stretched across and beyond ethnic boundaries. Did the active narrating of shared good experiences also include an open discussion on 'the bad stories', the atrocities performed mainly against the Bosniak population? Most people did in fact shy away from the divisive events, and did not challenge the silence surrounding these crimes. That was not necessarily a negative thing, several informants argued. Silence in this context was on the contrary often described as a sign of respect and as a means of 'avoiding the personally painful and the socially disruptive' (Eastmond and Mannergren Selimovic, 2012: 521)⁵:

We never talk about what happened [during the war]. And believe me, I don't want to talk about it. I have seen one [Bosnian Serb] friend from before a hundred times but we have never asked each other what happened [during the war]. I work with younger people at the station and they were kids when all of this happened. They know nothing about all of this, and we have to take care of them.

(Interview no 22)

Some people did bring up the subject of the war and its tragedies, but only at a more general level where once again the aim was to search for common ground: 'it is easy to say to people, and they accept it easily, that the Serb tear and the Muslim tear for the fallen are the same'. Such 'respectful' silence seemed a useful strategy for normalising life after extraordinary violence. But while it opened up a space where civil interaction could develop without openly challenging the ethnonationalist discourses, it also built voids around the suffering that many had experienced and were part of the marginalisation and forgetting of certain events – and not others.

The silences around these events were at times ominous. These voids in the public discourse could be accessed through paying attention to the 'physical narrative' in the townscape where mundane buildings formed an 'anatomy of violence'. The high school was a detention centre during the war. The youth activity hall, named Partizan, was the site of the biggest rape camp in the town and on the main bridge across the river Drina many people were shot and their bodies thrown into the water. But while the ICTY has sentenced dozens of people for these crimes, there were no commemorations and no mentioning of the suffering of the civilians in these places. Instead, by the above-mentioned bridge a big monument had been erected that paid tribute to the Bosnian Serb soldiers from Foča who died in the war. Nonetheless, the public forgetting could not be complete. Here and there in the townscape yawning holes opened up; places where several mosques used to stand. At the time of fieldwork, only one had been rebuilt. Similarly many houses were still in ruins – the owners far

away, or dead. These sites could be read as 'inverted' commemorations that served as constant reminders of the ethnic cleansing. They were physical voids that silently narrated to the inhabitants that which they tried to forget.

Concluding discussion

This chapter has provided some examples of how inhabitants in a community that saw grave atrocities during the war remade meaning and formed strategies for coexistence with former foes. It has considered the encounter between competing stories of coherence in a post-conflict setting and discussed how ordinary people embraced, resisted and transformed them in their everyday strategies for navigating the deep contestations in 'the ordinary' that shattering violence had inscribed (Das, 2007). The chapter has aimed to access the 'whispers in the margin' that challenged the coherence of polarising narratives and formed an unstable and complex web of meanings.

Narratives of ethnonationalism tell stories based upon collective categorisations that aim to turn plural and heterogeneous experiences within a particular group into a coherent collective story that continue the logic of the war. But, as this chapter has demonstrated, these stories had fissures and leaks. While many inhabitants 'front stage' upheld the idea of 'separate lives', they nonetheless continuously navigated and partially resisted the ethnonationalist narratives. As Hall points out, every construction of identity must exclude, and therefore always must produce a margin. In these margins, other stories are told (Hall, 2003: 5). In Foča there were certainly other stories told that made other moral claims, based upon inclusion instead of exclusion. People's everyday lives involved many contacts with the ethnic other, and it was obvious that there were other categories and affinities according to which people interacted. They constructed a coherent past and present by building upon experiences of good actions during the war, and evoked the pre-war titoist era as providing a different rationale for coexistence in the present. At the same time the crimes of the past were seldom discussed. These silences were both part of strategies for coping with coexistence – at the same time as they clearly limited the space for recognition of the crimes committed in the town.

Hence one may conclude that people in Foča engaged in what has been called a 'construction of normality' (Maček, 2007: 57), and used their agency in the everyday in order to weave a new social fabric, a process that was ongoing at the same time as polarised narratives were upheld. They claimed a limited narrative space to negotiate the disciplinary functions of hegemonic discourse to make everyday sense of the story of living with difference in a charged social landscape. Importantly, this chapter has shown the need to look for the ambiguous

ways that people may embrace many conflicting stories. A narrative enquiry unveils how human beings are constantly engaged in ontological struggles to understand themselves as whole subjects, but that we all live ‘a life of partitions and segments... a somewhat schizophrenic existence’ (Kerby, 2001: 129).

The findings from Foča have bearings for the wider question of how sustainable peace is to be built after mass atrocities when former foes once again live together. As part of the normative project of constructing a new imagined community to replace the one that was torn asunder in the war, not only ideas of a common future but of a common past is needed (Anderson, 2000; see also Winter, 2006: 58). Such a reading accesses the production of power in the post-conflict order, as it unveils how certain memories – and not others – are spun into coherent stories, which legitimise and delegitimise certain actions (Zehfuss, 2006). This process of remembering and forgetting at different narrative positions produces power – who decides what to tell? Who listens, who resists the dominant stories and who remains silent (Meskell, 2006; Winter, 2006; Zehfuss, 2006)? Through narrative methods it is possible to understand the production of hidden transcripts that make other moral claims than the dominant, collective narratives. Research on peace and reconciliation processes must listen carefully to these ‘stories in the margin’ and take into consideration the constant ambiguities in the way that individuals in post-conflict settings remake meaning. An interest in the dynamic, narrative production of claims and counterclaims can help us escape from a sole focus on ‘opposites’, which tend to fix subject positions and reify categories. Instead, an interest in the everyday as a messy social arena full of contradictions and contentions may provide a deeper understanding of processes towards durable peace in the everyday.

At the same time one has to be careful what conclusions for reconciliation and inclusive peace one may draw from these narrative strategies. As Jansen has pointed out (in one of few studies of coexistence at local level in BiH), ‘they also largely failed to evoke such a common future, remaining on the level of mutual confirmations of the importance of “normal life”’ (Jansen, 2010: 46). Nonetheless, the findings from Foča indicate that functioning social networks are a form of ‘security bargain between ethnic groups that will allow tolerant behavior to be rewarded’ (Ignatieff, 1993: 331). Hence they may begin to erode strictly monitored borders between self and other and may function as new ‘foundational memories’ for the ‘establishment of a new moral order’ (Theidon, 2006: 441). The encounter between Dragan and Emir may accordingly encompass a moment of making everyday peace. A close reading of such micropolitics of coexistence may give us a better understanding of the challenges of the post-conflict order and, ultimately, access the multiple ways in which peace may be imagined.

Notes

1. The research was conducted for the doctoral thesis 'Remembering and Forgetting after War: Narratives of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in a Bosnian Town', University of Gothenburg, 2010.
2. In 2004, it was reported that 730 people (596 men, 133 women, one baby) were still missing from the Foča municipality. Most of them disappeared between April and September 1992 (ICTY Report, 2004: 22).
3. The pre-war population according to the 1991 census consisted of 40,513 inhabitants of which 51.6 per cent were Bosniaks, 45.3 per cent were Bosnian Serbs and 3.1 per cent were others.
4. Personal interview, Head of Department for Return, Foča municipality, 8 April 2008.
5. The issue of silence is further discussed by Eastmond and Mannergren Selimovic in an article in the *International Journal of Transitional Justice* (2012) that analyses practices of silence in Foča as well as intergenerational silences among Bosnians. Some of the quotes in this section of the chapter have been published in this article.

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23

Political Socialisation and Social Movements: Escaping the Political Past?

Igor Petrović, Jacquélien van Stekelenburg and Bert Klanderfans

Even the staunchest authoritarian regimes allow citizens to raise their voices from time to time. In the Soviet Union, for instance, where political and social life was heavily controlled by the communist regime, citizens were allowed to complain about certain issues by writing a letter to newspapers or authorities. While no fundamental critique of the political system was permitted, this offered citizens a manner to try to resolve their daily problems and unfairness they encountered (Smale, 1985; White, 1999: 46–47). Once communism collapsed, many Soviet citizens saw their lifestyle being destroyed – most of the social services they had known all their lives fell apart. Faced with this transitional disaster, many of them kept complaining to the newspapers by writing letters. What citizens did not take into account was that the political system that made their letters count did not exist any longer – citizens kept writing letters that no one was reading anymore. This story teaches us that while the political and social system might change almost overnight, citizens might need more time to adapt their political behaviour to changing contexts.

In theory, citizens' political behaviour includes a wide range of activities that can roughly be divided into two patterns – party politics and movement politics. As we explain later on in this chapter, this division is increasingly seen as obsolete and not reflective of citizens' everyday political practice. Even though much of the literature on political participation is demarcated by this division, we depart from party and movement politics as being two separate realms. Party politics involves activities such as voting, contacting, campaigning, donating money, party membership, doing voluntary work, running for office. Movement politics centres around activities such as signing petitions, mass demonstrations, occupations of public sites, boycotts, strikes, blockades, violence against property and people, but also organising these activities – both by volunteers and professionals. In daily life, citizens employ party and

movement politics in various ways – inter alia, because they live under very different regimes – Western style democracies, transitional democracies, semi-democracies, totalitarian religious regimes, communist and non-communist one-party systems. Under each regime, citizens must deal with profoundly different socio-political contexts, ranging from full freedom of political participation in both party and movement politics to extreme restriction of political freedom, where only very risky underground dissent exists. As a consequence, they employ very different repertoires of political behaviour. Think for instance of citizens in Western Europe who see participation in political parties, freedom of speech and demonstrating as completely normal. But also think of those living suppressed and resorting to what Scott (1990) named *infrapolitics* – covert resistance found in everyday practices while living under severe oppression.

Yet, socio-political contexts are not static, vividly exemplified by the contemporary waves of democratisation surging throughout the world. As a consequence, many countries experience(d) regime *transitions* towards *democracy*. What will the political future of the formerly repressed citizens be, if the current system of oppression and violence ends? How can citizens who have learned to live under severe oppression adapt to and help to maintain freedom and democracy? But also, how do citizens who were socialised under relative freedom participate when the political system gets more authoritarian or just less reliable and less orderly? Or, in more general terms, *how does the political past shape citizens' political future?* Answers to this question boil down to the process of political socialisation, the focus of this chapter.

Political socialisation holds that individual political attitudes and behaviour are shaped by an individual's political past – what citizens learn about politics and participation during their youth has, at least partially, a lasting influence during the rest of their (political) lives. The field of political socialisation is characterised by its broad focus and has, in the recent years, undergone a revival. However, political socialisation scholars mainly focused on participation in party politics, thereby largely ignoring political socialisation into movement politics. Only recently has the political socialisation literature started to include studies on youth orientation towards activism in less traditional forms of civic participation (Hahn and Alviar-Martin, 2008: 81). Social movement scholars, on the other hand, have largely ignored political socialisation as a factor explaining movement participation. As we describe later on in this chapter, when social movement scholars do deal with political socialisation, it is often referred to indirectly. However, just like citizens are being socialised for participation in political channels typical for party politics, we see citizens being socialised into activism, and thus into channels of political participation typical for movement politics. To understand citizens' actions and reactions to fast and sudden changes of political systems, social movement scholars could

employ political socialisation frameworks in order to have a better understanding of how past circumstances influence today's patterns of participation in both party and movement politics. This might help us to understand whether and to which extent profound changes in political behaviour are possible even at advanced age and how political learning might help citizens to escape the pitfalls of their own undemocratic past.

In this chapter we aim to show that political socialisation might be as important for scholars of movement politics as it is for scholars of party politics. First, we will provide an overview of the literature on political socialisation in party politics by reviewing both its classical background and more recent focus. We continue by an overview of the literature on political socialisation in movement politics. Two important tasks of social movement scholars will be identified – first, we will discuss the relationship between party and movement politics and, second, political participation in times of democratic transition. Next, we will discuss how a focus on political socialisation might help social movement scholars to deal with those two tasks and conclude the chapter by discussing avenues for future research.

Socialisation into party politics

Political socialisation is defined as the process by which individuals learn to behave politically and subsequently endure in this behaviour (Hyman, 1959). Most definitions of political socialisation highlight the importance of the relationship between an individual and the political system. Easton and Dennis (1969) see it as a process of teaching citizens to belong to their political system and community. Greenberg (1970: 3) defines political socialisation as 'the process by which the individual acquires attitudes, beliefs, and values relating to the political system of which he is a member and to his own role as citizen within that political system'. Arnett (1995) sees political socialisation as a process that is responsible for the intergenerational passing on of norms and traditions. Greenberg (1970: 4) also argues that 'childhood political learning is relevant to later adult orientations and [...] that individual political attitudes and aggregates of individual attitudes have an impact on the operation of a nation's political life'.

In general, political socialisation has widely been mentioned as one of the decisive factors when it comes to whether and how citizens participate in politics (see Brady et al., 1995; Verba et al., 1995). The core idea of political socialisation is that during adolescence political ideas and skills crystallise and remain relatively stable with advancing age. Hence, political behaviour in later stages of life bears marks of the way citizens came to understand politics in their youth. Traditionally, the influences of family, school, peers and extra-curricular activities have been common factors of interest in studies

on political socialisation (Settle et al., 2011). Recently, scholars have found that the broader socio-political context also matters for the way citizens are politically socialised (Campbell, 2006; Gimpel et al., 2003; Sandell Pacheco, 2008).

The field of political socialisation has a rich history. In fact, according to Sapiro (2004), many a scholar sees it as an old-fashioned field, often basing their judgement on some of the pioneer studies. During this early period, political socialisation was seen as a matter of great hopes. Sears and Levy (2003: 60) note that many 'liberal social scientists saw a chance to avoid the great historical and social evils like ethnocentrism, prejudice and oppression by proper political socialization'. In the course of 1960s and 1970s, the field flourished. The original focus laid on the earliest childhood and hypothesised the crucial influence of this life period for the formation of political attitudes that were then to persist throughout the rest of individuals' life without significant changes. The late 1970s and 1980s brought a decline to the field of political socialisation. The number of published studies dealing with political socialisation declined and hardly any academic attention was given to the field any more. Political socialisation and childhood as a factor of influence more or less disappeared from political science (Cook, 1985). According to Niemi and Hepburn (1995: 7) 'the field atrophied because it was based on exaggerated premises and because of misinterpreted and misunderstood research findings (and lack of findings)'. After a virtual standstill in the 1980s, the field of political socialisation has recently made a notable comeback. One of the key reasons for this renewed interest was the concern about citizens' civic and political participation. Led by Putnam's (1995) image of decreasing levels of civic participation in developed democracies, many started worrying and wondering how citizens could be educated about their civic duties. Today, the field of political socialisation covers a broad range of topics and differs from the classical studies in several important aspects. Rather than being old fashioned, the field is now typified by two periods: the early field of political socialisation and today's field of political socialisation.

The early field of political socialisation

The idea that early political experiences might have a permanent formative influence on people's political attitudes and behaviour appeared rather early. Already in the 1920s Karl Mannheim proposed his classical thesis of political generations. According to Mannheim, political generations are formed when youth is exposed to similar major historical events during their formative years. Thereby, a 'concrete bond is created between members of a generation by their being exposed to the social and intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic de-stabilization' (Mannheim, 1952: 303). Major historical events that occur within the same socio-political context influence a group of youth and

have a long-lasting influence, conditioning the political life course of a whole generation.

Not long after Mannheim proposed his thesis, empirical evidence has showed that even experiences that are not major historical events may mark political attitudes for the rest of one's life. The famous Bennington study by Newcomb (1943) presents us with a colourful account of political socialisation and a fine case of political attitudes being formed in the period of late adolescence and early adulthood. In a longitudinal study conducted between 1935 and 1939, Newcomb found that within the four years of college life, socio-political attitudes of the Bennington students got more liberal in general. Follow-up studies which were conducted 20 and even 50 years after the original 1930s study have shown that the socio-political attitudes of the Bennington women have remained reasonably stable ever since their college years (Alwin et al., 1992; Newcomb et al., 1967).

The late 1950s and 1960s brought a kick-start to the field of political socialisation. Hyman (1959) both named the field and unlocked the attention into it by complaining about the lack of interest into the relation between socialisation and political behaviour. Soon, a range of studies appeared which dealt with how individuals internalise political traditions and political behaviour. Initial studies identified primary agents (mainly family) and secondary agents (schools, occupations, mass media, political parties) as possible socialising agents to political socialisation and extensively debated the interface between them, but also focused on the distinction between conscious and unconscious transmission of political feelings, values and beliefs (see for instance Bender, 1967).

The work of Greenstein (1965), Hess and Torney (1967) and Easton and Dennis (1969) saw children in the United States as having an idealised, positive image of political authorities. This image was paired with the assumption of persistence – once the socialisation process was completed, political views would remain stable throughout adulthood. Also, political socialisation was seen to be taking place rather early – being essentially completed by the time children reached adolescence. A seminal study based on longitudinal data from three US presidential elections by Campbell et al. (1960) found that the parents' party identification influences the party identification of their children, especially if the parents are politically active, meaning that early family years are crucial for the development of party identification. Others focused on the formation of different political and moral orientations as patriotism (Connell, 1971) or racial images (Stevenson and Stuart, 1958). Hopes were raised that education and intervention during childhood could resolve the problem of racial prejudice (Proshansky, 1966; Stember, 1961).

In her review of the subfield, Conover (1991: 127–128) describes the critique and the eventual decline of the idea that early childhood experiences play such

an important role. In the course of the 1970s, Conover argues, three major points of critique were forwarded. First, the children who were earlier found to have a positive image of the political authorities led the protest events in the 1960s – their positive image turned into rebellion against the very authorities they had positive image of during their childhood. Second, empirical evidence showed that the idealised image of political authorities was not shared by many (often minority) children. Also, the use of survey research among children was criticised. Finally, the theoretical assumption of persistence got seriously questioned as the empirical evidence suggested that important changes do occur after childhood period.

Today's field of political socialisation

Unlike earlier research which focused on very young people, the contemporary wave of research focuses on political socialisation in later phases of life – such as late adolescence and early adulthood – and in particular on the role of the socialising agents more suitable for these life periods, such as peers, schools and the media. The key period in political socialisation seems to be that of late adolescence and early adulthood. McLeod and Shah (2009: 8) argue that

the transition from late adolescence to early adulthood, from the end of schooling to the start of individuals' occupational lives, is perhaps the most important period for political socialisation research. For most young people, this change means a loss of social capital that supports civic engagement. Support from family, peers, and community diminishes, while the demands of the new occupational world delay reintegration.

While people might face intense changes such as immigration, college, first political or military experiences, all of these dramatic events in one's life tend to happen in the period of life we can describe as young adulthood. Even then, the influence of these experiences on political attitudes and behaviour is shown to be rather limited (Jennings and Markus, 1977; Sigel, 1989).

More attention is nowadays given to the balance between what citizens learn during their youth and what is learned over the rest of the life course. The possibility of political socialisation as a lifelong learning process has been considered (see for instance White et al., 2008; but also Sapiro, 2004). There is a lively discussion on the possibilities and the extent of change among adults, especially if the socio-political context changes, which is expected to condition their political attitudes and behaviours. This interest in lifelong learning is in all likelihood activated by the wave of democratisation surging throughout the world. The possibility for citizens to meaningfully adapt to democracy brings hopes for the future to many countries with long authoritarian tradition searching for a sustainable model of democratisation. In this, the normativist

tradition of the political socialisation field (see Sears and Levy, 2003) seems to continue.

Contemporary political socialisation research deals with a broad range of topics regarding almost every aspect of socio-political life. More prominent topics include a classical theme of partisanship (Achen, 2002; Ventura, 2001), immigration (Tam Cho, 1999; Wong, 2006; Wong and Tseng, 2008) and racial, gender and ethnic identities (see for instance Hughes et al., 2006 or Rosenthal et al., 2003). In this chapter, we give attention to two topics that might be of special significance for future research in social movements, namely civic engagement and education and political socialisation in shifting socio-political contexts.

Civic education

Recently, inspired by concerns about declining or weak civic engagement (ranging from classical political participation to more private and non-political patterns of participating in the community), civic education has become a prominent subject for numerous researchers (Sears and Levy, 2003). Although very close to political socialisation, the field of civic education is seen to be a discipline in its own right. Unlike earlier political socialisation research which focused on how agents of socialisation teach youth, the field of civic education is dominated by a constructivist paradigm where youth also actively construct, debate and negotiate meaning and not only passively receive what the agents of socialisation are presenting (Hahn, 2010).

Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) already identified the importance of schools and civic organisations as workplaces in which trust accumulates and people learn the virtues and skills of democratic citizenship. More recently, McIntosh and Youniss (2010) alluded to the importance of youth having direct participatory experience provided both by school and the community in order to build their political skills and foster engagement. Outside developed democracies, numerous studies deal with the possibility of citizens being educated for a meaningful role in a democratic system (see for instance Grossman et al., 2008; Kahne and Sporte, 2008; Torney-Purta and Wilkenfeld, 2009). Concerns surrounding a decline in active citizenship in developed democracies have led scholars to research and think about 'old' democracies in similar ways. Take for instance citizens' knowledge of and engagement with political institutions of the European Union. Within the Western world, the European Union as an institution has suffered from maybe the highest levels of disengagement expressed through the lack of knowledge and low levels of participation (see for example Dekker and Rijkhof, 2009).

For social movement scholars, it might make sense to extend the focus towards learning to participate through movement politics channels. The very first time people participate in protest is often experienced as a significant event

changing one's identity from an inactive bystander to an activist. Verta Taylor (1995) found that feminist activists were motivated not only by anger but also by the joy of participation, the friendship and love of other women and pride at maintaining their convictions in the face of strong opposition. A 1950s feminist said it best: 'It's as thrilling as a love affair, and lasts longer!!!' (Rupp and Taylor, 1987: 97). Participation in social movements also requires knowledge and skills – not only for the organisers but also for those who participate in social movements' activities. We might, for instance, ask ourselves how these skills are acquired and whether the knowledge needed for participation can be obtained even at advanced age. If we consider the frequently violent Gay Prides in Eastern Europe, we might also wonder how citizens of new democracies learn about the freedom of protest as a basic democratic value.

Shifting socio-political context

Another key theme of importance for social movement scholars is the shifting socio-political context. Consider for instance countries that went through large-scale political and social transition, such as the post-communist societies in Eastern Europe and in the future possibly countries that were swept by the Arab Spring. These specific major transformations have pushed large groups of people used to communism or totalitarianism into new socio-political relations, whether democratic or semi-democratic ones. It has also created groups of citizens whose youth has been marked by political, social and economic transition. These are the events that – in Mannheimian terms – create political generations. However, these profound changes in socio-political context also leave an impact on those who are well beyond their youth. In Eastern Europe, for instance, older generations seem to be nostalgic about their communist past (Rose and Carnaghan, 1995), while the period of political socialisation exerts an impact on contemporary political attitudes as well, especially left-right self-placement. That is to say, older citizens tend to lean more to the left than the younger ones, reflecting their attachment to the communist era which marked their youth (Evans and Whitefield, 1998; McAllister and White, 2007), while in Hungary the very oldest citizens with early memories of the pre-communist period tend to lean to the right (Evans and Whitefield, 1998). This corresponds to findings from the United States. While it is often argued that conservatism represents a life cycle effect, where aging leads to conservative beliefs, studies from the United States show that conservatism can rather be seen as a generational effect, where the attitudes of the whole generation have been formed by the period of their socialisation (see overview by Sears and Levy, 2003: 89). Thus, the period of political socialisation conditions contemporary political attitudes.

However, while the period of political socialisation seems to matter for political attitudes, we still do not know how political socialisation in non-democratic periods influences the pattern and ways of political participation

once democracy has been established. At the very beginning of this chapter, we described how Soviet citizens, used to letter writing as an official instrument of complaint, kept doing this even though this action became rather useless during the Russian transition. But is this example a rule? Are citizens who grew up in a repressive system that suppressed any political activities outside the conventional, totalitarian organisations able to use the alternative actions once democracy has been established? And what about the generations that went to the streets to topple the regime? Do they continue to protest and see movement politics as a rightful way to influence policy-makers or do they turn to parliamentary and party institutions once democracy has been established?

These profound socio-political changes are not confined to former communist Eastern European countries or totalitarian North African countries. In fact, shifting political context might also mean moving towards *more* instead of *less* authoritarianism. Diverse historical examples in Latin American democracies that descended into dictatorships lead us to similar types of questions regarding the political socialisation and the possibilities and extent of change. Mature Western democracies might also undergo profound socio-political changes. Take for instance the recent economic crisis since 2008. This crisis might in the end mean a change on similar scale for many a citizen in Southern Europe. In these developed democratic countries, daily lifestyle and political life are under enormous pressure. High (youth) unemployment, huge welfare cuts and especially the inability of the political elites to come up with feasible solutions are striking. These developments might put huge number of citizens, including adolescents and those of advanced age, in the same fluid situation. We might wonder whether this crisis will, in Mannheimian terms, create a political generation, that is to say, a group of youth coming of political age under severe economic circumstances that might evolve a cynical view of democracy. How will these circumstances condition the political life course of this generation? How will it affect their democratic citizenship? In fact, the same question may be posed for citizens of advanced age, to what extent will their political attitudes and behaviour prove to be stable in face of these changes in the socio-political context?

Socialisation in movement politics

We already mentioned that social movement literature rarely refers to political socialisation. This is not to say that social movement scholars do not examine the process by which individuals learn to become active in movement politics. To the contrary, they do explore the influence of embeddedness in activist milieus at early age on the engagement in social movements in later life. However, while they essentially describe the same phenomenon as political

socialisation, they seldom refer to it explicitly. Moreover, to our knowledge, political socialisation is not studied as a mechanism conditioning the social movement political life course. That is say, the core idea of political socialisation that during late adolescence political ideas and skills crystallise and remain relatively stable with advancing age has primarily been examined in the context of party politics rather than participation within social movements.

Yet, especially for people's long-standing involvement in social movements, youth political socialisation has been found to be of importance. For many activists there is a long personal history behind their involvement and their political views. They grew up in activist milieus surrounded by activism of their parents and were practically born into the dense activist networks their parents were involved in. This experience marked the rest of these children's lives and had a crucial influence on their value orientations and propensity to be activists themselves. Indeed, social networks, socialisation and activism are closely related (Passy, 2001).

In a collection of personal stories assembled by Kaplan and Shapiro (1998), we can read about the experiences of so-called red diaper generation, who grew up in radical leftist milieus in the United States in the 1950s. The stories they tell describe a generation that throughout its childhood witnessed the intense political experiences of their parents. The radical leftist upbringing left lasting effects on their lives – marked by their political childhoods, many went on to play an important role in social movements later on (Keniston, 1968).

Early political socialisation is not only confined to radical leftist milieus, Klandermans and Mayer (2006: 270) describe radical right activists who have in many cases been 'exposed to the same kind of ideas and values since their childhood'. Family was the most important socialising agent with activists being involved in the 'scene' even before they really joined the movement. In Italy, for instance, where radical right movements exist for a longer period of time, involvement was even a family tradition lasting for three or four generations. Blee (2011) cites socialisation as one of trajectories into racial extremism in the United States. While this path is relatively uncommon, some of the extremist women Blee (2011: 244) interviewed describe 'being raised by racial extremist parents and sometimes in isolated self-identified racist communities where they are exposed to extreme ideologies and actions from an early age'. Førland et al. (2012) used a retrospective survey to put the hypothesis forwarded in the literature that birth order influences radicalisation to a test. By looking at the experiences of former students of University of Oslo in the 1960s, they found birth order to be irrelevant but upbringing, especially in the cities, had a consistent significant positive effect. But, most important in the context of political socialisation, they found that upbringing in a home with radical parents had an enormous positive impact on radicalisation and activism, an impact which they describe as 'colossal at the extremes' (Førland et al., 2012: 830).

Becoming a long-term activist is to a large extent a matter of embeddedness in milieus conducive to protest. In these milieus people discuss politics, individual grievances are turned into collective claims and people are mobilised for protest. In other words, in these milieus people are socialised into movement politics. Moreover, people are more likely to be targeted and persuaded in protest activities in these milieus. Take for instance McAdam's (1988) study of participation in the Mississippi Freedom Summer. This project was a campaign launched in June 1964 to attempt to register as many African American voters as possible in Mississippi that had historically excluded most Blacks from voting. Well over 1,000 students mostly from white, elite universities such as Yale and Stanford participated in this project. In his study based on interviews and questionnaires with hundreds of activists, McAdam shows that knowing someone else who also participated was *the* most important predictor of participation. Thus, embeddedness in pro-protest milieus was crucial for participation. But what about embeddedness in anti-protest milieus? Unsupportive parents appeared to be a constraint to participation in this high cost/high risk action for freshmen, as one of the withdrawals interviewed by McAdam (1986: 84) explains: 'I was only a freshman. A year later I'm sure I would have, but at that point I'd only been out of the house for a few months and wasn't yet in my "defy the parents phase"'. And McAdam indeed shows that more senior students felt less constrained by unsupportive parents. Hence, unsupportive parents played a role in withdrawing from participation, but more so for freshmen than for senior students. Moreover, for many Freedom Summer activists, the experience of violence, community life and struggle for civil rights led to a lifelong involvement in different kinds of social movements. Corrigal-Brown (2011) assessed several factors affecting persistent participation. Most important in the context of political socialisation, after periods of individual abeyance, those embedded in activist networks were more easily reactivated than those not (anymore) embedded in activist networks. Hence, embeddedness in milieus conducive to protest, that is milieus where people are socialised into movement politics, plays a crucial role in becoming, staying and returning to activism.

It might not be a coincidence that many studies we mentioned focus on students engaging in protest. In the previous sections we repeatedly referred to the creation of political generations with specific characteristics, all under influence of a specific socio-political context that conditioned the processes of political socialisation of these groups. However, not all specific characteristics found among citizens of certain generations can be ascribed to generational effects. Life cycle effects might matter as well – having a certain age gets paired with a certain type of political behaviour. A typical example is the lower participation in voting among younger voters, either because of lack of political experience or the specific biographical situation typical for young adulthood.

On the other hand, younger cohorts are reported to show a higher propensity to engage in protest activities (Dalton, 2006; Verba et al., 1995). In fact, this is part of common knowledge – a revolutionary will most certainly not be someone on the verge of his retirement. Indeed, just like during the Freedom Summer or in the Serbian Otpor movement, many major protest waves are led by students.

While political socialisation was successfully applied to highlight the influence of upbringing on the development of activism, we believe that the socialisation framework has more to offer. Much has been written on processes, mechanisms and agents of political socialisation in party politics, while there is little systematic knowledge available on the processes, mechanism and agents of political socialisation in movement politics. We see opportunities to change this and identify two potential avenues of research where political socialisation could be interesting for social movements' scholars. The first concerns the relationship between party and movement politics and citizens' options when it comes to choosing between and combining these two paths to political influence. The second concerns political socialisation in times of democratic transition.

Bringing party and movement politics together

The first theme where we see an important role for political socialisation is the way citizens (learn to) combine party and movement politics in their quest to influence political outcomes. It is becoming increasingly difficult to see party politics and movement politics as two separate realms. With the waning participation in political parties, trade unions, religious organisations and even elections (see for instance Crouch, 2008; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000; van Biezen et al., 2012), citizens are looking for new ways to engage in political life. Demonstrators and activists are not seen as trying to topple the democratic system anymore, but receive acknowledgement for their role of giving voice to the unheard and providing input to policy-makers which does not come through traditional political organisations. As a result, movement politics are becoming increasingly conventional (Goldstone, 2003, 2004; Johnston, 2011). In a way, social movements have become a normal way of engaging in politics, inseparable from more classical tools such as political parties (Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995) which resulted in a 'demonstration democracy' (Etzioni, 1970) or 'social movement society' (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998), where protesters are not extremists but tend to resemble the general population (Norris et al., 2005; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). This is reflected in an increase in protest actions (see for instance Dalton et al., 2009; Dodson, 2011) but also in the fact that the number of those participating in protests is much higher than those participating in classic party politics if we exclude voting (Johnston, 2011: 67).

Thus, explanations of participation in social movements must reflect the fact that the divide between party and movement politics is becoming increasingly obsolete. What we need, in contrast, is a framework that combines party politics and movement politics. Such a framework will help us understand how citizens who want to influence the state learn to choose between participating in social movements, participation in classical party politics, combining those two or doing nothing (Klandermans and van Stekelenburg, 2013). The interesting question is why citizens decide to take one route or the other, or alternatively combine both routes or decide to do nothing. Studying this through the lens of political socialisation, that is taking into account what these citizens learned and experienced during their 'political past', might help us deal with this complex question. For instance, Corrigan-Brown (2011) finds a persisting influence of socialisation on participation, an influence that seems to return even after periods of individual abeyance. This is only one example of how, looking at the roles of socialising agents, shaping influences of socio-political context and the origins of individual patterns which citizens follow when engaging in political activism – whether within party or movement politics – could help us reach a more general explanation for political behaviour.

Political socialisation in times of democratic transition

The second theme where we see an important role for political socialisation concerns political participation under (shifting) socio-political contexts. We know that the political and social context matters and in many ways defines collective action (Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Roggeband, 2002, 2004; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). One of the most important aspects is certainly the level of democraticness or the nature of the political system itself. Studies by Dalton et al. (2009) and Klandermans (2013) provide evidence for Goldstone's (2004) claim that movement politics profit from democratisation, that is, the better democracy functions the more protest activity. On the other hand, Mackin (2011) found a negative correlation between levels of democratic performance and protest activity. Especially interesting are the differences found between so-called new and old democracies (see studies by Keman, 2002; Kirbis, 2011; Lup, 2011; Mackin, 2011; Teorell et al., 2007). Kirbis (2011) interprets the high levels of authoritarianism found among citizens of new democracies as the cause of their lower political engagement. Lup (2011) explains the participation deficit in new democracies by lower involvement in networks that cause less talking about politics and finally less direct involvement in political activities. Hence, democratisation does not naturally translate into democratic citizenship. It is far from clear what processes and mechanisms shape the translation from democratisation into actual active participation in the realms designated to practice democratic rights and plights, that is party politics and movement politics.

Teaching people how to 'do' democracy requires adequate political socialisation. Most political socialisation research is conducted in 'established' Western democracies. However, in countries under democratic transition not only children but every citizen has to learn to do democracy. This creates a *paradox of political socialisation* in times of democratic transition, as many, if not all, socialising actors learned to do politics under diverging circumstances. Political cultures, civil societies, educational curricula change relatively slowly, and still breathe the models of the past. Similarly, most parents were politically socialised under the past regime. The political past weighs on the future. How do adolescents and early adults learn to do democracy in the paradoxical situation where traditional political socialisers are still living in the political past? Yet, people *do* learn democracy in times of democratic transition. What is the story of their political socialisation? How did they 'escape' from their political past? Who were their political socialisers? Peers, parents, politicians, teachers? Did they rely on the Internet to create cut-and-paste-ideologies, the diasporas, national and/or international media, or organisations educating democracy? Were they involved in organisations where they could practice democratic decision processes? The crucial question to answer is, what makes some citizen's political socialisation a success story while others remain apathetic, cynical and inactive? Political socialisation offers numerous hints when it comes to answering these questions. As we mentioned earlier, in the United States and more recently in Eastern Europe, ideological patterns have been found to correspond to specific generations. In addition to these ideological patterns, we also referred to studies that found children who grew up in activist families were found to be active participants of social movements throughout their whole lives. In that sense, it seems that completely escaping the political past will be difficult – consequences of what citizens have learned when they were younger will persist – and this should include the way they participate in politics. We expect, for instance, that those who in their younger age actively and fervently participated in demonstrations and activism will continue to do that later on. Older citizens who were often obliged to vote in the official, often meaningless, elections will most likely continue to vote once democracy has been established. Those whose youth was marked by an insecure and often disappointing transition are most likely to be cynical and inactive later on. Indeed, political socialisation could help us resolve many questions. In these cases, hypothesising should be followed by further empirical investigation.

Conclusion

The key message of this chapter is that social movement scholars can build upon existing insights offered by the field of political socialisation. While early political socialisation work might have been overly optimistic in its view that

one's political orientations and political participation patterns are to be established during early childhood, the idea that past political experiences have a formative influence for later political life has survived. Since the 1990s, the political socialisation field has reappeared and is searching for a more nuanced view on the persistence of earlier influences and the possibilities of change at later stages of life. At the same time, it is a field that researches a diverse range of topics, many of them interesting to social movements' scholars as well.

Until now, social movements literature recognised the importance of youth socialisation into activism. Growing up among activists or a major participatory experience later in life often sets a path for a career of participation in social movements. In this chapter, we proposed a more extensive role for political socialisation in the study of social movements. We identified two important tasks students of social movements are facing, and we have hinted how the social movement field could profit from employing and building upon insights already obtained by scholars of political socialisation.

A focus on the socio-political context–individual citizen nexus answers both the theoretical need to relate the socio-political environment to individual behaviour and the practical problem of major contextual shifts. Social movement scholars are keen on explaining political behaviour of citizens in new, still unstable democracies and their sometimes disappointing democratic practices. We maintain that in socio-political systems which experienced profound changes, for instance after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Arab Spring, or the current economic crisis, the political past continues to have an impact and must therefore be taken into account.

At the same time, we also see the need to deal with political behaviour typical for party politics and movement politics within a single theoretical framework. Here, political socialisation might help us shed light on the origins of citizens' attempts to influence policy-makers, irrespective of their choice for party politics or movement politics, or both. In this way, an image of political behaviour, much more representative of real-life choices and decisions rather than artificial disciplinary divisions, will be created.

Understanding participation in movement politics while incorporating contextual variation is a challenging task as little political psychological research has dealt with the subjective experience of meso- and macro-level factors (Klandermans and Van Stekelenburg, 2013). What we need is a way to link contextual factors and especially contextual changes to individual political behaviour. The field of political socialisation may offer mechanisms that explain how contextual factors translate into individual behaviour. Moreover, as political socialisation is examined at the individual level of analysis, it may explain how and why individuals may differ in their political attitudes and behaviour, despite living under similar contextual circumstances. As people live in a perceived world, they respond to the world as they – personally – perceive

and interpret it. In fact, this is what political psychology is about – trying to understand why people who are seemingly in the same socio-political configuration respond so differently (Van Stekelenburg, 2013). As political psychology explores the causes of the thoughts, feelings and actions of people – and primarily how these are influenced by socio-political context – it has a lot to offer to the study of political socialisation, in both party and movement politics.

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Part V

Conclusion

24

Ideology, Society and the State: Global Political Psychology in Retrospect

Paul Nesbitt-Larking

In 'The Discursive Frames of Political Psychology', Nesbitt-Larking and Kinnvall (2012) set out points of epistemological, ideological and methodological continuity and discontinuity between the American and European traditions in political psychology. In so doing, we place emphasis on the historical conversations and journeys that theories, ideals and research agenda have taken across the Atlantic from the era of Freud, Merriam and Lasswell to the present day. While stressing the rich interweaving of research traditions, we also make note of those historical-structural and conjunctural forces from which distinct *problematiques* have arisen. Among these, the hegemony of possessive individualist ideology in the formation and development of the United States, in conjunction with slavery and the Civil War, and a powerfully assimilationist immigration regime have promoted epistemological positivism, ideological liberalism and libertarianism as well as a largely quantitative social science tradition. Given the existing concentrations of expertise in political psychology in American universities, it is unsurprising that much of the overall academic output has been grounded in these traditions.

The chapters that we have gathered throughout this volume both reflect and extend the largely American research traditions into Europe and beyond. This concluding chapter begins with a consideration of that extended tradition in a section entitled 'Applications and extensions'. Certain chapters have expertly applied and extended established and largely American paradigms and models such as political behaviour surveys, social psychological experiments and the application of scales such as RWA, SDO and the big five personality factors. These are of interest for the manner in which they extend these models into the complexities of European and other settings, often with interesting and striking results.

However, the majority of chapters in this compendium have in common a resetting of the agenda of political psychology through research in which history and social structure, the state and ideological hegemony and

counter-hegemony are integral to our understanding of the political mind. These chapters investigate the profound and already social character of the individual, one that is of necessity already constituted in power relations. As such, the models of political psychology developed in these pages tend to avoid the ontological binary of individual and society and do not regard the individual as an abstracted and monadic entity that encounters society from a perspective of cognitive and affective choice. Consequently the authors regard political relations and forces as grounded in dialectics of self and other, rather than as the resultants of aggregating the views of a large number of abstracted individuals. While not entirely absent from the epistemological work of these authors, positivism is less prominent than social constructionism, post-structuralism and Critical Realism. I present the core ideas of these chapters in the second and longer section of this conclusion, 'Revisions and Innovations'.

Analysing the chapters in the second section of this concluding chapter, the world of political psychology is approached and assessed through deep understanding, thick description and often through the positing of social and psychological dynamics – such as the unconscious – that resist ready calibration and quantification. The lived global political psychological reality of the early twenty-first century is one of ironic detachment from grand narratives, the disappearance of modernist loyalties of class, gender, nation and religion and consequently the panic reactionary forces of attempted recovery. The global world is networked and rhizomatic and characterised by instantaneous flows of information and capital. It is a place of danger and yet opportunity in which the familiar borders of the Westphalian world have been eroding, and yet one in which bids for imperial control and colonial nostalgia nonetheless continue. Perhaps most importantly for the authors of this volume, it is a self-reflexive order and therefore one in which hybridised, contingent, shifting and tactical identities and political strategies are at play across the fields of power. This is an order in which the power of the powerless is taken as seriously as that of the elites and the interactions between discourses, representations and ideologies of power – both within and between individuals – are opened up. This is simultaneously a top-down and bottom-up perspective.

More broadly, the second section of the chapter brings together a set of chapters that argue that the political must always and everywhere be deeply and thoroughly embedded in any accounts of psychology that seek to explain political life. It is not enough simply to add on or apply a set of political examples or cases to a generalised psychological paradigm or method or programme of studies. It is not even enough to insist on a constant contextualised historical and structural reading of the evolving settings of the politics of the mind – in different times and places. This is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Many of the chapters in the volume manifest the need to integrate the fullness and complexity of the political right into the heart of the psyche itself – as a set of forces and relations that are inherent to the construction of self and identity.

Both of the subsequent sections are intended as broadly thematic reflections across the chapters rather than as chapter summaries, which we presented in the introduction to this volume. Consequently the chapters under discussion are not presented in order and their content is selected conceptually rather than comprehensively. My overall intention in this concluding chapter is to convey a generalised purpose and pattern across the chapters, a *gestalt* of what they reveal about the emerging subfield of political psychology in a global setting. While this implies selectivity, I hope that it retains a fidelity to the intentions of the contributing authors.

Applications and extensions

This section consists of a consideration of six chapters that in various ways apply and extend the predominantly American research traditions and individualistic paradigms of political psychology.

The core intellectual materials for Henk Dekker's overview in Chapter 12 are American voting studies based upon survey research. Paralleling a multivariate analysis of voting intentions and nesting the decision to vote in a series of systemic, institutional, demographic and socio-economic variables, Dekker explores a range of political psychological variables that serve to explain voting behaviour. Personality variables, such as the Big Five, are presented and then assessed against propensity to vote. Dekker integrates the theory of planned behaviour by Fishbein and Ajzen that incorporates elements of social analysis through the psychological concept of the perceived subjective norm. In contradistinction to the studies discussed in 'Revisions and Innovations', Fishbein and Ajzen's individual receives the social through volitional acts of perception rather than through being formed as a self through emergence as an already social being. Dekker also examines the possibility of political socialisation exerting an impact on voting as well as biological and genetic factors and habitual factors.

One methodology that has remained underdeveloped in Europe and the world beyond the United States is experimental political science. In Chapter 7, Tereza Capelos argues the case for its usefulness. Capelos describes a range of classical and contemporary experimental designs and findings, both in the laboratory and in the field. While clearly articulating the shortcomings of experimental research (notably internal and external validity), Capelos highlights their strengths in identifying with precision causal paths and correlations of orientations. In so doing, Capelos encourages us to consider the potential for the experimental approach in the study of attitudes, perceptions, emotions and political identities.

In Chapter 17, Dimitra Pachi, Theopisti Chrysanthaki and Martyn Barrett adopt a mainstream political sociological orientation towards conventional, non-conventional and civic political participation among youth – both ethnic

minority and ethnic majority. While the form of the chapter extends American-based research traditions, its subject matter is grounded in distinctly European challenges – the differences in engagement between minority and majority youth. Their study is contextualised in macro political and socio-demographic factors such as legal rights and the availability of ethnic organisations. While the chapter does not consider racism, neo-nationalist exclusionism, ethnic separatism and parallel societies, it does look at the social bases of participation and the authors offer the useful insight that only the more embedded and organic and thick experiences of engagement can predict participation into adulthood. In the school context, it seems clear from the research that recognition, dialogue and equity are needed to condition a genuine sense of involvement, and not just superficial impositions of civic curricula. In other domains of influence – the family and the religious group, for instance – direct personal mentorship makes a difference. Importantly the authors point to the complexity of competing ethnic, national and religious identities among minority youth and that a great deal can be understood by taking into account each of these forms of identification.

Two chapters in the book, Chapter 11 by Sebastian E. Bartos and Peter Hegarty and Chapter 14 by Beate Kupper and Andreas Zick extend analyses of prejudice to the European context. In Chapter 11, Bartos and Hegarty examine the nature of prejudice from three perspectives – the social/institutional aspects of prejudice (situationist), such as the social structural precursors of genocide or prejudicial laws or workplace prejudices, the psychological nature of prejudice itself (dispositional) and its presence in cultural texts (discursive). The authors stress the importance of situational or social factors in prejudice as much as dispositional or psychological ones. The authors bring these elements together in a study of the treatment of the Roma and gay/lesbian people in Romania.

Chapter 14, authored by Kupper and Zick, illustrates an examination of the psychology of prejudice across eight European nations from data gathered in 2008. The syndrome that the authors employ to assess prejudice is Group-Focused Enmity (GFE). The authors report the still continuing prejudices and acts of discrimination and oppression against a range of targeted minorities across Europe. Their development of the concept of GFE is based upon a systematic assessment of the common factor that underwrites an inter-related syndrome of prejudices across a range of target groups. GFE is based on a ‘generalised ideology of inequality’ that leads to the devaluation of certain target groups. The studies associated with GFE syndrome explore the correlates of the syndrome – for instance that at times a generalised feeling of economic threat engendered by the economic crisis is a better indicator of increased GFE than the actual financial well-being of the individual. The authors report that there is a generalised support for inequality that underlies a range of prejudices against a series of target groups. The findings that there is an underlying

GFE that is grounded in an ideology of inequality suggest that the solution to prejudice lies not so much in gaining support for specific target groups as in changing the underlying societal conditions to encourage greater diversity and equality. Using questionnaire methodology across over 8,000 respondents in eight countries, the authors assess levels of prejudice. While varying, the authors uncover substantial levels of anti-immigrant, racist, sexist, homophobic, anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim prejudices in all eight European countries. Prejudices seem to score particularly high in most instances in Poland and Hungary and, to some extent, in Portugal. Prejudices are on average lower in Western and Northern Europe. Interestingly, Roma are the most disliked group where their resident numbers are low – in Western Europe – and conversely, Muslims are most disliked in Eastern Europe – where their resident numbers are lowest. Data analyses reveal that prejudices across all six types of prejudice are fair to strong in range. Anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments correlate strongly. Factor analysis confirms that all six prejudices load on the same factor, and so the authors have developed an index of GFE on the basis of a series of acceptable alpha scores. Their overall conclusion is that generalised prejudice measured through the GFE index is lowest in the Netherlands, about the same in other western European countries and highest in Poland and Hungary. Perceived intergroup threat – with regard to immigrants – and to a lesser extent SDO, authoritarianism, anti-diversity attitudes and religiousness predicted variation in GFE.

In Chapter 21, Daniel Bar-Tal, Guy Abutbul-Selinger and Amiram Raviv argue that through continuous acts of violence, intractable conflicts are perpetuated by a process of collective imprinting of a culture of conflict. Such intractable conflicts last over a generation and involve real issues – these are realistic conflicts and material as well as ideational goods are at stake. The chapter examines one key aspect of the propagation of a culture of conflict, its routinisation into everyday experience. The authors write of the emergence of collective memory, an ethos of conflict and a collective emotional orientation that inform the narratives and ideals that justify and serve the continuation of intractable conflict. The major strands of this culture become institutionalised. These cultural characteristics are readily available, widely spread and pervasive in both the educational system and the broader culture. The culture of conflict is neither immutable nor inevitable. For Bar-Tal and his colleagues, the symbols and practices of routinisation are banal and mundane. Four factors contribute to the routinisation: (1) the constant presence of reinforcing messages regarding security, victimisation, patriotism, unity, the evil enemy and so on via the media and personal channels of communication; (2) constant exposure to symbols and markers; (3) routine daily practices, such as checkpoints; and (4) the militarisation of language. The routines of normalisation create a sense of predictability and even security amidst the generalised climate of fear and attack.

The worldview of normalisation of intractable conflict at least provides some meaning and coherence. Military discourse assists in desensitisation. Violence can become banal in this way. The impact of militarisation can also be softened up with euphemisms and technical expressions. Routinisation also reinforces solidarity and cohesiveness. Shared routines and ways of seeing enhance a 'we experience' and distance the in-group from the out-group. Routinisation enhances the sense of common fate and renders unified group action more straightforward. While Bar-Tal and his colleagues adopt a social perspective and a structural-historical one, it is firmly in the mainstream psychological tradition in that the individual is considered prior to the social. They conclude: 'Because identity is not only an inner psychological state of individual self-definition but also a form of life that is lived daily, the constant encounters with the symbols of the conflict shape society members as latent bearers of the culture of intractable conflicts.' This places the emphasis on the individual cognition and the social element remains undertheorised here. Importantly, the authors note that the routinisation of intractable conflict blocks out other alternative perspectives on the situation. Regrettably, routinisation perpetuates conflict and makes it in some way comfortable and ontologically secure for those who benefit from it. Their motivation to move towards peace is thus correspondingly limited.

Revisions and innovations

This section consists of a series of reflections on 16 chapters in the book that in some way incorporate into political psychology the historical, structural, social, political and ideological contexts in which individual psyches are formed.

Two chapters in the book, Chapter 4 by Stephen Frosh on 'Psychoanalysis as Political Psychology' and Chapter 8 on 'Lessons from the Postcolony', re-visit and re-present the psychoanalytic tradition in political analysis. In Chapter 4, Frosh sets out the ways in which despite its individualistic moorings, the psychoanalytic tradition has been used in the service of politics, such as the analysis of fascism or in explanations of how ideologies work. Psychoanalytic themes have also been broadened and appropriated in the service of broader political analyses. Frosh draws a distinction between the fundamentally conservative theory of Freud's overtly socio-political texts and the more interesting political psychology that can be constructed from his technical model of the mind. In elaborating Lacanian and Relational psychoanalysis, Frosh explains how through psychoanalysis the social is shown to be inherent to the life of the individual psyche. He outlines Reich's and Marcuse's work on the internalisation of ideology as shaping the psyche in profound ways that distort desire through repressive desublimation. Importantly, Frosh presents the paradox of repression versus sublimation through an exposition of Žižek's ideas.

Žižek argues that while repression of the id is a conservative force in the maintenance of social order, sublimation in socially progressive ways can potentially be used in the service of progressive politics even as it can also come to serve the administered society – but a space is opened up here for a psychodynamically given progressive social formation that deals with the anti-social tendencies of the id. From the Lacanian concept of lack comes a series of explanations of political motivation and control. The concept of subjectivity as defined by an ineffable Other can result in both submission and rebellion – the same lack can be interpreted as a real monster or a cardboard cut-out. As the place of the Other, the unconscious can generate desire and creativity through the Real. The ultimate failure of any identity or social construction to satisfy the sense of psychic completeness reveals the sense of something missing – the lack – that then stimulates human initiative. The pre-Oedipal object relations of the emerging psyche, the sense of lack and of the ineffable Other condition a desire that results in a constant political and social striving. But does this mean that the only path out of endless searching is nihilistic violence – the smashing of the existing State and social order? Is there an inevitability about the propensity of *jouissance* or enjoyment to break through the symbolic by immersing itself into the Real – as terror, war or nationalism erupting over the political? The political is – although Frosh does not directly state this – antithetical to *jouissance* and enjoyment. It is of its nature about the symbolic and the ordering of that realm. But there is something important about the rupture of the political through the social movements grounded in irrational and unsymbolisable form. In an important moment of critique, Frosh raises Žižek's argument that late modern self-reflexivity is turning each of us into our own analyst and thereby actually blunting the subversive possibilities of psychoanalysis. If therapy can no longer shock or reveal, then does the unconscious run the risk of becoming colonised by master signifiers – if so, in whose service do these operate? The relevance of the concept of lack to the already socialised nature of the individual psyche is that the very predisposition to internalise the norms of the superego is grounded in the constant search for completion by the Other that is desired in the pre-Oedipal imaginary phase – prior to the emergence of any sense of unified selfhood – and fantasised in the bids to apprehend the Real. Such bids to apprehend an order can be sublimated into the service of tyrants or liberators but can also remain at the pre-symbolic and thereby constitute an ongoing marginality.

Given the strong impulse of many political psychologists and the International Society of Political Psychology to internationalise the field of enquiry and thereby incorporate theories, methodologies and experiences from beyond the West, there could be little more relevant than a thoroughgoing attempt to craft a postcolonial political psychology, one that is grounded in a critical exploration of global encounters and migrations. In Chapter 8, Truscott

and Hook develop a postcolonial political psychology through the complex psychoanalytic work of Fanon, notably in *White Skins, Black Masks*. The importance of this work – foundational to postcolonial studies – can hardly be exaggerated. Not only does it emerge from the conjunctural place of the colonial settlement in a period of rebellion but it also reflects a scholar and activist whose own relation to European ideas such as psychoanalysis is infused with the complex hybridity and duality borne of a position as an excluded insider and an included outsider. The role of psychoanalysis today in academe is twofold: first, to draw attention to the unconscious and the libido, and, second, to take up political issues outside the clinical setting – feminism, socialism or anti-racism. Despite acknowledging the over-individuated character of mainstream psychology, Truscott and Hook point to the critical importance of understanding the role of psychodynamics in sustaining and changing political relations. For both Foucault and Fanon, psychoanalysis focuses on the excluded, the reviled, the unacknowledged and the repudiated. It is thus a core theory for examining the bifurcations of orientalism and colonialism – exhibited in early anthropology – civilisation and the primitive, the heart of darkness and the sacred and the profane. Truscott and Hook expertly demonstrate how a critical appropriation of psychoanalysis can open up interpretation and memory of the colonial past in South Africa in a way that radically transcends and problematises repetition. While not rejecting the core Freudian concepts of castration anxiety and obsessional neuroses as applied to the individual psyche in the interpretation of relations of apartheid, Truscott and Hook add the more generalised and politicised notions of Fanon's analyses. For Fanon the origin of Black neuroses and the desire to be White is colonialism itself. We can begin to see not just the neuroticism of the White man but through the social relations of racism, the manner in which the Black man too has internalised the White image of him and thus sees himself through the White gaze. For Fanon it is the thoroughgoing racist and oppressive character of the colonial State and regime that acts as a trigger to the neuroses and not the individual circumstances of certain shocks and traumas. The ontological status of colonialism denies a Black man his subjectivity. In so doing and in positing the concept of epidermalisation, Fanon rejects vulgar psychologisation and places the socio-historical directly into the aetiology of the individual. Throughout their chapter, Truscott and Hook awaken a series of important dialectics that have been lost to much political psychology – the impossibility of enlightenment Western thought in the absence of the colonial project that accompanies it throughout the modern era; the critically important concepts of condensation and displacement as necessary tools in the analyses of political discourses; and the centrality of Eros and its repression in the genesis of political ideals and crises.

Demertzis's principal goal in Chapter 13 is to demonstrate the integration of emotions into the analysis of political psychology and how both the binary relegation of the emotions and the unsophisticated application of the emotions miss the nuances of how emotions work. Demertzis's chapter examines the political emotions of resentment and cynicism in detail. These emotions are, respectively, related to the rise in populism and political extremism and to the decline in the quality of democratic experience. Employing an analysis that avoids treating emotions and cognitions in a dualistic manner, Demertzis argues that emotions are not necessarily conscious. For Demertzis, political emotions are what he calls 'lasting affective predispositions' which both support and are supported by the wider norms of a society and then play a role in the development of both political culture and the authoritative allocation of resources. Demertzis's analysis here is Parsonian and as such is open to the criticism that he adopts a conservative perspective of social cohesion and automatic system reproduction. However, his broader sociology is not developed in this chapter. For Demertzis, emotions are akin to moods and 'emotional climates'. He acknowledges that emotions can take the form of sudden eruptions, and he classes such emergent emotional states as 'politically relevant emotions' rather than 'salient political emotions', which are of greater duration. He argues that the political emotions proper are more socially grounded and have a stronger moral component. The sense of injustice and powerlessness that is known as *ressentiment* is the public emotion that incubates the emergence of populism and racism in contemporary Europe. Once there are leaders, parties and movements that speak to the sense of angry impotence and the potential for mobilisation, *ressentiment* is transformed into resentment – a more active form of moral indignation. As Demertzis says, those who are victimised and powerless can transform into angry activists. More than mere mistrust, cynicism is a complex negative cluster of political emotions and cognitions – from melancholy and desperation to bad faith and resignation and amorality. For the powerful, cynicism allows for a cold setting aside of the rules of the game and for the powerless, cynicism is an ironic detachment and apathetic defensiveness. Cynicism may well lead to a withdrawal from political life – alienation and negativism and a disavowal of politics and democracy – although interestingly it does not always necessarily do so. Cynicism may also be associated with a fitfully engaged disillusionment or a sense of humorous resignation.

Central to political analysis is the social group. In Chapter 3, Dennis Sindic and Susan Condor set out how Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self Categorisation Theory (SCT) clarify the psychological processes that underpin group membership and action. Known collectively as the Social Identity Approach, these theories are centrally concerned with how conflict arises between groups and how associated established social hierarchies are supported or contested. Expounding the work of Tajfel, the authors emphasise that social identity,

or the extent to which people regard themselves and others as group members and personally identify with their group, has a strong impact on how individuals act towards others as group members rather than as unique individuals. Unlike other approaches in political psychology, then, the SIT and SCT approaches explain intergroup behaviour in terms of group influences rather than individual personalities or attitudes. The premise of SIT and SCT is that individuals come to categorise the world of social groups in certain ways and are motivated to identify positively with their own social groups. This characteristically involves comparison of in-groups and out-groups. From a political perspective the authors explain that what matters is how individuals experiencing superior or inferior group status will react – whether through bids for upward mobility, intergroup comparison, intergroup competition or selection of other dimensions of comparison. Sindic and Condor draw a firm distinction between status and power and in so doing minimise their claims as to the direct relevance of SIT and SCT towards political explanations. As they acknowledge, however, such conceptual distinctions are difficult to clarify in empirical reality. The distribution of valued ideational resources – say gay rights – is so close to group status as to be indistinguishable at times. This is particularly so once we extend the realm of politics beyond the artificially narrow and bounded ‘public realm’ to incorporate a broader civil society. The governance of sexuality is simultaneously a matter of status and power: to self-categorise as gay (or to deny it) is to claim a status whose very manifestation is already imbued with power. The assertion of gay pride is already a claim of power as well as status.

Sindic and Condor explain that SCT adds to SIT the concept of nested or multiple categories of social identification. Much depends on the level of abstraction from the individual to the group to the entire species. Dimensions of criteria for social comparison are of critical importance. What makes a particular categorisation psychologically salient? The critical importance of SCT is revealed around the issue of political persuasion. In the contemporary political climate of the West of declining party loyalties, personalised politics, fragmented and strongly divided communities and scorched earth political combat, the matter of tribal belonging has re-emerged. It is not so much a matter of logos or even pathos as much as it is a matter of ethos – in particular ‘is he one of us?’ and ‘are they for us or against us?’ The salience of common in-group membership matters when it comes to influence and communication of the most core values and ideals associated with such in-groups as well as the most prototypical members. Emerging from these elements of common categorisation and salience is the fact that leaders and followers both have power in the capacity to forge and reinforce in-group norms and membership.

Through an exploration of social knowledge as social representations in Chapter 2, Caroline Howarth, Eleni Andreouli and Shose Kessi deepen and

expand the concept of political participation beyond the individualistic conception of involvement in conventional acts such as voting and communicating with public officials. For Howarth and her colleagues, participation is a deeply embedded social practice that is grounded in the symbolic power to construct and convey certain social representations rather than others. In other words, participation is understood as an inherently ideological practice that governs the shaping of how the world is represented. Under these circumstances, certain actions are defined into the political (permitted) and others defined out (forbidden). Similarly, some agents are regarded as engaged in politics, while others are excluded. Importantly, and in contrast to elite theory, representations and the ideologies that underpin them are regarded as challengeable. As contested concepts, representations are neither neutral nor static. As such, they are open to appropriation and shaping. They can serve to bolster social relations or to undercut them or some combination. As the authors state, Social Representations Theory (SRT) is thus well equipped to navigate the current global order in which different rationalities and identities are mixed, hybridised and exist side by side.

Chapter 19 on Northern Ireland by Neil Ferguson, Orla Muldoon and Shelley McKeown starts with a dramatic critique of over-individualisation of explanations of political violence and conflict and makes the point that individualisation of political violence can itself be a political act. Structured divisions exert a powerful influence in Northern Ireland in accentuating distinct identities. Applying SIT and SCT to Northern Ireland, the authors explain how categorisations and social identities reinforce and accentuate the politics of division and difference and how this exaggerates differences and then entrenches divisions. These divisions are further accentuated and sustained through a complex of symbols, markers, icons and practices. While the group setting and strong in-group identification can accentuate out-group hostility, there is also a tendency for in-group distinctions to be lost or washed out. The authors indicate that it is not just in-group attachments that influence engagement in political violence but a range of broader social and situational factors too. They also stress the agentive choices of individuals who enter violent relations. The very same love of community that may prompt engagement in violence is also capable of priming community-centred peace-building activities in post-conflict Northern Ireland. Both arenas of action are about giving something back. Strong identification may lead to out-group hostility but in some cases it reduces stress and traumatic response. Strong social identities and ideological commitments can help individuals make sense of adversity. Equally, once a group loses its community respect its members can suffer an increase in mental health issues. Taking into account qualifiers regarding the complex nature of interaction, the Northern Ireland evidence supports the contact thesis and there is evidence that greater contact enhances intergroup attitudes and relations.

Philip Hammack and Andrew Pilecki's Chapter 5 is about how the symbolic ordering of the social world that is located in discourses and meta- or master narratives comes to be incorporated into individual psyches through the building of personal accounts and narratives. The key connecting element is the mediating role of language between social forces and individual existence. Building upon the traditions of symbolic interactionism, dialogical theory and post-structuralism, Hammack and Pilecki develop a perspective on language systems as constitutive of the possibilities of cognitive and affective constructions of the world. From the perspective of Rhetorical and Discursive Psychology (RDP), languages construct the world and do so in a manner to privilege certain social forces and relations. Moreover, language in use is itself constitutive of the social world. Textual analysis unearths the rhetorical use of language and how it is used to legitimise social action. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) shares elements of RDP but is more explicitly focused on how the ideological use of language maintains hegemonies. CDA looks at how language is used to maintain dominance. Narrative analysis adds to the concept of linguistically mediated social agency the notion of political life as grounded in the stories we tell and are told by others. What makes the research a dynamic concern is that personal narratives may or may not incorporate master narratives and they can combine and rework them. The building of narratives is a matter of critical psychic importance for the individual to attain coherence and an anchored sense of self in world. Moreover, narratives as collective stories serve to anchor social stability and cohesion and – as in discourse analysis – to animate and constitute forms of social action in their invocation. Hammack and Pilecki draw our attention to a broader and important theme in political psychology research, the extent to which our understandings are grounded in the empirical data or shaped by theoretical categories that inform the search. Sensitivity to the balances required here, as demonstrated by the authors, has been all-too-often missing from those scholars who simply aggregate on the basis of taken-for-granted and implicit coding schema or who, on the other hand, frame questions and prompts in a way that might have little bearing on the lives of those under consideration.

In Chapter 20, Andrews further develops the central place of narrative in the articulation of the political process and in framing political ideals. As contested accounts, narratives may serve to undergird or to undercut specific political projects and ideologies. Along with Hammack and Pilecki and Selimovic, Andrews underscores the distinction between macro (public) and micro (personal) narratives and she sets out the functionality of narratives in processes of political blame and attribution as well as healing and reconciliation. Andrews' chapter concentrates on the importance of macro and master narratives in shaping those stories through which people become aware, committed, engaged and mobilise for political change. Through her examples

of personal narratives in times of major political change, in the former East Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, Andrews illustrates the importance of personal narratives in developing adequate structural and macro political accounts of politics in transition. In so doing, she raises the importance of the specific, the detailed, the local and the biographical in the construction and questioning of shared stories and collective narratives.

In her narrative account of the aftermath of the conflict in Bosnia (BiH), Johanna Mannergren Selimovic argues in Chapter 22 that while the overt conflict has ceased, it has been achieved on the basis of lines of ethnic demarcation and entrenchment that conditioned the conflict in the first place. This is what she refers to as 'ethnic separation according to the same exclusionist logic that drove the war'. But her chapter is more interested in exploring through narrative analysis the ways in which people achieve forms of coexistence in hostile and divided places. As with Hammack and Pilecki and Andrews, Selimovic argues that narratives are formed through the interplay of collective (or master) narratives and individual narratives. It is in these encounters that more or less coherent versions of the past are constructed. In the instance of BiH these accounts must navigate the difficult history of past violence and conflict, much of it perpetrated by neighbour on neighbour, and the necessity to find some way of living in proximity with those who have been perpetrators, victims and bystanders. Selimovic's methods rely on long interviews, but also some extended local observations of interactions. What is striking is how the personal narratives of the residents while being located in exclusivist ethnonationalist narratives are nonetheless more subtle and complex than such simplified narratives suggest. Certainly some of her participants accept the master ethnonationalist narratives of trauma, victimhood and righteousness, but others develop more complex narratives. For instance, in returning to a demarcated Serbian enclave, a group of Bosniaks physically demonstrated their rejection of such divisions. Selimovic discovers that the binary rigidities of the ethnonationalist narratives are difficult for many to sustain as their lives are more complex than such black and white concepts can explain. Selimovic notes a pervasive tendency for people to want to break out of the exclusivist frames set by the master narratives and to cross the divisions established by them. During interviews, Selimovic's respondents tell tales of bravery and principled actions of support and rescue from the other side. These stories remain under reported, however, as they do not meet the criteria of the main ethnonationalist accounts. They also fail to account for the still-strong nostalgia among some for the former Yugoslavia and its capacity to cross ethnic divisions. Silence and the absence of commemorative uses of public space serve in this context for some to bridge, to heal and to allow the communities to continue. There is an interesting comparison here with the ostentatious use of public space in Northern Ireland as a series of markers. If we do not exactly see the conviviality of daily

mixing, described by Gilroy and mentioned in Chapter 16, we do at least see the effort to find some common way of living side by side.

Chapter 23 by Igor Petrovic, Jacquelin van Steckelenburg and Bert Klandermans applies analyses of political socialisation to movement politics and in so doing examines political behaviour across periods of transition and change. The authors show that life cycle – or generic change – explanations can be overblown while cohort/generational effects, more influenced by events and special social and historical circumstances, make a substantial difference. There is evidence of the importance of social milieu on the cultivation of activists – parents, peers and others – the red diaper movement, for instance. Further evidence of what they call embeddedness is evidence of the power of the Freedom Summer students in creating a life-lasting experience of community and struggle. The authors explain that because the overall level of formal democracy in a country does not directly affect political engagement, practices of political socialisation are important, particularly adult political socialisation in countries transitioning to formal democracies. While there is so far little data in this field, the authors reason from previous studies in the field that early socialisation patterns are likely to persist, even to some extent when States and regimes change. So they argue that older citizens of former communist regimes who were strongly socialised to vote, will continue to do so and that they may remain somewhat impervious to new circumstances. The point is that we do not know how individuals incorporate contextual factors and especially contextual changes at the meso and macro levels. Such knowledge is critical to enhancing our understanding of political engagement in the former Eastern block as well as the newly emerging Arab and North African states.

Moving to the heart of what it means to examine the social in the individual, Scuzzarello in Chapter 6 examines the dialogical self in political psychological analysis. As with many other contributors to the volume, Scuzzarello takes issue with the idea of an independent and pre-social core self. Scuzzarello argues instead that from the very conditions of the emergence of the self we are already socialised agents. Following Bakhtin and Hermans, Scuzzarello argues that the self is made up of a net of complex social interactions and networks and that the polyphony of voices operate in complex interplay within the psyche. Importantly, some voices, some narratives have greater force and authority than others. An important corollary of the dialogical concept is to explore how dialogue works in focus group settings. This arena allows us to see the interplay of framings and role assumptions and interventions that create a dynamic political psychological space. Another insight that is overt in Scuzzarello and implicit elsewhere throughout the volume is a critical orientation to the focus of enquiry. In Scuzzarello's case this means explicating the ethical principles of dialogism in addition to the intellectual explanation. Ethically this means taking into account recognition of the other and validation of claims made.

It implies an equity and equality in the deliberative forum, and creating spaces in which all members are equally welcome.

Chapter 9, Karin Aggestam's 'Conflict Analysis and International Relations' is an overview of elements of cognitive misperceptions and in particular attribution errors that come from overestimating one's own situational motivations and the enemy's dispositional motivations. As with other chapters in the volume, Aggestam's chapter stresses the powerful and central role of the political in contextualising changes in cognition. An awareness of impasse in domestic and international affairs may stimulate leaders to explore new information and insight and to be open to hitherto excluded ways of seeing. Aggestam expands upon this insight of Janice Stein. In terms of bargaining there needs to be mutual trust, recognition and the search for mutually acceptable and optimising solutions. This means acknowledging the justice of each side's goals and needs and includes the quest to work in the framework of core and universal human needs. The longest-standing conflicts and those that are most difficult to resolve are those grounded in ontological and existential crises of security, identity, recognition and autonomy. These are often intractable. Once the frames of antagonistic – and often derogatory – social beliefs become embedded, animosities become part of shared identities and master narratives. This theme is also explored in Chapter 21 by Daniel Bar-Tal and his colleagues. It therefore becomes important to know how far such belief systems and master narratives are supported or challenged. In the paradigm case of Israel-Palestine, the parties have internalised discourses and narratives of hatred, prejudice and animosity towards the other. In such a situation, the nature of conflict and division becomes embedded in a degree of familiarity and acceptance of ongoing conflict and this further fuels the misperceptions. A continued narrative of injustice and victimhood is grounds for continued conflict. Such an invocation of victimhood also arouses fears and anxieties that then serve to justify acts of aggression – as acts of 'defence'. This is buttressed by dehumanisation and denigration of the enemy Other and is the politics of chosen memories of traumas and glories. Echoing Scuzzarello in Chapter 6, Aggestam states that the heart of any attempt to construct a reconciliation is the need for acknowledgement, recognition, empathy, responsibility, apology and a readiness to make reparation. In terms of social identity, it is a major and self-reflexive act of identity change – of broadening the scope of the 'we' to incorporate those hitherto cast as 'they'. This implies the kind of dialogical openness that recognises the presence of the other in the self and the self in the other. Such moves involve reframing the past and thus undermining one's own entrenched and established moral righteousness and core victim-based identity. It is very difficult to achieve. Bringing narratives together is a Bakhtinian practice of dialogical change that will be fiercely resisted by those who do not want to recognise the other side.

Chapter 16 by Paul Nesbitt-Larking is an examination of the impact of migration and citizenship regimes on the political psychology of diversity, assimilation and integration. On the basis of early regimes of immigration and settlement, the social setting of receiving countries in Europe conditions a quiescence and retreatism as a core political strategy. The majority populations' reception of first-generation immigrants is conditioned by banal nationalism, demands for assimilation and ethno-cultural hostility and prejudice. Among the more prominent of the strategies to come to terms with settlement and second-generation descendents of immigrants are policies dealing with diversity and specifically multiculturalism. Multiculturalism respects diversity through either accommodation of group differences or forms of integration. The principal studies of multiculture examine inter-community trust and mistrust, degrees of inclusion and exclusion, symbolic racism and the existence of parallel societies. Integration depends on a politics of engagement, a critical and dialogical multiculturalism and a polity that co-operates, shares core procedural values in common and communicates. This implies being willing to adapt and change with the flows of the larger society. Sharing analyses in common with Scuzzarello in Chapter 6 and Selimovic in Chapter 9, the politics of engagement here is grounded in dialogue, an ethic of care and a willingness to expand categories of 'us' and 'we'. Those second/third-generation descendents of immigrants exhibit greater demands for inclusion and voice. Again the extent to which a politics of engagement works depends to an extent on the reciprocal willingness of majority communities to be open and inclusive. The opportunity to be able to sustain both dual and hybridised identities is related to positive political engagement. This is generated both by a dialogical orientation and the sense of irony and care that emerges through a growing cosmopolitical ethics.

In Chapter 15, Ian Manners discusses research into questions of European integration, an ideal that has strongly polarised European debate. Manners argues that an adequate understanding of the nature of European integration requires political-psychological perspectives. As with many other authors throughout the volume, he is aware of the distinctions between largely individualistic approaches towards political psychology and the more historically and socially contextualised approaches that he finds better suited to uncovering the identity politics and emotional characteristics of the debates over a unified Europe. Across Manners' analyses of psychological contributions towards European integration is a broad understanding of the power of otherness in constituting the self. As developed in other chapters throughout the volume, such encounters of self and other may be dialogical or confrontational, engaged or essentialist.

While the postcolonial global order in the context of contemporary Europe includes a politics of dialogue and engagement and viable community

relations, there is also widespread evidence of discord, division and antagonism. In Chapter 18, Catarina Kinnvall explains how global forces of fear and insecurity have conditioned legal-administrative and cultural changes across Europe. These developments have further conditioned and been conditioned by widespread ontological insecurity and existential anxiety. Such psychological responses have been particularly notable in recent decades of dramatic and unsettling events, including large-scale flows of global migration, acts of terrorism and global economic crises. In this context, many individuals have attempted to securitise their subjectivities. One consequence of this has been the dramatic recent revival of the Far Right across Europe. Successful leaders of far right parties and movements have acted as entrepreneurs of identity, claiming that they and their movements will re-impose the traditions and cultural standards of old Europe, variously characterised as White, Christian, enlightenment secular and muscular. Those categorised as outsiders or aliens are to be identified, limited or excluded altogether, or at the very least compelled to conform to certain standards. Kinnvall elaborates the role of sex and gender in the rise of the new European far right, demonstrating how constructions of masculinity and femininity are complexly interwoven into the meta-narratives of those movements seeking to 'reclaim' Europe.

From the start Jim McAuley's Chapter 10 is grounded in an ideological and socio-political framing of terrorism and politicised violence and as such eschews the lone lunatic approach. Politicised violence may be normalised in the settings of the communities in which it emerges, and goals may shift as gangs and groups become entrenched. Additionally, the interpretation of politicised crimes is open and contingent and not necessarily covered by the blanket term 'terrorism'. The same acts can be interpreted as politically motivated, as cultural performance, and as acts of ideology and symbolism. McAuley summarises the key research findings that demonstrate that there is little empirical evidence to support the proposition that terrorists are psychologically pathological. However, there is strong evidence to demonstrate their insertion into strong social networks with clear political and strategic goals. In this regard, McAuley's work shares a common perspective with Chapter 19 by Ferguson and his colleagues. In presenting a political and social structural explanation of terrorism, McAuley, following Stohl, reminds us that states can act as terrorists, that the central purpose of terrorism is not always to produce chaos and that governments do not always oppose terrorism. In the context of certain historical conjunctures, eras or waves of typical terrorist activity can be identified. McAuley explains how new, mostly religious-based terrorism of the past two decades reflects a change in social organisation from territorial and hierarchical to networked and ad hoc. In certain regards, such new terrorist organisations are losing shape and discipline and becoming more gang-like. Conversely, some new generation gangs

are developing a more coherent, sophisticated, hierarchical and politicised structure.

Conclusion

McAuley's insight regarding the evolving structures and practices of terrorist organisations and criminal gangs calls into question commonly held assumptions regarding polity and mind in the contemporary global order. The world is changing in ways that throw into question our very categories of social being and thereby make obsolete the matter of 'which came first, the social or the individual?' While this moves political psychology into complex and unchartered (uncharterable?) territory, it opens the way for more authentically global encounters, away from those currently dominated by American academic hegemony or 'Europe and Its Others' (Spivak, 1985). In their conclusion to Chapter 23, Petrovic, van Steckelenburg and Klandermans contend that:

[L]ittle political psychological research has dealt with the subjective experience of meso- and macro-level factors... this is what political psychology is about – trying to understand why people who are seemingly in the same socio-political configuration respond so differently.

While circumstances have of course dramatically changed from inter-war Europe, these are the very contentions that European political psychologists have been making over the past 70 years in various ways. Frankfurt School theorist, Willhelm Reich concretised the matter in 1933:

What has to be explained is not the fact that the man who is hungry steals or the fact that the man who is exploited strikes, but why the majority of those who are hungry don't steal and why the majority of those who are exploited don't strike.

(Reich, 1972: 53)

These are the puzzles of the European setting, grounded in its modern history of the dialectics of enlightenment, ideological divisions, revolutionary and reactionary upheavals and imperial wars. Emerging from this history, European political psychology has indeed sought to apprehend the social in the individual and to learn how social forces shape the psyche. The American challenge has conversely been that of how free individuals might build communities together and how individual preferences come to be expressed in the polity. Such contrasts serve to underscore the dominant challenges and opportunities presented throughout the volume: the legacies of imperialism and colonialism;

postcolonial migrations; racism; community cohesion; European unity; ethnic nationalism and ethnic wars; divisions of social class, region, religion and ethnicity; political extremism and the Far Right; cynicism; *ressentiment*; dialogical politics; the politics of care; multiculturalism; political engagement; and cosmopolitanism. While not unique, taken together these issues and themes reflect the principal political fault lines of postcolonial Europe.

The emerging realities of a highly liquid and increasingly digital global economy, in combination with the exponentially growing global reach of information and communications, raises questions regarding future developments in global political psychology. While this volume has evidenced political psychological research and findings from both the European-settled countries of Israel and South Africa as well as former Communist states (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Poland, Romania), it is clear that political psychology remains largely conducted in North America and Europe and almost exclusively within paradigms and discourses established in these continents. A genuinely global political psychology, one that is set in the lives, the dangers and the opportunities of the entire planet, has yet to emerge. To the extent that such developments are possible, the current maldistribution of resources for scholarship, in terms of money as well as social and cultural investments, stands in the way. The potential for more global exchanges in political psychology is currently weak; growing economic disparities are accompanied by bids to enforce cultural and national security walls around Europe and North America. But it is important not to exaggerate. There is every reason to suppose that the potential for innovative ideas in political psychology is evenly spread and that there are – at least from a Western perspective – large and hitherto undiscovered ideas. The challenge is how to bring these ideas into dialogue in an equitable manner, and this is easier to assert than to achieve. Having said this, the very socio-economic forces that have conditioned global inequalities and the politics of closure and essentialism are those that also open the possibilities for future equitable encounter. The postcolonial condition makes it possible for there to be intellectual interchange that is removed from the tropes and discourses of imperialism. The eclipse of grand narratives, established social orders, political regimes and cultural boundaries, opens up the possibility for a more cosmopolitan, dialogical and engaged openness towards others, one that is plurilocal and polyvocal. Intellectually this shifts the binary dilemma of ‘individual vs. social’ to a curiosity regarding the co-constitution of self and society in the context of a global experience that is increasingly perceived as pluralistic and creatively hybridised. If global political psychology is to develop further, the very language that we use will evolve to reflect the changing realities that we seek to explain. How exactly we will classify and identify and compare ourselves in a

world of declining national, religious, ethnic, gendered and other categorisations is unclear. What is apparent is that the erosion and opening up of the very categories that constitute us raises at least the possibility for a broader and more equitable global conversation.

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Afterword: For Inspiration and the Future

Paul Nesbitt-Larking, Catarina Kinnvall, Tereza Capelos and Henk Dekker

To read means to borrow; to create out of one's readings is paying off one's debts.

(Georg Christoph Lichtenberg)

Our *Handbook* is intended to address a gap in the political psychology literature by highlighting key developments in the research agenda of European and international scholars. By the time our readers reach this afterword, we hope they will share our view that variety in the epistemological approaches, theories and methodologies we use, as well as the contexts we study, can only enrich our field.

Our inspiration to produce this *Handbook* came from many driving forces. First, we have all been very fortunate to learn from great teachers on both sides of the Atlantic, during our formal training and later as we conducted our own research in the field. Political psychologists are a generous breed, sharing knowledge, ideas and resources, and we have enormously benefited from the leading example of so many charismatic mentors.

The desire to bring together the voices and research agendas of European political psychologists was first born during our meetings at the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR) Political Psychology Sections. In early 2006, Henk Dekker planted the idea that we needed to establish the presence of political psychology at the ECPR by setting up the Standing Group in Political Psychology. The purpose of the Standing Group was to convene and engage European scholars who conduct research in the field and was received with great enthusiasm. Since then, it has expanded to a large and truly multidisciplinary body of scholars who also attend the Political Psychology Sections at the ECPR annual conferences from 2007 to date. This is an excellent venue to present research on European developments and is particularly inviting to young scholars.

The International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP) is an internationally active organisation which initiated the dialogue in the field and has actively promoted research in political psychology since 1978. All of us have, over the years, been active members of the ISPP community, served at its governing council and presented our work at its annual conferences around the world, where we shared many inspirational conversations with our colleagues and friends. The ISPP annual conference hosts research presentations, round-tables and invited talks and adds richness to the debates and quality of scholarly work in our field. ISPP also supports research projects in political psychology by offering small grants, engages actively with young scholars, provides travel grants to its annual conference and hosts the ISPP Political Psychology Summer Academy, a three-day summer school in political psychology, which gives the opportunity to scholars and students who seek formal training in the field to take classes on central topics by established academics.

For many years, the four of us have been teaching courses in political psychology at our respective institutions. Enthusiastic conversations with our students motivated us to put together this *Handbook*. But teaching is a social exercise. The contents of our courses have been inspired by the writings of a number of colleagues who produced excellent pieces of work in political psychology. Journal articles, particularly from the journal *Political Psychology*, and also a number of books and edited volumes have been enormously important in drawing attention to the rich variety of theoretical traditions and documenting inspiring developments in our field. Iyengar and McGuire (1993), Sniderman et al. (1993), Kuklinski (2001, 2002), Monroe (2002), McDermott (2004), Sears et al. (2003), Jost and Sidanius (2004), Marcus (2012) and Huddy et al. (2013) are just a few that deserve mention here. It is beyond the scope of our *Handbook* to review these works or provide an exhaustive list of influential texts in political psychology. The field has a rich tradition of noteworthy readings and publications. It is important, however, to acknowledge that much of the foundations of what we know was stimulated by reading this literature. Our *Handbook* highlights some issues and topics that have received relatively little attention, particularly in the most recent publications. We believe that there is clear need to link these books to ours, hoping that colleagues and students will read and appreciate them equally.

Political psychology publications are also featured in established series by Cambridge University Press (Cambridge studies in Political Psychology and Public Opinion), Oxford University Press (Oxford Series in Political Psychology), and most recently by Palgrave Macmillan (the new Palgrave Studies in Political Psychology that includes our *Handbook of Global Political Psychology*). These houses offer a wide range of books and cutting-edge monographs dedicated to political psychology, reflecting the growing body of academic work in our field.

Our *Handbook* also grew out of intellectual exchanges with the authors of the chapters in this volume. Some are well-established figures in our field, while others are younger colleagues that illustrate our field's forward trajectory. Taken together, their chapters cover a broad set of topics and advance the quality of research in political psychology, and we greatly appreciate their enthusiasm, professionalism and hard work. They have proven time and again that when we find ways to cut across disciplinary and geographical boundaries, we also learn a lot more from each other. It has been a pleasure working with them in putting this *Handbook* together.

As editors, we have aimed to provide a resource and inspiration for the scholars and students who share our passion for research in political psychology, reflecting the vitality and richness of the field. We will know we have succeeded in our aim if our book raises as many questions as the answers it provides, through its plurality of approaches and debates.

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